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Well I don't know if you’ve ever read my previous posts. I had a long back and forth explaining the Taliban setup and organization, nevertheless, I'll keep it short, here goes:
The Afghan Taliban (AT) began as a grassroots. pan-Pashtun vigilante movement in Afghanistan, which subsequently grew into an organized party. Eventually other Mujahideen era leaders from all ethnic groups began joining it, albeit for a short period. This was probably because of the ethnic imbalance in favor of the Pashtuns, and also the heavy presence of pak intelligence. All the Talib training "academies" and "recruitment centers" (code for Madrassa) were on the pakistan side of the border, who-bearing in mind their "strategic depth" policy- were obviously going to malign the other ethnic groups.
When NATO invaded, the AT was scattered and AQ (reason why they went in) was dismantled, except for a few who crossed the Durand with the AT. Now there is a lot of evidence that suggests that the AT were going to give up OBL, except the only stumbling block was that should they give him up, they'd lose international legitimacy in the eyes of the only other two states (Saudi Arabia and UAE), except pakistan, which recognized them.
Well OBL and his cohorts made it along the border. Members of the ISI and pak army would use them as bargaining chips against the AT or NATO. Of course, when they took their leaders and sent them to secret military sites (OBL), they left a vacuum among the followers who instantly retaliated against the pakistani state. This forced the pakistanis to operate in FATA, which in turn led to the creation of the TTP(I won't go through all the specific events; if you want you can check my other posts).
The AT, contrary to popular perception, is not a uniform and defined unit. Instead it comprises of different warlords and factions (Haqqani, Bittani, , who may not even care about the pakistanis, but appreciate the aid and cover.
Now dux of the AT, Molla Omar, had close links with the intelligence leaders in the pak military. He got the refuge he wanted. What he didn't take into account was that the he would also eventually become a bargaining chip to be used by the pakistani military against NATO. But what the pakistanis underestimated was the willingness of the AT to escape from under their banner and seek negotiations, entering the political fray of Afghanistan as a legitimate party.
The Americans made the mistake of maligning the Pashtuns, and labeling them as Taliban sympathizers, but immediately sought to rectify it after leaders such as Ghani Baradar (killed by the ISI) initiated a line of communication in a bid to come to a settlement. (Not to mention NATO overestimated itself)
Now to answer the question, why the US hasn’t taken out Omar like they did OBL? Well, primarily because the top brass in the pak army was not responsible for giving OBL cover. (I go through the pak army structure in some of my previous posts as well). Intel officers, no higher than Colonel with extremely fundamentalist leanings were responsible. While in Omar’s case, the top brass is very much aware and keep tabs on him 24/7. But that’s only one of the reasons why the US won’t take him out.
The other happens to be the heavy presence of AT leaders, members and sympathizers openly yet secretly (know what I mean) embedded in the Afghan mainstream. Should they take out Omar, all the progress done with these individuals so far would be immediately reversed, thus derailing the Afghan peace process and reigniting the highly likely prospect of another civil war.
I hope that helps.
The Afghan Taliban (AT) began as a grassroots. pan-Pashtun vigilante movement in Afghanistan, which subsequently grew into an organized party. Eventually other Mujahideen era leaders from all ethnic groups began joining it, albeit for a short period. This was probably because of the ethnic imbalance in favor of the Pashtuns, and also the heavy presence of pak intelligence. All the Talib training "academies" and "recruitment centers" (code for Madrassa) were on the pakistan side of the border, who-bearing in mind their "strategic depth" policy- were obviously going to malign the other ethnic groups.
When NATO invaded, the AT was scattered and AQ (reason why they went in) was dismantled, except for a few who crossed the Durand with the AT. Now there is a lot of evidence that suggests that the AT were going to give up OBL, except the only stumbling block was that should they give him up, they'd lose international legitimacy in the eyes of the only other two states (Saudi Arabia and UAE), except pakistan, which recognized them.
Well OBL and his cohorts made it along the border. Members of the ISI and pak army would use them as bargaining chips against the AT or NATO. Of course, when they took their leaders and sent them to secret military sites (OBL), they left a vacuum among the followers who instantly retaliated against the pakistani state. This forced the pakistanis to operate in FATA, which in turn led to the creation of the TTP(I won't go through all the specific events; if you want you can check my other posts).
The AT, contrary to popular perception, is not a uniform and defined unit. Instead it comprises of different warlords and factions (Haqqani, Bittani, , who may not even care about the pakistanis, but appreciate the aid and cover.
Now dux of the AT, Molla Omar, had close links with the intelligence leaders in the pak military. He got the refuge he wanted. What he didn't take into account was that the he would also eventually become a bargaining chip to be used by the pakistani military against NATO. But what the pakistanis underestimated was the willingness of the AT to escape from under their banner and seek negotiations, entering the political fray of Afghanistan as a legitimate party.
The Americans made the mistake of maligning the Pashtuns, and labeling them as Taliban sympathizers, but immediately sought to rectify it after leaders such as Ghani Baradar (killed by the ISI) initiated a line of communication in a bid to come to a settlement. (Not to mention NATO overestimated itself)
Now to answer the question, why the US hasn’t taken out Omar like they did OBL? Well, primarily because the top brass in the pak army was not responsible for giving OBL cover. (I go through the pak army structure in some of my previous posts as well). Intel officers, no higher than Colonel with extremely fundamentalist leanings were responsible. While in Omar’s case, the top brass is very much aware and keep tabs on him 24/7. But that’s only one of the reasons why the US won’t take him out.
The other happens to be the heavy presence of AT leaders, members and sympathizers openly yet secretly (know what I mean) embedded in the Afghan mainstream. Should they take out Omar, all the progress done with these individuals so far would be immediately reversed, thus derailing the Afghan peace process and reigniting the highly likely prospect of another civil war.
I hope that helps.
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