Salafis, Wahabis, Arabs contribution to civilization and humanity

[ScimitarXEdge]

actually most mainstream scholars, even Salafi and Wahhabi Scholars, say Suicide Bombing is forbidden in Islam

Nice try Toramana

http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.a...tion=1&id=1427

London-Based Salafi Scholar Issues Fatwa Prohibiting Suicide Operations

27/08/2005
By Mohammed Al Shafey


London, Asharq Al-Awsat- A prominent Islamic scholar who specializes in the Salafi doctrine's perspective on Jihad has turned on the Al-Qaeda organization by publishing a fatwa (religious decree) in which he prohibited suicide operations.


Syrian ideologue Abd-al-Munim Mustafa Abu-Halimah, also known as Abu-Basir al-Tartusi, said on his website under the headline "A Word of Warning About Suicide Operations: "I have received 1,000 questions about these operations, which are for me closer to suicide than martyrdom. They are haram (Forbidden) and impermissible, for several reasons." Al-Tartusi, who lives in London, cited in the fatwa that he issued the day before yesterday some of the (Prophet Muhammad's) sayings, among them: "Anyone who harms a believer has no jihad." He said this is for someone who merely harms a believer, so imagine if he kills him, and kills him deliberately." He also cited the saying of the Honorable Messenger: "One who kills a non-Muslim does not find the winds of paradise; its wind is to be found from a 70 years walk."

The fundamentalists launched a bitter attack on Al-Tartusi on their websites and accused him of letting down "Al-Qaeda's" supporters. One of them asked, "What do you expect from him when he lives in London?" Another Islamist writing under a false name said, "One should not get attached to these people because they did not fight before. The rules on jihad are taken from the mujahidin. I never thought of learning about jihad from those sitting who are used to issuing fatwas from London."
Al-Tartusi said in his fatwa dated 24 August and published on his website: "Suicide operations necessarily mean a person killing himself with his own hand. This contravenes dozens of the shariah texts that are well documented and proven and which prohibit a person from killing himself with his own hand, whatever the reason for doing so. God Almighty says (And spend of your substance in the cause of Allah and make not your own hands contribute to (your death) and his Honorable Messenger said: "One who kills himself for something on earth will pay the penalty on the Day of Judgment." Sheikh Abu-Halimah added: "There should not be squandering of or leniency about the nation's greatest resources and embroiling them in a limited and similar action with unforeseen results and consequences." He said: "I was informed that in some battlefields in Iraq that Muslim youths from all countries are going to, the youth arriving there is given two choices only: Either agree to be a suicide bomber whose life is confined to a single action only, which might hit or miss and how many are the operations that miss, or go back to where he came from after facing dangers and suffering to reach these lands."

He stressed: "This is wrong according to all considerations and criteria. It is wrong according to sharia because it is coercing the one going to fight to kill himself in his suicide bombing operation when he is not convinced of its legitimacy or has some doubts or suspicion about its legitimacy and permissibility or it is to him rather more of suicide than anything else."
One of the most famous writings of Al-Tartusi, the Salafi jihad tendency's theorist, are a group of letters that include: "Rules and Actions That Take One Away From the Group, This Is Our Creed and What We Call for, Refining and Explaining Al-Tahhawiyah Creed, Refining and Commenting, The Ignorance Excuse, Islam's Rule on Democracy and Partisan Pluralism, Questions and Rules on Emigration." Other writings included "Rule on Regarding as Lawful the Possession of Polytheists Who Come Under Muslims' Protection."

He added in his fatwa: "Suicide operations kill innocent persons that are protected under the sharia unfairly, whether these protected persons are Muslims or others. This is forbidden and should not be belittled but one must be much careful about. One's religion remains well as long as he does not shed blood wrongly." According to Islamists in London, the fundamentalist theorist cited many of the Hadiths, including the prophet's sayings: "A Muslim and his blood, possession, and honor are haram to another Muslim", "the Muslim is the one who Muslims are safe from his tongue and hand", and "The Believer is the one that people trust with their possessions and lives."

[BarakzaiAbdali]

Do you approve of suicide bombing? I know you are a follower of Usama Bin Laden and Abdullah Azam and have pan-Islamist perspective on everything but I want your personal opinion about this?

actually most mainstream scholars, even Salafi and Wahhabi Scholars, say Suicide Bombing is forbidden in Islam

Nice try Toramana

http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.a...tion=1&id=1427

London-Based Salafi Scholar Issues Fatwa Prohibiting Suicide Operations

27/08/2005
By Mohammed Al Shafey


London, Asharq Al-Awsat- A prominent Islamic scholar who specializes in the Salafi doctrine's perspective on Jihad has turned on the Al-Qaeda organization by publishing a fatwa (religious decree) in which he prohibited suicide operations.


Syrian ideologue Abd-al-Munim Mustafa Abu-Halimah, also known as Abu-Basir al-Tartusi, said on his website under the headline "A Word of Warning About Suicide Operations: "I have received 1,000 questions about these operations, which are for me closer to suicide than martyrdom. They are haram (Forbidden) and impermissible, for several reasons." Al-Tartusi, who lives in London, cited in the fatwa that he issued the day before yesterday some of the (Prophet Muhammad's) sayings, among them: "Anyone who harms a believer has no jihad." He said this is for someone who merely harms a believer, so imagine if he kills him, and kills him deliberately." He also cited the saying of the Honorable Messenger: "One who kills a non-Muslim does not find the winds of paradise; its wind is to be found from a 70 years walk."

The fundamentalists launched a bitter attack on Al-Tartusi on their websites and accused him of letting down "Al-Qaeda's" supporters. One of them asked, "What do you expect from him when he lives in London?" Another Islamist writing under a false name said, "One should not get attached to these people because they did not fight before. The rules on jihad are taken from the mujahidin. I never thought of learning about jihad from those sitting who are used to issuing fatwas from London."
Al-Tartusi said in his fatwa dated 24 August and published on his website: "Suicide operations necessarily mean a person killing himself with his own hand. This contravenes dozens of the shariah texts that are well documented and proven and which prohibit a person from killing himself with his own hand, whatever the reason for doing so. God Almighty says (And spend of your substance in the cause of Allah and make not your own hands contribute to (your death) and his Honorable Messenger said: "One who kills himself for something on earth will pay the penalty on the Day of Judgment." Sheikh Abu-Halimah added: "There should not be squandering of or leniency about the nation's greatest resources and embroiling them in a limited and similar action with unforeseen results and consequences." He said: "I was informed that in some battlefields in Iraq that Muslim youths from all countries are going to, the youth arriving there is given two choices only: Either agree to be a suicide bomber whose life is confined to a single action only, which might hit or miss and how many are the operations that miss, or go back to where he came from after facing dangers and suffering to reach these lands."

He stressed: "This is wrong according to all considerations and criteria. It is wrong according to sharia because it is coercing the one going to fight to kill himself in his suicide bombing operation when he is not convinced of its legitimacy or has some doubts or suspicion about its legitimacy and permissibility or it is to him rather more of suicide than anything else."
One of the most famous writings of Al-Tartusi, the Salafi jihad tendency's theorist, are a group of letters that include: "Rules and Actions That Take One Away From the Group, This Is Our Creed and What We Call for, Refining and Explaining Al-Tahhawiyah Creed, Refining and Commenting, The Ignorance Excuse, Islam's Rule on Democracy and Partisan Pluralism, Questions and Rules on Emigration." Other writings included "Rule on Regarding as Lawful the Possession of Polytheists Who Come Under Muslims' Protection."

He added in his fatwa: "Suicide operations kill innocent persons that are protected under the sharia unfairly, whether these protected persons are Muslims or others. This is forbidden and should not be belittled but one must be much careful about. One's religion remains well as long as he does not shed blood wrongly." According to Islamists in London, the fundamentalist theorist cited many of the Hadiths, including the prophet's sayings: "A Muslim and his blood, possession, and honor are haram to another Muslim", "the Muslim is the one who Muslims are safe from his tongue and hand", and "The Believer is the one that people trust with their possessions and lives."

I have no learnings in the theologics behind this... however, let me use a lame example.

Remember that stupid and corny movie with Bruce Willis in it? You know the one where he and 5 other oil still workers were sent on some dumb mission to stop an asteroid from hitting the earth? It was called Armegeddon. Remember how the movie paints Willis as a hero that sacrificed himself for the greater good? American culture is no different in honoring self sacrifice. Remember Patrick Henry? Give me Liberty of Give me death etc.

How does one tell a guerilla warrior that is armed with an inaccurate AK and able to be seen with heat sensor visualization that he can not utilize any reasonable means, even it if means sacrifice himself, to hit out at a strategic target.

After all, do the Americans not call their soldiers that run into the line of fire to save their comrades as "making the ultimate sacrifice"?

[faye]

that was evasive. now i see why you are so defensive of catya.

[BarakzaiAbdali]

that was evasive. now i see why you are so defensive of catya.

Hardly. I just think its a double standard and utterly and profoundly donkey balls stupid to tell someone fighting a war, whether it be hindus fighting Muslims, whether it be Americans fighting the British, whether it be American Indians fighting the invaders that, while their enemy strikes and kills 9 children with high resolution weaponry, to hit a target, that the guerillas cannot utilize any means necessary to balance the asymmetry. As I noted, the Khost Bomber had a target in mind, it was high profile, strategic, and was a massive blow to the intelligence fueling the drone campaigns. Moreover, it seriously damaged the reliability of the campaign itself... if they were willing to bring that Khost Bomber in and listen to whatever he says, how reliable are their other informants? I am sure that Mr. Yar Muhammad Karzai, the cousin or Mr. Karzai would tell you, post humously, that they are none too reliable.

It matters little what you and Toramana think... for that matter, my opinion on the subject is hardly the clincher either. This is because he understand the tactic, as long as it does not alienate the populace, and as long as the surveys continue to show that the populace actually becomes more enraged with the occupation with each such event, renders it effective. Why would the insurgency stop utilizing IEDs or such measures when it continues to A) demoralize the enemy and B) costs so little to execute compared to a 2 tone laser guided bomb?

Another example of where the Afghan mujahideen departed from Islam in their prior incarnation was the practice of "Russian Christmas Trees" or British mutilation. The Russian intelligence agencies still recall how the Afghans would catch a Russian and slit his body from his sternum to his pelvis and hang him from a tree next to any comrades they had. This had a devastating effect on the enemy. When Wazir Akbar fought the British, he allowed the Ghazis to cut off the genitalia of the British and stuff them in their mouths.

Nonetheless, mutilation is haraam in Islam. My point is that it is useless for Toramana to sit here and talk about assymmetric tactics when he knows exactly why they are being utilized. Perhaps he ought to arm the insurgency with laser guided missiles and GPS trackers etc. He will likely then see the tactic less utilized.

[Wrayun]

Yes, now come up with that excuse for something which has found justification in Islam mostly Arab brand...But I know your sensitivities.

Yes, yes, my sensitivities. You know, your counterparts label me closet crypto-secularist, atheist sympathizer. While you reverse the labels.

It's about common sense bacha. Nothing personal.

[BarakzaiAbdali]

Yes, yes, my sensitivities. You know, your counterparts label me closet crypto-secularist, atheist sympathizer. While you reverse the labels.

It's about common sense bacha. Nothing personal.

Dont take it personally, this is their typical tactic. Baygham usually screams something emotionl about how some Mullah is emulating the Prophet by marrying so and so and such and such and how this scarred some kid in his village. Toramana utilizes the labeling tactic. Where he finds himself utterly confused is when Scheuer and Buchanon and others (ie nonmuslims) say the same exact things. This is an attempt by him to associate you with Salafist ideology, Arabs, and any thing that his ilk generally consider "bad."

Toramana's anti semitic nature is a problem because it cloud sensibilities sometimes despite his very admirable love for the Pashtuns.

[randolph85]

i dont have a problem with the tactic itself as long as its done intelligently and doesnt put civilians in harms way. the suicide issue is something for another thread. yet, as we can see, civilians are usually the casualties in such attacks. suicide attacks are usually over kill, and idiot talibs dont seem to understand this. its like trying to kill a fly with a grenade.

many for and against these tactics seem to miss the point entirely. some who are against will argue that suicide bombings are wrong without delving deeper into the reason why these attacks occur in the first place and the conditions in which this kind of thinking has developed in. whereas the people for it will conveniently disregard the civilian casualties that come with these attacks. they will place all the blame on others instead of thinking hey maybe setting off a large bomb in a place frequented by civilians in order to damage some passing vehicle probably isnt a good idea.

[faye]

civilians being murdered can not be excused by either side.

[BarakzaiAbdali]

civilians being murdered can not be excused by either side.

Exactly. However, for every action (invasion) there is an equal and opposite reaction (retaliation). It was no different in the probable insurgent tactics that the Persians, the Cubans, the American Indians utilized when an invader force stepped foot where it did not belong.

I just find it utterly ludicrous that an invading army and its supporters attempts to moralize or demoralize tactics being used against it.

Genghis Khan experienced assymetric tactics in the same region. I am sure he was capable enough to understand that he ought to spend less time whining about those Afghans hiding in the mountains and immorally attacking his men from higher ground and more time neutralizing a capable tactic.

[BarakzaiAbdali]

i dont have a problem with the tactic itself as long as its done intelligently and doesnt put civilians in harms way. the suicide issue is something for another thread. yet, as we can see, civilians are usually the casualties in such attacks. suicide attacks are usually over kill, and idiot talibs dont seem to understand this. its like trying to kill a fly with a grenade.

many for and against these tactics seem to miss the point entirely. some who are against will argue that suicide bombings are wrong without delving deeper into the reason why these attacks occur in the first place and the conditions in which this kind of thinking has developed in. whereas the people for it will conveniently disregard the civilian casualties that come with these attacks. they will place all the blame on others instead of thinking hey maybe setting off a large bomb in a place frequented by civilians in order to damage some passing vehicle probably isnt a good idea.

Yep. you catch the gist of this and I agree 100% with your comment.

My point is simply that Toramana has no issue with the tactic itself... do not let him fool you. If the tides were reversed and if this was a Muslim force facing such tactics he would be the first to praise the heroics and the self sacrifice of those that were willing to give their life "for their freedom."

I refuse to address, much less, care about the charge of immorality or salafism in understanding a basic warfare tactic. This is merely Toramana's attempt to neutralize the insurgency with propaganda.

Its like asking the girl that was being raped (in this case Afghanistan) why it pulled the immoral move of kicking the rapist (NATO) in the testicles. Most people who have ever seen a fist fight know that the general rules are that a kick to the groin is an off limits move... but most people also have enough common sense that if a big muscular guy attacks an 18 year old girl in a parking lot at night and she kicks him where it hurts... she is praised as being smart, not immoral or underhanded.

[Alchemist]

The effects of religious versus secular education on suicide ideation and suicidal attitudes in adolescents in Turkey.

Eskin M.
Adnan Menderes University, School of Medicine, Dept. of Psychiatry, Aydin, Turkey. meskin@adu.edu.tr
Abstract

BACKGROUND: Religion is associated with lower rates of self-killing, but the mechanism underlying religion-suicide association is not clear. To better understand this relationship, the present study investigated the impact of religious versus secular education on suicidal ideation and attitudes towards suicide and a suicidal close friend in Turkish adolescents. Deduced from religious commitment, social integration, networking and stigma perspectives, the study tested five specific predictions.
METHOD: A questionnaire was used to collect the data in a group of adolescents (n = 206) undergoing religious education and a group of adolescents (n = 214) undergoing secular education (N = 420).
RESULTS: Suicide ideation was more frequent in adolescents undergoing secular education than in those undergoing religious education. The secular group was more accepting of suicide than the religious group. Those from the religious group, however, were more accepting of a suicidal close friend than their secular counterparts.
CONCLUSION: It seems that self-killing finds accepting attitudes in secular segments of societies and,hence, people consider self-killing as an option during times of personal crises. People from religious communities, however, seem not to accept self-killing as an option, but they are more positive toward persons who have considered suicide for one reason or another.

PMID: 15243691 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]

Publication Types, MeSH Terms

Publication Types:

• Comparative Study

MeSH Terms:

• Adolescent
• Adult
• Attitude*
• Female
• Health Education*
• Humans
• Male
• Questionnaires
• Religion*
• Secularism*
• Suicide, Attempted/ethnology*
• Suicide, Attempted/psychology*
• Turkey

LinkOut - more resources

[faye]

ok, if you muslims think it is acceptable to blast other muslims to smithereens, who am i to object? good luck to you.

[Alchemist]

WORLD
AlterNet / By Nichole Argo
COMMENT NOW!
The Hard Truth About Suicide Bombers


Though many Americans assume otherwise, most suicide bombers are not poor, violent Muslims, as explained in this special report from MIT's Center for International Studies.
May 8, 2006 |


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Suicide terror has become a daily news staple. Who are these human bombs, and why are they willing to die in order to kill? Many observers turn to Islam for an explanation. They cite the preponderance of Muslim bombers today, indoctrination by extremist institutions, and the language used in jihadi statements.
But these arguments fall short. At present, bombers are primarily Muslim, but this was not always so. Nor does indoctrination play a strong role in growing today's selfselected global jihad networks. Rather, militants and bombers are propelled by social ties. And even when jihadis use the Qur'an and Sunna to frame their struggle, their justifications for violence are primarily secular and grievance-based.
So what is religion's role? Almost 100 years ago, Emile Durkheim contended that religious ideation is born of sentiment. This is worth considering in the current context. Against the repression, alienation and political helplessness of the Muslim world, jihad speaks of individual dignity and communal power. 'Against the Goliaths,' martrydom says, 'even one bursting body can make a difference.' The Muslim street is buying it, though sometimes ambivalently. To stop the bombers of today and tomorrow, we need to figure out why.
A Different Profile
Suicide attacks have been a prominent tactic in insurgent movements since the 1970s. Then, analysts believed that bombers and their masterminds were irrational, if not crazy, or had given up on life because of desperate circumstances such as poverty, depression, or social failure. However, data that have since been compiled show that suicide attackers come not from the criminal, illiterate, or poor, but from largely secular and educated middle classes. They do not exhibit signs of sociopathy or depression, nor do they appear to have suffered more than their respective populations. Surprisingly, many are volunteers, rather than recruits. There is, in short, no individual-level profile for a suicide bomber. Human bombs are a product of structural, social, and individual interactions.
Rather than evince suicidal tendencies -- as the term "suicide bombers" connotes -- psychological autopsies of past and would-be bombers show many of these individuals to be wholly, even altruistically invested in life. As a result, it is more apt -- and less misleading -- to refer to these individuals as "human bombs" rather than "suicide bombers."
Why Religion, and Why Not
Since 9/11, the notion that terror is bound to religious extremism has almost become an implicit assumption. This is easy to understand. If bombers were once "normal" people, then religious indoctrination could explain their fanatical behavior. Moreover, the numbers are powerful: 81 percent of suicide attacks since 1968 have occurred after 2001, with 31 out of the 35 organizations responsible being jihadi. Even the London and Bali (II) bombers who acted independently of terror organizations were Muslim. It would be difficult to deny that Islamic inspiration is at work in the motivation and mobilization of rising terror. But how? Inspiration is not causation, and a growing body of data suggests that Islamic indoctrination and belief are not the answer. Below, I audit several arguments commonly offered in support of the religious terror thesis.
1. Muslims perpetrate most of today's terror, so most terror must be motivated by Islam.
At present, 31 of 35 organizations perpetrating suicide terror are Muslim. But five years ago, a majority of attacks were carried out by secular rather than religious organizations. Because religion-terror correlations have changed over time, they tell us little about causation. Even if the statistics were stable, it is not possible to infer bomber motivations from organizational charters. Rather than ask who is perpetrating the attacks, we need to ask why.


Here history can help. Martyr missions made their official twentieth-century debut in the Second World War with the Kamikazes; they showed up again in the 1960s, when Viet Cong sympathizers exploded themselves amidst U.S. troops. Their debut in the Islamic world was not until the 1980s, during the Iran-Iraq war. Facing a far superior Iraqi military, Ayatollah Khomeini rounded up children by the tens of thousands and sent them in "human waves" to overrun the enemy. While Persians accrued losses in the war against Iraq, the role of the martyr in defensive jihad was exalted. As in U.S. wars, the dead became heroes.
The Iranian example had seismic effects. Lebanese groups appropriated the notion of a martyr's death almost immediately, employing human bombs against Israeli and international presences in Lebanon as early as 1981. Half of the human bombs in Lebanon were perpetrated by secular organizations. The Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka perfected the tactic, becoming the most professional cadre in the world. Human bombs were also used by the Kurdish PKK against Turkey, the Sikhs in India, and the Palestinians against Israel, to name a few.
When we think of suicide bombers, we think of extremism. But the cases above locate the bomber as one popularly supported element in a coherent campaign of resistance against a perceived occupier, and such was true for 95 percent of the bombings prior to 2003. Note that allegiance to resistance appeared to trump allegiance to religion. And most important, for bombers and for the publics that exalted them, the notion of self-sacrifice would not have existed except for the context: a perceived necessity for group defense.
2. Indoctrination: madrassas, mosques and terror cells manufacture suicide bombers.
Indoctrination suggests brainwashing. In popular parlance it can happen emotionally, when intense bonds are forged in a cell-like setting, or ideologically, where students are exposed to one rigid view of the world. If such mechanisms have been at work in fomenting global terror, we should see it in the data. Bombers would: a) spend significant time "training" with terror organizations; b) exhibit organizational allegiance, and probably share political views with their mentoring institutions; and c) come disproportionately from extremist madrassas or mosques. Above all, we would expect to locate the genesis of the twenty-first century surge in martyrdom in such institutions. But this is not what we find.
Consider the lack of organizational attachments revealed in a 2003 study of 15 would-be Palestinian bombers in the second intifada. Sixty percent had no prior experience with terror organizations, much less a history of violence against Israel.
Twenty percent started their mission within one week of accepting it, while 80 percent set out on their mission within a month. Indeed, half of them volunteered for missions, while those recruited were usually approached to take on the mission by family or friends.
Organizational allegiance was slim: 20 percent originally attempted missions independently, turning to local groups to help them when matériel or logistics became difficult. Three switched organizations when it appeared another group had better capabilities. These numbers, which ran parallel to findings in a similar Israeli government study, suggest that bomber convictions in the second intifada existed with little or no organizational priming. Terror organizations served as facilitators, not indoctrinators. Most bombers came to them through friends, and many times, friends engaged in operations together.
Neither organizational recruitment nor
madrassa training figured heavily in former intelligence officer Marc Sageman's 2004 study of 172 members of the global Salafi jihad. Sageman found that discipleship, a kind of mentor-student indoctrination, accounted for only 8 percent of the network. Although the study included networks from Europe, the Mideast, the Maghreb, and Asia, that entire 8 percent came from only two Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia and Malaysia.


The remaining network came to jihad informally through kinship and friendship bonds, 20 and 70 percent respectively. Like the Palestinian case, many joined in groups. Importantly, 78 percent of the network joined jihad in a country other than their homeland. Many of them met in mosques -- the primary local community centers for Muslims. Alienated and alone, they bonded over a feeling of Muslim victimhood as observed on television and in pictures of wars involving Muslims. Religious devotion did increase for most individuals prior to their missions, but it is difficult to say what that means: growing devotion could be a cause or an effect of engaging the jihadi network.
How does this compare to what we see in Iraq? Little evidence is available, but according to Saudi and Israeli investigations of 154 foreign fighters in Iraq, "The largest group [of foreign fighters] is young kids who see the images [of war] on TV and are reading the stuff on the internet. Or they see the name of a cousin on the list or a guy who belongs to their tribe, and they feel a responsibility to go." This suggests that foreign fighters come self-motivated, ready to sacrifice before funneling themselves into insurgent networks within the country.
What of hate-preaching madrassas throughout the Muslim world? Consider Pakistan, known as a "Jihad U" of sorts, with its ten thousand-plus madrassas, many of them sending students to Afghanistan for the war there. We would expect Pakistan to produce bombers in the early stages of global jihad, but there were only two. Rigid worldviews were not enough to push students to strap on bombs. They needed an emotional impetus. One had existed in Afghanistan; another was with the invasion of Iraq. Images of humiliation and needless death were ubiquitous on television, and in stories from friends and family. By the end of 2004, the number of Pakistani martyrs reached at least 10.
In sum, until 2004 and despite their hate-mongering, religious institutions did not contribute significantly to the rise in global terror. Instead, the empirical data parallel neuroscientific inquiries into how people acquire beliefs: First, emotion and social ties precede acquisition of ideology; second, joining the jihad does not appear to be an explicit decision, but a social and emotional process that happens over time.
3. Terrorists justify their violence with the language of Islam.
What about Islamic texts and martyr statements? By designating the non-Muslim West as an infidel enemy, do they not endorse a "we hate you for who you are, not what you do" belief? A closer examination of three words -- infidel, jihad, and martyr -- calls this into question.
Infidel: Abu Bakr Ba'asyir may be the most qualified "zealot" to teach about infidels. As the Emir of Jema'ah Islamiyya in Indonesia (an affiliate of al Qaeda), he is arguably responsible for at least 202 deaths, many from the Bali bombings in October 2002. But he says the logic of jihad is not against non-believers: "There are two types of infidels; the infidel who is against Islam and declares war on Islam is called kafir harby [enemy infidel]. The second type is kafir dhimmi [protected infidel]. These are people who don't fight against Islam, but don't embrace Islam or remain neutral ... As long as other communities don't fight against [us], we won't fight them." Ba'asyir says that the people in power today "do not tolerate [Islam], as in the case of America now which pushes its idea to change Islam with its weapons and dollars."
What does it mean to "fight" against Islam, and is the U.S. guilty? If "fighting" Islam means dictating what is preached in mosques, or disallowing headscarves in France, it was happening long before today. By itself, religious and cultural infringement on Islam was not enough to spur individuals to the risk and sacrifice of jihadi terror.


Rather, it seems that most Muslims, including terrorists, justify defensive jihad in response to violent social injustices. For instance, Osama bin Laden's statements are shrouded in religious references, but he cites the persecution of Islam in communal terms: "Its sons are being killed, its blood is being shed, its holy places are being attacked."
Such are the images and arguments that accompany most bomber wills and videos. Such are the images invoked in polling questions that ask whether Islam is under "threat": moderate Muslims who respond in the affirmative tend to support terror against the West.
Jihad: The Islamic debate over jihad -- greater and lesser, collective vs. individual, offensive vs. defensive, and ethical concerns -- is too complex to capture here. But most of those joining jihad today have not captured it either. They are not religious scholars, and the jihad that originally appeals to them appeals on the emotional basis of defense. The jihadi narrative solves a pressing emotional problem: Why are my people dying, or oppressed? What can I do?
In Palestine, psychologist Brian Barber found that adolescent participation in the struggle against occupation is correlated with higher esteem and pro-social in-group behavior, despite its risks and sacrifices. In contrast, unorganized Bosnian Muslim youth studied during the Balkans conflict exhibited lower selfesteem, anti-social behavior, and general feelings of depression. Irrespective of the chances for success, in certain conditions it may be psychologically harder to not act.
We know that suicide bombing and jihad are statistically unlikely where there are civil liberties and constructive political channels for action. That said, even in democratic countries opportunity is a matter of perception. Thus wrote Mohammad Khan before he became the leader of the London bombers, "Our words have no impact upon you. Therefore I'm going to talk to you in language that you will understand. Our words are dead until we give them life with our blood." In short, emotions matter to the creation and embrace of radical beliefs, especially the beliefs worth dying for. "Emotions create new beliefs... [because they] entail an appraisal based on currently salient concerns."
Martyrdom: In Arabic, the root for martyr has two meanings. Westerners know the term in its offensive sense: those who "sacrifice their lives" -- often against us -- in jihad (istish'hadiyyin). But the foundational meaning is "those who are killed by the enemy" (shuhada) -- often noncombatants, i.e., civilian casualties. The distinction is important because most terrorists and their communities will tell you that in the locale, state or homeland they identify with, shuhada (innocent casualties) came before the istish'hadiyyin (bombers). Whether or not they agree with the tactic of terror, these populations understand the istish'hadi as giving his life for those who fell before, and to prevent those who would fall in the future.
Those who interview terrorists often hear about the role that media images have played in their conclusions that Muslims are threatened. A militant in Gaza once remarked to me about the power of television: "The difference between the first intifada and the second is television. Before, I knew when we were attacked here, or in a nearby camp, but the reality of the attacks everywhere else was not so clear. Now, I cannot get away from Israel -- the TV brings them into my living room ... And you can't turn the TV off. How could you live with yourself? At the same time, you can't ignore the problem -- what are you doing to protect your people? ... We live with an internal struggle. Whether you choose to fight or not, every day is this internal struggle."
For all of us, images we view on television prompt two separate processes: affective reactions and cognitive appraisals. We feel the characters onscreen, but the feelings are turned off with an appraisal of reality. If the images were of your group under attack, however, it is highly plausible they would remain salient. We see this in the new terror. Global jihadis, like 78 percent of Sageman's network, often don't come from war zones. Like descriptions of Iraqi foreign fighters, they see images of injustice, have friends or family there, and feel obligated to help.


Sacred Values, Social Networks
Religious beliefs do not simply mold individuals. They exist as "sets of ideas that 'are there,' as if on the shelves of a supermarket waiting for someone to make them their own." Individuals pull them off the shelf when their old frames no longer make sense of the world around them.
If beliefs are not born of sacred texts alone, neither are behaviors like marytrdom. Rather, would-be bombers place jihadi values -- fighting for life, dignity, equality -- above all else. It is not the commandment that is sacred, but the emotional reward it bestows. We need to be asking new questions: For what are normal individuals able to kill? A plausible answer is: their community, under threat. When does a person make costly sacrifices to do so?
Within a social structure -- a terror cell, a military unit, a family, or group of friends -- that continually regenerates conviction to a cause, a feeling of obligation to do something about it, and a sense of shame at the idea of letting each other down. Whether one lands in a social group with jihadi tendencies may be random. But the prerequisite for this path is perceived injustice.
Policy Implications

Are we capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against us?-- Donald Rumsfeld, Internal Memo, National Security Council, 2002

The Bush administration argues that a violent ideology is at the root of terror, and that eradicating it and its believers is the way to a better world. But people aren't joining the jihad because of ideology. It is true that there are radical leaders capitalizing on the emotions of anger and resentment that seethe throughout the Muslim world -- but they could not foment something that did not resonate with many normal people. In today's terror mobilization story, demand is as strong as supply. Understanding why this is so is the first step to defusing terror mobilization.The social networks theory has several implications for policy. First, because commitment to jihad is rarely a cost-benefit decision, or an explicit decision at all, military deterrence will likely fail. Terrorists and insurgents forge loyalties that are difficult to betray, and like our own military units, many would prefer to fight to the death rather than leave their brothers. Second, under urban conditions of asymmetrical engagement, military missions almost inevitably entail civilian casualties. Military leaders must re-conceptualize the effect civilian casualties have on the populations surrounding the terrorist or insurgent. They are frequently interpreted by the population as offensive, and thereby engender an impulse to fight back. As one Palestinian told a reporter: "If we don't fight, we will suffer. If we do fight, we will suffer, but so will they."
Lastly, findings about the way in which people acquire beliefs suggest that a war of ideas will mean nothing unless it resonates emotionally with our targets. Emotional resonance only comes when the values we promote reflect our role in the local realities on foreign ground.




Nichole Argo is a doctoral candidate in political science at MIT. She lived for two years in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza and has conducted a study of human bombs for a forthcoming book.

[Alchemist]

Suicide bombing is an Arab, Salafi, Wahabi innovation that is going to be part ofsome Muslims lore and core value...

[Alchemist]

ok, if you muslims think it is acceptable to blast other muslims to smithereens, who am i to object? good luck to you.

do u smoke that lalala?