Tweet
President Barack Obama seemed aware of the “challenge†Hamid Karzai faced when he said on Friday that the Afghan president was “a critical partner†in his stated goal of creating a safe environment for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
While the Afghan president may or may not be conscious of that challenge, it is obvious that he has done very little to inspire confidence in his ability to deliver. There are two aspects to this misfortune: one is his record in office since the Bonn conference installed him as Afghan president in December 2001, and the other is his more recent performance characterised by lack of direction. Elected first by a grand jirga and later through the popular electoral process, Karzai failed to develop a political set-up acceptable to all sections of Afghanistan’s polyglot population.
Even though a Pakhtun himself, Karzai relied heavily on Tajik and Uzbek leaders, thus alienating the Pakhtuns, the country’s largest ethnic group. This denied him a strong political base and weakened his ability to dictate terms to the non-Pakhtun warlords.
In the absence of political strength, Karzai failed in all other vital tasks — like creating a corruption-free administration, raising a new Afghan army, and rebuilding a country devastated by decades of relentless war. More unfortunately, Afghanistan has returned to its pre-Taliban position as the world’s biggest opium producer. This has led to a thriving drug trade, especially in the south-eastern province of Kandahar, whose governor is Karzai’s brother. This has helped the Taliban use drug money to arm themselves.
His more recent behaviour should be seen against the backdrop of America’s decision to pull out next year. This deadline presupposes a Kabul government strong enough to take care of Afghanistan on its own. This is an extremely doubtful proposition and goes to explain Karzai’s nervousness. His threat to switch over to the Taliban is ludicrous. The only way Afghanistan can be stable after the stipulated American withdrawal is a comprehensive peace settlement. Karzai is not sure whether he will be there in such a set-up or be part of the negotiating process. There is very little time at his disposal, though Obama wants him to bring Afghanistan into the 21st century. America also appears keen not to repeat the mistake of relying on an individual to deliver on its goals. Kabul needs a broad-based government which enjoys friendly relations with all its neighbours and a much larger section of Afghan society. Nothing short of this will deliver stability to Afghanistan, a country that has not seen good governance for decades.
While the Afghan president may or may not be conscious of that challenge, it is obvious that he has done very little to inspire confidence in his ability to deliver. There are two aspects to this misfortune: one is his record in office since the Bonn conference installed him as Afghan president in December 2001, and the other is his more recent performance characterised by lack of direction. Elected first by a grand jirga and later through the popular electoral process, Karzai failed to develop a political set-up acceptable to all sections of Afghanistan’s polyglot population.
Even though a Pakhtun himself, Karzai relied heavily on Tajik and Uzbek leaders, thus alienating the Pakhtuns, the country’s largest ethnic group. This denied him a strong political base and weakened his ability to dictate terms to the non-Pakhtun warlords.
In the absence of political strength, Karzai failed in all other vital tasks — like creating a corruption-free administration, raising a new Afghan army, and rebuilding a country devastated by decades of relentless war. More unfortunately, Afghanistan has returned to its pre-Taliban position as the world’s biggest opium producer. This has led to a thriving drug trade, especially in the south-eastern province of Kandahar, whose governor is Karzai’s brother. This has helped the Taliban use drug money to arm themselves.
His more recent behaviour should be seen against the backdrop of America’s decision to pull out next year. This deadline presupposes a Kabul government strong enough to take care of Afghanistan on its own. This is an extremely doubtful proposition and goes to explain Karzai’s nervousness. His threat to switch over to the Taliban is ludicrous. The only way Afghanistan can be stable after the stipulated American withdrawal is a comprehensive peace settlement. Karzai is not sure whether he will be there in such a set-up or be part of the negotiating process. There is very little time at his disposal, though Obama wants him to bring Afghanistan into the 21st century. America also appears keen not to repeat the mistake of relying on an individual to deliver on its goals. Kabul needs a broad-based government which enjoys friendly relations with all its neighbours and a much larger section of Afghan society. Nothing short of this will deliver stability to Afghanistan, a country that has not seen good governance for decades.
Comment