Can a guerrilla movement sustain itself without local support?

[akbarkhan]

Discuss purely in the light of military strategy, historical accounts of guerrilla warfare and philosophy of war. Please keep your political ideology, personal spins and religion out of this topic.

Also please avoid writing essays unless that is the last resort. Short and to the point posts mean we won't miss any significant points that are raised.

Could a moderator please keep on eye on this thread an delete irrelevant posts? We have 1000s of threads with no conclusions as a result of irrelevant posts and ad-hominems.

Your opinions do not count unless supported by reliable sources!

[Amir al Ghaznavi]

Discuss purely in the light of military strategy, historical accounts of guerrilla warfare and philosophy of war. Please keep your political ideology, personal spins and religion out of this topic.

Also please avoid writing essays unless that is the last resort. Short and to the point posts mean we won't miss any significant points that are raised.

Could a moderator please keep on eye on this thread an delete irrelevant posts? We have 1000s of threads with no conclusions as a result of irrelevant posts and ad-hominems.

Your opinions do not count unless supported by reliable sources!

in most cases, a viable insurgency cant...but exceptions occur when the local populace has no means to resist the guerilla movement, there is a huge base of external support and the opposition to the guerilla movement is considering a worse alternative or no better

[شمله ور خراساني]

in most cases, a viable insurgency cant...but exceptions occur when the local populace has no means to resist the guerilla movement, there is a huge base of external support and the opposition to the guerilla movement is considering a worse alternative or no better

What are you trying to say? Exceptions? Can you be more specific?

[amna.]

In my honest opinion Akbar Khan,
I know I might get criticized but all I can use is historic references for my stance which tells me that historically when Pashtuns have used similar tactics they have been successful. The US has declared war on an ethnic roups that is known for ruling Persians,Indians and defeating the superpower of its time I.e UK AND Russia.

I think we have to analyze the Taliban first and while analyzing the Taliban and its guerella movement we reach 2 conclusions.

1)They are fighting for Religion.
2)They are fighting for important Pashtunwali codes.

They are not fighting to get paid, or to perhaps become the kngs but they want a free and azad Afghanistan.

Taliban is a predominant Pashtun movement out of which approximately 99.9 percent is Pashtun. Now Pashtuns are historically not only known as fierce warrior tribe but many of its emeies that we have defeated have went as far as admitting that we are good when it comes to war.

I met a Canadian soldier and he was serving in Kandahar. He told me that he could not sleep properly because Kandaharis would make hell for them in Kandahar air base. If a soldier can't have proper sleep how can they tackle guerrilla war fare? Imagine not sleeping for a week and your commander saying lets go kill the Taliban.

The enemy for Nato forces can't be identified. They walk around in Kamos partog, they attack you and they continue walking like nothing has happened.

Did I write too much Akbar Khan?

I look forward to your valued opinion on my post. I encourage all others to participate.

[Amir al Ghaznavi]

What are you trying to say? Exceptions? Can you be more specific?

for example, look at the Taliban....they are not the ideal preferred system of governance for most Afghans. the vast majority of its support (legitimate uncoerced support) is because theyre seen as "resisters" to occupation. some support them out of ethnic solidarity. but it is by no means a preffered ideology or movement....

i also point to various militias in Africa, that commit horrible atrocities against their own people. Many of them have no local support whatsoever, but the civilians have no means to resist them, the local govt forces are inept and theres usually a foreign backer or two to support these militias

[akbarkhan]

in most cases, a viable insurgency cant...but exceptions occur when the local populace has no means to resist the guerilla movement, there is a huge base of external support and the opposition to the guerilla movement is considering a worse alternative or no better

Though your argument is sound on the surface, it overlooks some crucial and fundamental factors. What if the local population has unprecendented international support to route the insurgency?

Furthermore, are you suggesting that a single parasitos base of external support can out do a global conglomerate host whose sole interest and its existence depends on the outcome of its current military engagement?

The modern master of guerrilla warfare Che does not agree with what you have mentioned above. Che says "the people are to the guerrila fighters what water is to a fish, that is, their means of existence." Based historical accounts and military expertise of Che, Mao, we can safely extrapolate; should the local mass be intrinsically against the ideals of the guerrilla movement then it is a matter of time before a mass rebellion occurs.

If the guerrilla movement is getting stronger and its tentacles reach far wider as the campaign is protracted then there is only one possibility, the local mass is fiercly supporting the insurgency through wealth, safe houses and information.

[akbarkhan]

The thread is about asymmetric warfare, its conducts and its principles. Please refrain from associating this thread with Taliban or any other specific group.

[Amir al Ghaznavi]

Though your argument is sound on the surface, it overlooks some crucial and fundamental factors. What if the local population has unprecendented international support to route the insurgency?

Furthermore, are you suggesting that a single parasitos base of external support can out do a global conglomerate host whose sole interest and its existence depends on the outcome of its current military engagement?

The modern master of guerrilla warfare Che does not agree with what you have mentioned above. Che says "the people are to the guerrila fighters what water is to a fish, that is, their means of existence." Based historical accounts and military expertise of Che, Mao, we can safely extrapolate; should the local mass be intrinsically against the ideals of the guerrilla movement then it is a matter of time before a mass rebellion occurs.

If the guerrilla movement is getting stronger and its tentacles reach far wider as the campaign is protracted then there is only one possibility, the local mass is fiercly supporting the insurgency through wealth, safe houses and information.

1. the international support is meaningless for 2 reasons. one, they are foreigners and there is always going to be a mistrust of foreigners especially if the support is contextualized in a military operation. if the US ended combat operations, declared a cease fire, withdrew their troops to their bases in anticipation of a declared withdrawal date, and strictly focused their efforts on aid and reconstruction while negotiating a peace deal with the Taliban, every single Afghan would support the foreigners. second the main conduit for this foreign aid is a despised and ineffective govt, so you cant easily say Afghans have access to huge international support. This point of mine is proven by the fact that an insurgency was almost non existent in the first couple years of the war. it also explains why the regime fell so easily. and it also explains why the entire country is not in an uproar over the occupation. the current taliban insurgency is nothing compared to the mujahideen support in the 80s

2. this is where i have to become a little conspiratorial and speculative because my personal analysis of the war leaves me no choice. I dont think US has a vested interest in a conflict free Afghanistan with a viable and sovereign state and an educated populace. Theyve made so many mistakes over the course of the last 8 years that the only conclusion one is left with is that they purposely have done this to facilitate the growing insurgency.

3. i dont doubt that the taliban have some degree of local support. absolutely. but its not overwhelming, and it certainly isnt because the people love the taliban movement, ideology and system of governance or at least not primarily. if that was the case, the US would be in a hell of a lot of trouble, more so than now

[akbarkhan]

This point of mine is proven by the fact that an insurgency was almost non existent in the first couple years of the war. it also explains why the regime fell so easily. and it also explains why the entire country is not in an uproar over the occupation. the current taliban insurgency is nothing compared to the mujahideen support in the 80s

Again, superficially your argument is sound but you are totally overlooking the tactics of modern day warefare.

The allied forces utilized Ullman & Wade's doctrine of rapid dominance also known as shock & awe hence the best asymmetrical counter-strategy was the doctrine of strategic dispersion. For the average man on the street, this process looks like 'fell easily' and 'no where to be seen for two years', but from a tactical perspective the story is anything but!

Why two years, you might ask. I must outline the fundamental steps necessary in realization of a guerrila campaign after strategic dispersion.

1. Arousing and organizing the people.
2. Achieving internal unification politically.
3. Establishing mobile bases.
4. Equiping forces.
5. Recovering national strenght.

3. i dont doubt that the taliban have some degree of local support. absolutely. but its not overwhelming, and it certainly isnt because the people love the taliban movement, ideology and system of governance or at least not primarily.

There are three groups of people who do not support the Taliban.

1. Ethnocentric minorities.
2. City-dwellers
3. Marxists

The problem is that these groups do not make or represent the bulk of the population, the bulk of the population are conservative peasants, villagers and nomads who have lived Taliban-style for centuries.

[KhyberKhan]

vietnam would suggest that without ground level integration, an insurgency would be starved of any sanctuary relatively quickly.

[Amir al Ghaznavi]

Again, superficially your argument is sound but you are totally overlooking the tactics of modern day warefare.

The allied forces utilized Ullman & Wade's doctrine of rapid dominance also known as shock & awe hence the best asymmetrical counter-strategy was the doctrine of strategic dispersion. For the average man on the street, this process looks like 'fell easily' and 'no where to be seen for two years', but from a tactical perspective the story is anything but!

Why two year, you might ask. I must outline the fundamental steps necessary in realization of a guerrila campaign after a .

1. Arousing and organizing the people.
2. Achieving internal unification politically.
3. Establishing mobile bases.
4. Equiping forces.
5. Recovering national strenght.




There are three groups of people who do not support the Taliban.

1. Ethnocentric minorities.
2. City-dwellers
3. Marxists

The problem is that these groups do not make or represent the bulk of the population, the bulk of the population are conservative peasants, villagers and nomads who have lived Taliban-style for centuries.

1. if they didnt have an external base of support, where would they have strategically dispersed to wrora? if the americans went in with 100,000 troops, kept combat operations to a minimum with the exception of say a few special forces operations, and focused strictly on building a clean government of technocrats and had they sidelined the warlords they became dependent on, there would be no insurgency. even if they had thousands of troops present on the ground.

2. these 5 points you mention i dont deny. but my argument is the ineffeciency of US policy allowed the Taliban to do those things, they did not plan it this way from the beginning.

3. they might not be a bulk of the populace but they are a significant element, significant enough that the taliban will never have widespread support, to take a single provincial capital let alone Kabul. this is not the marxist elite of the 80s who could only count on a small group of elitists. the anti taliban block of todays afghanistan is much greater i believe, then the anti mujahideen block of afghans back in the 80s

[akbarkhan]

1. if they didnt have an external base of support, where would they have strategically dispersed to wrora? if the americans went in with 100,000 troops, kept combat operations to a minimum with the exception of say a few special forces operations, and focused strictly on building a clean government of technocrats and had they sidelined the warlords they became dependent on, there would be no insurgency. even if they had thousands of troops present on the ground.

2. these 5 points you mention i dont deny. but my argument is the ineffeciency of US policy allowed the Taliban to do those things, they did not plan it this way from the beginning.

3. they might not be a bulk of the populace but they are a significant element, significant enough that the taliban will never have widespread support, to take a single provincial capital let alone Kabul. this is not the marxist elite of the 80s who could only count on a small group of elitists. the anti taliban block of todays afghanistan is much greater i believe, then the anti mujahideen block of afghans back in the 80s

You are turning military talk to political talk.

If you want to discuss this in the light of politics please make a thread and I will be more than happy to discuss else please keep your arguments within topic.

[Amir al Ghaznavi]

You are turning military talk to political talk.

If you want to discuss this in the light of politics please make a thread and I will be more than happy to discuss else please keep your arguments within topic.

to me they go hand in hand

as for the topic, i gave examples in africa. look at this past week in eastern congo where renegade militias launched a rape campaign against civilians. they have no civilian support but theyre foreign funded and the govt is weak

[شمله ور خراساني]

to me they go hand in hand

as for the topic, i gave examples in africa. look at this past week in eastern congo where renegade militias launched a rape campaign against civilians. they have no civilian support but theyre foreign funded and the govt is weak

Are there over 40 nations with the most advanced technology present in Congo to oppose the rebels? And the rebels there in Congo are from other ethnic background than the people they rape. Are Taliban from another ethnic back ground?

[ijaz yousafzai]

Discuss purely in the light of military strategy, historical accounts of guerrilla warfare and philosophy of war. Please keep your political ideology, personal spins and religion out of this topic.

Also please avoid writing essays unless that is the last resort. Short and to the point posts mean we won't miss any significant points that are raised.

Could a moderator please keep on eye on this thread an delete irrelevant posts? We have 1000s of threads with no conclusions as a result of irrelevant posts and ad-hominems.

Your opinions do not count unless supported by reliable sources!

akbarkhana! As they say , " guerella tacticians are like fish, they do not survive in muddy water". A hostile environment is the first and foremost enemy of a gurella.