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  • Originally posted by Azmal View Post
    That is the dilemma then….the Orwellian concept of ‘ doublethink’--- the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one mind, and accepting both of them. lol

    Or it was nuanced. Take for instance the Socialist semi Marxist leanings of Archbishop Romero of Latin America:

    El Salvador: The Assassination of Archbishop Romero

    He fused the concept of social justice and humanism he gleaned from religion with an attack on injustices perpetuated by the oligarchy that he derived from semi Marxist philosophy.

    Was it not The Christ that said it is "as hard for the wealthy man to enter Heaven as for the Camel to pass through the needle's eye"?



    I agree with notation of deep understanding, however I would love to hear your alternative to “nationalism”….

    Why must one take on the arduous and uphill gradient battle that renders concepts mutually exclusive?

    how are we to gather our people out of this misery?

    I think the answer lies in mass media and information dissemination. If we take the two population of Pashtuns, one thing Pakistan has definitively proven (and not merely Pakistan by also American where some 2/3 of Americans were led to believe Saddam perpetrated 9/11 via the media blitz) is that if you take the Pakistani Pashtuns as the experimental and Afghan and tribal Pashtuns as controls ---> the former have been manipulated by mass media to somehow view Musharraf as a nation savior, Benazir as a modern Joan of Arc (despite the irony that these two hated one another) and that the very same people that were called freedom fighters and holy warriors are now Indian agents and terrorists.

    So i would posit that gathering them out is not so much in infusing them with a new quasi - dogmatic ideology - but rather increasing awareness of reality.


    Political Islam which Pakistan preaches has already leaded to genocide of Pashtuns in Wazeristan, Swat, and destruction of Afghan state and decline of Pashtuns by strategic depth and Kabul must burn policy.

    See, this is the issue that I have with this topic. It begins to border on an Ataturkian, "throw the baby out with the bathwater" solution even though the attempts to extricate religion out of the conversation is really akin to an Elphinstonian and orientalist revisionist rendering of the hujra vs mullah paradigm.

    It also completely dismisses the same successes that Ahmad Shah Abdali and Mir Wais before him had with tactics that did not buck the natural order of things and that utilized politicization of religion to galvanize a nationalistic fervor instead of assuming that the two had to be mutually exclusive forever and always. And when the latter paradigm is attempted (mutual exclusivity and subordination of religion out of the conversation in a region where no matter what revisionists say - there was never a purist Jeffersonian separation of Church and state) ---> this nearly always sets up the situation for internecine conflict and creates two polar opposites (militant secularists and militant religionists) who are prone to taking outside comfort and aid.


    As I have stated before the underlying reason for the Islamist enterprise in Pakistan owes itself to the fact that in the absence of any national coherence, political Islam has been the ONLY means at the government's disposal for keeping their synthetic nation glued together.

    Well then you should also take from this a very important lesson - that no matter how much elites and the western educated scoff at the masses and attempt to insinuate Islam as the ultimate opiate of the masses - that its galvanizing and uniting characteristics are potent and not to be dismissed out of hand. It is also a practical lesson on how one should be very careful to not stampede roughshod over the religious sentiments of the region and people (even if they are only culturally religious) and instead work within that fabric toward a goal.

    That is, why permit Pakistan to be the sole arbiter, jury, judge, and executioner of a religious tradition that spans over 1400 and sum years?



    Hence the underlying reason for Pakistan's support of Islamist movements in Afghanistan have nothing to do with religion or any pretense to moral virtue.

    Once again I think its complex. My assessment of it is that there are cross border links and that the record evidences something far more miserable. I think there are generals and agencies that contain folks that truly think they are arm chair intelligence and Machiavellian in some sort of war of attrition (death by a thousand cuts) that puts the Afghans front and center a battle that both bleeds outside powers in the theater of war but also bleeds them economically via duplicity. I would contradict your statement by saying that none of the juristic schools have weighed in on whether a single state can somehow decide to utilize another state without informing its people of this mosquitoes vs The Elephant brand of warfare.

    I agree that ideologies, whether nationalist, religious, or sectarian, prevent people from using their brains and thinking clearly. Subjects thus become veiled by preconceived notions of good and evil… However, I’m not preaching to get Mohmand or Khil’s land or have any imperial design…I want Pashtuns to raise above sum of their individual or tribal ambitions-- as a nation…

    I wish this was an easy thing to do. I really do. And like I said perhaps the combination of education and some sort of mass media effect could help move this forward. But if I had to estimate, I would say we are about 2 generations off from any ability to do this.

    Lets talk about two examples of why this is an uphill battle. Across the border in Peshawar the Arbab clan of Khalil (they are the Khan Khel of that tribe) have a political family embedded into the Pakistani political class for generations. I encountered a member of the family in DC. The nepotism runs rampant and the overwhelming majority of the Pashtuns in that region look to that specific family for leadership despite known corruption. Their clan leader says jump, they say how high.

    Or more recently the way Noorzai and Atzakzai clans of Kandahar have local conflict that is very bloody and very tumultuous that inherently feeds militancy.



    this is the only way to our survival as people.

    Well this is true as is the observation by some of the Marxists of the prior era that feudalism inherent to tribal hierarchy can hold a nation state back from developing due to an inability to enact "imminent domain." The issue though is how one enacts change. And we both see the outcomes of their attempts and how unfortunate they were. They did not even have the patience and wherewithal of other Socialist-Marxist groups like the Sandinista.. they just thought they could insult, disparage, beat, and murder their way to a new Afghan state.

    When a society has an abysmal literacy rate coupled to a strong village-centric mode of life - and the local economy is the economy then regionalism prevails and stability resides in these heirarchies.


    It is not about Nationalistic tendencies, it is about coming out of tribalism.

    It is more than just tribalism from my medical travels across all the regions. Its about my house>>my local family>>My village>>My set of villages>>Tribe>>Province>>Country region (sometimes even cross border region will take precedence)>>Country. And this relates to the set of circumstances above that are beyond the notion of "isms" of any sort.

    In my opinion a confederacy is the only way for us tribal Pashtun to consolidate our identity as a people, develop our culture/language…which hopefully our state eventually will evolve and privileges personal autonomy over group identity, and assumes a neutral, non-ethnic state acting for the good of greatest number.(natural evolution of state.)

    Sure, this is how all great powers develop... but this takes time, blood, conflict, civil war, and most importantly - pure unfettered autonomy. No one from the outside can accomplish this and no one has ever done this for anyone else in history.

    The alternative to confederacy is tribalism and due to our geopolitical location it means endless war in our own land . . . war of every tribe against every other tribe…or against invaders/foreigners. Mind you…just a simplified observation not criticism…. All our wars…even our Jihad which I must say were mostly motivated or lead by non-Pashtuns like Indian Ahmad Shah Barelvi, Uzbek/Tajiks likes of Termezi, Mullah Darwaza and Gujar rather than Yousufzay Akhund of Swat did not lead to positive results… in a sense combat was really no more than the prelude to the bargaining that always followed and there were always rival tribes on side of enemy. This is because for a khan or tribal chieftain what counts is his prestige in the eyes of his equals and not victory won against an external enemy.

    Yes, similar to the example I gave above - we see folks in history like Kuli Khan Khattak doing what is best for his set of circumstances. This is no different than the way the native American tribals operated. They crafted treaties that would pit some tribes and colonizers against other tribes to the detriment of all the native peoples and their cause. We agree on the fact that our leaders or often short-sighted.

    Political intrigue within the tribe takes place behind closed doors, for tribes it is better to come to some agreement with an enemy who recognizes your local standing than to gain jihad and risk losing your identity within the tribe or against rival tribe. This fact was well understood by all the invaders be it British, who maintained their power by strengthening tribalism, is also the policy being followed by Pakistan.

    I would say the last part regarding Pakistan is not completely true. While Pakistan made a show of permitting FATA to exist before this war - the sense I got from the Pashtuns there is a very poor understanding of their tribal lineage, clan division, and tribal linkages. Very few knew who Ahmad Shah Durrani was or that he and Ahmad Shah Abdali was the same person. Some confused Nadir Afshar with him and fused him and Abdali into some sort of single person... Sher Shah Suri was known but minimally. The poetry of Khushal Khan and Rahman Baba was known. So I would say that Pakistanism has actually deteriorated the condition of the tribe. Some of the FATA tribes that have cross border links that retain their identities (e..g Wazir and Mahsud) are the only ones I met that indicate they maintain statehood based on benefit to their tribe and that if Kabul became their economic benefactor they may consider a switch.



    I disagree, respectfully with notation Pashtuns tribes being distinct… even antagonist historian Sir Olaf Caroe only used socio-economic interest to segregate Pashtun of Pashtunistan from Afghanistan.

    I agree with you that they are not genetically distinct or culturally... I meant that the tribes on that side have political affiliation in their leadership structure that intertwines them into the state. What is interesting is that it is not always the true hereditary leader of the tribe that is the current big-wig. For example - Behram Khan Arbab was killed in holy war against the Sikhs I believe as was others of his family against Brit proxies. This family was a leadership family but deprived of land rights and the current ruling family has been in power since the British elevated their prestige.

    I do not doubt of many internal upheavals before, during and after Ahmad Shah baba’s rule…but it cannot agitate the foundation that Ahmad Shah baba created for Pashtun. Some western historian also makes some claims of distinct sociopolitical tribal structure of Gilzay/Durrani vs Eastern Pasthun based on centuries of Saffavid rule Vis a Vis Mughal rule. If I remember correctly Barnnett Rubin in one of his books claims Safavid Shahs imposed elements of the Turo-mongolian Tribal structure on to those Pashtuns living in their territory and it was due to Safavid Turks effort that Abdali(later Durrani) and Ghilzai Pashtuns developed Turkic-style confederation. While the Mughals treated east Pashtuns quite differently, and under Mughals eastern Pashtuns never developed a broad confederation. In my opinion it does not really matter, we can label Baba’s achievement as pure luck or accidental or as result of outside influence but it does not reduce the significant of his achievement for Pashtun as a people.

    I am not denigrating his amazing accomplishment. I am pointing out that it was transient for important reasons. Just as I cannot take away from Alexander's accomplishments but I can with certainty note that his empire was transient for reasons we both know. What we can do is understand these reasons to help in the future.

    This is why all Pashtuns regardless of tribe consider him a hero and many parents, even uneducated one make a point to name their offspring after him.

    As I said, I had unfortunate experiences with the Pakistani Pashtun folks regarding their general on the street lack of knowledge of Ahmad Shah Abdali as an important personage. To the credit of ANP, one thing they did do during their term was distribute literature about these important figures to re-educate the populace.




    I would love to hear how religious groups in current shape led by the Mullahs that want Pashtun population to remain uneducated and docile, which is a similar political tactic used by European rulers during the dark ages---Find a religious base, support it according to your own interpretations and ruthlessly attack innocent people who defy your will---can achieve emancipation of the Pashtuns? Or at least prevent bloodshed of Pashtun?

    Once again we have to be careful to not consider important galvanizing concepts as mutually exclusive. Mir Wais and his fatwa are an important allegory for us today. In modern events, the return of the Anatolian elite to religious power in Turkey shows that an Ataturk can try his best but that he will inevitably fail to destroy the religious character of a people. In fact if he and his inheritors try - they will see blowback eventually, if even almost a century later.

    I would say that ceding Islam and its message to charlatans, fools, and morons while dismissing innocent madrassah orphans as a part of the problem will not be a solution.

    Also, confusing cause and effect (i.e. radicalization being falsely claimed as perpetuating the war as opposed to the more proper correlation of war inevitably radicalizing) will not help matters.

    Democrats here in the US figured this out the hard way. Religion even here where you and I are plays in an important implicit role in politics. You now have Trump actually saying he will repeal the law that prohibits religious institutions from taking politically apparent stances or lose their tax exempt status.

    My view on it is that Ghani and others should not try to somehow take Western standards and a view of Jeffersonian democracy and try to demarcate some sort of separation of church and state that took a millennia to accomplish in Europe and expect it to happen in even a century in Afghanistan.

    And Pashtuns need leaders that wont try to appease the world at the expense of rubbing their people the wrong way. Pashtun leaders that are for, by, and of the people may not resemble suit wearing Westerners and Ankara Turks for that matter... they may be something altogether different and we should be OK with that.

    In my estimation, it will be some sort of fusion of native nationalism that does not run counter to religion and actually galvanizes under its banner that will hold the day and produce sustainable results.

    In summary I would say that it is dangerous to simply cede religious ground to political Mullahs the same way it is dangerous to simply cede ground to their counterpart like Jerry Falwell. But it is equally dangerous to assume that Falwell does not channel some sort of real religious undertone in the society that can be claimed by his betters.


    x
    "2 crackheads don't become any better or stronger by sharing the same crack pipe." - Greatest PF quote

    Comment


    • Originally posted by BarakzaiAbdali View Post
      x


      Let me first ask how you suggest we can “utilized politicization of religion to galvanize a nationalistic fervor” when Madrassah, and Mullahs are in our enemies hand? Will write detail reply in few days.
      ای وخته بېرته راشه يو افغان وزېږوه
      نو بيا يو احمد خان يا ميروس خان وزېږوه

      چې ننګ په وطن وکړئ داسي ځوان وزېږوه
      نويا خو خوشحال خان يا بادشا خان وزېږوه

      سپن اوشن بيرغ د ازادۍ کړي زمونږ پورته
      بيا داسې يو بادشا لکه امان وزيږوه

      چې جوړه کړي انګريز ته بيا غزا د ارنوۍ
      يو داسې لوی غازي ميرزمان خان وزيږوه

      سرو مال قربان کړي له وطن او له ناموسه
      په مينه د وطن کي افغانان وزيږوه

      ټپې د ازادۍ کړه بورا ته په خيالونو
      اوس راشه په شعرنو کي طوفان وزيږو

      Comment


      • Originally posted by Azmal View Post


        Let me first ask how you suggest we can “utilized politicization of religion to galvanize a nationalistic fervor” when Madrassah, and Mullahs are in our enemies hand? Will write detail reply in few days.
        We would need to be specific. Which mullahs? which madrassahs? Haqqania Madrassah? The ones scattered all over the country side on both sides of the border?

        To date, I do not think there is a proven effort to try and debate, discuss, and reach into these realms to inform denizens and students therein about political ramifications of various undertaken actions.

        Additionally, the handiwork and well documented by MEMRI (not that I at all endorse that group but the advantage of going to their site is that one cannot label a visitor there as 'visitor to militant websites') of Hakim Mahsud and Mullah Fazl more than show that you may be making suppositions.

        1. H Mahsud and Fazl have done very active and deadly operations against Pakistan for the simple reason that they viewed Pakistan's actions of supply lines to Afghanistan, incursions into Swat and FATA, attacks on said groups as affronts. In summary, there is no other way to conclude based on the evidence at hand that is open source evidence that these actors had a set of objectives and principles that melded religion and regional goals. When the Pakistani Army or any other body ran headlong against those goals they attacked them.

        2. The Afghan Talibs despite all the allure and yet to be proven hearsay operated much along the same paradigm. Their stated goals on paper relate to the physical presence of outsiders and the military actions as well as arming of rival groups by said outsiders.

        My point is that this simple picture painting of regional semi religious (e.g. Hekmetyar, Sayyaf, Taliban, Madrassah actors) as all lock stock and barrel the shadow actors and players taking detailed orders from semi functional military states lays down dangerous assumptions that will only PROLONG the conflict, result in MORE dead Afghans, and give way to governance that does not reflect the national character.

        Why? Because it ignores on the ground realities.
        These folks are not individual figures. They command thousands of people that they win and won the loyalty of and they have more than proven their insurgency worth if we are to be realistic. And the proportion of those not picking up weapons to support them locally but sympathizing with them is also not easily quantifiable. We cannot be condescending and call all these people "aloof, cattle, stupid" etc. Many of them sided with with folks they either saw eye to eye with or gained security and advancement through.

        Additionally, was this not Najib and the Marxists question? Their operating paradigm was that religion is the opiate of the masses and therefore it is utilized by elites or others to subvert progress or social governance and fair distribution of resources.

        Even here in the US, the notion of the democrats regarding misuse of religion is the same and causes blue dog southern democrats to have to modify their platform to fit the environment.

        Many faith based communities face the same quandaries. In the US where Robertson, Falwell, Dobson etc are the public face of political Christianity, there are also theologians in Harvard and other places that have a profound and deeper understanding as well as a wider breath of knowledge than these types who find them repugnant.

        Astute politicians trying to walk the line but still get in their 2 cents like Rand Paul have done a decent job holding up the mirror of hypocrisy:
        Blessed are the Peacemakers - Breitbart

        The problem with this assumption also that "the levers of religion and its potent power are in the hands of enemies" is that it will induce a McCarthyism that will only bring misery and blowback.

        There is a speech given by a Mullah at an event held by Wali Karzai back in the earlier part of the last decade. This mullah was picked to speak by Karzai and was a born and raised Kandahari and discussed the mounting pressure on him where he said that the security forces accused him and native clerics of being "Pakistani agents." That video is actually posted here somewhere on PF.

        This notion of identifying clerics and religion as tools of the enemy and in need of being neutralized is a dangerous step in the same direction as Najib and other istan states have taken to dealing with the sentiments of the rural majority.

        A good first step by any government is permitting informed, educated, and religious figures to speak out even if it is against them and even if it may bring about a change in governance from the western secular humanist paradigm.

        But a major step forward whether one likes it or not is to acknowledge that in any and all branches of Islamic jurisprudence, resistance to occupation has its place and is a discussed philosophy.

        This concept of somehow getting a Muslim people to think along these lines:
        1. Pakistanis are doing retarded stuff (drinking, selling *****s, worst of all murdering human beings via governmental fiat) = a
        2. Kharij do the same whether they be Russians or Americans = b
        3. The interests of the Kharij and Afghans align better so therefore by the law of mathematics since a = b in Islamic respects Afghans should align with b

        Is really a no go Azmal. No matter how hard one tries, no matter how many TV channels are coopted, no matter how many newspapers are sold - this is a hard sell in that part of the world. Because the a = b equation forgets long histories of foreign occupation (Gurgin, British, Russians, etc) and attempts to relegate the complex interplay between local Muslim communities to the dustbin of history.

        Just as in the US or in Europe... there is a long, historical tradition that remembers the Turks as avowed enemies. There is a greater likelihood of Europeans or the US accepting or at least being less agitated against an occupation or military force that looks like them and worships like them than say, accepting an Arab or Turk occupying force. We see this in the speeches of modern blow hard like that idiot moron Allen West in Florida:
        Gates of Vienna: Allen West: “We Are Already in a Declared War”

        In our regions a lot of politics is local. Afghans have interacted at the human level with Quettans, FATA folks, etc and don't have this grasp or wont accept the existence of some larger nefarious scheme of Rawalpindi or Lahore being behind on the ground attacks against Kharej that have, now in the press, been documented to have committed very real acts in Afghanistan proper (e.g. Gardez attack on civilians documented in great detail by Scahill). That story is something they can touch, feel, and see. Repercussions of proxy warfare and shadow boxing by outside state actors are less so. This is exactly why in many countries during the cold war, large factions of human beings in the nation states being fought over by the powers (e.g. Nicaragua) still fought, maimed, and murdered each other despite knowing that their side and the other had backers. In some instances these backers took advantage of very real schisms and conflicts that existed before they entered the picture.

        So to summarize I think religious dialogue and discussion should be harnessed by those that view both of the current options as bad. But at the same time those that use this approach should be ready to speak truth to power wherever and whenever it is needed.

        I think this will be forever hard to do if figures on both sides try to inoculate foreign ideologies that are an anathema to the ground level realities that have existed for centuries. In the case of the Talibs, attacks of on feudal and tribal structures have not been shown to historically win the day, but I highly doubt a government tip-toeing around separation of mosque and state will do any better realistically.

        Putting this concept of enemies having a monopoly over religious dialogue is a first step toward bringing some balance to the equation.

        If a religious scholar can reference the texts and have a deeper and more profound discussion than his adversary and still cannot convince die hard who are solely motivated by religion then it means two things based on logic:

        1. The said scholar, in the eyes of his listeners cannot validate or justify a standing army on his soil and is forced to acknowledge this

        2. The listeners have a motley array of grievances where religion is merely the glue that provides a moral imperative.

        What we can say when looking back on history is that neither extreme approach:
        Najib, Amanullah, etc on the one side nor Bacha Saqo, Syed Ahmad on the other, has won the day indicating that some sort of in between approach coupled to gradualism has to be taken.

        At the end of the day, what history has shown us, and many of us have witnessed first hand, is that when there is peace and relative stability in a region the standard hierarchy of a society prevails ---> The Malik (elite) has his role and the mullah retreats into the mosque and there is always a bit of light tension and back and forth but a symbiosis none the less between these players. The mullah knows not to get too deep into affairs beyond his ken and the Malik knows not to over step the religious sentiments of his people. Rural and urban exchange occurs at the society level and this permits the populace to, in theory, hold both to account.

        In the modern era, the closest we may have come to this societal stability was that period of the Zahir Shah Nadir Shah monarchy (trust me, I am not at all saying they were good rulers or had historical legitimacy). Note that an important element there, despite Nadir Shah not returning the throne to Amanullah was the lack of any visible outside force on the soil to immediately de-legitimize their rule.
        Last edited by BarakzaiAbdali; 08-21-2016, 05:13 PM.
        "2 crackheads don't become any better or stronger by sharing the same crack pipe." - Greatest PF quote

        Comment


        • Originally posted by BarakzaiAbdali View Post
          We would need to be specific. Which mullahs? which madrassahs? Haqqania Madrassah? The ones scattered all over the country side on both sides of the border?

          To date, I do not think there is a proven effort to try and debate, discuss, and reach into these realms to inform denizens and students therein about political ramifications of various undertaken actions.

          Additionally, the handiwork and well documented by MEMRI (not that I at all endorse that group but the advantage of going to their site is that one cannot label a visitor there as 'visitor to militant websites') of Hakim Mahsud and Mullah Fazl more than show that you may be making suppositions.

          1. H Mahsud and Fazl have done very active and deadly operations against Pakistan for the simple reason that they viewed Pakistan's actions of supply lines to Afghanistan, incursions into Swat and FATA, attacks on said groups as affronts. In summary, there is no other way to conclude based on the evidence at hand that is open source evidence that these actors had a set of objectives and principles that melded religion and regional goals. When the Pakistani Army or any other body ran headlong against those goals they attacked them.

          2. The Afghan Talibs despite all the allure and yet to be proven hearsay operated much along the same paradigm. Their stated goals on paper relate to the physical presence of outsiders and the military actions as well as arming of rival groups by said outsiders.

          My point is that this simple picture painting of regional semi religious (e.g. Hekmetyar, Sayyaf, Taliban, Madrassah actors) as all lock stock and barrel the shadow actors and players taking detailed orders from semi functional military states lays down dangerous assumptions that will only PROLONG the conflict, result in MORE dead Afghans, and give way to governance that does not reflect the national character.

          Why? Because it ignores on the ground realities.
          These folks are not individual figures. They command thousands of people that they win and won the loyalty of and they have more than proven their insurgency worth if we are to be realistic. And the proportion of those not picking up weapons to support them locally but sympathizing with them is also not easily quantifiable. We cannot be condescending and call all these people "aloof, cattle, stupid" etc. Many of them sided with with folks they either saw eye to eye with or gained security and advancement through.

          Additionally, was this not Najib and the Marxists question? Their operating paradigm was that religion is the opiate of the masses and therefore it is utilized by elites or others to subvert progress or social governance and fair distribution of resources.

          Even here in the US, the notion of the democrats regarding misuse of religion is the same and causes blue dog southern democrats to have to modify their platform to fit the environment.

          Many faith based communities face the same quandaries. In the US where Robertson, Falwell, Dobson etc are the public face of political Christianity, there are also theologians in Harvard and other places that have a profound and deeper understanding as well as a wider breath of knowledge than these types who find them repugnant.

          Astute politicians trying to walk the line but still get in their 2 cents like Rand Paul have done a decent job holding up the mirror of hypocrisy:
          Blessed are the Peacemakers - Breitbart

          The problem with this assumption also that "the levers of religion and its potent power are in the hands of enemies" is that it will induce a McCarthyism that will only bring misery and blowback.

          There is a speech given by a Mullah at an event held by Wali Karzai back in the earlier part of the last decade. This mullah was picked to speak by Karzai and was a born and raised Kandahari and discussed the mounting pressure on him where he said that the security forces accused him and native clerics of being "Pakistani agents." That video is actually posted here somewhere on PF.

          This notion of identifying clerics and religion as tools of the enemy and in need of being neutralized is a dangerous step in the same direction as Najib and other istan states have taken to dealing with the sentiments of the rural majority.

          A good first step by any government is permitting informed, educated, and religious figures to speak out even if it is against them and even if it may bring about a change in governance from the western secular humanist paradigm.

          But a major step forward whether one likes it or not is to acknowledge that in any and all branches of Islamic jurisprudence, resistance to occupation has its place and is a discussed philosophy.

          This concept of somehow getting a Muslim people to think along these lines:
          1. Pakistanis are doing retarded stuff (drinking, selling *****s, worst of all murdering human beings via governmental fiat) = a
          2. Kharij do the same whether they be Russians or Americans = b
          3. The interests of the Kharij and Afghans align better so therefore by the law of mathematics since a = b in Islamic respects Afghans should align with b

          Is really a no go Azmal. No matter how hard one tries, no matter how many TV channels are coopted, no matter how many newspapers are sold - this is a hard sell in that part of the world. Because the a = b equation forgets long histories of foreign occupation (Gurgin, British, Russians, etc) and attempts to relegate the complex interplay between local Muslim communities to the dustbin of history.

          Just as in the US or in Europe... there is a long, historical tradition that remembers the Turks as avowed enemies. There is a greater likelihood of Europeans or the US accepting or at least being less agitated against an occupation or military force that looks like them and worships like them than say, accepting an Arab or Turk occupying force. We see this in the speeches of modern blow hard like that idiot moron Allen West in Florida:
          Gates of Vienna: Allen West: “We Are Already in a Declared War”

          In our regions a lot of politics is local. Afghans have interacted at the human level with Quettans, FATA folks, etc and don't have this grasp or wont accept the existence of some larger nefarious scheme of Rawalpindi or Lahore being behind on the ground attacks against Kharej that have, now in the press, been documented to have committed very real acts in Afghanistan proper (e.g. Gardez attack on civilians documented in great detail by Scahill). That story is something they can touch, feel, and see. Repercussions of proxy warfare and shadow boxing by outside state actors are less so. This is exactly why in many countries during the cold war, large factions of human beings in the nation states being fought over by the powers (e.g. Nicaragua) still fought, maimed, and murdered each other despite knowing that their side and the other had backers. In some instances these backers took advantage of very real schisms and conflicts that existed before they entered the picture.

          So to summarize I think religious dialogue and discussion should be harnessed by those that view both of the current options as bad. But at the same time those that use this approach should be ready to speak truth to power wherever and whenever it is needed.

          I think this will be forever hard to do if figures on both sides try to inoculate foreign ideologies that are an anathema to the ground level realities that have existed for centuries. In the case of the Talibs, attacks of on feudal and tribal structures have not been shown to historically win the day, but I highly doubt a government tip-toeing around separation of mosque and state will do any better realistically.

          Putting this concept of enemies having a monopoly over religious dialogue is a first step toward bringing some balance to the equation.

          If a religious scholar can reference the texts and have a deeper and more profound discussion than his adversary and still cannot convince die hard who are solely motivated by religion then it means two things based on logic:

          1. The said scholar, in the eyes of his listeners cannot validate or justify a standing army on his soil and is forced to acknowledge this

          2. The listeners have a motley array of grievances where religion is merely the glue that provides a moral imperative.

          What we can say when looking back on history is that neither extreme approach:
          Najib, Amanullah, etc on the one side nor Bacha Saqo, Syed Ahmad on the other, has won the day indicating that some sort of in between approach coupled to gradualism has to be taken.

          At the end of the day, what history has shown us, and many of us have witnessed first hand, is that when there is peace and relative stability in a region the standard hierarchy of a society prevails ---> The Malik (elite) has his role and the mullah retreats into the mosque and there is always a bit of light tension and back and forth but a symbiosis none the less between these players. The mullah knows not to get too deep into affairs beyond his ken and the Malik knows not to over step the religious sentiments of his people. Rural and urban exchange occurs at the society level and this permits the populace to, in theory, hold both to account.

          In the modern era, the closest we may have come to this societal stability was that period of the Zahir Shah Nadir Shah monarchy (trust me, I am not at all saying they were good rulers or had historical legitimacy). Note that an important element there, despite Nadir Shah not returning the throne to Amanullah was the lack of any visible outside force on the soil to immediately de-legitimize their rule.
          Whilst I agree with your sentiment in harnessing religious dialogue however it will be helpful if you can offer a suggestion how to harness a dialogue with people who think their opinion is the God-sanctioned truth and those that disagree deserves to be killed…Last I check they(Taliban) have not given up on their obliteration fanaticism and ominous ideology. Let me remind you we are talking about an organization that beheads its own people just on the suspicion of being spy… sometimes even use 12 years old kids to take part in this frenzy. Also lets not ignore the outside influences that sustain these religious groups..which in my opinion is the crux of issue. Take the Madrasas as example; most believe Madrasas in Pashtuns region existed for hundreds of years, which is far from the truth, creation of Madrasas are recent phenomenon that have mushroom all over Pashtunistan in 70s, 80s and 90s… according to Ian Talbot Pakistan a Modern history 1998 “….12000 Madrasas was created between 19830-1984 period alone almost all in NWFT and FATA regions.” Yet across Durand in Afghanistan side there are only handful of Madrasas..even when there are same tribe, simply because there is no funding for it. Sad reality is Madrasas are the consequence of a policy which has and is being used to radicalize the Pashtun society. Why Mullah in Pashtun society are more powerful and influential than the many others more educated, qualified and sincere people simply because mullah are backed up by an ideology. ….and why are Pashtun parents sending their kids to Madressas........a number of reasons...because the ideology propagates that to be a better option than going to school........there are not many schools compare to number of Madressas…in addition to food and shelter and allied facilities in the Madaris like Hafsa and Faridya. Even in Swat—most educated Pashtun region…there were only handful of Madressas….Why did they mushroom and where did the money come from? Did the people suddenly realize that they are Muslims? Who empowered the clergy? Dr Fazel Rahim Marwad book "From Muhajir to Mujahid" is worth reading in this regard. He writes how, during Soviet War, US funded Nebraska University to publish books for Afghan children in which arithmetic and counting was taught with the help of concepts associated with violence e.g. bullets, Kalashnikovs, murders, etc.
          For example, a typical addition problem would be like this.

          2 communist killed in Jalalabad
          5 Russians killed in Kabul
          How many kafirs killed in total?



          There is total 10 Mujahids
          3 gets martyred
          how many survives?

          This is how USA and Pakistan helped to radicalize young Afghan minds…use of extremist Islam as an alternative ideology to communism and pimped such fanatic movements as Wahhabism in order to establish and sustain hegemony over energy resources in ME and to counter influence of communist. Same approached were utilized in Syria and Iraq some 30 years later..


          https://www.theguardian.com/commenti...sis-syria-iraq

          No surprise when Israeli Center for Strategic Studies, publishes a paper claiming destruction of Islamic state is a strategic mistake…worth reading if you have time.
          http://besacenter.org/perspectives-p...tegic-mistake/

          When there is no political power in place to protect the interest of poor people, they can easily fall for Jehad with propaganda. When they don't have the power to bring positive change in their lives, they fill the vacuum with activities like Jahad... Moreover, it is a fact that when a people become dis-empowered and when their politico-administrative structures break down, they become exposed to machinations by others...a nations own patriotic political force and politico-administrative structures can protect the nation better.

          The fact is the appeal to Jahad or Islamim is not that native as most western or Pakis try to make us believe...even after soviet invasion the appeal of Jahud was not that common among Afghans as recent declassified British Foreign Office (FCO) papers reveal.

          http://sputniknews.com/analysis/2016...tan-syria.html



          “A telegram from the British Embassy in Kabul, to the FCO, dated January 11, 1984, explained: “The fundamentalist groups have no tribal base in Afghanistan and little popular appeal. They have achieved the position they have only because most of the financial support from the Islamic countries for the resistance movement has been channeled in their direction. I think it is widely accepted that many of the members of the fundamentalist groups in Peshawar belong to them not for ideological reasons but because they are the best providers of money and guns. Most of their supporters would have few problems with their consciences in transferring their loyalty to other groups, or to a unified larger grouping, if the material pickings seemed to be better.”

          As you can see the raise of Jihad-ism is the after-effects of West's Cold War geopolitics and strategy to defeat communism whatever and how much immoral way they could in the true sense of "end justifies the means".

          In return the Anti-US/west sentiments are being fanned by the ideological propaganda of the sitting establishments of Muslim countries especially of Pakistan, which has two faces and roles, fundamentalist and anti-western and promoting Islamic militancy and fanaticism at home and pretending to be moderate and liberal abroad. Both these forces dictatorship or corrupt ruling elite like that of Pakistan and west geopolitical strategy sustain each other for their own benefit.

          Now life be beautiful if Taliban Jan and Mullah Jan listen to me and you..lol Especially by means of debate and democratic methods...or at minimal does not undermine our progress by burning girl’s school, killing women that are working for TV channels and newspapers, beheading Afghans who refuse to follow the bigotry promoted from Pakistani madrasas. The point is “peace and relative stability in a region” is actively prevented by outside powers for their own benefit. Thanks to Durand and the division of Pashtuns has deprived us of a unified political voice, base, leadership, and institutional structures to decide what is better for us as people, especially in case of broader regional and global conflict, and how to guard Pashtun interests against these outside interference. As we are being ruled by others, foreigners decide as how to use our land and people like they did in war between communism and capitalist West or like they are doing now in clash between militant Islam and the West.



          I almost forgot to mention ...why is that 100 years of British Raj and before that Mughal Raj and now Punjabi Raj are never addressed as ‘foreign forces’ in your post.
          ای وخته بېرته راشه يو افغان وزېږوه
          نو بيا يو احمد خان يا ميروس خان وزېږوه

          چې ننګ په وطن وکړئ داسي ځوان وزېږوه
          نويا خو خوشحال خان يا بادشا خان وزېږوه

          سپن اوشن بيرغ د ازادۍ کړي زمونږ پورته
          بيا داسې يو بادشا لکه امان وزيږوه

          چې جوړه کړي انګريز ته بيا غزا د ارنوۍ
          يو داسې لوی غازي ميرزمان خان وزيږوه

          سرو مال قربان کړي له وطن او له ناموسه
          په مينه د وطن کي افغانان وزيږوه

          ټپې د ازادۍ کړه بورا ته په خيالونو
          اوس راشه په شعرنو کي طوفان وزيږو

          Comment


          • As for as Zahir shah’s policies…Thomas Barfield in his book “Afghanistan.” Princeton University Press writes:

            "For the Musahibans nothing was more important than preserving the internal stability of Afghanistan, which they defined as maintaining their own rule over the country. Such a goal may not seem ambitious but it was far from easy to achieve. Power remained highly concentrated within Nadir’s extended family over the course of almost fifty years. In a country of weak institutions, their success in remaining united (or at least keeping the fights within the immediate family) provided the ballast to keep the ship of state on an even keel. They also had a long-term vision about how to structure the relationship between state and society to avoid conservative rebellions while still modernizing the country. It was a strategy of limited and gradual social change accompanied by economic development. Changes would begin in Kabul and move outward in a manner that would facilitate change without imposing it. To this end, the Musahibans realized that most Afghan rural rebellions that were later justified in Islamic terms had initially been provoked by the state’s economic demands for money and conscript troops. They still needed cheap manpower for the military, but they did seek to reduce the state’s economic pressure on the countryside in return for greater political subservience. Over the decades, taxes on rural production and people gradually declined in real terms until they were no longer a significant revenue source. In their place the Musahibans put the revenue burden on trade tariffs, government monopoly enterprises, and (particularly in its last twenty years) foreign aid and loans.
            These strategies had developed in reaction to the Amanullah’s difficulties, and were designed to both prevent the turmoil that brought his regime down and reestablish an unchallenged central government. The Musahibans perceived the greatest threat to their rule as arising from any alliance between Afghanistan’s disaffected rural population and the conservative Islamic establishment, but over time its own policies made these groups ever more marginal and less politically significant. As the state gradually eliminated rural taxation (and thus the need for corrupt tax officials who scoured the land to collect it), the tension between Kabul and the countryside subsided. Similarly, the Musahibans gradually marginalized the clergy and Sufi order leaders who played a powerful role in the 1930s, until by the 1960s they hey were no longer able to set state policy and had been pushed into the background. The success of both these strategies appeared sealed by the mid-1970s, when the government easily suppressed a new nonclerical Islamist movement that had attempted to foment a rebellion in the countryside. Not only was there no positive response to the call for insurrection; the imprisonment of many established clerics during the ensuing government’s crackdown produced little protest. But the very strategies used to sideline the conservatives had also empowered the modernist ideological descendants of Amanullah who believed that the Musahiban rule was too reactionary. Underestimating these people would prove the dynasty’s undoing."


            In my opinion today's ground realities internal, reigonal--specially enemy neighbors Iran and Pakistan and world makes re-implemention of Musahibans policies impossible.
            ای وخته بېرته راشه يو افغان وزېږوه
            نو بيا يو احمد خان يا ميروس خان وزېږوه

            چې ننګ په وطن وکړئ داسي ځوان وزېږوه
            نويا خو خوشحال خان يا بادشا خان وزېږوه

            سپن اوشن بيرغ د ازادۍ کړي زمونږ پورته
            بيا داسې يو بادشا لکه امان وزيږوه

            چې جوړه کړي انګريز ته بيا غزا د ارنوۍ
            يو داسې لوی غازي ميرزمان خان وزيږوه

            سرو مال قربان کړي له وطن او له ناموسه
            په مينه د وطن کي افغانان وزيږوه

            ټپې د ازادۍ کړه بورا ته په خيالونو
            اوس راشه په شعرنو کي طوفان وزيږو

            Comment


            • Originally posted by Azmal View Post
              As for as Zahir shah’s policies…Thomas Barfield in his book “Afghanistan.” Princeton University Press writes:

              "For the Musahibans nothing was more important than preserving the internal stability of Afghanistan, which they defined as maintaining their own rule over the country. Such a goal may not seem ambitious but it was far from easy to achieve. Power remained highly concentrated within Nadir’s extended family over the course of almost fifty years. In a country of weak institutions, their success in remaining united (or at least keeping the fights within the immediate family) provided the ballast to keep the ship of state on an even keel. They also had a long-term vision about how to structure the relationship between state and society to avoid conservative rebellions while still modernizing the country. It was a strategy of limited and gradual social change accompanied by economic development. Changes would begin in Kabul and move outward in a manner that would facilitate change without imposing it. To this end, the Musahibans realized that most Afghan rural rebellions that were later justified in Islamic terms had initially been provoked by the state’s economic demands for money and conscript troops. They still needed cheap manpower for the military, but they did seek to reduce the state’s economic pressure on the countryside in return for greater political subservience. Over the decades, taxes on rural production and people gradually declined in real terms until they were no longer a significant revenue source. In their place the Musahibans put the revenue burden on trade tariffs, government monopoly enterprises, and (particularly in its last twenty years) foreign aid and loans.
              These strategies had developed in reaction to the Amanullah’s difficulties, and were designed to both prevent the turmoil that brought his regime down and reestablish an unchallenged central government. The Musahibans perceived the greatest threat to their rule as arising from any alliance between Afghanistan’s disaffected rural population and the conservative Islamic establishment, but over time its own policies made these groups ever more marginal and less politically significant. As the state gradually eliminated rural taxation (and thus the need for corrupt tax officials who scoured the land to collect it), the tension between Kabul and the countryside subsided. Similarly, the Musahibans gradually marginalized the clergy and Sufi order leaders who played a powerful role in the 1930s, until by the 1960s they hey were no longer able to set state policy and had been pushed into the background. The success of both these strategies appeared sealed by the mid-1970s, when the government easily suppressed a new nonclerical Islamist movement that had attempted to foment a rebellion in the countryside. Not only was there no positive response to the call for insurrection; the imprisonment of many established clerics during the ensuing government’s crackdown produced little protest. But the very strategies used to sideline the conservatives had also empowered the modernist ideological descendants of Amanullah who believed that the Musahiban rule was too reactionary. Underestimating these people would prove the dynasty’s undoing."


              In my opinion today's ground realities internal, reigonal--specially enemy neighbors Iran and Pakistan and world makes re-implemention of Musahibans policies impossible.
              Oh wait wait. A Pashtun blaming all his miseries on Iran, Pakistan, America, Tajiks and Israel.Nothing new here. Move along loooooooooool
              "For thirty years, I endured much pain and strife,
              I awaken the Ajam by this Persian [language]. "

              -Ferdowsi.

              Comment

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