Originally posted by DSM0305
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1) There are actually surrogate measures of who is, ethnically involved in the insurgency. One of those is the ethnicity/identification of the suicide bombers.
Here is what we know:
The UNAMA analysts interviewed 23 persons incarcerated or awaiting trial in connection with suicide attacks in Afghanistan. The interviews ranged from 30 minutes to two hours. They reveal that, contrary to the popular contention that Afghans are not involved in suicide
attacks, 21 of the 23 interviewees were Afghan nationals and two were Pakistani nationals. However, of the 21 Afghan nationals, 14 had spent time as refugees in Pakistan and two had been refugees in Iran. The youngest interviewee was 15 years-old and the oldest was in his 50s. The average age was around 26. The profiles of two of the interviewees are reproduced below (the UNAMA report provides biographical sketches of five prisoners). To protect their identities, all names have been changed. Page 5
attacks, 21 of the 23 interviewees were Afghan nationals and two were Pakistani nationals. However, of the 21 Afghan nationals, 14 had spent time as refugees in Pakistan and two had been refugees in Iran. The youngest interviewee was 15 years-old and the oldest was in his 50s. The average age was around 26. The profiles of two of the interviewees are reproduced below (the UNAMA report provides biographical sketches of five prisoners). To protect their identities, all names have been changed. Page 5
Some of this derives from UNAMA and Pape has the largest database of such attacks and events in Afghanistan and corroborates the overwhelming predominant ethnicity in this surrogate measure is Pashtun and that they are Afghan nationals.
The other gives some reasoning as well:
It is true that many suicide bombers have Pakistani connections, but the reason for that is that Pakistan has had more than two million Afghan refugees, many of whom have attended or still attend madrasas and are or were exposed to radical and militant ideologies. The general point is that the environment of the refugee camps seems to be conducive to producing a
militant ideology. Page 3
militant ideology. Page 3
the other directly comments on this ANA propaganda point:
A senior military commander of the Afghan Army was reported as saying: “The explosives come from Pakistan and the drivers come from Pakistan and foreign countries. It is very difficult for an Afghan to persuade himself to commit suicide”. (Baldauf 2006). page 3
It is true that many suicide bombers have Pakistani connections, but the reason for that is that Pakistan has had more than two million Afghan refugees, many of whom have attended or still attend madrasas and are or were exposed to radical and militant ideologies.
Even today the large majority of the Taliban rank-and-file are Pashtuns, perhaps up to 95 percent of them.
2) Trusting army sources. Irrespective of which army it is, whether it is the US Army, the Nicaraguan Army, the ANA, Pakistan's Army - there is no way to justify that statement as a valid piece of submitted truth/evidence.
There are a host of examples, like the one provided above that evidence a propensity for the ANA leadership, for instance, to lie or fabricate these things.
Its like when the US Army said that they shot through hostile enemies and territory to save Jessica Lynch:
As was the death of Pat Tillman etc.
Members of the ANP, like AbdurRazzaq, have even used this ruse, regarding Pakistani infiltrators to kill Afghans:
Yet, as a 2006 State Department report shows, U.S. officials have for years been aware of credible allegations that Raziq and his men participated in a cold-blooded massacre of civilians, the details of which have, until now, been successfully buried. And this, in turn, raises questions regarding whether U.S. officials may have knowingly violated a 1997 law that forbids assistance to foreign military units involved in human-rights violations
As Raziq intended, the victims were framed as Taliban in the Afghan press. There was an outcry across the border in Pakistan, however, where many of the victims’ families lived. On March 23, two days after the murders, the Pakistani Foreign Office lodged a protest with the Afghan ambassador in Islamabad. Yet it is likely that Raziq and Lalai would have kept the truth hidden, were it not for an Afghan official working for the European Union who had happened to be in Spin Boldak at the time of the murders.
The same went for the famous Gardez killings where both ANA and the USA claimed first that Talibs killed the family members Scahill reported on, and then they tried to save face by claiming Talibs lived in the house. They eventually had to admit to the truth.
Armies at war are expected to do cover ups and emit propaganda - therefore, asking an audience to rely on the ANA's word about their sworn enemy is like asking a Catholic Priest to give an earnest assessment about the Quran... he might be honest, he might be a studied person, but most people know to recalibrate for bias.

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