Poll: Will the Taliban regain power after the US "leaves"?

[vinyard80]

Well, they already have regained power in most of Afghanistan.
Outside of Kabul, Herat, Mazar, and the most of the North, the Afghan insurgency retains control of the Southern, Central, and Eastern Afghanistan.

The Lt. Davis Report of 2012 confirms this, and this report was published before US/NATO withdrawal began

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/truth-lies-and-afghanistan/

Whether the US/NATO wants to stay or not is not the issue, its whether Pakistan military continues to give NATO supply routes to Afghanistan. Without the Pakistani NATO routes, the US/NATO can not stay for a limited mission. This issue was a sticking point back in 2012 when NATO sought reopening of the supply routes. Pakistan intends to close the NATO supply route in 2015. http://www.startribune.com/world/164524536.html


With the Nawaz government taking primacy over the Pakistani military, and pursuing peace talks with the Pakistan insurgency, its anyone guess what the results of the talks will be.

By "central afghanistan" I guess you mean bamyan, maidan and daykundi. Well these provinces are mainly inhabited by hazeras and according icasualities are the most peaceful provinces in afghanistan.

Talibans have a strong presence in south and east but its not a real rule because there is not any taliban rule. When ANA attacks those provinces they just leave and come back after the operation. They are just taking advantage of the lawless situation in those areas. They just remain a rural pashtun militia with no real power in politics.

[Da Bannu Mazdigar]

Formation of new countries in this century is impossible.

BSA need to be signed,American troops should remain in Afghanistan since with them,America will also provide financial support to Afghanistan.

A divided Afghanistan will create alot of problems in the region.Considering tha the pashtun belt with be on Pakistan head while the persian belt on iran

[Shah-i-Kot]

By "central afghanistan" I guess you mean bamyan, maidan and daykundi. Well these provinces are mainly inhabited by hazeras and according icasualities are the most peaceful provinces in afghanistan.

Talibans have a strong presence in south and east but its not a real rule because there is not any taliban rule. When ANA attacks those provinces they just leave and come back after the operation. They are just taking advantage of the lawless situation in those areas. They just remain a rural pashtun militia with no real power in politics.

Several reports state it, not me. Its up to you whether you want to accept the facts or not.

This is what the ANSF is today. I predict you will attempt to discredit the report (only thing you can do to maintain your out of reality perspective). However, you should know the Lt.Davis is a US military officer who has US interests on his mind, and wanted the US effort to succeed. He has concluded with his report that the US has failed, as many other reports have.

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/truth-lies-and-afghanistan/

"Davis: “Here you have many units of the Afghan National Security Forces [ANSF]. Will they be able to hold out against the Taliban when U.S. troops leave this area?”
Adviser: “No. They are definitely not capable. Already all across this region [many elements of] the security forces have made deals with the Taliban. [The ANSF] won’t shoot at the Taliban, and the Taliban won’t shoot them.
“Also, when a Taliban member is arrested, he is soon released with no action taken against him. So when the Taliban returns [when the Americans leave after 2014], so too go the jobs, especially for everyone like me who has worked with the coalition."

[Bengal_Tiger]

This thread was started a year ago.

From the poll (not that it means, just a few Pashtun forum members that's all but perhaps representative of their wider friends and family or certain segments of Afghan society) it seems that there was a majority thinking that the Taliban (or Pashtun "Islamists" of some sort) would regain power.

What has happened since then?

1. The Kabul government (KG) is still in power.

2. The KG in the form of its ANA troops has taken parts of Helmand from the Taliban and other parts of the mainly Pashtun south and east.

The Taliban are trying to regain control.




3. The much talked about "2014 withdrawal" is now being extended to 2016.

For those who unquestioningly believe the comments of US officials (one of the most duplicitous and deceitful regimes on earth) in online articles, they need to realize.

a: There is something called "lying" and the US - believe it or not (*shock, horror* - gasp) - is capable of that.

b: Even if you believe the US never lies (alongside Santa and the tooth fairy) it is possible that they might "change their mind" as they have already done, first saying a 2014 withdrawal then 2016.

Some are already suggesting that:

The White House made it clear that the 2016 deadline remains firmly in place, but that will likely eventually slip too.

http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/04/02/US-delays-Afghanistan-troop-withdrawal;-will-others-follow.aspx?COLLCC=325288847&

4. So there is no guarantee of a US "withdrawal" but even a withdrawal does not mean zero US troops in the country, in fact the US always says there will be a force of soldiers for basic things e.g. protecting their embassy.

But aside from that there are also non-regular US forces such as professional contractors who are not included in this.

I am not sure if Turkey will withdraw all its troops alongside the Americans.




5. There is a general consensus that the Taliban is not strong enough to take Kabul.




6. China is more pro-active in Afghan affairs and might be discreetly leaning on Pakistan to behave a bit better.

Aside from China, Afghanistan has Turkey and Iran to counter the Taliban as Turkey supports Turkic peoples like the Uzbeks, Turkmens and the Hazaras (Mongoloid but considered Turanic by the Ankara regime) and Iran supports Shias and opposed to the Taliban.


[MENTION=5723]Kushan Prince[/MENTION] has been proven right it seems that the ANA are much stronger than someone like me (of 1 year ago) or others had thought.

Well done Kushan.



- Aside from that there is the peace process which Ghani is trying very passionately to push through to resolve the country's war. The mere fact that there is a peace process means both sides have to some what moderate their military activities a bit because if they go too far the other side will call it off. The Taliban anyway control mainly irrelevant uninhabited stretches of Afghan territory.


It's not entirely impossible that the Taliban fight their way to conquer Kabul , however it doesn't seem likely at all.

[kanishka]

No

The AFghan Mellat will kick Taliban take over

[kanishka]

http://afghanmirror.tripod.com/id41.html

these guys will take over

[BarakzaiAbdali]

This thread was started a year ago.

From the poll (not that it means, just a few Pashtun forum members that's all but perhaps representative of their wider friends and family or certain segments of Afghan society) it seems that there was a majority thinking that the Taliban (or Pashtun "Islamists" of some sort) would regain power.

What has happened since then?

1. The Kabul government (KG) is still in power.

2. The KG in the form of its ANA troops has taken parts of Helmand from the Taliban and other parts of the mainly Pashtun south and east.

The Taliban are trying to regain control.




3. The much talked about "2014 withdrawal" is now being extended to 2016.

For those who unquestioningly believe the comments of US officials (one of the most duplicitous and deceitful regimes on earth) in online articles, they need to realize.

a: There is something called "lying" and the US - believe it or not (*shock, horror* - gasp) - is capable of that.

b: Even if you believe the US never lies (alongside Santa and the tooth fairy) it is possible that they might "change their mind" as they have already done, first saying a 2014 withdrawal then 2016.

Some are already suggesting that:

http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/04/02/US-delays-Afghanistan-troop-withdrawal;-will-others-follow.aspx?COLLCC=325288847&

4. So there is no guarantee of a US "withdrawal" but even a withdrawal does not mean zero US troops in the country, in fact the US always says there will be a force of soldiers for basic things e.g. protecting their embassy.

But aside from that there are also non-regular US forces such as professional contractors who are not included in this.

I am not sure if Turkey will withdraw all its troops alongside the Americans.




5. There is a general consensus that the Taliban is not strong enough to take Kabul.




6. China is more pro-active in Afghan affairs and might be discreetly leaning on Pakistan to behave a bit better.

Aside from China, Afghanistan has Turkey and Iran to counter the Taliban as Turkey supports Turkic peoples like the Uzbeks, Turkmens and the Hazaras (Mongoloid but considered Turanic by the Ankara regime) and Iran supports Shias and opposed to the Taliban.


[MENTION=5723]Kushan Prince[/MENTION] has been proven right it seems that the ANA are much stronger than someone like me (of 1 year ago) or others had thought.

Well done Kushan.



- Aside from that there is the peace process which Ghani is trying very passionately to push through to resolve the country's war. The mere fact that there is a peace process means both sides have to some what moderate their military activities a bit because if they go too far the other side will call it off. The Taliban anyway control mainly irrelevant uninhabited stretches of Afghan territory.


It's not entirely impossible that the Taliban fight their way to conquer Kabul , however it doesn't seem likely at all.

Zama Malgaraay (My Friend),

I would say that I stand by Michael Scheuer's prediction as most of his assessments have been spot on:

And the thing that these American experts knew best and above all others was that there was no possibility of installing a broad-based, Western style, democratic, power-sharing central government in Kabul. They knew that any attempt to do so would inevitably fail and take that much-brutalized country on yet another long and bloody trail that would end at some point, in the restoration of a Pashtun-dominated Islamist government that would mirror the Taliban in all but name.

Imperial Hubris pg 29

What is going on currently is the following: Their continued presence is merely delaying defeat. This was stated in 2009 with the "surge"

Team Obama faces quite a dilemma. McChrystal’s plan to stave off defeat by asking for substantial immediate reinforcements — a request that is still far short of what is needed to "win" in Afghanistan...

http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/12/get-nasty-or-go-home/?wp_login_redirect=0

Additionally, be wary of trusting the military industrial complex's Lara Loganish pollyanna potemkin village narrative trumpeting a supreme ANA fighting force.

This very recent article dated March 3 2015

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/mar/3/afghan-national-army-decimated-dwindling-personnel/

states:

The

Afghan National Army is shrinking at the very time it is being called on to conduct all combat operations as American troops head toward a complete exit by 2017, a new audit shows.

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) said on Tuesday that the ANA has declined by 8.5 percent, or 15,636 soldiers, in the past 12 months alone. It is down to 169,203 personnel, the lowest level since August 2011.

What’s more, the IG’s report strongly implies that the U.S. command in Kabul tried to cover up the bad numbers.

The IG report said that just a week after it submitted a classified report to Congress on troops strength, ArmyGen. John F. Campbell, the top U.S. commander, informed the IG that the command “had reversed itself and declassified the bulk of the material it had classified only a few days earlier.”

The authors are referring to this controversial move that ended up being overturned when critics bore down on them: The never before done move to classify information as Top Secret, relating to the status of the Afghan forces

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/29/opinion/inconvenient-truths-in-afghanistan.html?_r=0

Five days later, military officials followed up with an unusual request. Commanders in Afghanistan informed the inspector general’s office that they had decided to classify the bulk of that data. The decision came after the military, late last year, classified a periodic report that the inspector general has used over the years as the primary source to assess the state of Afghan forces. The stated reason? It could give the enemy the upper hand.

The excuse???

http://news.yahoo.com/us-says-details-aid-afghan-army-now-secret-180956976.html

The US commander in Afghanistan, General John Campbell, defended the move, saying the information -- which includes an assessment of the combat readiness of Afghan units -- could prove helpful to Taliban insurgents and needed to be kept secret.

So John Campbell is saying that after 15 years of fighting a bloody conflict, that somehow now, a decade and a half later they have discovered that Taliban might benefit from knowing that the status of the Afghan forces is "peachy", "amazing", "warrior strong", or whatever other nonsense emanates from Kabul or Washington to somehow explain the attrition and death rates?

That is not the sign of a strong military or a strengthening one. At best they utilized some northern alliance mercenaries as their front men in provinces they shouldn't and call it "progress" at worst, they kick down doors like they did in Gardez and murder innocent people and then have to lie about how amazing their forces are doing:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O7UCFSbduuY

[Bengal_Tiger]

Barakzai Abdali a couple of points,


1. I am not an expert and don't claim to be and have stated this profusely on the forum and in a long-winded rant to [MENTION=1201]Toramana[/MENTION] yesterday I was basically saying I place great value on personal evidence, witness of sincere people as opposed to the "unquestionably, always true, always honest mainstream western media" which transmits nothing but truth.



2. A year or two ago like many others who don't know much about Afghanistan I would simply have assumed that the Taliban were a motivated fighting force (yes I know that it is not as simple as "The Taliban" and this is a lazy term denoting many local conservative Pashtuns in the south & eastern regions) and as soon as the Americans left the Kabul government would inevitably fall in much the way that the south Vietnam government fell to the more motivated Vietcong.



3. However I have realized and learnt that the ANA are actually much stronger than I thought. In the past I used to believe what [MENTION=17960]Herat[/MENTION] used to say that they are all addicted to Hash and a post-NATO withdrawal collapse of the Kabul government was inevitable (as I've said in point 2) but actually they are doing quite well militarily considering their limited resources.

Even [MENTION=17582]Al-Afghani[/MENTION] a little while back said he thinks the Taliban cannot capture Kabul.

[MENTION=1498]ComradePashtun[/MENTION] a few weeks ago I think said that in his opinion it's obvious the Kabul government was going to defeat the Taliban.

From the top of my head I can't remember what [MENTION=1444]Azmal[/MENTION] thinks on this but I know he is quite smart on this.

I'd be interested in what [MENTION=17579]Loy Afghanistan[/MENTION] thinks on this too.



4. Even if the Taliban do regain power they will not be seen as a liberating force by all of the Afghan people (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Turkmen, Baloch etc) but as one particular faction having taken control of a large (most likely majority) of the country but seen by them as repressive.

They are not some sort of liberation army.

When the Soviets occupied Afghanistan, all ethnic groups basically wanted them out be it Pashtuns or Tajiks.

This is not the case now.




5. If the Taliban regain power, what will their policies be on these issues?

- Employment
- IT industry and digitalization
- Education including sponsoring Afghans to do MAs and Phds abroad
- Rights of women
- Foreign investment

Do they even have policies on some of these policy areas?




6. Though it does have a time and a place be careful of extensive quoting of western "experts".

We live in a very west/Euro-centric global order and just quoting these white men and citing them as some sort of examples of authority is putting them on a pedestal which they don't deserve. If it's concrete knowledge e.g. medicine, science where there are hard concrete facts then that's fine. If it's just personal opinions on a political issue (unless reinforced by years of knowledge of a certain country and its history, culture, politics etc or inside information with e.g. Washington insiders) it is just as valid as any one else's opinion, and less valid perhaps than the opinion of any educated Afghan who lives in the country or visits regularly.

I have noted you love to paste quotes extensively and cite the names of the sources (usually some white western man of a Christian background) but moderation is a virtue, and excess in anything has its flaws.


Anyway just my 2 cents.

[BarakzaiAbdali]

Barakzai Abdali a couple of points,


1. I am not an expert and don't claim to be and have stated this profusely on the forum and in a long-winded rant to @Toramana yesterday I was basically saying I place great value on personal evidence, witness of sincere people as opposed to the "unquestionably, always true, always honest mainstream western media" which transmits nothing but truth.


Dear Sher-Da-Bengladesh, I do not disagree that we have to have a systematic way of assessing truth from untruth in this modern environment. Take for instance the Ukraine War - tons of disinformation floating around in the media. However, where I diverge and would ask you to elucidate your thoughts is to think about the following:

1) On the ground: What does this mean exactly? So for instance, if you talk to an "on the ground" person with an NGO who is Western vs Afghan ethnic; or "on the ground" Taliban, or "on the ground" former Marxist/nationalist/now democrat, or governmental employee you will get a certain viewpoint.

Take Iran for instance, if you talk to an upper class Tehran individual vs a rural country side Iranian you will get two viewpoints but both will argue that theirs is the predominant and often they inject emotionalism and their own personal desires and wants into the discussion.

This is not to say that on the ground reporting doesn't matter... it has its place - as I quoted Hajji Durrani of Kandahar regarding the recent ISIS issue to show that the locals are not as keen on endorsing that particular commanders reputed move to said organization.

2) What does mainstream mean? For instance, is Michael Scheuer mainstream when he tells the truth here?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IMOtC9zGQHI

A discerning mind can cut through the fat so to speak, and do a few things:

A) Look at the person's credentials and background... if David Frum is writing an article - of course we would be suspicious based on his idiotic history
B) Read prior work by individual and see how evidence based on target he or she is.
C) Examine media correspondents reaction to said party.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5OI8Y0jjM0k

^ Or does this documentary carry weight? Since Refsdahl is on the ground with individuals?

3) Are you balancing out the on the ground information by ensuring you are hearing those multiple voices?

2. A year or two ago like many others who don't know much about Afghanistan I would simply have assumed that the Taliban were a motivated fighting force (yes I know that it is not as simple as "The Taliban" and this is a lazy term denoting many local conservative Pashtuns in the south & eastern regions) and as soon as the Americans left the Kabul government would inevitably fall in much the way that the south Vietnam government fell to the more motivated Vietcong.


I never assumed this or alleged this. Others here have, but I have viewed this is possibly a 30 year conflict. Its not common sense to assume the richest super power to exist will simply be defeated in that quick manner. Those who study insurgency strategy and discuss it academically will tell you that there are a few key ingredients for a successful insurgency (and we see this in Iraq/Syria as well): 1) A backwards operating base 2) Unlimited manpower 3) Home turf advantage 4) Time and less of a requirement for money and treasure. The difference also between Vietnam and now is that China and Russia, two rising super powers were training the Vietcong whereas the Afghan insurgency has limited access to these measures.

3. However I have realized and learnt that the ANA are actually much stronger than I thought. In the past I used to believe what @Herat used to say that they are all addicted to Hash and a post-NATO withdrawal collapse of the Kabul government was inevitable (as I've said in point 2) but actually they are doing quite well militarily considering their limited resources.

I would beg to differ based on the sources I provided... which aren't Western or media savvy - they simply are to the root of the problem and provide hard numbers and stats.

With just two months left before the formal end of the 13-year international combat mission, Western officials insist that the Afghan security forces have managed to contain the Taliban’s offensives on their own. But the insurgents’ alarming gains in Kunduz in recent weeks present a different picture.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/wo...orth.html?_r=0

Even @Al-Afghani a little while back said he thinks the Taliban cannot capture Kabul.

They do not need to "capture" it, they merely need to prove that the most safe areas like Wazir Akbar are not secure, and they have done this, holding off ANA security for gun battles lasting 2/3 of a day or more and strike again a few weeks later. The excuses from the government are "these are nuisance attacks, nothing more." Yet nuisance attacks do not cause economic hesitance, and cause supportive NGOs to rethink presence due to security. These are better metrics than a northern alliance, mossoud era devotee supporting a northern alliance fiat accompli.

@ComradePashtun a few weeks ago I think said that in his opinion it's obvious the Kabul government was going to defeat the Taliban.

On a personal level I like ComradePashtun, but he and I disagree on pretty much everything, which is OK. But they have been saying this for 15 + years. Every year they "are on the verge of a peace deal" or "on the verge of defeating" the Taliban "or on the verge of squeezing Pakistan into submission." Each passing year we see the same thing happen - NATO/ISAF leaves and an area gets overrun. It makes the news and the Talibs recede to live another day and pop up elsewhere.

In an area that has not been a primary front against the Taliban for years, there are now two districts almost entirely under Taliban rule, local officials say. The Taliban are administering legal cases and schools, and even allowing international aid operations to work there, the officials say.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/wo...orth.html?_r=0

From the top of my head I can't remember what @Azmal thinks on this but I know he is quite smart on this.

I'd be interested in what @Loy Afghanistan thinks on this too.



4. Even if the Taliban do regain power they will not be seen as a liberating force by all of the Afghan people (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Turkmen, Baloch etc) but as one particular faction having taken control of a large (most likely majority) of the country but seen by them as repressive.

They are not some sort of liberation army.

Liberation is in the eye of the beholder. I tend to think that it is more complex in our Pashtun areas and that dynamics, war driven history, and local flavor also contributes to how governance occurs. As you said above, what is called Taliban is sort of a blanket grouped term of sometimes multiple disparate groups. Some of them are old school like Abdul Salam Zaeef and have a code they live by, others are brigands, and yet others are affiliated with proxy warfare.

When the Soviets occupied Afghanistan, all ethnic groups basically wanted them out be it Pashtuns or Tajiks.

This is not the case now.




5. If the Taliban regain power, what will their policies be on these issues?

- Employment
- IT industry and digitalization
- Education including sponsoring Afghans to do MAs and Phds abroad
- Rights of women
- Foreign investment

Do they even have policies on some of these policy areas?

In times of war in third world countries, whether it was the Sandinistas being assaulted by Reagan's goons, the Contras, or whether it was Guevara having to take on Batista, etc etc, to ask a liberation war front to don suits and ties and write out a history book and incorporate Steve Jobs while being maimed, massacred, hunted, relatives killed is a little much and a little bit ahistorical. However, I do agree with you that in the ideal world any group would be thinking in the long term. The issue here is that what is raging across the middle east is in some ways similar to the battles that raged across Latin America a few decades back. The Pan Latin American resistance had a greater continental ideology, and quiet frankly ideology is what drives the foot soldier as opposed to Steve Jobsian tinkering and inventiveness.

For instance, in Donetsk, the native Russians are doing their best to survive and to provide some semblance of governance and order as opposed to drafting out all the things you mention... instead it is the Kiev government that is thinking about IT, Women in the work place, etc. That however does not diminish the moral right that the Donetsk ethnic Russians have to defend their land against Victoria Nuland's onslaught does it?



6. Though it does have a time and a place be careful of extensive quoting of western "experts".

Without evidence and expertise, there is merely spread of disinformation. I hardly think a man that the insurgency itself pointed out could spell out its defeat (Scheuer) or an evidence based approach to analyzing why attacks occur (Pape) etc should be excluded from the discussion and people with agendas and secondary gain should be considered as having greater contribution?

We live in a very west/Euro-centric global order and just quoting these white men and citing them as some sort of examples of authority is putting them on a pedestal which they don't deserve.

My friend, it is not about merely white and black or red and blue. When a person has been proven right and cites direct sources and uses an evidence based approach and metrics, that person deserves attention irrespective of his creed. What is Scheuer's secondary gain as a college professor? If nothing else, he could do what Peter Bergen does and try to extend US involvement to ensure he has a terror analyst career for another decade or two.. instead he is advocating noninterventionalism. How is that suspect?

Here is an example of how prescient he is:
http://globalsecuritynews.com/Terror...a-terror-tiger

This is merely a month or two before Mumbai.. and he surmises:

If Islamist terrorists/insurgents - whether acting alone or with Pakistani aid - strike an Indian target of heretofore unprecedented economic importance or one that produces huge and mostly Hindu casualties, the road to war may be quite short.

That was a very skilled assessment my friend. I cannot simply call him a "white man" and ignore him because what he says makes me uncomfortable. Truth is truth from wherever it emanates.

If it's concrete knowledge e.g. medicine, science where there are hard concrete facts then that's fine.

Papes suicide data base is not hard facts and concrete data?

If it's just personal opinions on a political issue (unless reinforced by years of knowledge of a certain country and its history, culture, politics etc or inside information with e.g. Washington insiders)

Being the head of the Bin Ladin Unit (Scheuer) certainly meets this "reinforced with years of experience" principle.

it is just as valid as any one else's opinion, and less valid perhaps than the opinion of any educated Afghan who lives in the country or visits regularly.

It depends on the circumstance. As I said, which Afghan are you talking about? Karzai's relative Yama? Zahir Shah's grandson? Mullah Omar's kinsmen? etc etc. Each may offer a unique perspective but they also introduce bias and taint into the dialogue because they operate on the possibility of secondary gain.

Think about it like this: a person sitting in Kabul affiliated with the government with 24 hours of internet access in one of the poorest most war torn countries is a far far far far far cry from a person in the country side (80%+ of the population) with barely potable water and electricity <15% of the day. Of course for them, everything is pollyannish, up and up, and roses! And why wouldn't they? Why give up their shiny laptop and foreign assistance derived job by telling a bit of the truth regarding how things really are?

I have noted you love to paste quotes extensively and cite the names of the sources (usually some white western man of a Christian background) but moderation is a virtue, and excess in anything has its flaws.

If you can show me their errors, where their evidence trail is inept or corrupt, then I think we can agree or at least agree to disagree... until then I will simply have to disagree respectfully with such a sentiment that demands expertise, evidence, and references with a strong basis in history and skill be ignored. If you choose to do ignore evidence, history, and expertise then its at your own peril in interpretation my fear friend. Here is what you will miss:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qZNfuIvtLos




Anyway just my 2 cents.

And I truly appreciate your opinion but disagree with a certain percentage of it. The people of Bengladesh are a beautiful people with a rich history and a great service to humanity, and I enjoy your company here. Stay safe.

x

[Toramana]

Taleban are a spent force. They lost Afghanistan politically long-time ago and now they are loosing it militarily. However, Barakzai like people live in their self-constructed Utopia believing someday their fantasy dreams will be realised.

[Bengal_Tiger]

[MENTION=1772]BarakzaiAbdali[/MENTION]

Thanks for your kind words about Bangladesh and you welcoming my presence here is in stark contrast to a certain Arab (Yemeni to be precise) who is on this forum, discouraging non-Pashtun Muslims from contributing.


1. In terms of quoting people, that was a general comment not to give too much authority to "experts" (so-called).

As I said I'm not an expert on Afghanistan so can't say either way what is happening.


2. In terms of trusting ground sources, what I mean basically is the following.

There is an almost religious-like fundamentalist belief amongst some (including one or two in this forum) in the unquestionable truth of the "mainstream western media" and that if anyone questions their narrative or quotes from sources which disagree (no matter how much laden with actual facts) then he is a "conspiracy theorist", with connotations of being quasi-mad, irrational and quasi-radical.

Some of these connotations are not intended, but are subconscious.

The western media have an agenda and despite the false claims of them being free and fair they are connected to the establishments that rule the west and provide a narrative that supports the western agenda.

This sometimes includes dehumanizing people and casting them as units in a wider religious/ethnic community rather than the complex, multi-faceted reality of their individuality and often their general inherent human desire to live in peace.



Example. In place X in the middle east the media will say "so-and-so" is Sunni, "so-and-so" is a Shia. The viewer is led to believe these are people who hate all members of the opposite sect and will thus kill, they won't be shown the reality that most people (even in the middle east, and I'm not a fan of Arabs) want to live in peace.

There are simplified narratives presented e.g. "Yemen = Shia-Sunni conflict".

Nonsense, the Zaydi are hardly standard 12er Shia (though the Jarudiya strain within them are quite close to 12er Shias and are hostile to Abu Bakr and Umar) and most pray in Sunni mosques and vice versa. However in the western media the conflict in Yemen is portrayed as some sort of eternal conflict of hatred between two Shia and Sunni communities who loathe each other and live separately in an apartheid style situation.

Nonsense.

Anyway enough ranting from me, but the point is I would trust an Afghan who knows Afghanistan better than some western journalist who has a superficial understanding of Afghanistan and can't even speak Pashto or Dari.

Often western propaganda hides the true feelings and narratives of ordinary people.

Now there may be different types of Afghans, pro-Kabul, pro-Taliban, neutral, mixed etc.

However they have far more authority to speak on these issues than some Farangai western journalist, especially if they are ordinary civilians not affiliated to any political group or ideology.


Anyway I might have not made myself clear and am just rambling on and being long-winded but I've made some attempt to address some of your points, albeit maybe not as comprehensively and systematically as you may have wished.


As a foreigner who doesn't know about Afghanistan, I have some questions for you.

My questions

1. If the Kabul government has been democratically elected by the people how can Afghanistan be "occupied"?

Even if you argue that the elections are not legitimate or fair, what if hypothetically we knew that the majority of people in Afghanistan support the Ghani/Abdullah government and Kabul, then how can Afghanistan be "occupied"?

If it is not under occupation but under a popular government (albeit supported by foreign troops just as US troops are in Germany, Japan, South Korea etc) isn't armed opposition to it thus illegitimate?

Aren't the Taliban "terrorists"?

On social media, the vast majority of Afghans seem to be anti-Taliban



2. The goal of the people of Afghanistan is to live peacefully, happily and dignity in an independent Afghanistan.


Now isn't the issue of governance and how to make the lives of Afghanistan, very fundamental to any group striving to gain power?

What is the point of them trying to capture power if they have no vision of how they will make people's lives better?

The Taliban/"resistance" must have a programme for the Afghan people on all these points.

- How will they give them jobs?
- How will they give them good quality schools?
- How will they make them enjoy a better standard of living e.g. Iphones, cars and other consumer goods which everyone in the world has.

Is it wrong for Afghan citizens to want to have Iphones, cars, consumer goods which all of us in this forum enjoy?




Do the Taliban/"resistance" have any positive programme of their own besides just killing Muslim Afghan soldiers in the ANA (and also the Americans) and capturing power?

Why is it that the Taliban are prepared to kill Muslim Afghans but show utmost respect for Turkish soldiers?

Are Turkish lives more sacred than Afghan lives?

Link

I am genuinely interested.



To summarize, is Afghanistan really "occupied" when the government there has arguably (though you may despite this) received the democratic mandate of the Afghan people, and what will the Taliban do to make the lives of the Afghan people better or do they just want to enforce the backwards rule of the 1990s, or some sort of ISIS-type state?

[Insight]

Are Turkish lives more sacred than Afghan lives?

Link

I am genuinely interested.



To summarize, is Afghanistan really "occupied" when the government there has arguably (though you may despite this) received the democratic mandate of the Afghan people, and what will the Taliban do to make the lives of the Afghan people better or do they just want to enforce the backwards rule of the 1990s, or some sort of ISIS-type state?

There have been Turkish NATO troop casualties in Afghanistan in the last decade. The most recent was in February. http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/turkish...abul-1.2973049

In regards to the second question, the puppet regime in Kabul has no legitimacy since it was propped up by a foreign (Western troop) presence, and also by Pakistani NATO supply lines (interference). Karzai arrived in Afghanistan on a NATO chopper which flew out of Islamabad. Lets look at the facts.

Contrary to what you claim, the Kabul regime exerts almost no authority outside of Kabul. Here is one of the most valid reports written a few years back that you should read to gain a better understanding.

[khushal]

Kabul is basically surrounded:
March 2015 report:

http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/AFGH%20Report.pdf

[Insight]

Full text of the Davis report (which was fortunately posted here since the Armed Forced Journal-where it was originally published has removed it)

Truth, lies and Afghanistan
Mon Feb 6, 2012
I spent last year in Afghanistan, visiting and talking with U.S. troops and their Afghan partners. My duties with the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force took me into every significant area where our soldiers engage the enemy. Over the course of 12 months, I covered more than 9,000 miles and talked, traveled and patrolled with troops in Kandahar, Kunar, Ghazni, Khost, Paktika, Kunduz, Balkh, Nangarhar and other provinces.

What I saw bore no resemblance to rosy official statements by U.S. military leaders about conditions on the ground.

Entering this deployment, I was sincerely hoping to learn that the claims were true: that conditions in Afghanistan were improving, that the local government and military were progressing toward self-sufficiency. I did not need to witness dramatic improvements to be reassured, but merely hoped to see evidence of positive trends, to see companies or battalions produce even minimal but sustainable progress.

Instead, I witnessed the absence of success on virtually every level.

My arrival in country in late 2010 marked the start of my fourth combat deployment, and my second in Afghanistan. A Regular Army officer in the Armor Branch, I served in Operation Desert Storm, in Afghanistan in 2005-06 and in Iraq in 2008-09. In the middle of my career, I spent eight years in the U.S. Army Reserve and held a number of civilian jobs - among them, legislative correspondent for defense and foreign affairs for Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, R-Texas.

As a representative for the Rapid Equipping Force, I set out to talk to our troops about their needs and their circumstances. Along the way, I conducted mounted and dismounted combat patrols, spending time with conventional and Special Forces troops. I interviewed or had conversations with more than 250 soldiers in the field, from the lowest-ranking 19-year-old private to division commanders and staff members at every echelon. I spoke at length with Afghan security officials, Afghan civilians and a few village elders.

I saw the incredible difficulties any military force would have to pacify even a single area of any of those provinces; I heard many stories of how insurgents controlled virtually every piece of land beyond eyeshot of a U.S. or International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) base.

I saw little to no evidence the local governments were able to provide for the basic needs of the people. Some of the Afghan civilians I talked with said the people didn’t want to be connected to a predatory or incapable local government.

From time to time, I observed Afghan Security forces collude with the insurgency.

From Bad to Abysmal

Much of what I saw during my deployment, let alone read or wrote in official reports, I can’t talk about; the information remains classified. But I can say that such reports - mine and others’ - serve to illuminate the gulf between conditions on the ground and official statements of progress.

And I can relate a few representative experiences, of the kind that I observed all over the country.

In January 2011, I made my first trip into the mountains of Kunar province near the Pakistan border to visit the troops of 1st Squadron, 32nd Cavalry. On a patrol to the northernmost U.S. position in eastern Afghanistan, we arrived at an Afghan National Police (ANP) station that had reported being attacked by the Taliban 2½ hours earlier.

Through the interpreter, I asked the police captain where the attack had originated, and he pointed to the side of a nearby mountain.

“What are your normal procedures in situations like these?” I asked. “Do you form up a squad and go after them? Do you periodically send out harassing patrols? What do you do?”

As the interpreter conveyed my questions, the captain’s head wheeled around, looking first at the interpreter and turning to me with an incredulous expression. Then he laughed.

“No! We don’t go after them,” he said. “That would be dangerous!”

According to the cavalry troopers, the Afghan policemen rarely leave the cover of the checkpoints. In that part of the province, the Taliban literally run free.

In June, I was in the Zharay district of Kandahar province, returning to a base from a dismounted patrol. Gunshots were audible as the Taliban attacked a U.S. checkpoint about one mile away.

As I entered the unit’s command post, the commander and his staff were watching a live video feed of the battle. Two ANP vehicles were blocking the main road leading to the site of the attack. The fire was coming from behind a haystack. We watched as two Afghan men emerged, mounted a motorcycle and began moving toward the Afghan policemen in their vehicles.

The U.S. commander turned around and told the Afghan radio operator to make sure the policemen halted the men. The radio operator shouted into the radio repeatedly, but got no answer.

On the screen, we watched as the two men slowly motored past the ANP vehicles. The policemen neither got out to stop the two men nor answered the radio - until the motorcycle was out of sight.

To a man, the U.S. officers in that unit told me they had nothing but contempt for the Afghan troops in their area - and that was before the above incident occurred.

In August, I went on a dismounted patrol with troops in the Panjwai district of Kandahar province. Several troops from the unit had recently been killed in action, one of whom was a very popular and experienced soldier. One of the unit’s senior officers rhetorically asked me, “How do I look these men in the eye and ask them to go out day after day on these missions? What’s harder: How do I look [my soldier’s] wife in the eye when I get back and tell her that her husband died for something meaningful? How do I do that?”

One of the senior enlisted leaders added, “Guys are saying, ‘I hope I live so I can at least get home to R&R leave before I get it,’ or ‘I hope I only lose a foot.’ Sometimes they even say which limb it might be: ‘Maybe it’ll only be my left foot.’ They don’t have a lot of confidence that the leadership two levels up really understands what they’re living here, what the situation really is.”

On September 11, the 10th anniversary of the infamous attack on the U.S., I visited another unit in Kunar province, this one near the town of Asmar. I talked with the local official who served as the cultural adviser to the U.S. commander. Here’s how the conversation went:

Davis: “Here you have many units of the Afghan National Security Forces [ANSF]. Will they be able to hold out against the Taliban when U.S. troops leave this area?”

Adviser: “No. They are definitely not capable. Already all across this region [many elements of] the security forces have made deals with the Taliban. [The ANSF] won’t shoot at the Taliban, and the Taliban won’t shoot them.

“Also, when a Taliban member is arrested, he is soon released with no action taken against him. So when the Taliban returns [when the Americans leave after 2014], so too go the jobs, especially for everyone like me who has worked with the coalition.

“Recently, I got a cell phone call from a Talib who had captured a friend of mine. While I could hear, he began to beat him, telling me I’d better quit working for the Americans. I could hear my friend crying out in pain. [The Talib] said the next time they would kidnap my sons and do the same to them. Because of the direct threats, I’ve had to take my children out of school just to keep them safe.

“And last night, right on that mountain there [he pointed to a ridge overlooking the U.S. base, about 700 meters distant], a member of the ANP was murdered. The Taliban came and called him out, kidnapped him in front of his parents, and took him away and murdered him. He was a member of the ANP from another province and had come back to visit his parents. He was only 27 years old. The people are not safe anywhere.”

That murder took place within view of the U.S. base, a post nominally responsible for the security of an area of hundreds of square kilometers. Imagine how insecure the population is beyond visual range. And yet that conversation was representative of what I saw in many regions of Afghanistan.

In all of the places I visited, the tactical situation was bad to abysmal. If the events I have described - and many, many more I could mention - had been in the first year of war, or even the third or fourth, one might be willing to believe that Afghanistan was just a hard fight, and we should stick it out. Yet these incidents all happened in the 10th year of war.

As the numbers depicting casualties and enemy violence indicate the absence of progress, so too did my observations of the tactical situation all over Afghanistan.

Credibility Gap

I’m hardly the only one who has noted the discrepancy between official statements and the truth on the ground.

A January 2011 report by the Afghan NGO Security Office noted that public statements made by U.S. and ISAF leaders at the end of 2010 were “sharply divergent from IMF, [international military forces, NGO-speak for ISAF] ‘strategic communication’ messages suggesting improvements. We encourage [nongovernment organization personnel] to recognize that no matter how authoritative the source of any such claim, messages of the nature are solely intended to influence American and European public opinion ahead of the withdrawal, and are not intended to offer an accurate portrayal of the situation for those who live and work here.”

The following month, Anthony Cordesman, on behalf of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, wrote that ISAF and the U.S. leadership failed to report accurately on the reality of the situation in Afghanistan.

“Since June 2010, the unclassified reporting the U.S. does provide has steadily shrunk in content, effectively ‘spinning’ the road to victory by eliminating content that illustrates the full scale of the challenges ahead,” Cordesman wrote. “They also, however, were driven by political decisions to ignore or understate Taliban and insurgent gains from 2002 to 2009, to ignore the problems caused by weak and corrupt Afghan governance, to understate the risks posed by sanctuaries in Pakistan, and to ‘spin’ the value of tactical ISAF victories while ignoring the steady growth of Taliban influence and control.”

How many more men must die in support of a mission that is not succeeding and behind an array of more than seven years of optimistic statements by U.S. senior leaders in Afghanistan? No one expects our leaders to always have a successful plan. But we do expect - and the men who do the living, fighting and dying deserve - to have our leaders tell us the truth about what’s going on.

I first encountered senior-level equivocation during a 1997 division-level “experiment” that turned out to be far more setpiece than experiment. Over dinner at Fort Hood, Texas, Training and Doctrine Command leaders told me that the Advanced Warfighter Experiment (AWE) had shown that a “digital division” with fewer troops and more gear could be far more effective than current divisions. The next day, our congressional staff delegation observed the demonstration firsthand, and it didn’t take long to realize there was little substance to the claims. Virtually no legitimate experimentation was actually conducted. All parameters were carefully scripted. All events had a preordained sequence and outcome. The AWE was simply an expensive show, couched in the language of scientific experimentation and presented in glowing press releases and public statements, intended to persuade Congress to fund the Army’s preference. Citing the AWE’s “results,” Army leaders proceeded to eliminate one maneuver company per combat battalion. But the loss of fighting systems was never offset by a commensurate rise in killing capability.

A decade later, in the summer of 2007, I was assigned to the Future Combat Systems (FCS) organization at Fort Bliss, Texas. It didn’t take long to discover that the same thing the Army had done with a single division at Fort Hood in 1997 was now being done on a significantly larger scale with FCS. Year after year, the congressionally mandated reports from the Government Accountability Office revealed significant problems and warned that the system was in danger of failing. Each year, the Army’s senior leaders told members of Congress at hearings that GAO didn’t really understand the full picture and that to the contrary, the program was on schedule, on budget, and headed for success. Ultimately, of course, the program was canceled, with little but spinoffs to show for $18 billion spent.

If Americans were able to compare the public statements many of our leaders have made with classified data, this credibility gulf would be immediately observable. Naturally, I am not authorized to divulge classified material to the public. But I am legally able to share it with members of Congress. I have accordingly provided a much fuller accounting in a classified report to several members of Congress, both Democrats and Republicans, senators and House members.

A non-classified version is available at www.afghanreport.com. [Editor’s note: At press time, Army public affairs had not yet ruled on whether Davis could post this longer version.]

Tell The Truth

When it comes to deciding what matters are worth plunging our nation into war and which are not, our senior leaders owe it to the nation and to the uniformed members to be candid - graphically, if necessary - in telling them what’s at stake and how expensive potential success is likely to be. U.S. citizens and their elected representatives can decide if the risk to blood and treasure is worth it.

Likewise when having to decide whether to continue a war, alter its aims or to close off a campaign that cannot be won at an acceptable price, our senior leaders have an obligation to tell Congress and American people the unvarnished truth and let the people decide what course of action to choose. That is the very essence of civilian control of the military. The American people deserve better than what they’ve gotten from their senior uniformed leaders over the last number of years. Simply telling the truth would be a good start."

[khushal]

How can one have an election with foreign troops on the ground. Thats like having an election here in America with Chinese troop presence. Like Americans will sit still for that and accept it.
Putin held an election in Crimea under Russian guns and Obama criticized him for it but it apparently is OK for Obama to do the same thing in Afghanistan. Hypocrisy at its finest. Hey Bangali lady, stop worshiping hypocrites like Putin and Obama.