Tweet
Abstract
The Pashtun people that straddle Afghanistan and Pakistan are divided along family, clan and tribal lines, but constitute an ethnic-based nation in the classic sense of the term. Since the end of 2001, many of them find themselves subjected to intense efforts by the Afghan and Pakistani governments, backed by the US and many of its allies, to expunge the Pashtun-dominated radical Taliban Islamic movement from their midst. However, many Pashtuns now see themselves as squeezed in by adversarial forces, encroaching upon their religion, land, resources, honour, and cultural-social norms and values. In the absence of a return to peace and stability in their lives and locations, they are becoming increasingly prone to accommodating the Taliban not only as a religious, but also as a nationalist movement, and could eventually brush aside their historical divisions, and rally behind the Taliban leadership in pursuit of their historical goal of an independent “Pashtunistan”. This paper identifies several ways of acting to avert such a development—a consideration that seems to be missing in the strategic calculations of the Afghan and Pakistani governments, as well as their international backers.
Introduction
Although divided along family, clan and tribal lines, the Pashtun people that straddle Afghanistan and Pakistan share a common ethnic origin. They have historically shown a flair for self-rule or independence. Since the end of 2001, many of them now find themselves subjected to intense efforts by the Afghan and Pakistani governments, backed by the US and many of its allies, to expunge the Pashtun-dominated radical Taliban Islamic movement from their midst. This carries the risk of political and social alienation that could only enhance Pashtun militancy across the Afghan-Pakistan border, with serious political, security, and territorial consequences for both countries. The question is: how to deter such a development?
The Pashtuns as an "Ethnie"
Originating from what is today southern Afghanistan, the Pashtuns form an “ethnie”, or what Anthony Smith defines as “a named population sharing a collective proper name, a presumed common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differencing elements of common culture, an association with a specific 'homeland' and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population”.1 As such they constitute an ethnic-based nation in the classic sense of the term.
One of the Pashtuns' patrimonial codes of conduct is pakhunwali, which centres upon such notions as honour or nang, involving the protection of sexual propriety, which is of utmost importance to a Pashtun; the principle of revenge or badal, which is intimately associated with the notion of honour and upholds the dictum of “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth”; and hospitality, or melmastia—which underlines the importance of maintaining loyalty to friends and allies, and providing protection to whoever seeks it, including an enemy, for so long as a person is in the realm of a Pashtun's home.2 Another shared characteristic since the end of the seventh century has been their adherence to Islam, predominantly its Sunni sect, although the Pashtuns have generally embraced a moderate, rather than radical, form of Islam, as expounded by the Hanifi School of thought.3
The Pashtuns' existence as far back as 2,500 years ago is confirmed by the Greek historian Herodotus (484-425 bc), who referred to “Partika” in his writings.4 This fact has since been firmly established by a string of historians, including the British writer and traveller Henry Walter Bellew (1834-1892), who published extensively on various Pashtun tribes.5
The Pashtuns' “home territory” has historically straddled today's Pakistan and Afghanistan, stretching from the Indus River, which runs from Kashmir through Pakistan and to the Arabian Sea, to the Hindu Kush ranges that dissect Afghanistan into north and south, with the Afghan capital Kabul located in the latter. They have in the past identified this area as “Pakhtunkhwa”, or “Pashtun Quarter”. In 2007, an estimated 12.5 million Pashtuns formed 42% of the total population of Afghanistan, and some 30 million made up 16% of the total citizens of Pakistan, with a concentration in Pakhtunkhwa.6 Yet, the Pashtuns have never had an independent state-homeland of their own. They have constantly suffered from not only internal divisions, but also from foreign subjugation, which has instilled among them an acute perception of deprivation and victimization. All this has come to lay the necessary historical foundations for a distinct Pashtun identity and codes of behaviour, and, therefore, for the growth of what can be termed as Pashtun nationalism in pursuit of self-rule and independence.
The Pashtuns have rarely acted as a coherent collective. They have often been fragmented into various social segments, at times in serious feuds and conflicts with one another. Throughout history, they have been subjected to periodic interventions, and occupation, by outside forces which have sought to subdue them for geopolitical objectives (although, at times, they have done the same to others). Attempts by some of their leaders to unite them in pursuit of independence have in general been futile. But there have been periods during which they have shown nationalist solidarity, especially when they have either been engaged in successful military offensives and territorial conquests, or seriously threatened by an outside force.
The Pashtuns' Shared History
Until the Twentieth Century
One of their earliest patriotic leaders, who sought to unite them in a nationalist movement in the seventeenth century, was the famous Pashtun warrior-poet and chief of the Khattak tribe, Khushal Khan Khattak (1613-1689). He was initially in the service of the Mughal emperors, but his relationship with his masters turned sour, partly due to his Pashtun nationalist tendencies. After a period of imprisonment by the Mughal Emperor Aurangzib, he devoted himself to promoting Pashtun unity and independence. Although ultimately he could not achieve this objective, his efforts nonetheless contributed significantly to raising a nationalist consciousness among the Pashtuns as a distinct Muslim ethnie—a development which, in turn, contributed to many Pashtun nationalist revolts. He is widely revered by many Pashtuns in both Afghanistan and Pakistan as a great nationalist hero.7
Pashtun unity and nationalism peaked when Ahmad Shah Durrani, an Afghan (synonymous with Pashtun) tribal chief and military commander, formed a confederation of Pashtun tribes in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in 1747, which he consolidated rapidly into a vast Afghan/Pahstun-dominated empire. By the time of his death in 1772, the Durrani Empire stretched from north-eastern Iran, through Central Asia to eastern Punjab. It included all the areas that Pashtun nationalists recognized as “Pashtunkhwa”. This amounted to the fulfilment of a nationalist dream that the Pashtuns had not achieved before. The strength of the empire rested very much on “Pashtunism”—the assertion of Pashtun political and military supremacy—but this was combined with a form of moderate “Islamism”, and the inclusion of some elements of non-Pashtun minorities, to afford Ahmad Shah's rule wider religious and popular legitimacy.8
However, the Durrani Empire and the political domination of the Pashtuns could not last long. Internal conflicts, which stemmed from weak domestic structures, sibling rivalries resulting from the systematic practice of polygamy within the royal family, and the rise of the outside actors caused the Empire to crumble. At first, Ranjit Singh rose from Punjab and succeeded in establishing his Sikh empire (1799-1849), conquering the Pashtun territory to his west to include parts of what is today Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP); most importantly, its capital Peshawar, and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).9
Following the death of Ranjit Singh in 1849, and the decline of his empire largely because of internal strife, the British subjugated the Sikh domain, including its Pashtun territory, and adopted a forward policy to determine the status and boundaries of Afghanistan according to its colonial interests. Britain engaged in a protracted rivalry with Russia, within what became known as the “Great Game”, turning Afghanistan into a buffer state and gaining control over the country's finances and foreign policy.10 The most damaging British action, especially for the Pashtuns, came in 1893, when a British Commission, led by Sir Edward Durand, unilaterally determined the border between Afghanistan and British India. The 2,400-km long border, known as the “Durand Line”, ran exactly along the line that marks the Afghan-Pakistan boundary today.11 Although the opposing zones of influence were by this time a political fact, the Durand line confirmed that existing political separation. It dissected many Pashtun tribes, seriously undermining their potential for unity and prospects for an independent territory of Pashtunistan (or “place of Pashtuns”), which could have possibly been consolidated between the Indus River and Hindu Kush. At the same time, it sowed the seeds of an enduring border dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan which emerged upon the creation of the latter as a majority Muslim state out of the Hindu-dominated India in 1947.
In the Twentieth Century
Although a particular Pashtun clan—Mohammadzai of the Durrani tribe—retained Pashtun political and military ascendency in Afghanistan for most of the period from the late nineteenth century until the successful communist coup of April 1978, the Pashtuns of British India remained discontented, and at times rebellious in their pursuit of autonomy and independence. In the 1930s, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a renowned non-violent Pashtun political and popular leader, once again sought to unite the Pashtuns in opposition, at first to the British rule of India, and then to the transfer of India's Pashtun areas to the projected Pakistan. He founded the Khudai Khidmatgar (Servant of God) or “Red Shirt” movement for this purpose. He advocated the establishment of an independent “Pashtunistan”, but only through a non-violent strategy, as had been promoted by Mahtma Gandhi, and for this he became known as the “Frontier Gandhi”.12
However, his efforts did not result in the creation of an independent Pashtunistan. In the end, the Pashtuns not given what Muhammad Ali Jinnah's Muslim League had pledged in its Lahore Resolution of March 23, 1940: that the Pakistani state would be a confederation under which the main constituent units of East Bengal (which in 1971, broke away from the confederation and established itself as the independent state of Bangladesh), Punjab, Sindh, North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and Baluchistan would be “autonomous and sovereign”, and that the central government would be limited to defence, foreign affairs, foreign trade, communications and currency. Following a controversial referendum in the NWFP in 1947 by the British colonial authorities, the Pashtuns finally became part of Pakistan. The referendum gave the Pashtuns only the choice of joining either India or Pakistan, with no option of independence. Many Pashtuns boycotted the referendum—of the 572,799 eligible voters, only 292,118 participated.13
Once again, the hopes of Pashtun nationalists were frustrated, but their dreams remained alive. After the creation of Pakistan, successive Pashtun-led Afghan governments backed Ghaffar Khan's demand for a Pashtunistan carved out of the territory of Pakistan, but without any success. Kabul's demand was ostensibly in support of the right of Pakistani Pashtuns to self-determination. But in reality it was grounded in a firm assumption that a Pashtunistan entity would be closely linked to Afghanistan, enabling it to achieve two main objectives. One was to resolve, once and for all, the border dispute with Pakistan. Another was to secure direct access for landlocked Afghanistan to the Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Afghanistan's position was boosted from the late 1950s when the Soviet Union backed its Pashtunistan policy as part of a wider strategy of growing friendship between Afghanistan and the USSR, and alliance between Pakistan and the United States in the context of the global Cold War.14 The problem all along with Afghanistan's Pashtunistan policy was that if Kabul really wanted an independent state to exist, it would have had to concede much of its southern and eastern territories—something that no Afghan leader was prepared to do.
The Soviet Invasion
The Communist coup of April 1978 and the subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 20 months later changed the overall national and regional political and strategic landscape for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and for their Pashtun populations. Most of the communist leaders came from Pashtun background, however, the burning issue for most of the Pashtun population, as for the majority of the people of Afghanistan, was how to combat the Godless Soviet occupation and imposition, and to prevent Soviet expansion, especially into Pakistan as a frontline state. Most Pashtuns from both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border, like a majority of the non-Pashtun populations of Afghanistan as well as Pakistan, and many members of the international community, drew on Islam as an ideology of resistance to support an Afghan jihad against the Soviets and their surrogates. Various Afghan Islamic resistance groups (the Mujahideen) were formed to fight for their religion, honour and independence. Of the seven main Mujahideen groups, representing some 80% of the Sunni population of Afghanistan, six were predominantly Pashtun, supported by Pakistan to various degrees.15 Given the permeability of the Afghan-Pakistan border, through which all outside assistance was channelled to the Mujahideen, and the location of the Afghan Pashtun provinces on that border with Pakistan, the Pashtuns bore the brunt of Soviet bombardments. One consequence of this was that a majority of the tens and thousands killed, injured and forced into exile in Pakistan during the decade-long Soviet occupation were Pashtuns.16 This was instrumental in invoking their historical memory of subjugation and victimization.
Meanwhile, as the Pakistani Pashtuns were stimulated to support their Afghan kindred, Islamabad was provided with a unique opportunity to further its wider interests. It devised a strategy whereby it could overcome the Afghan-Pakistan border dispute in its favour, and seriously weaken the basis for any Pashtun nationalist demand for a Pashtunistan in the future. The strategy focused primarily on two goals. One was to support mainly the Pashtun Mujahideen groups, with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's radical Hezbi Islami (Islamic Party) of Afghanistan acting as the main client of Pakistan's powerful Directorate for Inter-services Intelligence (ISI),17 which was entrusted, from the early 1980s, with the implementation of Pakistan's Afghanistan and Kashmir policies. Another was to promote radical Islamism as a counter-balance to Pashtun nationalism. It is important to remember that although, until this time, Sunni Islam was a common thread in Pashtun nationalism, radical political Islam had not fundamentally underpinned it. Ethnicity had proved to be a greater motivating force.
The Soviet Withdrawal
The Soviet retreat from Afghanistan by 1989 and the collapse of the communist regime in Kabul three years later did not result in the political empowerment of Pashtuns in the country, as ISI and Islamabad had desired. The Soviet invasion had not only caused the Pashtuns to oppose the invasion, but also drove the non-Pashtun population of Afghanistan to play a key role in the resistance, and thus to secure a position for themselves whereby they would no longer accept a return to the historical Pashtun supremacy. When the communist government in Kabul reached its last days, a moderate Islamist nationalist, and predominantly non-Pashtun Mujahideen group, Jamiati Islami Afghanistan (the Islamic Society of Afghanistan), led by its political head Burhanuddin Rabani, and legendary resistance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, succeeded in taking power.18 To reverse this development, Islamabad swiftly repackaged its approach: at first it relied on Hekmatyar to prevent the consolidation of power under Jamiat's leadership, and then, when Hekmatyar failed to wrest power, it orchestrated and empowered the Taliban militia to achieve its objectives. The ISI raised the Taliban as a radical Sunni Pashtun force intended, at the very least, to link the Afghan territory organically from the Pakistan border to the Hindu Kush, into Pakistan for wider national and regional purposes, including securing unfettered access to Central Asia and strengthening its position vis-
-vis India.
The Taliban projected themselves as a radical Sunni Islamic movement, but the militia's Pashtuniat (Pashtun-centred) identity was undeniable. The Taliban did not officially recognise the Durand Line, but their rule of most of Afghanistan by 1998 marked the height of Pashtun political supremacy in Afghanistan.19 It also produced an Islamic pincer among the Pashtuns on the Pakistan side of the border, providing Islamabad with a potent means to shift the basis of Pashtun nationalism from ethnic and cultural solidarity to Islamism.
The Implications of the US-led Intervention
The US-led intervention in Afghanistan, as part of its wider “war on terrorism” following Al Qaeda's 11 September 2001 attacks on the US, once again swung the geopolitical pendulum against the Pashtuns. Although Hamid Karzai was chosen as a Pashtun to lead post-Taliban Afghanistan, he proved ineffective in rallying Pashtun support. He assumed the reins of power with the support of the mostly non-Pashtun, anti-Taliban United Front for the Islamic Salvation of Afghanistan, or what Pakistan dubbed the “Northern Alliance”, the US and its allies. As such, Karzai could not act as a Pashtun torchbearer. Nor could he or his international backers persuade Islamabad to abandon altogether its policy of backing the Taliban and their cross-border attacks.20
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf publicly adopted a two-pronged approach to developments in and over Afghanistan. On the one hand, under intense US pressure, he expediently and publicly joined America's war on terror and declared support for the Karzai leadership. On the other hand, he made sure that he did nothing that could seriously undermine his position and Pakistan's wider regional interests. He discreetly allowed the Afghan Taliban to enjoy sanctuary and logistic assistance from Pakistan, especially through the ISI and the Pakistani Islamic radicals in FATA and NWFP (where, in the 2002 provincial elections, these radicals managed to be successful), and also to some extent in Baluchistan. Musharraf also pressured Karzai and Washington to include more Pashtuns, including pro-Taliban elements, in the Afghan government. He incorrectly argued that the Pashtuns formed some 60% of the Afghan population and that without the Taliban's participation in the power structure, Afghanistan would not achieve stability and security. In effect, he called for the neutralisation or marginalisation of the United Front, which had played a leading role in Karzai's Interim and Transitional Governments (2001-2004).21 As a result, after winning the first presidential election in late 2004, Karzai replaced some of the key figures of the Front with his Pashtun allies in the Cabinet, and began to make serious overtures to the Taliban for some kind of power-sharing arrangement, provided that they denounced violence. However, he still could not win over either the Taliban or Pakistan. The Taliban have declared their refusal to negotiate with the Afghan Government, until the departure of all foreign troops from Afghanistan. However, many high ranking Afghan military officers have been forcibly retired under the Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation (or DDR) program.22 The Afghan army's present need for these officers would be even greater in the event of a withdrawal of foreign troops.
The Karzai leadership ultimately faltered in building an effective, clean, and efficient government, and the US and its NATO and non-NATO allies failed to devise an appropriate and well-coordinated strategy and to deploy sufficient military and reconstruction resources. A massive political and strategic vacuum was created. The Taliban and their supporters, together with a host of other sub-national actors from both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border—poppy growers, drug traffickers, local power-holders, and criminal gangs—found ample opportunities to regroup and reinvent in order to mount serious challenges, thwarting the processes of reconstruction and security-building in Afghanistan.23
Meanwhile, Musharraf's domestic and foreign policy behaviour backfired. He could neither shore up the domestic front to place Pakistan on a stable path of change and development, nor could he make any meaningful contribution to Afghanistan's stabilisation. Under increased US pressure, by 2005 he changed tack in order to be seen as finally willing to fight Islamic extremism in Pakistan and cross-border operations into Afghanistan. He deployed some 80,000 troops on the border with Afghanistan, but as military casualties mounted, he soon followed the path of negotiations and truce, which allowed the Taliban and their supporters on both sides of the border to operate freely and expand their armed struggle.24
The Taliban's challenge became so big that finally Musharraf's elected successor Asif Ali Zardari and the new US President, Barack Obama, found it imperative to resolve, in a seemingly joint approach, to intensify military efforts against the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan concurrently. Islamabad launched the Swat campaign in May 2009. This campaign, designed to be the start of a long military assault to “eliminate” the Taliban, opened a new chapter in Pakistan's short but turbulent history. It resulted in the killing and injuring of many civilians, the destruction of Swat's main city, Mingora, and the dislocation of some two million people, causing a massive humanitarian crisis. More importantly, it introduced a fresh dimension into Pakistan's troubled ethnic relations. It essentially pitched the country's Punjabi-dominated army against the predominantly Pashtun people of the region. It once again reminded the latter of the Punjabi political and military supremacy in Pakistan. Further, the Swat campaign, which was to be extended to the wider Taliban front in Waziristan, has had the potential to enable the Taliban and their cohorts to whip up the ethnic issue as much as possible in order to galvanize Pashtun unity and support. Admittedly, the Pashtuns also make up a good proportion of the Pakistani army, but this will not stop the Taliban from exploiting the ethnic factor to the maximum.
Pakistan's anti-Taliban campaign has been accompanied by even more determined efforts by the US and its allies to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan and to hit as many targets as possible across the border in Pakistan. The purpose in the short run was to stabilise the situation for the Afghan presidential election that was held on 20 August 2009. However, the long-term goal focused on reducing the Taliban insurgency to a manageable level, so that the danger of extremism in both Afghanistan and Pakistan is marginalised, and the foreign forces can thin out of Afghanistan sooner rather than later. The US and its allies boosted their troop numbers from about 57,000 in early 2009 to close to 100,000 by the end of the year, with an emphasis on clearing and retaining the heartland of the Taliban in southern and eastern Afghanistan, and to block the militia's escape routes into Pakistan. The Taliban and their supporters, whose ranks have swelled from amongst those who have fled the parallel Pakistani military campaign, have indeed proved to be very adaptable and resilient.25 However, in the process, a great number of Afghanistan's Pashtun population, like their Pakistani counterparts, have inevitably been subjected to greater dislocation and suffering. This is despite a resolve on the part of the US and its allies to take extra caution to minimise civilian casualties and discomforts.
Whilst notwithstanding their extremist ideological disposition, and draconian methods of cajoling and intimidating the Pashtun population into silence and submission, the Taliban have been gaining popular support among their fellow Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Without such support, they could not have remained so potent a force as to make the NATO and Islamabad operations very costly. They may have been driven out of parts of Helmand and Swat, but this does not appear to have reduced their capacity to continue the fight on a long-term basis. The top US commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, warned recently that the Taliban have “gained the upper hand”, “moving beyond their traditional strongholds in southern Afghanistan to threaten formerly stable areas in the north and west”.26 The militia is now in a position to present itself as the repository of the nationalist aspirations and interests of the Pashtun population as a victimised people. Many Pashtuns across the Afghan-Pakistan border see themselves as squeezed in by adversarial forces, encroaching upon their religion, land, resources, honour, and cultural-social norms and values, and, therefore, upon their whole way of life. In the absence of a return to peace and stability in their lives and locations, they have become prone to accommodating the Taliban not only as a religious, but also as a nationalist movement. Their sense of common desperation and victimisation may eventually constitute a powerful incentive for them to brush aside their historical divisions, and rally behind the Taliban leadership in pursuit of their historical goal of an independent “Pashtunistan”.
Policy Recommendations
The issue of how the current operations against the Taliban could possibly invoke a fierce nationalist backlash among the Pashtuns is something that seems to be missing in the strategic calculations of the Afghan and Pakistani governments, as well as their international backers. There are several ways of acting to avert such a development.
With Regard to Pakistan
From Pakistan, there is an urgent need for structural changes in Islamabad's policy approach. After Baluchistan, the NWFP and FATA are not well represented in Pakistan's power structure. Nor do they have as much social and economic development as Pakistan's two other provinces: Punjab and Sindh. Whilst the Punjabis and Sindhis have come to dominate the levers of political, military and economic power—Sindhis less so than Punjabis—the same cannot be said about the Pashtuns. In the past, a number of Pashtun personalities have reached the pinnacles of power, most famously Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, who ruled Pakistan from 1958 to 1969; and several others have reached senior federal political and military posts. But this on its own cannot compensate for the deeper political grievances and lack of sufficient educational, social and economic development among Pakistan's Pashtun population.
In July 2008, the population of Pakistan was estimated at 172.8 million. Of this, Pakistan's main national groups—the Punjabis formed 94.5 million (including 18.2 million Seraiki); the Sindhis 24.4 million; the Pashtuns 26.6 million; and the Baluchis 6.2 million, respectively.27 However, the Pashtuns have had a proportionally smaller share in Pakistan's power constructs than have the Punjabis and the Sindhis. This disparity has markedly paralleled on the economic and social fronts. For example, “… the per capita income of the NWFP is 30% lower than the national average and the literacy ratio in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 57% lower”. The NWFP is rich in natural resources, especially coal, and this has recently been enhanced by the discovery of new oil and gas reserves. Yet these resources are exploited primarily to the benefit of the Punjabis and the Sindhis, which aggravates the grievances of the province's predominantly Pashtun population against the central government. The Pashtuns of NWFP have repeatedly demanded higher royalty rates and a greater investment in the social and economic development of their province.28 In light of the recent military operations and consequent destruction and dislocation, the grievances and demands will most likely grow stronger.
Beyond this, not only the Pakistani government, but also the US must become very mindful that the more they apply brute force to quell the Taliban and their supporters, the more they carry the risk of inflicting collateral suffering on Pakistan's Pashtun population as a whole. Every care should be taken not to alienate them further and push them deeper towards the very force which the Pakistanis and the US want them to reject. To arrest the situation, it is imperative to do whatever is required in order to integrate them into the national structures, through profound political reforms, social and economic development, redistribution of wealth, greater benefits from their natural resources, and genuine autonomy in the conduct of their internal affairs. The military and the ISI ought to be funnelled out of Pakistani politics, with an emphasis on curbing the power of the ISI to manipulate ethnic relations and tensions, and to use radical Islamism as an instrument of policy direction and implementation. Of course, Islamabad cannot be expected to accomplish all this rapidly, given the political incongruities and vested interests that underpin Pakistan's system. However, this is the direction to pursue, if Islamabad and its international allies really want to avoid a possibly debilitating Pashtun nationalist backlash.
With Regard to Afghanistan
In relation to Afghanistan, the dysfunctional and corrupt nature of the Karzai government, and the poor strategy pursued so far by the US and its allies, has proved to be a major asset for the Taliban and their supporters. A majority of the Afghan people have lost faith in Karzai's governing elite and administration. They no longer have confidence in what the government and its international backers say or do. Eight years since the toppling of the Taliban regime, most Afghans still do not understand what the government and international forces stand for and what they want to achieve in the country. For most, the initial promise of stability, security and prosperity has yielded little result.29
The costs of maintaining the Karzai government and keeping the Taliban out of power have been too overwhelming for many Afghans. Foreign operations have resulted in the loss of too many civilian lives, violation of Afghan codes of honour, cultural and social norms, and traditional neutrality in world politics. From the Afghan people's perspective, Afghanistan has become a stomping ground for too many foreigners, most of whom do not understand the complexities of Afghan society and culture, and who appear to be more concerned about what serves their interests than what is required to enable the Afghans to rebuild their lives and country. This sentiment has been particularly strong among the Pashtuns, whose areas have become a hotbed of Taliban insurgency and US-led counter-insurgency operations. Whilst viewing the Kabul government and international forces as predators, many Pashtuns have found solace in the Taliban's promise of ethnic and religious salvation. Whether right or wrong, they see themselves more a victim of these actors than that of the Taliban.30 If the US and its Afghan and non-Afghan allies want to dull the lure of the Taliban, they need to take urgent steps on four inter-related fronts.
1. Reform of the Political Order
The first is reform of the political order. The strong presidential system established under President Karzai has not worked and urgently needs restructuring. It has proved to be unsuitable for a traditional, conflict-ridden Muslim country with a myriad of ethnic, tribal, linguistic and sectarian divisions. Such a system typically produces one winner and many disgruntled losers, capable of challenging and undermining the victor. It places too much responsibility on one person, leaving the president highly vulnerable to unrealistic public expectations and to discontent, especially when things go wrong. Yet, paradoxically, the actual powers of the president are often less than they appear on paper. To manage the affairs of the state, the president may find it tempting to engage in the politics of patronage and nepotism. This is what has transpired in Afghanistan.
Karzai has not been able to create a united and competent governing elite, and personal friendship and family, tribal, ethnic and factional connections, rather than merit, have formed the basis of most senior government appointments. He has surrounded himself with a number of political and ethnic entrepreneurs, most of whom come from the Afghan Diaspora and lack the necessary qualifications and experience to serve Afghanistan beyond their individual interests.31
The Taliban and their allies, notably the Hezb-i Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, as well as foreign intelligence agencies, have penetrated the government and its instrumentalities of power at many levels. This has not only compromised governmental activities, but also held back the US and its allies from channelling most of their reconstruction aid through the government, and coordinating closely on major policy and security operations.
The Afghan political system needs to be changed to a diversified, party-based parliamentary system of governance, headed by a prime minister, who would come from the parliament with a parliamentary majority, under a figurehead president, elected by the parliament and provincial assemblies. Such a system can be more inclusive, providing for a range of influential actors to be locked in positions of national obligations and responsibilities. It can also provide for more accountability, transparency, efficiency, and popular connection to the political system. To achieve this, the Afghan Constitution of 2004 requires substantial modification. This in turn demands the convening of a new Loya Jirga (traditional grand assembly), similar to the one that ratified the present Constitution, to legitimize the necessary constitutional changes.
The emphasis should not be on democracy, but rather on creating a workable government, with a culturally relevant national manifesto of state-building that could help generate good governance as a prelude to democracy. Elections are too often equated with democracy. In a country like Afghanistan, which has lacked democratic traditions and has historically been subjected to traditionalist, authoritarian rule, elections have to be, for an extended period, simply one means of creating legitimate governments, with a gradual approach to fostering manageable political pluralism, civil society activities and national reconciliation. Only then could the country succeed in securing the necessary foundations for the growth of substantive democracy.32
2. Confronting the Insurgency
The second issue is how to ensure that the Taliban insurgency remains confined, and eventually weakened, within the militia's heartland. Karzai, a majority of his ministers and many other senior government office holders share a common ethnic background with the Taliban (although most of the former come from the Durrani tribes and the latter from the traditionally rival Ghilzai tribe). As such, and since a majority of the non-Pashtun population has remained largely aloof from the conflict, the current conflict is essentially intra-Pashtun. However, many among the non-Pashtun ethnic groups, such as the Tajik, Uzbek, Turkmen and Hazara, populating mainly northern, central and western Afghanistan, have been relatively peaceful. Yet many of them feel that they have not been rewarded for their cooperation.33 One way to assuage their concerns is to channel international reconstruction to their areas, until such time that the Taliban insurgency in the Pashtun-dominated provinces is contained, and the way is opened for reconstruction efforts to be implemented on a similar or higher scale in those provinces. Otherwise, there is a serious risk that many non-Pashtuns could engage in insurgent activities. As such, they could, despite their opposition to the Taliban, who were exceptionally discriminatory and brutal towards them during their rule from 1996 to 2001, benefit the Taliban by default.
3. Assuring Afghan Sovereignty
The third issue is how to assure the Afghans of their sovereignty. It is imperative that the Afghans' sovereignty is not compromised or violated. Historically, the Afghans have been proud of the fact that, regardless of the extent of their domestic problems, and of the external pressures on them, they have ultimately been in charge of their destiny. They do not feel that this has been the case in recent years. A majority of them believe that their country and lives are controlled and determined by an influx of foreign non-governmental organisations and forces, most of whom have not understood their culture, and have too often acted in violation of their norms, values, practices and codes of honour. They view the Karzai government and its dependence on external actors as an affront to their historical sense of independence and sovereignty. This was a significant factor that drove them to resist the Soviet impositions in the 1980s and that has come to concern them in the face of the long-term stay of the US and its allies in Afghanistan.
4. Handling Geopolitical Complexities
The fourth area is how to devise a sound approach to handling Afghanistan's geopolitical complexities. One factor that had historically helped Afghanistan, especially from the time of its formal independence in 1919 to the Soviet invasion of the country in late December 1979, was the country's pursuance of neutrality in world politics. The Afghan-US strategic partnership, signed in August 2005, together with the concurrent elevation of Pakistan to the status of a major non-NATO ally of the US, has unnecessarily complicated Afghanistan's regional position. On the one hand, it has cushioned Pakistan against making major structural changes in its long-standing predatory behaviour towards Afghanistan. On the other, it has caused deep concern among other regional actors. While the Islamic Republic of Iran has viewed the long-term US presence in Afghanistan as a serious threat and has remained highly sensitive to any return of Pakistan's influence in the country, as was the case during the Pakistan-backed rule of the Taliban, Russia and India have shared Iran's trepidation. Moscow would like to see the end of US and NATO involvement in Afghanistan and in Central Asia, which it has historically regarded as vital to its security interests. By the same token, New Delhi has been keen to see a curtailment of Pakistan's regional ambitions and has therefore quietly shared Moscow's opposition to any situation in Afghanistan that could benefit Pakistan. Meanwhile, despite its cosy relations with Pakistan and historical differences with India, China shares a common interest with Tehran, Moscow and New Delhi over Afghanistan.
Conclusion
A formal affirmation of Afghanistan's neutrality in world politics is needed to reassure Afghanistan's neighbours that the country will not become a long-term base from where the US and its allies, especially Pakistan, could advance their geo-strategic interests. This is not a call for the US to halt its assistance in support of Afghanistan's stabilisation and reconstruction, but rather for it to conduct them within the frame of UN Security resolutions. There is no need for an Afghan-US strategic partnership, which has potentially stimulated regional actors to remain predatory in their approach to Afghanistan in pursuit of their conflicting interests.34 This partnership has not gone down well with most of the Afghan people either. The Afghans have traditionally been accustomed to their country's policy of neutrality as symbolising their devotion to their sovereignty and independence.
When a clean, efficient and effective government is in place and the US and its allies can closely coordinate with this government and among themselves, and the majority of citizens enjoy a more peaceful and secure life, the conditions would be right for two further developments. One is a realistic timetable to be drawn up for the withdrawal of foreign forces. Another is a viable settlement to be negotiated with the Taliban from a position of strength. As the situation stands, any approach to a negotiated settlement with the Taliban is undermined by the Taliban leadership's demand for the departure of foreign forces as a precondition for peace talks, and by the inability of the government and its international supporters to induce the Taliban to accept a settlement that would appeal to a wide cross-section of Afghanistan's mosaic society. The best way to proceed would be to reach a settlement with the support of Afghanistan's neighbours, predicated on a US-Iranian rapprochement.
However, if there is no substantial improvement in the above areas, there are ample grounds for the Taliban to increase their appeal to the Pashtuns as a movement for their Islamic and nationalist salvation. Such a development can only solidify the basis for Pashtun nationalism at the cost of greater problems for Afghanistan and Pakistan than they have experienced so far.
Notes
A.D. Smith, The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism, Hanover, New Hampton: University Press of New England, 2000, p. 65.
L. Dupree, Afghanistan, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980, p. 126-27.
A. Fletcher, Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982, pp. 20-21.
Cited by S.M.M. Qureshi, “Pakhtunistan: The Frontier Dispute Between Afghanistan and Pakistan”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 1/2, Spring-Summer 1966, p. 101.
See, for example, Bellew's references to the Pashtuns in H.W. Bellew, Elibron Classics: Afghanistan and the Afghans, Charleston, SC: BiblioBazaar, 2008, pp. 210-18.
The most numerous urban Pashto-speaking population lives in Karachi, Pakistan, belonging to many tribes and speaking Pashto among themselves. Karachi's number of Pashto speaking population is more than Pashto speaking population of Peshawar. John Hopkins University Model United Nations Conference XII Delegate Preparation Guide: Special Political and Decolonization Committee: Stabilizing and Monitoring the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Region, Maryland: JHUMUNC, 5-9 March 2009, p. 4.
See, H.G. Raverty, Selections from the Poetry of the Afghans from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century, London: Williams and Norgate, 1867, pp. 142-148.
For details of Ahmad Shah's rule, see A. Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival, London and New York: I.B. Taubris, 2006, pp. 19-22.
Ibid., p. 26.
Ibid., pp. 26-27.
A. Saikal, “Securing Afghanistan's Border”, Survival, Vol. 48, No. 1, 2006, p. 131.
A. Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival, op. cit., p. 102.
S.S. Harrison, Pakistan: The State of the Union (Special Report), Washington, DC: Centre for International Policy, 2009, p. 13.
H.S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1983, p. 25.
See, A. Saikal and W. Maley, Regime Change in Afghanistan: Foreign Intervention and the Politics of Legitimacy, Boulder: Westview Press, 1992, pp. 59-62, 69.
W. Maley, The Afghanistan Wars, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002, p. 158.
Ibid., pp. 66-76.
With regard to Jamiat-i Islami-i Afghanistan (Islamic Society of Afghanistan), see A. Saikal and W. Maley, Regime Change in Afghanistan: Foreign Intervention and the Politics of Legitimacy, op. cit., p. 60. For details of Rabani and Massoud's seizure of power, see A. Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival, op. cit., pp. 205-208.
R.D. Crews and A. Tarzi (eds), “Introduction”, The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, pp. 29-32.
A. Saikal, “The Roots of the Afghanistan Conflict”, in What are We Doing in Afghanistan? Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2009, pp. 13-14.
See, A. Saikal, “Musharraf and Pakistan's Crisis”, in R. Jetly (ed.) Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics, New Delhi: Routledge, 2009, pp. 1-19.
See, GlobalSecurity.org, Military: DDR - Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration at, retrieved at http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...nistan/ddr.htm, 27 August 2009.
For a discussion of the failings of Karzai's presidency, and of the strategy of his international allies, see D. Rohde, “Afghan Symbol for Change Becomes a Symbol of Failure”, The New York Times, 5 September 2006.
C. Zissis, “Judgment Time for Musharraf”, Council on Foreign Relations, Daily Analysis, March 19, 2007.
C. Gall, “Ragtag Taliban Show Tenacity in Afghanistan”, The New York Times, 4 August 2008.
Y.J. Dreazen and P. Spiegel, “Taliban Now Winning”, The Wall Street Journal, 10 August 2009.
S.S. Harrison, Pakistan: The State of the Union (Special Report), Washington, DC: Centre for International Policy, 2009, p. 15.
Ibid., p. 19.
See, Rohde, “Afghan Symbol for Change Becomes a Symbol of Failure”, op. cit.
Y.J. Dreazen and Peter Spiegel, “Taliban Now Winning”, The Wall Street Journal, 10 August 2009.
A. Saikal and W. Maley, “The President Who Would Be King”, New York Times, 6 February 2008.
Ibid.
A. Saikal, “Afghanistan: What Way Forward?”, East Asia Forum, Vol. 31, October 2008.
A. Saikal, “Kabul Must Say No to U.S. bases”, The Globe and Mail, 24 May 2005.
Source:http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/sec...text=713240928
The Pashtun people that straddle Afghanistan and Pakistan are divided along family, clan and tribal lines, but constitute an ethnic-based nation in the classic sense of the term. Since the end of 2001, many of them find themselves subjected to intense efforts by the Afghan and Pakistani governments, backed by the US and many of its allies, to expunge the Pashtun-dominated radical Taliban Islamic movement from their midst. However, many Pashtuns now see themselves as squeezed in by adversarial forces, encroaching upon their religion, land, resources, honour, and cultural-social norms and values. In the absence of a return to peace and stability in their lives and locations, they are becoming increasingly prone to accommodating the Taliban not only as a religious, but also as a nationalist movement, and could eventually brush aside their historical divisions, and rally behind the Taliban leadership in pursuit of their historical goal of an independent “Pashtunistan”. This paper identifies several ways of acting to avert such a development—a consideration that seems to be missing in the strategic calculations of the Afghan and Pakistani governments, as well as their international backers.
Introduction
Although divided along family, clan and tribal lines, the Pashtun people that straddle Afghanistan and Pakistan share a common ethnic origin. They have historically shown a flair for self-rule or independence. Since the end of 2001, many of them now find themselves subjected to intense efforts by the Afghan and Pakistani governments, backed by the US and many of its allies, to expunge the Pashtun-dominated radical Taliban Islamic movement from their midst. This carries the risk of political and social alienation that could only enhance Pashtun militancy across the Afghan-Pakistan border, with serious political, security, and territorial consequences for both countries. The question is: how to deter such a development?
The Pashtuns as an "Ethnie"
Originating from what is today southern Afghanistan, the Pashtuns form an “ethnie”, or what Anthony Smith defines as “a named population sharing a collective proper name, a presumed common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differencing elements of common culture, an association with a specific 'homeland' and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population”.1 As such they constitute an ethnic-based nation in the classic sense of the term.
One of the Pashtuns' patrimonial codes of conduct is pakhunwali, which centres upon such notions as honour or nang, involving the protection of sexual propriety, which is of utmost importance to a Pashtun; the principle of revenge or badal, which is intimately associated with the notion of honour and upholds the dictum of “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth”; and hospitality, or melmastia—which underlines the importance of maintaining loyalty to friends and allies, and providing protection to whoever seeks it, including an enemy, for so long as a person is in the realm of a Pashtun's home.2 Another shared characteristic since the end of the seventh century has been their adherence to Islam, predominantly its Sunni sect, although the Pashtuns have generally embraced a moderate, rather than radical, form of Islam, as expounded by the Hanifi School of thought.3
The Pashtuns' existence as far back as 2,500 years ago is confirmed by the Greek historian Herodotus (484-425 bc), who referred to “Partika” in his writings.4 This fact has since been firmly established by a string of historians, including the British writer and traveller Henry Walter Bellew (1834-1892), who published extensively on various Pashtun tribes.5
The Pashtuns' “home territory” has historically straddled today's Pakistan and Afghanistan, stretching from the Indus River, which runs from Kashmir through Pakistan and to the Arabian Sea, to the Hindu Kush ranges that dissect Afghanistan into north and south, with the Afghan capital Kabul located in the latter. They have in the past identified this area as “Pakhtunkhwa”, or “Pashtun Quarter”. In 2007, an estimated 12.5 million Pashtuns formed 42% of the total population of Afghanistan, and some 30 million made up 16% of the total citizens of Pakistan, with a concentration in Pakhtunkhwa.6 Yet, the Pashtuns have never had an independent state-homeland of their own. They have constantly suffered from not only internal divisions, but also from foreign subjugation, which has instilled among them an acute perception of deprivation and victimization. All this has come to lay the necessary historical foundations for a distinct Pashtun identity and codes of behaviour, and, therefore, for the growth of what can be termed as Pashtun nationalism in pursuit of self-rule and independence.
The Pashtuns have rarely acted as a coherent collective. They have often been fragmented into various social segments, at times in serious feuds and conflicts with one another. Throughout history, they have been subjected to periodic interventions, and occupation, by outside forces which have sought to subdue them for geopolitical objectives (although, at times, they have done the same to others). Attempts by some of their leaders to unite them in pursuit of independence have in general been futile. But there have been periods during which they have shown nationalist solidarity, especially when they have either been engaged in successful military offensives and territorial conquests, or seriously threatened by an outside force.
The Pashtuns' Shared History
Until the Twentieth Century
One of their earliest patriotic leaders, who sought to unite them in a nationalist movement in the seventeenth century, was the famous Pashtun warrior-poet and chief of the Khattak tribe, Khushal Khan Khattak (1613-1689). He was initially in the service of the Mughal emperors, but his relationship with his masters turned sour, partly due to his Pashtun nationalist tendencies. After a period of imprisonment by the Mughal Emperor Aurangzib, he devoted himself to promoting Pashtun unity and independence. Although ultimately he could not achieve this objective, his efforts nonetheless contributed significantly to raising a nationalist consciousness among the Pashtuns as a distinct Muslim ethnie—a development which, in turn, contributed to many Pashtun nationalist revolts. He is widely revered by many Pashtuns in both Afghanistan and Pakistan as a great nationalist hero.7
Pashtun unity and nationalism peaked when Ahmad Shah Durrani, an Afghan (synonymous with Pashtun) tribal chief and military commander, formed a confederation of Pashtun tribes in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in 1747, which he consolidated rapidly into a vast Afghan/Pahstun-dominated empire. By the time of his death in 1772, the Durrani Empire stretched from north-eastern Iran, through Central Asia to eastern Punjab. It included all the areas that Pashtun nationalists recognized as “Pashtunkhwa”. This amounted to the fulfilment of a nationalist dream that the Pashtuns had not achieved before. The strength of the empire rested very much on “Pashtunism”—the assertion of Pashtun political and military supremacy—but this was combined with a form of moderate “Islamism”, and the inclusion of some elements of non-Pashtun minorities, to afford Ahmad Shah's rule wider religious and popular legitimacy.8
However, the Durrani Empire and the political domination of the Pashtuns could not last long. Internal conflicts, which stemmed from weak domestic structures, sibling rivalries resulting from the systematic practice of polygamy within the royal family, and the rise of the outside actors caused the Empire to crumble. At first, Ranjit Singh rose from Punjab and succeeded in establishing his Sikh empire (1799-1849), conquering the Pashtun territory to his west to include parts of what is today Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP); most importantly, its capital Peshawar, and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).9
Following the death of Ranjit Singh in 1849, and the decline of his empire largely because of internal strife, the British subjugated the Sikh domain, including its Pashtun territory, and adopted a forward policy to determine the status and boundaries of Afghanistan according to its colonial interests. Britain engaged in a protracted rivalry with Russia, within what became known as the “Great Game”, turning Afghanistan into a buffer state and gaining control over the country's finances and foreign policy.10 The most damaging British action, especially for the Pashtuns, came in 1893, when a British Commission, led by Sir Edward Durand, unilaterally determined the border between Afghanistan and British India. The 2,400-km long border, known as the “Durand Line”, ran exactly along the line that marks the Afghan-Pakistan boundary today.11 Although the opposing zones of influence were by this time a political fact, the Durand line confirmed that existing political separation. It dissected many Pashtun tribes, seriously undermining their potential for unity and prospects for an independent territory of Pashtunistan (or “place of Pashtuns”), which could have possibly been consolidated between the Indus River and Hindu Kush. At the same time, it sowed the seeds of an enduring border dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan which emerged upon the creation of the latter as a majority Muslim state out of the Hindu-dominated India in 1947.
In the Twentieth Century
Although a particular Pashtun clan—Mohammadzai of the Durrani tribe—retained Pashtun political and military ascendency in Afghanistan for most of the period from the late nineteenth century until the successful communist coup of April 1978, the Pashtuns of British India remained discontented, and at times rebellious in their pursuit of autonomy and independence. In the 1930s, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a renowned non-violent Pashtun political and popular leader, once again sought to unite the Pashtuns in opposition, at first to the British rule of India, and then to the transfer of India's Pashtun areas to the projected Pakistan. He founded the Khudai Khidmatgar (Servant of God) or “Red Shirt” movement for this purpose. He advocated the establishment of an independent “Pashtunistan”, but only through a non-violent strategy, as had been promoted by Mahtma Gandhi, and for this he became known as the “Frontier Gandhi”.12
However, his efforts did not result in the creation of an independent Pashtunistan. In the end, the Pashtuns not given what Muhammad Ali Jinnah's Muslim League had pledged in its Lahore Resolution of March 23, 1940: that the Pakistani state would be a confederation under which the main constituent units of East Bengal (which in 1971, broke away from the confederation and established itself as the independent state of Bangladesh), Punjab, Sindh, North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and Baluchistan would be “autonomous and sovereign”, and that the central government would be limited to defence, foreign affairs, foreign trade, communications and currency. Following a controversial referendum in the NWFP in 1947 by the British colonial authorities, the Pashtuns finally became part of Pakistan. The referendum gave the Pashtuns only the choice of joining either India or Pakistan, with no option of independence. Many Pashtuns boycotted the referendum—of the 572,799 eligible voters, only 292,118 participated.13
Once again, the hopes of Pashtun nationalists were frustrated, but their dreams remained alive. After the creation of Pakistan, successive Pashtun-led Afghan governments backed Ghaffar Khan's demand for a Pashtunistan carved out of the territory of Pakistan, but without any success. Kabul's demand was ostensibly in support of the right of Pakistani Pashtuns to self-determination. But in reality it was grounded in a firm assumption that a Pashtunistan entity would be closely linked to Afghanistan, enabling it to achieve two main objectives. One was to resolve, once and for all, the border dispute with Pakistan. Another was to secure direct access for landlocked Afghanistan to the Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Afghanistan's position was boosted from the late 1950s when the Soviet Union backed its Pashtunistan policy as part of a wider strategy of growing friendship between Afghanistan and the USSR, and alliance between Pakistan and the United States in the context of the global Cold War.14 The problem all along with Afghanistan's Pashtunistan policy was that if Kabul really wanted an independent state to exist, it would have had to concede much of its southern and eastern territories—something that no Afghan leader was prepared to do.
The Soviet Invasion
The Communist coup of April 1978 and the subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 20 months later changed the overall national and regional political and strategic landscape for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and for their Pashtun populations. Most of the communist leaders came from Pashtun background, however, the burning issue for most of the Pashtun population, as for the majority of the people of Afghanistan, was how to combat the Godless Soviet occupation and imposition, and to prevent Soviet expansion, especially into Pakistan as a frontline state. Most Pashtuns from both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border, like a majority of the non-Pashtun populations of Afghanistan as well as Pakistan, and many members of the international community, drew on Islam as an ideology of resistance to support an Afghan jihad against the Soviets and their surrogates. Various Afghan Islamic resistance groups (the Mujahideen) were formed to fight for their religion, honour and independence. Of the seven main Mujahideen groups, representing some 80% of the Sunni population of Afghanistan, six were predominantly Pashtun, supported by Pakistan to various degrees.15 Given the permeability of the Afghan-Pakistan border, through which all outside assistance was channelled to the Mujahideen, and the location of the Afghan Pashtun provinces on that border with Pakistan, the Pashtuns bore the brunt of Soviet bombardments. One consequence of this was that a majority of the tens and thousands killed, injured and forced into exile in Pakistan during the decade-long Soviet occupation were Pashtuns.16 This was instrumental in invoking their historical memory of subjugation and victimization.
Meanwhile, as the Pakistani Pashtuns were stimulated to support their Afghan kindred, Islamabad was provided with a unique opportunity to further its wider interests. It devised a strategy whereby it could overcome the Afghan-Pakistan border dispute in its favour, and seriously weaken the basis for any Pashtun nationalist demand for a Pashtunistan in the future. The strategy focused primarily on two goals. One was to support mainly the Pashtun Mujahideen groups, with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's radical Hezbi Islami (Islamic Party) of Afghanistan acting as the main client of Pakistan's powerful Directorate for Inter-services Intelligence (ISI),17 which was entrusted, from the early 1980s, with the implementation of Pakistan's Afghanistan and Kashmir policies. Another was to promote radical Islamism as a counter-balance to Pashtun nationalism. It is important to remember that although, until this time, Sunni Islam was a common thread in Pashtun nationalism, radical political Islam had not fundamentally underpinned it. Ethnicity had proved to be a greater motivating force.
The Soviet Withdrawal
The Soviet retreat from Afghanistan by 1989 and the collapse of the communist regime in Kabul three years later did not result in the political empowerment of Pashtuns in the country, as ISI and Islamabad had desired. The Soviet invasion had not only caused the Pashtuns to oppose the invasion, but also drove the non-Pashtun population of Afghanistan to play a key role in the resistance, and thus to secure a position for themselves whereby they would no longer accept a return to the historical Pashtun supremacy. When the communist government in Kabul reached its last days, a moderate Islamist nationalist, and predominantly non-Pashtun Mujahideen group, Jamiati Islami Afghanistan (the Islamic Society of Afghanistan), led by its political head Burhanuddin Rabani, and legendary resistance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, succeeded in taking power.18 To reverse this development, Islamabad swiftly repackaged its approach: at first it relied on Hekmatyar to prevent the consolidation of power under Jamiat's leadership, and then, when Hekmatyar failed to wrest power, it orchestrated and empowered the Taliban militia to achieve its objectives. The ISI raised the Taliban as a radical Sunni Pashtun force intended, at the very least, to link the Afghan territory organically from the Pakistan border to the Hindu Kush, into Pakistan for wider national and regional purposes, including securing unfettered access to Central Asia and strengthening its position vis-
-vis India.The Taliban projected themselves as a radical Sunni Islamic movement, but the militia's Pashtuniat (Pashtun-centred) identity was undeniable. The Taliban did not officially recognise the Durand Line, but their rule of most of Afghanistan by 1998 marked the height of Pashtun political supremacy in Afghanistan.19 It also produced an Islamic pincer among the Pashtuns on the Pakistan side of the border, providing Islamabad with a potent means to shift the basis of Pashtun nationalism from ethnic and cultural solidarity to Islamism.
The Implications of the US-led Intervention
The US-led intervention in Afghanistan, as part of its wider “war on terrorism” following Al Qaeda's 11 September 2001 attacks on the US, once again swung the geopolitical pendulum against the Pashtuns. Although Hamid Karzai was chosen as a Pashtun to lead post-Taliban Afghanistan, he proved ineffective in rallying Pashtun support. He assumed the reins of power with the support of the mostly non-Pashtun, anti-Taliban United Front for the Islamic Salvation of Afghanistan, or what Pakistan dubbed the “Northern Alliance”, the US and its allies. As such, Karzai could not act as a Pashtun torchbearer. Nor could he or his international backers persuade Islamabad to abandon altogether its policy of backing the Taliban and their cross-border attacks.20
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf publicly adopted a two-pronged approach to developments in and over Afghanistan. On the one hand, under intense US pressure, he expediently and publicly joined America's war on terror and declared support for the Karzai leadership. On the other hand, he made sure that he did nothing that could seriously undermine his position and Pakistan's wider regional interests. He discreetly allowed the Afghan Taliban to enjoy sanctuary and logistic assistance from Pakistan, especially through the ISI and the Pakistani Islamic radicals in FATA and NWFP (where, in the 2002 provincial elections, these radicals managed to be successful), and also to some extent in Baluchistan. Musharraf also pressured Karzai and Washington to include more Pashtuns, including pro-Taliban elements, in the Afghan government. He incorrectly argued that the Pashtuns formed some 60% of the Afghan population and that without the Taliban's participation in the power structure, Afghanistan would not achieve stability and security. In effect, he called for the neutralisation or marginalisation of the United Front, which had played a leading role in Karzai's Interim and Transitional Governments (2001-2004).21 As a result, after winning the first presidential election in late 2004, Karzai replaced some of the key figures of the Front with his Pashtun allies in the Cabinet, and began to make serious overtures to the Taliban for some kind of power-sharing arrangement, provided that they denounced violence. However, he still could not win over either the Taliban or Pakistan. The Taliban have declared their refusal to negotiate with the Afghan Government, until the departure of all foreign troops from Afghanistan. However, many high ranking Afghan military officers have been forcibly retired under the Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation (or DDR) program.22 The Afghan army's present need for these officers would be even greater in the event of a withdrawal of foreign troops.
The Karzai leadership ultimately faltered in building an effective, clean, and efficient government, and the US and its NATO and non-NATO allies failed to devise an appropriate and well-coordinated strategy and to deploy sufficient military and reconstruction resources. A massive political and strategic vacuum was created. The Taliban and their supporters, together with a host of other sub-national actors from both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border—poppy growers, drug traffickers, local power-holders, and criminal gangs—found ample opportunities to regroup and reinvent in order to mount serious challenges, thwarting the processes of reconstruction and security-building in Afghanistan.23
Meanwhile, Musharraf's domestic and foreign policy behaviour backfired. He could neither shore up the domestic front to place Pakistan on a stable path of change and development, nor could he make any meaningful contribution to Afghanistan's stabilisation. Under increased US pressure, by 2005 he changed tack in order to be seen as finally willing to fight Islamic extremism in Pakistan and cross-border operations into Afghanistan. He deployed some 80,000 troops on the border with Afghanistan, but as military casualties mounted, he soon followed the path of negotiations and truce, which allowed the Taliban and their supporters on both sides of the border to operate freely and expand their armed struggle.24
The Taliban's challenge became so big that finally Musharraf's elected successor Asif Ali Zardari and the new US President, Barack Obama, found it imperative to resolve, in a seemingly joint approach, to intensify military efforts against the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan concurrently. Islamabad launched the Swat campaign in May 2009. This campaign, designed to be the start of a long military assault to “eliminate” the Taliban, opened a new chapter in Pakistan's short but turbulent history. It resulted in the killing and injuring of many civilians, the destruction of Swat's main city, Mingora, and the dislocation of some two million people, causing a massive humanitarian crisis. More importantly, it introduced a fresh dimension into Pakistan's troubled ethnic relations. It essentially pitched the country's Punjabi-dominated army against the predominantly Pashtun people of the region. It once again reminded the latter of the Punjabi political and military supremacy in Pakistan. Further, the Swat campaign, which was to be extended to the wider Taliban front in Waziristan, has had the potential to enable the Taliban and their cohorts to whip up the ethnic issue as much as possible in order to galvanize Pashtun unity and support. Admittedly, the Pashtuns also make up a good proportion of the Pakistani army, but this will not stop the Taliban from exploiting the ethnic factor to the maximum.
Pakistan's anti-Taliban campaign has been accompanied by even more determined efforts by the US and its allies to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan and to hit as many targets as possible across the border in Pakistan. The purpose in the short run was to stabilise the situation for the Afghan presidential election that was held on 20 August 2009. However, the long-term goal focused on reducing the Taliban insurgency to a manageable level, so that the danger of extremism in both Afghanistan and Pakistan is marginalised, and the foreign forces can thin out of Afghanistan sooner rather than later. The US and its allies boosted their troop numbers from about 57,000 in early 2009 to close to 100,000 by the end of the year, with an emphasis on clearing and retaining the heartland of the Taliban in southern and eastern Afghanistan, and to block the militia's escape routes into Pakistan. The Taliban and their supporters, whose ranks have swelled from amongst those who have fled the parallel Pakistani military campaign, have indeed proved to be very adaptable and resilient.25 However, in the process, a great number of Afghanistan's Pashtun population, like their Pakistani counterparts, have inevitably been subjected to greater dislocation and suffering. This is despite a resolve on the part of the US and its allies to take extra caution to minimise civilian casualties and discomforts.
Whilst notwithstanding their extremist ideological disposition, and draconian methods of cajoling and intimidating the Pashtun population into silence and submission, the Taliban have been gaining popular support among their fellow Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Without such support, they could not have remained so potent a force as to make the NATO and Islamabad operations very costly. They may have been driven out of parts of Helmand and Swat, but this does not appear to have reduced their capacity to continue the fight on a long-term basis. The top US commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, warned recently that the Taliban have “gained the upper hand”, “moving beyond their traditional strongholds in southern Afghanistan to threaten formerly stable areas in the north and west”.26 The militia is now in a position to present itself as the repository of the nationalist aspirations and interests of the Pashtun population as a victimised people. Many Pashtuns across the Afghan-Pakistan border see themselves as squeezed in by adversarial forces, encroaching upon their religion, land, resources, honour, and cultural-social norms and values, and, therefore, upon their whole way of life. In the absence of a return to peace and stability in their lives and locations, they have become prone to accommodating the Taliban not only as a religious, but also as a nationalist movement. Their sense of common desperation and victimisation may eventually constitute a powerful incentive for them to brush aside their historical divisions, and rally behind the Taliban leadership in pursuit of their historical goal of an independent “Pashtunistan”.
Policy Recommendations
The issue of how the current operations against the Taliban could possibly invoke a fierce nationalist backlash among the Pashtuns is something that seems to be missing in the strategic calculations of the Afghan and Pakistani governments, as well as their international backers. There are several ways of acting to avert such a development.
With Regard to Pakistan
From Pakistan, there is an urgent need for structural changes in Islamabad's policy approach. After Baluchistan, the NWFP and FATA are not well represented in Pakistan's power structure. Nor do they have as much social and economic development as Pakistan's two other provinces: Punjab and Sindh. Whilst the Punjabis and Sindhis have come to dominate the levers of political, military and economic power—Sindhis less so than Punjabis—the same cannot be said about the Pashtuns. In the past, a number of Pashtun personalities have reached the pinnacles of power, most famously Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, who ruled Pakistan from 1958 to 1969; and several others have reached senior federal political and military posts. But this on its own cannot compensate for the deeper political grievances and lack of sufficient educational, social and economic development among Pakistan's Pashtun population.
In July 2008, the population of Pakistan was estimated at 172.8 million. Of this, Pakistan's main national groups—the Punjabis formed 94.5 million (including 18.2 million Seraiki); the Sindhis 24.4 million; the Pashtuns 26.6 million; and the Baluchis 6.2 million, respectively.27 However, the Pashtuns have had a proportionally smaller share in Pakistan's power constructs than have the Punjabis and the Sindhis. This disparity has markedly paralleled on the economic and social fronts. For example, “… the per capita income of the NWFP is 30% lower than the national average and the literacy ratio in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 57% lower”. The NWFP is rich in natural resources, especially coal, and this has recently been enhanced by the discovery of new oil and gas reserves. Yet these resources are exploited primarily to the benefit of the Punjabis and the Sindhis, which aggravates the grievances of the province's predominantly Pashtun population against the central government. The Pashtuns of NWFP have repeatedly demanded higher royalty rates and a greater investment in the social and economic development of their province.28 In light of the recent military operations and consequent destruction and dislocation, the grievances and demands will most likely grow stronger.
Beyond this, not only the Pakistani government, but also the US must become very mindful that the more they apply brute force to quell the Taliban and their supporters, the more they carry the risk of inflicting collateral suffering on Pakistan's Pashtun population as a whole. Every care should be taken not to alienate them further and push them deeper towards the very force which the Pakistanis and the US want them to reject. To arrest the situation, it is imperative to do whatever is required in order to integrate them into the national structures, through profound political reforms, social and economic development, redistribution of wealth, greater benefits from their natural resources, and genuine autonomy in the conduct of their internal affairs. The military and the ISI ought to be funnelled out of Pakistani politics, with an emphasis on curbing the power of the ISI to manipulate ethnic relations and tensions, and to use radical Islamism as an instrument of policy direction and implementation. Of course, Islamabad cannot be expected to accomplish all this rapidly, given the political incongruities and vested interests that underpin Pakistan's system. However, this is the direction to pursue, if Islamabad and its international allies really want to avoid a possibly debilitating Pashtun nationalist backlash.
With Regard to Afghanistan
In relation to Afghanistan, the dysfunctional and corrupt nature of the Karzai government, and the poor strategy pursued so far by the US and its allies, has proved to be a major asset for the Taliban and their supporters. A majority of the Afghan people have lost faith in Karzai's governing elite and administration. They no longer have confidence in what the government and its international backers say or do. Eight years since the toppling of the Taliban regime, most Afghans still do not understand what the government and international forces stand for and what they want to achieve in the country. For most, the initial promise of stability, security and prosperity has yielded little result.29
The costs of maintaining the Karzai government and keeping the Taliban out of power have been too overwhelming for many Afghans. Foreign operations have resulted in the loss of too many civilian lives, violation of Afghan codes of honour, cultural and social norms, and traditional neutrality in world politics. From the Afghan people's perspective, Afghanistan has become a stomping ground for too many foreigners, most of whom do not understand the complexities of Afghan society and culture, and who appear to be more concerned about what serves their interests than what is required to enable the Afghans to rebuild their lives and country. This sentiment has been particularly strong among the Pashtuns, whose areas have become a hotbed of Taliban insurgency and US-led counter-insurgency operations. Whilst viewing the Kabul government and international forces as predators, many Pashtuns have found solace in the Taliban's promise of ethnic and religious salvation. Whether right or wrong, they see themselves more a victim of these actors than that of the Taliban.30 If the US and its Afghan and non-Afghan allies want to dull the lure of the Taliban, they need to take urgent steps on four inter-related fronts.
1. Reform of the Political Order
The first is reform of the political order. The strong presidential system established under President Karzai has not worked and urgently needs restructuring. It has proved to be unsuitable for a traditional, conflict-ridden Muslim country with a myriad of ethnic, tribal, linguistic and sectarian divisions. Such a system typically produces one winner and many disgruntled losers, capable of challenging and undermining the victor. It places too much responsibility on one person, leaving the president highly vulnerable to unrealistic public expectations and to discontent, especially when things go wrong. Yet, paradoxically, the actual powers of the president are often less than they appear on paper. To manage the affairs of the state, the president may find it tempting to engage in the politics of patronage and nepotism. This is what has transpired in Afghanistan.
Karzai has not been able to create a united and competent governing elite, and personal friendship and family, tribal, ethnic and factional connections, rather than merit, have formed the basis of most senior government appointments. He has surrounded himself with a number of political and ethnic entrepreneurs, most of whom come from the Afghan Diaspora and lack the necessary qualifications and experience to serve Afghanistan beyond their individual interests.31
The Taliban and their allies, notably the Hezb-i Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, as well as foreign intelligence agencies, have penetrated the government and its instrumentalities of power at many levels. This has not only compromised governmental activities, but also held back the US and its allies from channelling most of their reconstruction aid through the government, and coordinating closely on major policy and security operations.
The Afghan political system needs to be changed to a diversified, party-based parliamentary system of governance, headed by a prime minister, who would come from the parliament with a parliamentary majority, under a figurehead president, elected by the parliament and provincial assemblies. Such a system can be more inclusive, providing for a range of influential actors to be locked in positions of national obligations and responsibilities. It can also provide for more accountability, transparency, efficiency, and popular connection to the political system. To achieve this, the Afghan Constitution of 2004 requires substantial modification. This in turn demands the convening of a new Loya Jirga (traditional grand assembly), similar to the one that ratified the present Constitution, to legitimize the necessary constitutional changes.
The emphasis should not be on democracy, but rather on creating a workable government, with a culturally relevant national manifesto of state-building that could help generate good governance as a prelude to democracy. Elections are too often equated with democracy. In a country like Afghanistan, which has lacked democratic traditions and has historically been subjected to traditionalist, authoritarian rule, elections have to be, for an extended period, simply one means of creating legitimate governments, with a gradual approach to fostering manageable political pluralism, civil society activities and national reconciliation. Only then could the country succeed in securing the necessary foundations for the growth of substantive democracy.32
2. Confronting the Insurgency
The second issue is how to ensure that the Taliban insurgency remains confined, and eventually weakened, within the militia's heartland. Karzai, a majority of his ministers and many other senior government office holders share a common ethnic background with the Taliban (although most of the former come from the Durrani tribes and the latter from the traditionally rival Ghilzai tribe). As such, and since a majority of the non-Pashtun population has remained largely aloof from the conflict, the current conflict is essentially intra-Pashtun. However, many among the non-Pashtun ethnic groups, such as the Tajik, Uzbek, Turkmen and Hazara, populating mainly northern, central and western Afghanistan, have been relatively peaceful. Yet many of them feel that they have not been rewarded for their cooperation.33 One way to assuage their concerns is to channel international reconstruction to their areas, until such time that the Taliban insurgency in the Pashtun-dominated provinces is contained, and the way is opened for reconstruction efforts to be implemented on a similar or higher scale in those provinces. Otherwise, there is a serious risk that many non-Pashtuns could engage in insurgent activities. As such, they could, despite their opposition to the Taliban, who were exceptionally discriminatory and brutal towards them during their rule from 1996 to 2001, benefit the Taliban by default.
3. Assuring Afghan Sovereignty
The third issue is how to assure the Afghans of their sovereignty. It is imperative that the Afghans' sovereignty is not compromised or violated. Historically, the Afghans have been proud of the fact that, regardless of the extent of their domestic problems, and of the external pressures on them, they have ultimately been in charge of their destiny. They do not feel that this has been the case in recent years. A majority of them believe that their country and lives are controlled and determined by an influx of foreign non-governmental organisations and forces, most of whom have not understood their culture, and have too often acted in violation of their norms, values, practices and codes of honour. They view the Karzai government and its dependence on external actors as an affront to their historical sense of independence and sovereignty. This was a significant factor that drove them to resist the Soviet impositions in the 1980s and that has come to concern them in the face of the long-term stay of the US and its allies in Afghanistan.
4. Handling Geopolitical Complexities
The fourth area is how to devise a sound approach to handling Afghanistan's geopolitical complexities. One factor that had historically helped Afghanistan, especially from the time of its formal independence in 1919 to the Soviet invasion of the country in late December 1979, was the country's pursuance of neutrality in world politics. The Afghan-US strategic partnership, signed in August 2005, together with the concurrent elevation of Pakistan to the status of a major non-NATO ally of the US, has unnecessarily complicated Afghanistan's regional position. On the one hand, it has cushioned Pakistan against making major structural changes in its long-standing predatory behaviour towards Afghanistan. On the other, it has caused deep concern among other regional actors. While the Islamic Republic of Iran has viewed the long-term US presence in Afghanistan as a serious threat and has remained highly sensitive to any return of Pakistan's influence in the country, as was the case during the Pakistan-backed rule of the Taliban, Russia and India have shared Iran's trepidation. Moscow would like to see the end of US and NATO involvement in Afghanistan and in Central Asia, which it has historically regarded as vital to its security interests. By the same token, New Delhi has been keen to see a curtailment of Pakistan's regional ambitions and has therefore quietly shared Moscow's opposition to any situation in Afghanistan that could benefit Pakistan. Meanwhile, despite its cosy relations with Pakistan and historical differences with India, China shares a common interest with Tehran, Moscow and New Delhi over Afghanistan.
Conclusion
A formal affirmation of Afghanistan's neutrality in world politics is needed to reassure Afghanistan's neighbours that the country will not become a long-term base from where the US and its allies, especially Pakistan, could advance their geo-strategic interests. This is not a call for the US to halt its assistance in support of Afghanistan's stabilisation and reconstruction, but rather for it to conduct them within the frame of UN Security resolutions. There is no need for an Afghan-US strategic partnership, which has potentially stimulated regional actors to remain predatory in their approach to Afghanistan in pursuit of their conflicting interests.34 This partnership has not gone down well with most of the Afghan people either. The Afghans have traditionally been accustomed to their country's policy of neutrality as symbolising their devotion to their sovereignty and independence.
When a clean, efficient and effective government is in place and the US and its allies can closely coordinate with this government and among themselves, and the majority of citizens enjoy a more peaceful and secure life, the conditions would be right for two further developments. One is a realistic timetable to be drawn up for the withdrawal of foreign forces. Another is a viable settlement to be negotiated with the Taliban from a position of strength. As the situation stands, any approach to a negotiated settlement with the Taliban is undermined by the Taliban leadership's demand for the departure of foreign forces as a precondition for peace talks, and by the inability of the government and its international supporters to induce the Taliban to accept a settlement that would appeal to a wide cross-section of Afghanistan's mosaic society. The best way to proceed would be to reach a settlement with the support of Afghanistan's neighbours, predicated on a US-Iranian rapprochement.
However, if there is no substantial improvement in the above areas, there are ample grounds for the Taliban to increase their appeal to the Pashtuns as a movement for their Islamic and nationalist salvation. Such a development can only solidify the basis for Pashtun nationalism at the cost of greater problems for Afghanistan and Pakistan than they have experienced so far.
Notes
A.D. Smith, The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism, Hanover, New Hampton: University Press of New England, 2000, p. 65.
L. Dupree, Afghanistan, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980, p. 126-27.
A. Fletcher, Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982, pp. 20-21.
Cited by S.M.M. Qureshi, “Pakhtunistan: The Frontier Dispute Between Afghanistan and Pakistan”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 1/2, Spring-Summer 1966, p. 101.
See, for example, Bellew's references to the Pashtuns in H.W. Bellew, Elibron Classics: Afghanistan and the Afghans, Charleston, SC: BiblioBazaar, 2008, pp. 210-18.
The most numerous urban Pashto-speaking population lives in Karachi, Pakistan, belonging to many tribes and speaking Pashto among themselves. Karachi's number of Pashto speaking population is more than Pashto speaking population of Peshawar. John Hopkins University Model United Nations Conference XII Delegate Preparation Guide: Special Political and Decolonization Committee: Stabilizing and Monitoring the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Region, Maryland: JHUMUNC, 5-9 March 2009, p. 4.
See, H.G. Raverty, Selections from the Poetry of the Afghans from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century, London: Williams and Norgate, 1867, pp. 142-148.
For details of Ahmad Shah's rule, see A. Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival, London and New York: I.B. Taubris, 2006, pp. 19-22.
Ibid., p. 26.
Ibid., pp. 26-27.
A. Saikal, “Securing Afghanistan's Border”, Survival, Vol. 48, No. 1, 2006, p. 131.
A. Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival, op. cit., p. 102.
S.S. Harrison, Pakistan: The State of the Union (Special Report), Washington, DC: Centre for International Policy, 2009, p. 13.
H.S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1983, p. 25.
See, A. Saikal and W. Maley, Regime Change in Afghanistan: Foreign Intervention and the Politics of Legitimacy, Boulder: Westview Press, 1992, pp. 59-62, 69.
W. Maley, The Afghanistan Wars, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002, p. 158.
Ibid., pp. 66-76.
With regard to Jamiat-i Islami-i Afghanistan (Islamic Society of Afghanistan), see A. Saikal and W. Maley, Regime Change in Afghanistan: Foreign Intervention and the Politics of Legitimacy, op. cit., p. 60. For details of Rabani and Massoud's seizure of power, see A. Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival, op. cit., pp. 205-208.
R.D. Crews and A. Tarzi (eds), “Introduction”, The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, pp. 29-32.
A. Saikal, “The Roots of the Afghanistan Conflict”, in What are We Doing in Afghanistan? Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2009, pp. 13-14.
See, A. Saikal, “Musharraf and Pakistan's Crisis”, in R. Jetly (ed.) Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics, New Delhi: Routledge, 2009, pp. 1-19.
See, GlobalSecurity.org, Military: DDR - Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration at, retrieved at http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...nistan/ddr.htm, 27 August 2009.
For a discussion of the failings of Karzai's presidency, and of the strategy of his international allies, see D. Rohde, “Afghan Symbol for Change Becomes a Symbol of Failure”, The New York Times, 5 September 2006.
C. Zissis, “Judgment Time for Musharraf”, Council on Foreign Relations, Daily Analysis, March 19, 2007.
C. Gall, “Ragtag Taliban Show Tenacity in Afghanistan”, The New York Times, 4 August 2008.
Y.J. Dreazen and P. Spiegel, “Taliban Now Winning”, The Wall Street Journal, 10 August 2009.
S.S. Harrison, Pakistan: The State of the Union (Special Report), Washington, DC: Centre for International Policy, 2009, p. 15.
Ibid., p. 19.
See, Rohde, “Afghan Symbol for Change Becomes a Symbol of Failure”, op. cit.
Y.J. Dreazen and Peter Spiegel, “Taliban Now Winning”, The Wall Street Journal, 10 August 2009.
A. Saikal and W. Maley, “The President Who Would Be King”, New York Times, 6 February 2008.
Ibid.
A. Saikal, “Afghanistan: What Way Forward?”, East Asia Forum, Vol. 31, October 2008.
A. Saikal, “Kabul Must Say No to U.S. bases”, The Globe and Mail, 24 May 2005.
Source:http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/sec...text=713240928
Comment