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Charles Chevenix Trench writes in his
'The Frontier Scouts' (1985): In October 1947, the Hindu
Maharajah of Kashmir, although
the vast majority of his subjects
were Moslems, joined his State to
India, Pakistan was outraged,
and from all over the Frontier tribal lashkars hastened in lorries
- undoubtedly with official logistic
support - into Kashmir. Scouts
were instructed to see nothing,
hear nothing, say nothing and do
nothing in this matter, although at least one British Officer, Harvey-
Kelly of the SWS, took part in the
campaign. It seemed that nothing
could stop these hordes of
tribesmen taking Srinagar with its
vital airfield. Indeed nothing did, but their own greed. The
Mahsuds in particular stopped to
loot, rape and murder; Indian
troops were flown in and the
lashkars pushed out of the Vale
of Kashmir into the mountains. The Mahsuds returned home in a
savage mood, having muffed an
easy chance, lost the loot of
Srinagar and made fools of
themselves. Lashkar invasion of Kashmir: the truth
by Prof Farakh A Khan (19. 8. 2007): A First Hand knowledge of the
Lashkar Commander(Kashmir
War 1948) (Lt Col (R ) Gaideen
Khan Abdullai Mahsud
From one generation to the next
we have created myths and ignored history. We know very
little truth about the war in
Kashmir in 1947-48 but we all
know that the Pathan Lashkar
from the Tribal Areas sent in to
conquer Srinagar went on a looting spree after they were
beaten back from the outskirts of
Srinagar. It is also understood
that the Lashkars on their way
back resorted to further looting
some say even raping. It is unfortunate that we the people of
Pakistan were never told the real
story of war in Kashmir' and have
to rely on popular myths and
propaganda handed over from
one generation to the next. Why the war in Kashmir was
necessary in 1947 and the legal
rigmarole is a long story which I
shall reserve for the future. Here I
shall briefly summarise the role of
tribal Lashkar in the Kashmir war of 1947-48. From the outset let
me make it clear that there were
three fronts labeled as Kashmir
war with almost no connection
with each other. In the north
(Northern Areas) it was a peoples uprising against Dogra rule. Here
the Gilgit and Chitral scouts joined
by Dogra Muslim regiments were
fighting without any help from
Pakistan (Dani, Ahmed Hasan.
History of Northern Areas of Pakistan. Sang-e-Meel Pub.
Lahore. 2001). In the south
Poonch was surrounded by local
forces (Poonch Brigade) under Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan again with little help from
Pakistan. The Muzaffarabad
Srinagar sector was where the
tribal Lashkar was operating with
some officers of the regular
Pakistan army. During the prelude to partition
(1947) Kashmir State was
disputed by India and Pakistan.
There was unrest among the
majority Muslim population of the
State and the Hindu Maharaja was losing his authority in many
areas. Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan was desperate to physically oppose the Maharajas decision to
join India that he even wanted to
get 100 year old muzzle loader
guns for his people to fight the
Dogra army (Khan, Sardar M
Ibrahim. The Kashmir saga. Ripon Printing Press Ltd. 1965). On
October 23, 1947 Lashkar of
about 5000 tribesmen from FATA
was launched through
Muzaffarabad. We must remember
that a spontaneous uprising of Gilgit Scouts had taken place in
August 1947 in Gilgit area. This
was triggered when the Maharaja
appointed a new governor to
Gilgit on July 30, 1947. The two
actions in Kashmir were independent of each other. One
was taking place in the Northern
Areas and the other in Kashmir
itself. When the Lashkar captured
Baramulla located 35 miles from
Srinagar Maharaja Hari Singh fled to Jammu (October 26) and on
October 27, 1947 acceded
Kashmir State to India asking for
military help and the same day
the Indian army was air lifted and
was in place to defend Srinagar. Heavy armament took a week by
road. The leadership in Pakistan
were of the opinion that to
commit regular troops was too
risky and could result in an all out
war between the two recently independent countries. The
leadership in India was also
afraid of starting a full-fledged
war between the two new
nations and wanted war in
Kashmir limited to that area (Kaul, BM, 1967). Pakistani leaders
decided that we should use
tribesmen from FATA, Swat army,
volunteers and retired army
personnel to conquer Kashmir.
The tribesmen formed the majority and the most feared
component of the rag tag army
sent into Kashmir. It was also
hoped that the Muslims of
Kashmir shall also rebel against
Dogra rule but this did not happen except in Poonch. In fact
Sheikh Abdullah had managed to
raise a Militia, which was later
commanded by Lt Gen BM Kaul
(The untold story. Allied Pub.
Bombay. 1967). Muslims in Kashmir were divided.
There are few authentic sources
available to understand what
happened in Kashmir in 1947-48.
Book by Maj Gen Akbar Khan
gave the source material for this article (Raiders in Kashmir. Pak
Publishers Ltd. Karachi. 1970). I
was fortunate to interview one of
the few surviving Lashkar
commanders two years back who
gave the inside information on the frontline reality. The
spectacular advance of the
Lashkar on Muzaffarabad
Srinagar road and equally rapid
retreat needs to be explored.
Kashmir War Interview with Lashkar Commander Lt Col. (R)
Gaideen Khan Abdullai Mahsud
(2005)
Kursheed Anwar Commander of
the Muslim League National
Guards was made in-charge of the Lashkars for Kashmir by
Abdul Qayum Khan. Sardar
Shaukat Hayat Khan was the over
all in-charge of operations in
Kashmir. There was a clear
understanding with the Lashkar that when they captured Srinagar
they would be allowed to loot the
treasury and the palace in lieu of
payment. This was the accepted
mode of warfare of not only for
Tribal Pathans but all unpaid armies in the world since times
immoral. In 1929 when the
British against usurper in Kabul
launched Nadir Shah he was
allowed to recruit Wazir tribe from
FATA. The Wazir tribes were allowed to loot the king's palace
in Kabul in lieu of payment for
their efforts. In case of Kashmir
jihad in 1947 the Pakistan
government was not responsible
for their death or injury and only supplied some ammunition and
rudimentary transport. Food and
accommodation was also
arranged by the Lashkar. This
was called 'living off the land'.
Despite all the drawbacks the Lashkars brushed aside the
Dogra forces within the first
week.
The Lashkar was launched from
Muzaffarabad on October 23,
1947. When the Lashkar reached Baramulla and captured the town
(October 26) after a stiff action
they realized that they were now
fighting the Indian regular army
and hence knew that Indian
reinforcements had reached the Valley. The Indian Commanding
Officer was killed and one person
from the Lashkar took off his
jacket and wore it. Anwar
addressed the Lashkar at
Baramullah and told them that there was a change of plan and
the treasury and the palace was
not to be looted. The leaders of
various Lashkars had earlier
pleaded with him not to say this
and matter could be resolved once they captured Srinagar. The
Lashkars were enraged and
showed their displeasure with
Lashkar leaders, which was
embarrassing for the leaders.
Nevertheless some elements reached outskirts of Srinagar on
October 29. Here Commander
Gadeen Khan and his small group
faced determined resistance. They
overran opposition after a
firefight but realised that they were now facing Indian
armoured cars, artillery, air force
and regular Indian ground
troops. The Lashkar had no anti
tank or anti air craft weapons.
Small bands of the Lashkar when opposed by full Indian army in
the open in sight of Srinagar did
not stand a chance. The Lashkar
started to disperse very rapidly. Of
the 5000 tribesmen only 25
remained with Commander Gadeen Khan the rest went on a
looting spree in the Valley and
then headed home. The few
remaining Pathans fought a
rearguard action till some units of
Pakistan army and volunteers arrived and stabilised the position
at Chakoti.
According to Gen Akbar Khan
(1970) by November 5 the
lashkar had retreated to Uri 65
miles from Srinagar and small parties were pulling out of
Kashmir altogether. The
retreating lashkar mainly of
Mahsud from South Waziristan
and Afridi from Tirah were met by
Gen Akbar Khan at Uri and was bombarded with questions such
as:
“Who was I? I told them. Had the
Pakistan Government sent me?
No. Were any troops coming to
help? No. Had I brought any weapons or ammunition? No. Did
Pakistan want Kashmir or not?
Yes. ”
Soon the apologetic tribesmen
started negotiations for re-
entering the fight for Kashmir. Large numbers again joined the
battle. In April 1948 India
launched its summer offensive.
Facing Uri on the Muzaffarabad
Srinagar road we had one regular
battalion, Frontier Scouts, tribesmen and Azad units to stop
the might of the Indian army
supported by tanks, armoured
cars, artillery and air cover. This
rag tag force was able to stop the
Indian army. The finest moment of the tribesmen was in the
capture of Pandu and Chakoti
where they distinguished
themselves. We must remember
that tribal volunteers were not a
trained modern army. The natural ability of the tribesmen to use
guerrilla tactics especially ambush
was very affective. This second
action by the FATA tribesmen is
not remembered. On December
31, 1948 at midnight guns on both sides fell silent with the
cease-fire (Khan, Akbar. 1970).
The Pathan 'volunteers' came at
the call of Pir of Wana, South
Waziristan Pir Ghulam Dastigir and
Malik Akhya Jan (Izzatullah, Shaikh. Kashmir-Plebiscite: Part 1.
Iqbal Company Ltd. Lahore). The
people of FATA were encouraged
to join the Lashkar by the Chief
Minister of NWFP Khan Abdul
Qayyum Khan despite- objections from the NWFP Governor Sir
George Cunningham (Hussain,
Ijaz. Kashmir dispute: an
international law perspective.
National Institute of Pakistan
Studies, Islamabad. 1998). Sulemankhel tribesmen from
Afghanistan also joined the fight
as part of jihad (Khan, Sardar M
Ibrahim. The Kashmir saga. Ripon
Printing Press, Lahore. 1965).
Sardar Mohammad Abdul Qayyum Khan called these 'volunteers' as
Mujahideen/Tribal Volunteers
(The Kashmir case. Published by
Sardar Attique Ahmed Khan,
Rawalpindi. 1970). Sheikh
Izzatullah called the Pathans as 'raiders' working for Army of
Liberation. Gen Akbar Khan also
refers to them as 'raiders' . For the
Indian side the Pathan Lashkar
were invaders/raiders (Khalifa,
Abdul Mannan. Kashmir story. ABKO, Lahore. 1970).
In the first wave of attack on the
road to Srinagar the Lashkar had
an incentive ie. to loot the Rajgarh
palace and the treasury in
Srinagar. However there were people amongst the Lashkar who
opted to stay on and fight
without material reward. Later the
Lashkar rallied back for the
Pando action and took valuable
territory without material reward. I do hope we now have a
balanced view of the contribution
of people of Waziristan and other
parts of FATA who put their life
on line for Pakistan
'The Frontier Scouts' (1985): In October 1947, the Hindu
Maharajah of Kashmir, although
the vast majority of his subjects
were Moslems, joined his State to
India, Pakistan was outraged,
and from all over the Frontier tribal lashkars hastened in lorries
- undoubtedly with official logistic
support - into Kashmir. Scouts
were instructed to see nothing,
hear nothing, say nothing and do
nothing in this matter, although at least one British Officer, Harvey-
Kelly of the SWS, took part in the
campaign. It seemed that nothing
could stop these hordes of
tribesmen taking Srinagar with its
vital airfield. Indeed nothing did, but their own greed. The
Mahsuds in particular stopped to
loot, rape and murder; Indian
troops were flown in and the
lashkars pushed out of the Vale
of Kashmir into the mountains. The Mahsuds returned home in a
savage mood, having muffed an
easy chance, lost the loot of
Srinagar and made fools of
themselves. Lashkar invasion of Kashmir: the truth
by Prof Farakh A Khan (19. 8. 2007): A First Hand knowledge of the
Lashkar Commander(Kashmir
War 1948) (Lt Col (R ) Gaideen
Khan Abdullai Mahsud
From one generation to the next
we have created myths and ignored history. We know very
little truth about the war in
Kashmir in 1947-48 but we all
know that the Pathan Lashkar
from the Tribal Areas sent in to
conquer Srinagar went on a looting spree after they were
beaten back from the outskirts of
Srinagar. It is also understood
that the Lashkars on their way
back resorted to further looting
some say even raping. It is unfortunate that we the people of
Pakistan were never told the real
story of war in Kashmir' and have
to rely on popular myths and
propaganda handed over from
one generation to the next. Why the war in Kashmir was
necessary in 1947 and the legal
rigmarole is a long story which I
shall reserve for the future. Here I
shall briefly summarise the role of
tribal Lashkar in the Kashmir war of 1947-48. From the outset let
me make it clear that there were
three fronts labeled as Kashmir
war with almost no connection
with each other. In the north
(Northern Areas) it was a peoples uprising against Dogra rule. Here
the Gilgit and Chitral scouts joined
by Dogra Muslim regiments were
fighting without any help from
Pakistan (Dani, Ahmed Hasan.
History of Northern Areas of Pakistan. Sang-e-Meel Pub.
Lahore. 2001). In the south
Poonch was surrounded by local
forces (Poonch Brigade) under Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan again with little help from
Pakistan. The Muzaffarabad
Srinagar sector was where the
tribal Lashkar was operating with
some officers of the regular
Pakistan army. During the prelude to partition
(1947) Kashmir State was
disputed by India and Pakistan.
There was unrest among the
majority Muslim population of the
State and the Hindu Maharaja was losing his authority in many
areas. Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan was desperate to physically oppose the Maharajas decision to
join India that he even wanted to
get 100 year old muzzle loader
guns for his people to fight the
Dogra army (Khan, Sardar M
Ibrahim. The Kashmir saga. Ripon Printing Press Ltd. 1965). On
October 23, 1947 Lashkar of
about 5000 tribesmen from FATA
was launched through
Muzaffarabad. We must remember
that a spontaneous uprising of Gilgit Scouts had taken place in
August 1947 in Gilgit area. This
was triggered when the Maharaja
appointed a new governor to
Gilgit on July 30, 1947. The two
actions in Kashmir were independent of each other. One
was taking place in the Northern
Areas and the other in Kashmir
itself. When the Lashkar captured
Baramulla located 35 miles from
Srinagar Maharaja Hari Singh fled to Jammu (October 26) and on
October 27, 1947 acceded
Kashmir State to India asking for
military help and the same day
the Indian army was air lifted and
was in place to defend Srinagar. Heavy armament took a week by
road. The leadership in Pakistan
were of the opinion that to
commit regular troops was too
risky and could result in an all out
war between the two recently independent countries. The
leadership in India was also
afraid of starting a full-fledged
war between the two new
nations and wanted war in
Kashmir limited to that area (Kaul, BM, 1967). Pakistani leaders
decided that we should use
tribesmen from FATA, Swat army,
volunteers and retired army
personnel to conquer Kashmir.
The tribesmen formed the majority and the most feared
component of the rag tag army
sent into Kashmir. It was also
hoped that the Muslims of
Kashmir shall also rebel against
Dogra rule but this did not happen except in Poonch. In fact
Sheikh Abdullah had managed to
raise a Militia, which was later
commanded by Lt Gen BM Kaul
(The untold story. Allied Pub.
Bombay. 1967). Muslims in Kashmir were divided.
There are few authentic sources
available to understand what
happened in Kashmir in 1947-48.
Book by Maj Gen Akbar Khan
gave the source material for this article (Raiders in Kashmir. Pak
Publishers Ltd. Karachi. 1970). I
was fortunate to interview one of
the few surviving Lashkar
commanders two years back who
gave the inside information on the frontline reality. The
spectacular advance of the
Lashkar on Muzaffarabad
Srinagar road and equally rapid
retreat needs to be explored.
Kashmir War Interview with Lashkar Commander Lt Col. (R)
Gaideen Khan Abdullai Mahsud
(2005)
Kursheed Anwar Commander of
the Muslim League National
Guards was made in-charge of the Lashkars for Kashmir by
Abdul Qayum Khan. Sardar
Shaukat Hayat Khan was the over
all in-charge of operations in
Kashmir. There was a clear
understanding with the Lashkar that when they captured Srinagar
they would be allowed to loot the
treasury and the palace in lieu of
payment. This was the accepted
mode of warfare of not only for
Tribal Pathans but all unpaid armies in the world since times
immoral. In 1929 when the
British against usurper in Kabul
launched Nadir Shah he was
allowed to recruit Wazir tribe from
FATA. The Wazir tribes were allowed to loot the king's palace
in Kabul in lieu of payment for
their efforts. In case of Kashmir
jihad in 1947 the Pakistan
government was not responsible
for their death or injury and only supplied some ammunition and
rudimentary transport. Food and
accommodation was also
arranged by the Lashkar. This
was called 'living off the land'.
Despite all the drawbacks the Lashkars brushed aside the
Dogra forces within the first
week.
The Lashkar was launched from
Muzaffarabad on October 23,
1947. When the Lashkar reached Baramulla and captured the town
(October 26) after a stiff action
they realized that they were now
fighting the Indian regular army
and hence knew that Indian
reinforcements had reached the Valley. The Indian Commanding
Officer was killed and one person
from the Lashkar took off his
jacket and wore it. Anwar
addressed the Lashkar at
Baramullah and told them that there was a change of plan and
the treasury and the palace was
not to be looted. The leaders of
various Lashkars had earlier
pleaded with him not to say this
and matter could be resolved once they captured Srinagar. The
Lashkars were enraged and
showed their displeasure with
Lashkar leaders, which was
embarrassing for the leaders.
Nevertheless some elements reached outskirts of Srinagar on
October 29. Here Commander
Gadeen Khan and his small group
faced determined resistance. They
overran opposition after a
firefight but realised that they were now facing Indian
armoured cars, artillery, air force
and regular Indian ground
troops. The Lashkar had no anti
tank or anti air craft weapons.
Small bands of the Lashkar when opposed by full Indian army in
the open in sight of Srinagar did
not stand a chance. The Lashkar
started to disperse very rapidly. Of
the 5000 tribesmen only 25
remained with Commander Gadeen Khan the rest went on a
looting spree in the Valley and
then headed home. The few
remaining Pathans fought a
rearguard action till some units of
Pakistan army and volunteers arrived and stabilised the position
at Chakoti.
According to Gen Akbar Khan
(1970) by November 5 the
lashkar had retreated to Uri 65
miles from Srinagar and small parties were pulling out of
Kashmir altogether. The
retreating lashkar mainly of
Mahsud from South Waziristan
and Afridi from Tirah were met by
Gen Akbar Khan at Uri and was bombarded with questions such
as:
“Who was I? I told them. Had the
Pakistan Government sent me?
No. Were any troops coming to
help? No. Had I brought any weapons or ammunition? No. Did
Pakistan want Kashmir or not?
Yes. ”
Soon the apologetic tribesmen
started negotiations for re-
entering the fight for Kashmir. Large numbers again joined the
battle. In April 1948 India
launched its summer offensive.
Facing Uri on the Muzaffarabad
Srinagar road we had one regular
battalion, Frontier Scouts, tribesmen and Azad units to stop
the might of the Indian army
supported by tanks, armoured
cars, artillery and air cover. This
rag tag force was able to stop the
Indian army. The finest moment of the tribesmen was in the
capture of Pandu and Chakoti
where they distinguished
themselves. We must remember
that tribal volunteers were not a
trained modern army. The natural ability of the tribesmen to use
guerrilla tactics especially ambush
was very affective. This second
action by the FATA tribesmen is
not remembered. On December
31, 1948 at midnight guns on both sides fell silent with the
cease-fire (Khan, Akbar. 1970).
The Pathan 'volunteers' came at
the call of Pir of Wana, South
Waziristan Pir Ghulam Dastigir and
Malik Akhya Jan (Izzatullah, Shaikh. Kashmir-Plebiscite: Part 1.
Iqbal Company Ltd. Lahore). The
people of FATA were encouraged
to join the Lashkar by the Chief
Minister of NWFP Khan Abdul
Qayyum Khan despite- objections from the NWFP Governor Sir
George Cunningham (Hussain,
Ijaz. Kashmir dispute: an
international law perspective.
National Institute of Pakistan
Studies, Islamabad. 1998). Sulemankhel tribesmen from
Afghanistan also joined the fight
as part of jihad (Khan, Sardar M
Ibrahim. The Kashmir saga. Ripon
Printing Press, Lahore. 1965).
Sardar Mohammad Abdul Qayyum Khan called these 'volunteers' as
Mujahideen/Tribal Volunteers
(The Kashmir case. Published by
Sardar Attique Ahmed Khan,
Rawalpindi. 1970). Sheikh
Izzatullah called the Pathans as 'raiders' working for Army of
Liberation. Gen Akbar Khan also
refers to them as 'raiders' . For the
Indian side the Pathan Lashkar
were invaders/raiders (Khalifa,
Abdul Mannan. Kashmir story. ABKO, Lahore. 1970).
In the first wave of attack on the
road to Srinagar the Lashkar had
an incentive ie. to loot the Rajgarh
palace and the treasury in
Srinagar. However there were people amongst the Lashkar who
opted to stay on and fight
without material reward. Later the
Lashkar rallied back for the
Pando action and took valuable
territory without material reward. I do hope we now have a
balanced view of the contribution
of people of Waziristan and other
parts of FATA who put their life
on line for Pakistan
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