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I came across this article titled Mad Mullahs, Opportunists, and Family Connections: The Violent Pashtun Cycle" "at the tribal analysis center and found it very interesting and was interested in others opinions on it. I will post the beginning of the article here but please read all of it.
Mad Mullahs, Opportunists, and Family Connections: The Violent Pashtun Cycle
“Their superstition exposes them to the rapacity and tyranny of a numerous priesthood – “Mullahs,” “Sahibzadas,”
“Akhundzadas,” Fakirs,” – and a host of wandering Talib-ul-ilms, who correspond with the theological students in
Turkey, and live free at the expense of the people.”
Winston Churchill, The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War, 1897
“He is forbidden colourful clothes or exotic music, for they weaken the arm and soften the eye. He is taught to look at
the hawk and forget the nightingale. He is asked to kill his beloved to save the soul of her children. It is a perpetual
surrender – an eternal giving up of man to man and their wise follies.
Ghani Khan, The Pathans, 1947
Invariably, when there is an emergence of extreme violence within Pashtun society, their clergy will be deeply involved. The exact opposite
is true when the Pashtuns are at peace: the mullah class is quiet and remains within its mosques and madrassas. There is a long modern history of
a pattern of opportunistic mullahs suddenly taking advantage of local or regional unrest to advance themselves over the traditional sources of tribal
governance, maliks and khans. It is this pattern of conflict between opportunists and traditionalists that lies at the foundation of much of the violence
seen among the Pashtuns. This violence appears to take the form of a cycle that repeats itself when local social and political circumstances permit
the opportunist mullahs to gather enough followers to take control of their region. The period of the cycle depends on the underlying social or
political stimulus that created the unrest in the first place. One thing seems sure: the displaced maliks eventually recover their status at the expense
of the generally weaker mullah class and gradually restore order. In normal times, there seems to be a symbiotic relationship between maliks and the
mullahs with the clergy often being responsible for announcing and implementing the decisions made by secular jirgas headed by maliks. Violence
emerges within this time-tested system when mullahs attempt to gain power and authority over the traditional secular leadership of the Pashtun tribes.
It had made little real difference if the political or social instability the mullahs used to gain power resulted from the occupation of tribal
lands by Sikhs, annexation by British and Indian soldiers, coups that overthrew the last of the traditional Durrani Pashtun rulers of Afghanistan, a
series of assassinated communist rulers, a Soviet invasion, or the arrival of Americans and western Coalition forces charged with restoring order –
and installing the maliks and khans to their proper positions as the ruling class. In all cases, the tension and instability resulted from resistance to
the goal of imposing centralized secular control – maliks and khans – over a rural, tribal periphery where the uneducated population could be rallied
quickly to the support of the emerging opportunistic mullahs claiming to represent God’s Will to people prone to believe their messages. Added to
the susceptible population, these practiced orators frequently claimed a heritage derived from religious, respected ancestors and claimed an ability to
perform miracles to demonstrate that they were the “instruments of God’s Will.” While focusing their supporter’s attention on the external factors
threatening their tribal way of life, their first targets were the traditional, secular khans and maliks whose normal authority restrained the mullah class
and kept them in their mosques and madrassas. The secular side of Pashtun governance stood in the way of the opportunists seeking to elevate their
status and gain both funds and the power new positions would provide.
The entire article can be found here:
Mad Mullahs, Opportunists, and Family Connections: The Violent Pashtun Cycle
“Their superstition exposes them to the rapacity and tyranny of a numerous priesthood – “Mullahs,” “Sahibzadas,”
“Akhundzadas,” Fakirs,” – and a host of wandering Talib-ul-ilms, who correspond with the theological students in
Turkey, and live free at the expense of the people.”
Winston Churchill, The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War, 1897
“He is forbidden colourful clothes or exotic music, for they weaken the arm and soften the eye. He is taught to look at
the hawk and forget the nightingale. He is asked to kill his beloved to save the soul of her children. It is a perpetual
surrender – an eternal giving up of man to man and their wise follies.
Ghani Khan, The Pathans, 1947
Invariably, when there is an emergence of extreme violence within Pashtun society, their clergy will be deeply involved. The exact opposite
is true when the Pashtuns are at peace: the mullah class is quiet and remains within its mosques and madrassas. There is a long modern history of
a pattern of opportunistic mullahs suddenly taking advantage of local or regional unrest to advance themselves over the traditional sources of tribal
governance, maliks and khans. It is this pattern of conflict between opportunists and traditionalists that lies at the foundation of much of the violence
seen among the Pashtuns. This violence appears to take the form of a cycle that repeats itself when local social and political circumstances permit
the opportunist mullahs to gather enough followers to take control of their region. The period of the cycle depends on the underlying social or
political stimulus that created the unrest in the first place. One thing seems sure: the displaced maliks eventually recover their status at the expense
of the generally weaker mullah class and gradually restore order. In normal times, there seems to be a symbiotic relationship between maliks and the
mullahs with the clergy often being responsible for announcing and implementing the decisions made by secular jirgas headed by maliks. Violence
emerges within this time-tested system when mullahs attempt to gain power and authority over the traditional secular leadership of the Pashtun tribes.
It had made little real difference if the political or social instability the mullahs used to gain power resulted from the occupation of tribal
lands by Sikhs, annexation by British and Indian soldiers, coups that overthrew the last of the traditional Durrani Pashtun rulers of Afghanistan, a
series of assassinated communist rulers, a Soviet invasion, or the arrival of Americans and western Coalition forces charged with restoring order –
and installing the maliks and khans to their proper positions as the ruling class. In all cases, the tension and instability resulted from resistance to
the goal of imposing centralized secular control – maliks and khans – over a rural, tribal periphery where the uneducated population could be rallied
quickly to the support of the emerging opportunistic mullahs claiming to represent God’s Will to people prone to believe their messages. Added to
the susceptible population, these practiced orators frequently claimed a heritage derived from religious, respected ancestors and claimed an ability to
perform miracles to demonstrate that they were the “instruments of God’s Will.” While focusing their supporter’s attention on the external factors
threatening their tribal way of life, their first targets were the traditional, secular khans and maliks whose normal authority restrained the mullah class
and kept them in their mosques and madrassas. The secular side of Pashtun governance stood in the way of the opportunists seeking to elevate their
status and gain both funds and the power new positions would provide.
The entire article can be found here:
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