Research on Afghanistan and Pashtun matters (Updated with more links)

[PFgulalai]

Darweshkhel, I have no words to appreciate your great service of accumulating and presenting this priceless treasure of knowledge and information here. There is superabundance of information and I just found it now!!! Pashtuns like you inspire and motivate me a lot. They know the power of knowledge as a weapon to fight all evils.
I have not been able to devour all of it but it's on my to-do-list now.
Keep rendering your holy services to Pashtun nation as the pursuit of knowledge is the holiest and noblest of all quests.
Dera Manana and khushala wusee!

Anytime my brother. Nice to see yall hungry for knowledge my nation has been kept in darkness for a very long time now.
I thank you all for all the props given but what I'm doing here is really not worth mentioning.

I call it پښتو ته خدمت

Regards
Darweshkhel

[Darweshkhel]

SMALL WARS JOURNAL

Operations in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas
By William McCallister

Strategic Design Considerations for Operations in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas:
Dust-up along the North-West Frontier

William S. McCallister

“It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovations can rely on themselves or have to depend on others: That is to say, whether to consummate their enterprise, have they to use prayer or can they use force. In the first instance they always succeed badly and never compass anything, but when they can rely on themselves and use force; then they are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have conquered and the unarmed ones have been destroyed”.

-- Nicolo Machiavelli, The Prince

Background

Ideas as to what constitutes good governance various among individuals, groups and cultures. The current definition of good governance as outlined in a recent report on threats from safe havens and ungoverned areas is a case in point. (1) The report defines governance as the “delivery of security, judicial, legal, regulatory, intelligence, economic, administration, social and political goods and public services, and the institutions through which they are delivered”. The definition implies a social service centric function for government emphasizing “delivery” and distribution of social services. It further implies that only democratic institutions are a safeguard against militancy, extremism and terrorism. Not all cultures view the role and function of government in quite the same way. Tribal society, particularly along the North-West frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan judges the role and function of effective government quite differently.

Tribes compete with one another for limited resources and access to influence. The function of effective government in such a sociopolitical system is therefore expressed in another way. Legitimacy is based on the social contract with fighting as a form of negotiation. The social code is the basis for negotiating the social contract and hence “legitimacy” upon which the existing political formula is based. (2) The political formula in turn greatly influences the form and function of indigenous social institutions and organizations and reflects the accepted norm of behavior between individuals and groups.

The application of Pakthunwali or the “way of the Pathans”; requirement to manage competition among the various groups and promote some type of stability in tribal areas has evolved into a distinct sociopolitical system that embodies its own unique mix of social contract and political formula. The sociopolitical system along the North-West frontier is therefore best described as an arena in which groups compete. (3) The government acts as the fulcrum around which the various actors revolve forming, breaking apart, and reforming as warranted in competition for position, influence and authority.

Effective governance ensures that latent and existing hostilities between groups’ remains confined within acceptable levels. Its primary role is to enforce traditional codes of conduct in managing violence. The fighting and lawlessness engulfing Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989 may be directly attributed to a lack of controlling agent to enforce a semblance of balance between rival groups. The indigenous population therefore bases its definitions of ungoverned or under-governed areas on quite different criteria.

An ungoverned or under-governed area reflects the inability of the central government to maintain parity between the various groups competing and cooperating for position, influence and authority. A fair government is one that is perceived to maintain all actors equally and balanced against the other “in splendid equilibrium”. (4) The central government may be considered “corrupt” if it favors only one particular group or has been co-opted by one or more groups at the expense of all the others. The criterion for illegitimacy along the North-West frontier is therefore judged in the manner in which each group perceives itself to be governed in comparison to other groups and not necessarily because the region is poor and socially chaotic and therefore assumed to be more prone to western concepts of corruption.

Applied Strategy: U.S. and Tribal Perspectives

The differences in mental models, experience and expectations greatly influences our perspective on strategic design processes and strategy in achieving political or military objectives whether in cooperation or competition with other actors pursuing their own objectives. The American cultural legacy fosters a rational interpretation of the world. U.S. strategic design processes are therefore rational and mechanistic. Tribal society, on the other hand, perceives the world from within the confines of its immediate and extended kinship group and territory where competition i.e. winning and losing is literally a matter of life and death. This outlook on life greatly influences behavior. As a result, tribal strategic design processes are more dynamic; flexible, competitive and adaptive in nature.

The western way of strategy is about how (way or concept) available power (means or resources) is applied to achieve objectives (end) in support of interests. Experts stress that the strategist must know what is to be accomplished and that only by analyzing and understanding the internal and external environment in which he operates can he develop appropriate objectives leading to the desired end-state. The theory itself highlights the requirement for strategy to ensure an appropriate balance among objectives, methods, and available resources.

The tribal way of strategy is of a networked nature. The reason why is found in the way the tribe is governed and administered. The paramount leader of a given tribe is assisted by a number of trusted advisors and principal lieutenants consisting predominantly of senior family members and a few outstanding commoners. His brothers and paternal uncles, in particular, are everywhere entitled and expected to assist him and thus have special authority over portions of the tribe as a whole. In carrying out his specific duties the paramount leader, in addition to his immediate family, is also assisted by various grades of local authority. The tribe is therefore administered not so much by the paramount leader alone as by the whole of his family and local authority, though as holder of the office he personally has distinctive powers and privileges. In terms of tribal strategy development, all factions represent powerful interests competing for leverage and influence in support of familial political, economic or security objectives.

While the paramount leader is the representative and spokesman of the tribe and is responsible for the tribe’s external relations, the strategy to care for his people and to promote the tribe’s welfare and security is a reflection of various powerful interest groups competing with one another for positions of advantage within the tribe. The outward expression of what we perceive to be strategic consensus at any given moment is the product of a process of adaptation, competition and cooperation within the tribe itself and subject to change as one or another faction gains or loses influence. Adaptation to changing conditions is intuitive and less based on rational cost-benefit analysis than shaped by traditional rules of behavior that governs competition and cooperation amongst the various factions.

Discussion of power should not be limited to only two categories; soft and hard power. Power in tribal terms may also be described as latent power. Targeted violence, or fighting as a form of negotiation, is a means to initiate change; applied force to change the existing sociopolitical condition in one’s favor. Initiating hostilities seeks to test the present relationship and to create the conditions for even greater benefits to be realized in the future.

Strategic Risks Considerations Along the North-West Frontier

There are a number of risks considerations that must be addressed prior to involving ourselves in the sociopolitical arena along the North-West frontier. First and foremost is the risk of engaging an opponent whose strategic calculus differs so markedly from our own. U.S. strategic development processes are rational, mechanistic and as a result hierarchical so as to facilitate control. In order to maintain the perception of control we seek comprehensive knowledge over all facets of the environment and operation.

Tribal strategy development processes, on the other hand, are intuitive and the product of a process of competition, cooperation and adaptation. Tribal strategy does not seek to create comprehensive knowledge but only to gain local advantage at a specific point in time and space. It is opportunistic due to its intuitive character. This characteristic differential between western and tribal strategic design is a key point of consideration. While there is no disagreement that we must understand the situation and gain an appreciation for the potential first, second, and third effects at the tactical and operational levels, comprehensive knowledge of all the things that might influence the situation may be a bridge too far. Effects are determined not simply by preceding causes but are part of a continuous process of evolution. These complex interactions are too numerous to predict, identify and observe as they manifest themselves in their various end states along the historical timeline.

Our emphasis on controlling every potential strategic effect limits our flexibility in exploiting windows of opportunity and is the primary cause of much surprise when confronted with unpredicted events. Unpredicted events cause execution to revert to a reactive mode. Valuable time is lost as the strategic plan is realigned so as to focus on the changed condition. Time that is used by an adversary who relies on intuitive, flexible and adaptive behavior to exploit opportunities so as to shape the situation in his favor. In the meantime, unable to appreciate the cultural nuance and adapt quickly enough to the changed circumstances we are forced to press on with inappropriate tactical and operational level actions so as to maintain momentum regardless of the applicability or desirability of the potential long-term strategic effects we may be initiating with these actions. The Achilles Heel of our hierarchical strategic design and execution process is exposed when confronted by an opponent executing an intuitive, opportunistic and adaptive tribal strategy.

The second risk lies in the language we use in assessing the operational environment. Considerations of long and short-term factors such as causes of conflict, competing demands for resources, economic realities, legal and moral implications, and international interests are expressed in language. Implicit theories and interpretations are embedded in the vocabulary and subconsciously shape our perceptions and understanding of the world and our interaction with it. Widely held beliefs live on implicitly in words or phrases and therefore are likely never to be explicitly challenged or subjected to criticism. Descriptions of the operating environment are a case in point. Although much time is spent in defining the types of conflict in which we engage i.e. conventional or unconventional and its forms i.e. insurgency or counterinsurgency, we are not yet mentally flexible enough to describe our opponent accurately. Our terminologies to describe conventional or unconventional conflicts tend to brand the participants as conventional military or guerilla fighters, terrorists or criminals. When the opponent are tribal organizations, generally accepted terms such as insurgents, guerillas, terrorists or criminals do not necessarily provide the best description nor accurately describe the conflict in question. Language laded with interpretations or theories about our surroundings will profoundly shape the questions we ask and solutions we develop. Common terms by design seek to foster corporate concepts and shared understanding but if generally accepted terms describe the situation poorly, diplomatic and military initiatives based on this vocabulary are likely to deal poorly with the situation.

Insurgency or Irregular Warfare

Insurgency is currently defined as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict”. (5) This definition, if applied along the North-West frontier may be too narrowly circumscribed. The definition does not take into consideration the social contract i.e. tribal relations with the central government or challenges to its authority. A particular tribal “dust-up” may not necessarily be aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government but may only seek to limit its control over a partial area of its declared sovereign territory. In essence, the tribe is engaged in renegotiating the social contract between itself and the central government. In this case, hostilities might be initiated to only limit government encroachment into territory inhabited by the tribe. Tribal fighters may employ subversion and direct attacks against government organizations yet compliment the effort with participation in the traditional governance process i.e. jirga system. (6) It is therefore important to avoid the temptation to simply label groups as “insurgents”, “terrorists” and “criminals”; definitions that embody unquestioned assumptions contained in the language itself and cause us to respond reflexively in our own stylized forms of diplomacy and fighting.

Irregular warfare is defined as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population”. (7) In tribal terms, irregular warfare is fought employing the tribe’s diplomatic, economic, informational and martial instruments of tribal power.

The importance of description is highlighted in the following paragraphs. The scenario illustrated below should be familiar to all those currently engaged in fighting extremists in Afghanistan or along the frontier with Pakistan. The narrative reflects many “modern” concepts of insurgency and revolutionary warfare.

A religious personality proclaims a movement and declares himself Amir. Adherents of the movement swear a baiat or oath of religious allegiance to him and an advisory and planning council consisting of a vice-regent and supporters is established. Supporters are appointed as regional emirs and administrative officers such as religious tax collector. A highly sophisticated propaganda campaign is launched to promote the Amir and the movement.

The movement is sophisticated but remains largely covert in the early stage. Developing a district network usually begins with a religious missionary seeking out a suitable base where he can establish himself, often marrying into the local Muslim community. He then sets himself up as a religious teacher or mullah and gains a following in the district. He expands the administrative network by appointing three lay figures to act as general manager, tax-collector and postmaster. The great majority of recruits are poor, illiterate and unskilled young men, while those selected for further training and indoctrination are invariably older and better educated.

Once the administrative network is established, these four local representatives act independently of each other; the mullah teaches and proselytizes, the tax collector gathers funds, the postmaster arranges for communication of messages and movement of recruits, and the general manager co-ordinates the overall effort. Compartmentalization of duties avoids detection and the attention of authorities. The mullah may be investigated and called before the authorities to account for his seditious preaching, but will likely be permitted to continue his activities because he appears to be working in isolation.

In time, local groups are linked through a number of regional centers while the regional center is linked to the frontier through a network of routes and safe houses, which enable messengers, supplies and recruits to be moved up and down the line in secrecy and safety. Security measures such as giving each member a nom de guerre and establishing communication codes are established. As the organization expands it evolves into a highly effective organization for Islamic revival and revolution with branches throughout the support and target area and sustained by a large popular constituency.

A disciplined, small group of hard-core of fighters or ghazis are raised and led by a dedicated chain of command. They are well armed, trained and supplied by members or supporters of the movement. Many pious Muslims contribute to their upkeep including members of a number of leading Muslim houses throughout the Islamic world.

Since jihad should only be launched from territory where sharia prevails or recognized as dar al-Islam (house/abode of peace), the movement decides to establish itself in the mountainous territory of the North-West Frontier. The Islamists may be welcomed initially as a potential ally against a rival tribe but since being called upon by God to liberate the land from the infidel oppressor a jirga (8) composed of the elders of one tribe or a loya jirga composed of a number of tribes and sub-tribes may be convened to tender their armed support to the holy warriors. They are promised nanawati or hospitality that cannot be denied even to a criminal or enemy. The tribe is now obligated to honor badal i.e. the right of revenge or vendetta if they are killed by an outsider. The Islamists may marry into the local tribal community and could be offered a permanent home and a plot of land in perpetuity to support the impending jihad. This area becomes the movement’s spiritual and worldly fortress from which to wage holy war against the infidel. The process of building social networks begins anew as mullahs begin teaching and proselytizing in the target area. Madrassas draw the youngest for further indoctrination. Once established in the mountains, the Amir and his closest disciples may issue a formal summons calling on all Muslims to join in holy war.

The Islamists exploit traditional methods of tribal governance and commence organizing local shura. Funds continue to flow into the tribal area as the Islamists ability to attract and create patronage relationships begin to bear fruit. District and regional shura may be formed to continue proselytizing new tribes attracted by increased revenues and religious sentiments. In time, a Greater Shura whose members include the Islamists’ inner circle, elders and religious leaders from all the provinces and districts may be summoned. The Greater Shura serves to engage and reduce tensions between rival tribes ready to challenge the rising power of the emergent alliance. Rival tribes may form their own shura feeling ignored, threatened or in perpetual blood feud with tribes that are members of the Islamist gathering.

The jirga now calls for all out war against the infidel. Tribal levies or laskhkar are raised for the campaigning season. (9) The small elite group of dedicated, hard-core fighters forms the vanguard of the Salafi ghazi or war party. It fights along side the tribal levies under the Amir’s personal command. The ghazis are afforded prestige and special privileges and are the envy of the levied tribal fighters who now strive to be accepted as members of this special band.

The lesser jihad is initiated by attacking the weakest opponent first. Ambassadors are sent calling on the opponent to convert before the ghazi are ordered to attack. If the tribe is too powerful a non-aggression pact may be concluded until strong enough to engage directly. Guarded against engaging the opponent if he is strong, they wait until he is too weak to defend himself and only then conduct raids into neighboring territories that look more like pillaging expeditions than war. They hesitate at the first sign of resistance, flee if pursued and pursue if the opponent withdraws. Surveillance is conducted for days on end until an opportunity to surprise and slaughter an opponent without great danger to themselves presents itself; the tribal art of war instructs that the greatest victory lies in destroying everything without incurring any losses yourself. The opposing tribe relies on a system of arbakai militias, bands of local men who take up arms at times of danger to protect themselves and their territory. It too adheres to the same tribal warfare tenets as its opponent.

In 1827-8 a very different kind of threat appeared along the Frontier. His name was Syed Ahmad. He is credited by British authorities as the founder and first of the Hindustani Fanatics. Syed Ahmad was a disciple and follower of al-Muwahhidun (Unitarians) or Wahhabism. From 1828 onwards Syed Ahmad’s message of Islamic reform was heard in Sunni mosques and meeting places across northern India. His “path of Muhammad” network worked in secret, swore oaths of loyalty to their leaders, followed their own code of morality and believed themselves to be God-fearing. The Syed Ahmad’s strategy to wage lesser jihad against British authorities applied the tactics, techniques and procedures summarized above eventually culminating in the Sepoy or Indian Mutiny of 1857.

Syed Ahmad’s activities spread the message of al-Muwahhidun among the tribes along the present day North-West Frontier. To the British authorities his followers were known as the Hindustani Fanatics. A generation later the message reappeared in Arabia calling itself Al-Ikhwan or the Brotherhood. It later mutated into Salafi ideology or “followers of the forefathers” and in our own time is known as the Taliban or al-Qaeda. (10)

Recent news in the popular press asserts that the Pentagon is “ready, willing and able” to send U.S. troops to conduct joint operations with Pakistan’s military in the tribal areas. (11) The Los Angeles Times reports that “American officials remain skeptical of the Pakistani army’s counterinsurgency abilities and want to find more ways to help the army become more efficient.” (12) One can’t but help sense an air of arrogance in our skepticism in the Pakistani army’s ability to properly execute counterinsurgency (COIN) or irregular warfare operations in a tribal society. The reason for skepticism may be more about value judgments than reality.

Much thought should be given to what we are about to do. Syed Ahmad’s approach to irregular war preceded by approximately 180 years Lenin’s What is to be done, Mao’s treatise on guerilla warfare, Che Guevara’s foci theory, Carlos Marighella’s Mini-manual of the Urban Guerilla, David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice and the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency. His organizational blueprint and those of present day jihadist operating in the tribal areas are based on much older concepts of community and traditional codes of behavior. It is easy to draw analogies between our own revolutionary warfare and counterinsurgency experiences but quite another to believe it just as easy to template this experience wholesale upon tribal culture. We have to accept the fact that the use of analogical reasoning can oversimplify inherently complex problems. People tend to use analogies on the basis of surface similarities rather than in-depth examination of the situation at hand. Top down or “theory driven processing” describes the tendency to immediately fit new information into the established analogy and causes decision-makers to dismiss other similarities for more detailed study and comparison. The result is perseverance or the phenomena of persistently believing in the applicability of the analogy even in the face of contradictory information. (13) Perseverance is something that we must guard against, especially when dealing with a culture as challenging as the Pathan living along the North –West Frontier. Much wisdom is passed on through words, phrases and analogies but also much folly that is difficult to correct once it gains momentum.

Operational Planning Considerations

Operational planning should consider the following as we prepare to assist the Pakistani army and execute COIN and irregular warfare operations in a tribal society. First, shame and honor not hearts and minds governs individual and group behavior along the North-West Frontier. We are not going to win hearts nor change minds. Study and gain a detailed appreciation of Pakthunwali, the honor code of the Pathans, in order to effectively communicate intent, whether kinetic or non-kinetic, within the target audience’s cultural frame of reference.

Appreciate the tendency of tribes to segment. This organizing principle is expressed in groups allying themselves against an external threat, economic or political necessity even though they may be potentially hostile toward one another or involved in open conflict. The segmentation principle applies to tribes, religious movements, military units, etc. British experience along the frontier provides for numerous example of this principle. Although an area may be divided into numerous tribes and clans that are constantly at each other’s throats, the moment an outsider so much threatens to encroach these same tribes and clans put aside their feuds and unite under one banner. The tribes resisted the best efforts of the Great Mughal, British and now the Pakistanis in this manner for ages. (14)

The third consideration is patronage. Patronage is the guarantor of the “social contract.” It supports establishing and articulating relationships between individuals and groups that share solidarity and origin. Therefore, it is closely linked to segmentation. Patronage reflects a two-way exchange. In exchange for someone’s patronage, the patron is responsible for providing something in return i.e. protection, economic and or political assistance, etc. A patronage relationship is not easily entered into. The decision to do so reflects a strategic decision and a commitment by two parties to maximize a “kindred” strategy or long-term relationship.

The last consideration is territory. Every piece of terrain is considered owned or controlled by some tribe or clan. Territory will be defended by force. The extent of territorial control is determined by the state’s ability to project power and influence and challenge ownership. Tribal law is in effect.

Study the tribesman and his culture. In the words of T.E. Lawrence “their minds work just as ours do, but on different premises. There is nothing unreasonable, incomprehensible or inscrutable [about the Pathan]. Experience of them and knowledge of their prejudices will enable you to foresee their attitude and possible course of action in nearly every case.” (15)

Be clear as to who and what it is that we are really fighting. Is it the tribe, or the social code of Pakthunwali itself, is it the disciples or followers of al-Muwahhidun (Unitarians) better known as Wahhabism or Hindustani Fanatics, Al-Ikhwan, Salafi ideology, Taliban, al-Qaeda, the global jihad, the entire Islamic world or the Islamic faith? We need to be honest with ourselves and accept the fact that after 9 generations of exposure to Islamic revivalism many tribes in the frontier region embody the ideology of al-Muwahhidun and that no amount of statesmanship, salesmanship or wishful thinking is going to change the situation. Not even the dangling bright-shiny object of representational government or promises of an efficient social services distribution system.

Empowering moderate forces in the tribal areas is not a defense against extremism and terrorism. (16) Neither is extending the government’s control over and imposition of good governance upon the inhabitants of the North-West Frontier. The acceptance of western rule of law may very well be achieved in the near-term with the imposition of civil and political authority into the tribal areas but government presence will in time be perceived as occupation no matter the arguments to the contrary. The tribes will inevitably rise in rebellion to challenge perceived tyranny and slip back to fighting as a form of renegotiating the social contract. Western notions of legitimacy and good governance are unlikely to resonate with individual tribesmen since they do not share our cultural heritage and appreciation for the implied wisdom these concepts embody.

Before we embark on pacifying a given tribal area we must have a clear appreciation whether the military campaign is in our vital or national interest or a matter of national prestige. Many a “cool points” have been lost by other great powers of their day tangling with mountain tribesmen. There is no win-win in these situations. If I win a little; you lose a little. Secondly, once we embark on chastising rebellious tribes we must accept that we are in a personal relationship; an ongoing conversation. Treaties of friendship and concessions will be honored until they are broken. Unless we are willing to “brother up” we will always be the outsider, foreigner or infidel. If by remote chance we decide to literally marry into the tribe we must understand that we will incur the enmity of all those tribes presently unfavorably disposed to our new relatives and extended family. We must therefore maintain constant situational awareness of tribal politics for tribal relationships will change and adapt as alliances are renegotiated, allowed to lapse or sought with tribes that were until recently considered hostile.

We will leave aside for now a detailed analysis of Pakistan’s strategic interests in the region. In its simplest terms, Pakistan lacks strategic depth vis-à-vis its primary competitor India. Pakistan therefore seeks to improve its position by fixing Indian forces in Kashmir. (17) To do so, it must maintain a dynamic balance in the tribal areas and Afghanistan. Pakistan’s shaping operations consist of simultaneously supporting Islamic Pashtu proxies inside the tribal areas and Afghanistan i.e. the Taliban while at the same time checking Pashtu ethnic nationalism. (18) It is therefore likely, in order to retain U.S. support, that Pakistan will be willing to sacrifice AQ in the tribal areas so as to continue to exploit the potential of the Afghan Taliban and Kashmiri groups against India in the future. Suffice it to say, Pakistan is the fulcrum that seeks to manage and shape the orbit of tribal competition to achieve its own vital interests.

All effects desired in tribal irregular warfare are short-term. There is no military campaign to end all military campaigns nor will the imposition of good governance withstand the vagaries of time. Before our skepticism in the Pakistani army’s ability to properly execute counterinsurgency (COIN) gets the better of us we may wish to study the Pakistani army’s operational design in dealing with martial tribes instead of basing our opinion strictly on tactical failures in execution. There is no doubt that we will win every tactical engagement against tribal fighters but still lose the military campaign.

Military campaigns in tribal areas may be better served if seizing, holding and clearing terrain is not the envisioned end-state. A more appropriate mission design may be to divide and isolate the tribe from its existing social network in order to destroy the elite group of dedicated, hard-core fighters that form the vanguard of the embedded Islamist movement or war party. The hard-center will be protected by a concentric ring of tribal levies or laskhkar that should not be the primary target. Aside from the vendetta obligation that this would incur on the part of the tribe, the same tribe is a future potential ally when campaigning against one of its rivals.

A given tribe is perceived by others by virtue of its social network, alliances, patronage relationships and martial prowess. The “force” that balances the objective, methods and available resources of the tribe is an example of a Center of Gravity (COG) and reflects Classic Chinese military thinking to first “attack the strategy, then the alliance, and lastly the soldiers themselves”. In tribal terms, methods and available resources are a reflection of the tribal leader’s ability to attract (segmentation), maintain (patronage) and defend (territory) allies. Each method and the available resources to implement a given strategy signifies an attractor or force that potentially serves as a balancing mechanism between the objective, methods and available resource and therefore represents a potential decisive point for targeting.

Tribal power is dependent upon their connections and influence. If a tribe’s power is diminished few will want to ally themselves. Tribes that feel isolated may overreact in desperation–which isolates them even further. Tribal diplomats will attempt to create the impression that an opponent is losing his connections. This will be done indirectly for if done directly the attacker may become entangled in an open fight. Attempts to divide the opponent from his power base (connection and prestige) are intended to make him appear to be weak.

No tribal leader will declare his ambitions until certain of success because of the risk of exposure, antagonism and mobilization of more powerful opponents against his tribe. Instead he intrigues, he influences as best as he may, he conspires. If he is to win he has to enlist or neutralize challengers.

Within any tribe people naturally form smaller factions based on mutual self-interest. The primary desire is to find strength in numbers. These sub-groups form power-bases and if left unchallenged will threaten the status-quo of the tribe, alliance or confederation as a whole. The formation of factions within the tribe is a leader’s greatest threat for eventually these factions will work to secure their own interests before those of the tribe, alliance or confederation. Before launching an overt attack attempts will be made to first weaken the opponent by creating as much division in his ranks as possible. An example may be targeting an opponents leadership structures outside the tribal area and crediting success to assistance received from select members of the same movement. The desired shaping strategy is therefore to divide and isolate before initiating any military action.

When the decision is made for military action it must be short and decisive. The unit must not linger in tribal territory longer than necessary. Cultural messaging requires that other tribes clearly understand that the cost of challenging the status quo is not worth the consequences. Successful combat action must be followed up immediately with negotiation/mediation to establish the parameters for peaceful coexistence until the next dust up. It is during this phase that “hearts and minds” projects may be negotiated. All projects must be negotiated on a quid pro quo basis and never out of compassion or sympathy. Pakthunwali will not condone condescension.

Conclusion

Military operations along the North-West Frontier are far more intellectual than a bayonet charge. The sociopolitical environment in tribal areas differs greatly from our experience. Legitimacy is based on the social contract with fighting as a form of negotiation. The social code is the basis for negotiating the social contract and hence “legitimacy” upon which the existing political formula is based.

Perspectives as to implementation of strategy differ. Western designs are rational and mechanistic. Tribal designs are dynamic, intuitive, flexible, competitive and adaptive in nature. Although easy to draw analogies between our own revolutionary warfare and counterinsurgency experiences words, phrases and analogies mean different things to different people and cultures.

The social code of “Pakthunwali” governs individual and group behavior in the tribal areas. The cultural operating codes that provide the framework for causal processes are shame and honor, segmentation principle, patronage and territory.

Military campaigns in tribal areas differ from our own doctrinal insurgency and counterinsurgency templates. Political and military planners must therefore take into account that the overall tribal sociopolitical blueprint and those in use by present day jihadist operating in the tribal areas are based on much older concepts of community and traditional codes of behavior.

William S. McCallister is a retired military officer. He has served extensively in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Mr. McCallister is currently employed in Iraq as the senior analyst for Applied Knowledge International (AKI), a consulting company specializing in human factors and cultural terrain modeling in support of II MEF operations in Anbar province.

Endnotes

1. “Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens”, Final Report of the Ungoverned Areas Project, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, January 2008.
2. Pakthunwali” also the “the honor code of the Pathans” is based on melmastia (hospitality), nanawati (hospitality cannot be denied even to a criminal or enemy), and badal (the right of revenge or vendetta). The greatest tests of honor involve zar (gold), zun (women) and zamin (land). Punishments and settlements are derived from narkh (tribal precedent); the jirga can impose strong sanctions and punishments, including punishment of a noncompliant person or clan, confiscation or girvi (mortgage) of property, fines and formation of a laskhkar (tribal militia) to punish the accused party. The social code governs behavior between individuals and groups in the tribal areas of the North-West frontier.
3. The Islamic law of nations (siyar) defines a “nation” as a group of related individuals.
4. “The tribes are at their best when in splendid equilibrium”. Attributed to Gertrud Bell while describing the Arab tribal system in early 20th-century Iraq.
5. JP I-02, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5.
6. The Afghan jirga or “council of elders” serves a similar function as a shura and is generally defined as a decision-making council. The main difference between the Jirga and a shura is that whereas a leader can reject the recommendations of a shura; the Jirga has decision making authority. Shura are a traditional method of community governance in tribal and Islamic cultures. It provides a mechanism to reach consensus among the disparate factions represented in the larger community. Shura are consultative in nature; they do not decide issues but provide leaders a means of receiving input from the population. Specialty shura are formed to address diplomatic, economic or martial issues. The leadership is not bound by the recommendations of the shura but may authorize or delegate decision-making powers to the body if desired. Shura are formed and disbanded as required.
7. IW JOC version 1.0 Jan 07
8. Loya Jirga is an inter-tribal assembly.
9. “Laskhkar” are Afghan tribal militia. The Laskhkar system is a social institution and should not be considered a functioning military organization from a professional military perspective.
10. Charles Allen, God’s Terrorists: The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad”, Little, Brown, 2006, pages 14, 20, 30, 37, 41, 50.
11. Ann Scott Tyson, “U.S Troops ‘Ready’ to Aid Pakistan, Washington Post, January 25, 2008.
12. Julian E. Barnes, “Gates Offers Troops for Joint Efforts with Pakistan”, January 25, 2008.
13. P.J. Ridderhof, LtCol, USMC, “Reasoning by Analogy”, 23 Dec 2003, WAR ROOM REPORT 2-04, dated 9 January 2004.
14. Charles Allen, God’s Terrorists: The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad”, Little, Brown, 2006, page 8.
15. T.E. Lawrence, “27 Articles”, The Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917.
16. “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants”, Crisis Group, Asia Report Number 125 – 11 December 2006, page 27.
17. Mark J. Roberts, “Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate: A State within a State?”, JFQ, Issue 48, 1st Quarter 2008, page 107.
18. “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants”, Crisis Group, Asia Report Number 125 – 11 December 2006, page 2.
19. Courtesy of T.E. Lawrence: “Irregular Warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge.”

[Darweshkhel]

Conflict, War, Ethnicity, Jihad, Taliban, Warlords etc.

Respectable Warlords. The Politics of State-Building in Post-Taleban Afghanistan
by Giustozzi, Antonio (August 2004)
http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/WP33.pdf

Village Institutions in the Perception of National and International Actors in Afghanistan
by Noelle-Karimi (April 2006)
http://131.220.109.9/fileadmin/webfi..._Series_26.pdf

Local Governance in Warsaj and Farkhar Districts
by Schetter, Mielke, Glassner, Yarash (May 2007)
http://131.220.109.9/fileadmin/webfi..._Series_32.pdf

Legal Pluralism in Afghanistan
by Meininghaus, Esther (December 2007)
http://131.220.109.9/fileadmin/webfi...inghaus_33.pdf

Understanding Local Violence. Security Arrangements in Kandahar, Kunduz and Paktia
by Schetter, Glassner and Karokhail (May 2006)
http://131.220.109.9/fileadmin/webfi..._Series_28.pdf

Where is the Village? Local Perceptions and development Approaches in Kunduz Province
by Mielke & Schetter (July 2007)
http://131.220.109.9/fileadmin/webfi...04_071_087.pdf

Livelihoods in the Asqalan and Sufi-Qarayateem Canal Irrigation Systems in the Kunduz River Basin
by Shah, Usman (January 2007)
http://131.220.109.9/fileadmin/webfi..._Series_29.pdf

On the Concept of 'Village' in Northeastern Afghanistan. Explorations from Kunduz and Takhar Provinces
by Mielke, Katja (May 2007)
http://131.220.109.9/fileadmin/webfi..._Series_31.pdf

State-Building

Afghanistan’s New Democratic Parties. A Means to Organise Democratisation
by Larson, Anna (May 2009)
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/...ticParties.pdf

From Warlords to Peacelords. Local Leadership Capacity in Peace Processes
by Peake, Gormley-Heenan, Fitzduff (December 2004)
http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/researc...l/WlplFull.pdf

The Failure of a Clerical Proto-State: Hazarajat 1979 - 1984
by Niamatullah Ibrahimi (September 2006)
http://www.crisisstates.com/download...ies2/wp6.2.pdf

Ethnic Groups, Pashtunwali

Alikozai Tribal Dynamics. A Very Unusual Durrani Tribe
Tribal Analysis Center 2009
http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/...20Dynamics.pdf

Jirga System in Tribal Life
by Taizi, Sherzaman (April 2007)
http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/...bal%20Life.pdf

Ishaqzai Tribe
by Tribal Analysis Center 2009
http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/...C/Ishaqzai.pdf

The 1897 Revolt and Tirah Valley Operations from the Pashtun Perspective
by Johnson, A. Robert (November 2009)
http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/...Operations.pdf

Pashtun Tribal Dynamics
Tribal Analysis Center 2009
http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/...20Dynamics.pdf

The Panjpai Relationship With the Other Durranis
Tribal Analysis Center 2009
http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/...i-Durranis.pdf

Pashtun Reconciliation Programs
Tribal Analysis Center 2009
http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/...20Programs.pdf

Pashtun Cultural Factors Limiting Warlord Development
Tribal Analysis Center 2009
http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/...evelopment.pdf

Putting It Together in Southern Afghanistan
Tribal Analysis Center 2009
http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/...20Together.pdf

The Quetta Shura: A Tribal Analysis
Tribal Analysis Center 2009
http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/...ta%20Shura.pdf

Pukhtu. The Pukhtun code of life
Dr. Sultan Rome
http://www.valleyswat.net/literature/papers/Pukhto.pdf

[Darweshkhel]

The Survivalist of North Waziristan: Hafiz Gul Bahadur
Biography and Analysis

By Charlie Szrom
August 6, 2009



North Waziristan, August 1938



Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters use Waziristan to prepare for and launch attacks against American forces in Afghanistan and Western targets abroad. Since early June, the Pakistani military has been conducting a campaign to kill Waziristan’s preeminent Taliban leader, Beitullah Mehsud. Standing in the military’s way is Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a key Taliban leader in North Waziristan and an enigmatic man of complex ideology, shifting alliances, and an overarching commitment to his own survival.


1. Importance of Hafiz Gul Bahadur

2. History

3. Outlook on the World

4. Relationship with Foreign Militants, Haqqani, and Mullah Omar

5. Relationship with Beitullah Mehsud and the Pakistani Government

6. Conclusion

1. IMPORTANCE OF HAFIZ GUL BAHADUR

The American-led coalition in Afghanistan faces insurgents directed, trained and supported by Taliban leaders in the North Waziristan Agency, a district within Pakistan that borders Afghanistan and sits roughly 130 miles to the southwest of Islamabad (see Waziristan map insert below). A September 2007 UN report estimated that 80 percent of all suicide bombers in Afghanistan pass through training facilities in North and South Waziristan.[1] Although American drone attacks have killed some foreign fighters operating in North Waziristan, these attacks cannot dismantle the area’s insurgent support network.

The Pakistani military has been conducting a significant military operation in Waziristan since early June. The stated goal of this operation is to kill or, at least, significantly diminish the power of Beitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the most wanted man in Pakistan. Mehsud is widely held responsible for the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and his forces threaten the stability of the Pakistani government, which has blamed Mehsud for the deaths of 1200 people in the last two years.[2] He also threatens to expand, or at the very least continue, Waziristan’s significance as a staging ground for attacks abroad, whether by Taliban insurgents against coalition forces in Afghanistan or by al-Qaeda members against targets worldwide.

To attack or isolate Mehsud from the north the Pakistani military must cross through North Waziristan, an area controlled by Taliban leader Hafiz Gul Bahadur. Bahadur could hinder the Pakistani military’s campaign against Mehsud by preventing or seriously impeding the movement of Pakistani forces through his region. [3] Since late June, he has demonstrated –on a limited scale – his ability to disrupt Pakistani operations in the region, kidnapping at least ten Pakistani soldiers on July 31 (whom he released two days later) and claiming responsibility for a suicide bombing – the first time Bahadur has claimed responsibility for such an attack– on July 28. [4]

Bahadur has cooperated with both the Pakistani government and Beitullah Mehsud in the past, but he has never made permanent alliances with either. On June 29, Bahadur’s forces attacked Pakistani troops in North Waziristan, which began the recent violence between his forces and those of the government. This attack broke an on-again, off-again peace deal Bahadur had maintained with the Pakistani government since September 2006. [5] Bahadur said he attacked Pakistani forces because of continued American drone strikes and increasing Pakistani military operations in and near his territory, which he claimed violated the 2006 agreement’s terms.[6] Bahadur repeated this message through his spokesman after the July 28 suicide bombing.[7]

Bahadur has protected his powerbase by engaging in limited violence in response to American drone strikes, Pakistani military operations, or encroachment by certain groups of foreign fighters. Yet he has never launched an unrestricted war against the Pakistani government, Beitullah Mehsud, or other elements in North Waziristan, including foreign fighters who have occasionally crossed him. It appears that the maintenance of his sphere of influence motivates Bahadur more than any other factor. Unrestrained attacks on the Pakistani military or other power brokers in his area could entail risk above the level Bahadur seems willing to accept, effectively limiting his potential use of force. His current fight with the Pakistani military does not seem to be a life-or-death struggle, but is more like a series of negotiations through violence with attacks and threats of attacks as bargaining chips. Bahadur attacks to limit or direct Pakistani military operations, and the Pakistani military responds to ensure its continued freedom of movement through his area, but neither side seeks open conflict with the other. As a result, neither a true peace agreement nor a complete defeat of Bahadur seems likely any time soon, and Bahadur’s limited raids are likely to trouble Pakistani operations in Waziristan for their duration.

2. HISTORY

Little information is available on Bahadur’s early years. He comes from Madda Khel, North Waziristan, a town close to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Estimates of his age vary widely, from early thirties to late forties. [8] He likely received his education at a Deobandi madrassa and probably participated in the Afghan civil war from 1992 to 1996, during which the Taliban, founded in 1994, began to seize control of most of Afghanistan.[9] His self-designation as a Hafiz, or one who has memorized the entire Qur’an, suggests that his religious education plays an important role in his thinking.

Bahadur first received media mention in 2000 when he was active as a North Waziristan leader of the Jamiaat Ulema Islam (JUI), a major Islamist Pakistani party. [10] He received still more attention in the month before the 9/11 attacks when he threatened to attack monitors the United Nations planned to deploy to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region to halt the flow of weapons to the Afghan Taliban.[11] Bahadur vehemently opposed the deployment of such monitors, which would have diminished the ability of Pakistani Pashtuns to support the Afghan Taliban fighting Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance. In conjunction with other JUI leaders and in his role as the head of the JUI’s student wing, the Jamiat-Tulaba-i Islam, Bahadur recruited a lashkar, or militia, of as many as 4,000 volunteers to oppose the monitors, who never deployed due, in part, to the disruption created by the 9/11 attacks.[12]

Bahadur’s ability to combine political acumen and charisma with local tribal ties gave him a strong foundation for acquiring power. Bahadur is one of the leaders of the Utmanzai Wazir tribe, who reside primarily in North Waziristan. Reports suggest that Utmanzai Wazirs have historically exhibited more unity than other tribes, perhaps providing Bahadur with a relatively stable base. [13] Within the Utmanzai Tribe, Bahadur probably belongs to the Madda Khel subgroup, part of the Ibrahim Khel branch. [14] Bahadur’s men, reported to be some of the fiercest fighters in North Waziristan, have been reported to number several thousand.[15]

Bahadur has used his ability to negotiate peace agreements in his area to expand the influence he had because of his tribal leadership. He has frequently served as chief negotiator, giving him significant control over post-ceasefire situations; negotiations have also served as tools whose short-term nature and exacting terms Bahadur uses to ensure that both the Pakistani military and Taliban leaders like Mehsud continue to woo him.

Bahadur achieved his greatest prominence with the September 2006 peace deal with the Pakistani government, which resulted in an end to hostilities and military operations in exchange for an expulsion of foreign fighters (which never occurred fully), among other terms. Between September 2006 and June 2009, Bahadur conducted occasional violence against the Pakistani government while scuffling from time to time with fellow Taliban and, particularly, foreign fighters whom he perceived to be encroaching on his area of control, such as Uzbeks.


3. OUTLOOK ON THE WORLD

Reports often mention Bahadur in the same breath as his fellow Taliban leader Maulvi Nazir Ahmad, who resides in South Waziristan. Nazir Ahmad, a leader of the Ahmedzai Wazir tribe and its Taliban branch, has likewise made alliances with both the Pakistani government and Beitullah Mehsud. Style, outlook on the world, and Bahadur’s political background separate the two leaders, but an opposition to foreign fighters in Waziristan, particularly Uzbeks, as well as loyalty to Mullah Omar and the Haqqani family, connect them.

Unlike other major Taliban leaders in Waziristan, especially Maulvi Nazir, there is little public knowledge about Bahadur’s worldview. Nazir has made numerous public statements, including an April 2009 interview with as-Sahab, al-Qaeda’s media branch.[16] Bahadur by contrast maintains a private profile, avoiding any direct contact with journalists in recent years and putting out statements only through his spokesman, Ahmadullah Ahmadi. [17]

In August 2008, his forces banned journalists working for Western news agencies from operating in his territory based on claims that such reporters had ties to foreign intelligence agencies. Stating, “those who work for intelligence agencies will be punished,” Ahmadi called foreign media employees “harmful for Islam, Muslims and the country.” [18] The North Waziristan Taliban made good on their promise in November 2008, when they kidnapped a freelance Canadian journalist who sought to meet with North Waziristan Taliban leaders.[19] Gul Bahadur’s forces still have not released the journalist, Beverly Giesbrecht, although they have distributed videos of her pleading for her life.[20]

Bahadur’s worldview draws heavily from his religious beliefs, which originate from his reportedly Deobandi education.[21] Deobandism, a branch of Sunni Islam, arose in Deoband, India in 1866 as part of a wave of civic reform across India brought on by the Indian Rebellion of 1857. Deobandism’s students came from as far as Afghanistan and Arabia.[22] The teachings of Shah Wali Allah, a scholar who lived from 1703 to 1762, laid the foundation for Deobandism. Wali Allah promoted takhayyur, or the belief that, instead of following a single school of Islam throughout one’s life, one could employ any one of the four principal schools. Eventually, Wali Allah hoped for a “harmonization” of all of the four schools. Wali Allah also promoted the cautious use of ijtihad, or the independent interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah for the modern age, as opposed to a reliance entirely on ancient commentaries.[23]

Deobandis initially studied how to revive Islamic life while living under a colonial regime, eschewing politics and focusing on Islamic practices and personal belief, as opposed to the long-term political goals promoted by Islamist thinkers such as Hassan-al Banna. Deobandism eventually became the force behind the Jamiaat Ulema Islam (JUI), founded in 1947 first as a religious movement, which helped to set up popular mosques across Pakistan.[24]

The creed of today’s Pashtun Taliban probably stems from the combination of ideologies that resulted when hundreds of mosques sprung up in the Pashtun tribal belt during the Afghan-Soviet war. Pashtun local custom, known as Pashtunwali, and Wahabbism, brought to the region by mass Saudi funding for the mujahideen, created a new form of Deobandism specific to the Taliban, far more radical than the apolitical movement originally envisioned by Deobandism’s founders. Today’s Taliban may actually draw more from something closer to the Salafi-Jihadism ideology espoused by al-Qaeda and its followers than from that expressed by traditional Deobandi beliefs. [25]

While Nazir and Bahadur both believe in jihad as it applies to fighting coalition forces in Afghanistan, recently, Nazir has been a much stronger champion of the implementation of radical Islamism. In April 2009, Nazir said the goal of Islamic militants should be “to make supreme the Word of Allah and establish the system of shari‘a.”[26] Nazir even imposed a strict form of shari’a in his portion of South Waziristan (see here for more on Nazir's ideology).[27]

Bahadur’s fellow Taliban leader Maulvi Saddiq Noor, who has sometimes worked alongside Bahadur, did lead an August 2006 campaign in Miranshah to force shopkeepers not to sell CDs and barbers not to shave men’s beards;[28] other North Waziristan Taliban also imposed taxes in line with shari’a practices in October 2006. [29] In 2000, Bahadur himself said that, “Opium and alcohol have destroyed the youth. Obscenity, video and satellite dishes are everywhere. The government is not taking the responsibility to eradicate these evils, therefore, we decided to put an end to it.” [30] Bahadur did work through political channels earlier in his life to pressure the government to adopt more Islamist-oriented values, but he has remained quiet on the issue in recent years and appears never to have directly implemented shari’a himself.

The most recent information on Bahadur’s views on international jihad comes from a public statement he issued jointly with Beitullah Mehsud and Nazir in February 2009, after their formation of the Council of United Mujahideen. The document, which quotes several Qur’anic verses citing the need for the unity among Muslims, states:
The objective of this alliance and shura is to fight as one force in the name of God to stop the trespasser from his trespass and the oppressor from his oppression. So that Islam, the religion of God, and Truth is glorified.
…
[It is] just as the enemies, that is, the Jews and Christians, have united against the Muslims, particularly the mujahideen, under the leadership of the United States whose leader is new President Obama. [31]

This document, however, may better represent the overall Taliban’s views, rather than the specific views of the three men who signed it.

Views on the state of Pakistan reveal the greatest divergence between Bahadur and Nazir. Nazir and Bahadur both agree that attacks on Pakistan distract from anti-coalition efforts in Afghanistan. [32] Yet Nazir goes further: he also sees the conflict in Kashmir as a diversion.[33] Bahadur, while not explicitly commenting on the Kashmiri conflict, has proclaimed the importance of defending Pakistan. Just days after the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, in the midst of tension between India and Pakistan, Bahadur’s spokesman said:
We consider any attack on Pakistan an attack on Islam. We resolve to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Pakistan Army by joining Pakistan on the condition that the government should win the tribal people's trust, and following our ancestors' footsteps, we shall refresh the memories of their history.[34]

While Nazir said nothing along such lines at the time, other Taliban leaders made similar statements during the post-Mumbai period: even Beitullah Mehsud said that, “Thousands of our well-armed militants are ready to fight alongside the army if any war is imposed on Pakistan.”[35] Bahadur is no Pakistani nationalist: his November 2008 statement goes on to say that the Pakistani government has made the slogan “Pakistan ka Matlab Kya: La Ilaha Illallah” (“What does Pakistan mean? There is no God but God”) a “shibboleth” through its actions, particularly the alliance with the US. [36] In 2000, Gul Bahadur stated most clearly his views on Pakistan and Islam: “We are not against the government. We are Pakistanis, but we want the rule of Allah.”[37] This ambivalence appears to define his position and actions in Waziristan.

4. RELATIONSHIP WITH MULLAH OMAR, HAQQANI, AND OTHER FOREIGN MILITANTS

Bahadur’s conflicting views on the Pakistani state, combined with his attacks on government forces, show his desire to preserve his autonomy and power through limited action. Most of Bahadur’s interactions, however, have occurred with fellow fighters in North Waziristan. These relationships best show Bahadur’s personality as a survivalist: he hopes to maintain power through fealty to Haqqani and Omar while fending off foreigners who encroach too much on his power or draw too much attention to Bahadur’s area of influence.

The first major Pakistani military offensive against foreign militants in Waziristan, beginning in March 2004, brought Western media coverage to militant leaders such as Gul Bahadur through reports of clashes and the eventual peace deal between Bahadur and the Pakistani government in September 2006.[38] Bahadur’s prominence rose significantly once the military began focusing on North Waziristan in early 2005 (parts of North Waziristan, particularly the Shawal Valley, had seen more limited fighting in early 2004), due to an increased focus on al-Qaeda and other foreign militants in that area.[39]

Bahadur played a key role in the conflict as a Taliban leader who, while opposed to the Pakistani military operation, remained skeptical of the presence of some foreign militants in North Waziristan. Some of these foreign fighters were Uzbeks, who began arriving in Waziristan en masse after the 9/11 attacks and subsequent fall of Kabul. [40]

Uzbek militants initially came as part of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a group founded by Tahir Yuldashev and Joma Namangani in 1998 to overthrow Islam Karimov’s regime in Uzbekistan.[41] A faction of the IMU broke away around 2002[42] to form a smaller group known as the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) over an apparent disagreement with the larger organization’s leadership that the time was not ripe to resume operations in Uzbekistan. The group left IMU territory in South Waziristan to reside near Mir Ali in North Waziristan and, in 2005, changed its strategy to focus less on Uzbekistan and more on global jihad, reportedly following a directive from al-Qaeda. Soon the group changed its name to the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) and made Mir Ali, North Waziristan, a key operational and training base. The IJU’s fighters likely number between 100 and 200, according to estimates.[43]

These Uzbeks eventually began to bother Bahadur. His Madda Khel hometown and Miranshah base of operations lie in western North Waziristan, closer to the Afghan border and roughly fourteen miles by road to the west of the Uzbeks’ base of Mir Ali. However, areas of influence in North Waziristan overlap and shift quickly (both Bahadur and foreign fighters work in each other’s territory), meaning the Uzbeks – perhaps on their way to jihad in Afghanistan, or perhaps in the process of acquiring choice tracts of land (as they did in South Waziristan) could have easily aggravated Bahadur.[44]

In August 2006, perhaps caving to pressure from the Pakistani government, Bahadur decided to cease hosting foreign militants, a decision backed and perhaps precipitated by the drop in support for foreign militants by fellow Taliban leader Maulvi Saddiq Noor, with whom Bahadur has allied on occasion.[45] Direct statements from Bahadur on the eviction of foreign militants are not available, but the September 2006 peace agreement between Bahadur and the Pakistani government (see below for more information on the agreement) called for their eviction.[46] Other reports have surfaced on Bahadur’s displeasure with growing Uzbek influence in North Waziristan, and opposition to Uzbek influence was one of the reported aims of his formal alliance with Nazir (detailed below).[47]

Bahadur followed up on the 2006 peace deal by orchestrating a drive to force foreigners led by Iraqi national Abu Okash to remove tinted windows from their vehicles in March 2007, showing that non-Uzbek foreign fighters could also irritate Bahadur. [48] Okash had resided in North Waziristan since 2001, winning the respect of some locals, who also believed he had al-Qaeda ties. Tensions between him and tribesmen such as Bahadur, however, increased after the September 2006 peace deal.[49] Bahadur’s forces nearly exchanged fire with the foreigners after they attempted to expand the campaign to Mir Ali from Miranshah, but tempers cooled after Beitullah Mehsud reportedly intervened.[50]

As recently as December 2008, Bahadur’s organization turned against a local Taliban leader who had worked closely with foreign fighters, accusing the individual, Maulana Abdul Khaliq Haqqani (as a Pakistani, Abdul Khaliq is unrelated to the Haqqani network[51]) of embezzling funds collected on behalf of local Taliban.[52] Bahadur’s men seized the man from his office in Miranshah and drove him towards Mir Ali.[53] Khaliq, a firebrand radical whose mosque and madrassah – Gulshan-e Uloom in Miranshah – the Pakistani military destroyed in 2006, worked closely with Uzbek militants. [54] He even appeared with IMU leader Tahir Yuldashev in a propaganda video in January 2008.[55] In July 2007, Khaliq launched attacks against Pakistani military targets, promising to “avenge the martyred brothers, sisters and sons” who had died in the raid on the Red Mosque on July 10 that year.[56] Khaliq, also reportedly a proponent of suicide bombings, may have drawn unwanted attention to Bahadur’s home base of Miranshah through his pronouncements and Uzbek associates, who often treated local Pashtuns brutally. Khaliq also may have simply encroached on Bahadur’s control.[57]

Bahadur’s relationships with Mullah Omar (head of the Quetta Shura Taliban and former leader of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan) and the Haqqani network have likely tempered Bahadur’s opposition to the foreign fighters. Omar, who wants the Taliban in Afghanistan to have as much support as possible, attempts to avoid internal Taliban conflicts on the Pakistani side. [58] The Haqqanis use Uzbek and other foreigners to assist in operations against coalition forces in Afghanistan.[59] Bahadur trusts, and perhaps follows, both of them. Omar pressured Nazir, Mehsud, and Bahadur to form the Council of United Mujahideen, or Shura Ittehad ul-Mujahideen, in February 2009; the statement announcing the council’s formation cites bin Laden, with whom Haqqani has ties, and Mullah Omar as the leaders of the mujahideen.[60] Omar and Haqqani also reportedly pushed for the September 2006 Waziristan peace agreement between the Pakistani government and Bahadur. [61] Finally, Haqqani’s forces must pass through Bahadur’s strongholds to conduct attacks in Afghanistan. No reports of Bahadur preventing the work of such forces have surfaced. Indeed, Bahadur has dedicated himself to fighting American-led forces in Afghanistan and reportedly cooperates with and assists Haqqani.[62]

Probably thanks to the Haqqani network, foreign fighters remained in North Waziristan despite some opposition. A sampling of the list of foreigners killed by CIA drone strikes in or near Bahadur’s area of North Waziristan shows the that Bahadur either failed to remove some of the foreigners, chose to work with some foreign fighters, or harbored fighters at Haqqani’s behest. Drone strikes killed Al-Qaeda leader Abu Laith al-Libbi in January 2008 near Mir Ali, [63] former Egyptian Islamic Group Leader and reported chief al-Qaeda propagandist Abu Jihad al-Masri in October 2008,[64] senior al-Qaeda member Abdullah Azzam al-Saudi died on November 19, 2008,[65] and Rashid Rauf, the organizer of the plot to bring down trans-Atlantic flights, on November 22, 2008. [66] A May 16, 2009 strike that killed al-Qaeda member Asad al-Misri along with twenty-three militants loyal to Bahadur and a September 4, 2008 drone strike near Miranshah that killed two Arab fighters along with four Daur tribesmen show Bahadur may indeed have chosen to associate with some foreigners.[67]

Such strikes infuriated Bahadur as they occurred within his territory and sometimes killed individuals loyal to him. After the November 2008 Rauf killing, Bahadur spokesman Ahmadi said, “Americans have killed innocent people and none of them were foreigners.”[68] After Azzam’s death, Ahmadi said that, “We will start revenge attacks across other districts if the US drone attacks do not stop after November 20 [2008].” Such feelings may have caused Bahadur to waver in his peace dealings with the Pakistani government and potentially ally with Beitullah Mehsud.

5. RELATIONSHIP WITH BEITULLAH MEHSUD AND PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT

Bahadur has maintained on-again, off-again relationships with both the Pakistani government and Beitullah Mehsud over the last several years. Bahadur’s Wazir tribesmen are traditional rivals of Beitullah’s Mehsud tribe, although both tribes share a common lineage.[69] Bahadur opposes any perceived infringement upon his territory and power, and he has thus constructed short-term arrangements, rather than full-fledged peace treaties, to force both sides to seek his support. [70]

The first of these occurred in September 2006, when the Pakistani government, worn out after its two –and-half-year offensive against foreign militants and Taliban fighters in Waziristan, signed a deal with Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Saddiq Noor, among other tribal leaders, many of whom had aided and abetted foreign fighters. Many analysts saw the deal as a victory for North Waziristan Taliban leaders, as the region had seen well over a year of fierce fighting.[71] The deal called for the Pakistani military to cease operations in the region, release detained militants, remove checkpoints, and reimburse local Taliban for damages during the operation. In return, the militants agreed to halt attacks on the government, refrain from setting up a parallel government, stop cross-border movement into Afghanistan, and expel foreigners, although the agreement made an exception for foreigners who remained and chose to “live peacefully in line with tribal customs and traditions.”[72] The deal, however, remained virtually unenforceable and, immediately after its conclusion, NATO reportedly recorded a 300 percent increase in attacks in Afghanistan.[73]

While both Jalaluddin Haqqani and Mullah Omar reportedly supported the peace deal, Bahadur reportedly could not extend the peace deal provisions concerning foreign fighters to Mir Ali, a primary location for foreign fighters in North Waziristan.[74] Haqqani, who reportedly controls seven thousand fighters,[75] relies on a large number of foreign militants, particularly the aforementioned Islamic Jihad Union, to conduct attacks in Afghanistan. These tensions almost resulted in conflict between Bahadur and foreign forces in March 2007. [76]

Bahadur called off the peace accord with the government on July 15, 2007, reportedly accusing the government of violating its terms by reestablishing checkpoints along North Waziristan roads.[77] Anti-government attacks by fellow North Waziristan Taliban leader Maulvi Abdul Khaliq Haqqani and anti-government sentiment generated by the July 10, 2007 raid on the Red Mosque in Islamabad may also have pressured Bahadur to call off the peace deal.[78] The Pakistani government responded to the deal’s breakdown by attempting to encourage tribal leaders to engage in talks with Bahadur. [79]

After months of conflict, Bahadur joined the newly formed Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (Taliban Movement of Pakistan) – an umbrella group of several Pakistani Taliban factions – as the first deputy to Beitullah Mehsud in December 2007. [80] The TTP has since become the primary Taliban group operating inside Pakistan. Despite joining the new group, Bahadur’s forces refused to coordinate attacks against the Pakistani government, signing a short-term peace deal with the government on December 18, 2007 that would last until the beginning of 2008, restoring the September 2006 agreement.[81]

Rumors have emerged that Bahadur left the TTP, and, although he has made no formal announcement to that effect, he certainly has not coordinated operations with the umbrella group.[82] Further clashes between Bahadur and the government occurred in January, followed by another agreement on February 17, 2008, reportedly the sixth extension of the ceasefire between Bahadur and Islamabad.[83]

In June 2008, Bahadur’s name did not appear on a Pakistani government list of most-wanted individuals. [84]Also absent from the list was the name of Maulvi Nazir, the leader of the Ahmedzai Wazirs in South Waziristan and Bahadur’s counterpart. Nazir and Bahadur formalized their cooperation on July 7, 2008, creating the Local Taliban Movement, or Muqami Tehrik-e Taliban, with Bahadur as the chief and Nazir as the deputy.[85]

Just a few days before the Local Taliban Movement’s formation, Beitullah Mehsud distributed pamphlets in North Waziristan that stated he would never fight Bahadur, demanding proof from those who said he would.[86] Two weeks later in Bannu, just to the east of North Waziristan, “unidentified” individuals distributed anti-Mehsud pamphlets attributed to Bahadur and Nazir. [87] Bahadur denied a role in pamphlet distribution while Beitullah Mehsud, on July 3, 2008, blamed the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s intelligence agency, for attempting to create divisions among the militants. [88] Mehsud also called Bahadur “a true mujahid,” or fighter for jihad, at the time. [89]

Nazir and Bahadur would continue their cooperation throughout 2008 and 2009, forming the Council of United Mujahideen in February 2009 with Beitullah Mehsud and declaring their joint peace deal with the Pakistani government ineffective in June 2009.[90]

Having attempted to prove their allegiance, Bahadur and Mehsud, along with Nazir, took their most formal step towards alliance with the formation of the Council of United Mujahideen on February 20, 2009. [91] As mentioned above, Mullah Omar reportedly pushed for the unity agreement. [92] Bahadur may have been responding to the existing perception of disunity between him and Mehsud, as well as pressure from Taliban colleagues represented by statements made by Taliban leaders in Bajaur and Swat in early February 2009 that declared Bahadur their enemy because he refused to fight Pakistani forces.[93] Bahadur’s loyalty to Mullah Omar also likely influenced his decision.

The compacts between Bahadur and Mehsud and Bahadur and Islamabad came under the greatest stress in late spring and early summer 2009 as reports emerged that the Pakistani military would conduct a campaign in Waziristan targeting Mehsud. On June 1, 2009, Bahadur’s forces escorted a group of Pakistani military cadets from the military college in Razmak, in the southern portion of North Waziristan, to the border with the Bannu district of the NWFP. Two hours after Bahadur’s forces left the convoy, forces reported to be loyal to Beitullah Mehsud seized the more than 500 cadets.[94] In reported retaliation, the Pakistani military began conducting operations near North Waziristan in Bannu and Makeen.[95]

With such operations serving as the final straw – Bahadur saw them as intruding on his area of influence – on top of the primary irritation of drone strikes, Bahadur’s forces attacked Pakistani forces, just weeks after the Pakistani military had worked with Bahadur to evacuate the students through his area of control. On June 29, 2009, a reported 150 Taliban fighters attacked a convoy of Pakistani soldiers, killing anywhere from thirty to sixty Pakistani soldiers; the fighting left at least ten Taliban fighters dead. [96] In taking responsibility for the attack, Bahadur’s spokesman Ahmadullah Ahmadi said at the time that, “This accord is being scrapped because of Pakistan's failure to stop the American drone attacks in North and South Waziristan…Since the army is attacking us in North and South Waziristan, we will also attack them.”[97]

The Pakistani military responded in force, targeting Bahadur’s hometown of Madda Khel with airstrikes on June 30 and helicopter attacks on July 1, causing local tribesmen to flee to Peshawar, Bannu, and across the border into Afghanistan. [98] Yet the Pakistani military took pains to assure the local populace that it did not intend to launch operations in North Waziristan, dropping leaflets in Pashto and Urdu on July 1 and asking for tips on terrorist locations.[99] Despite the leaflet statements, “stray missiles” from Pakistani Air Force jets hit a village near Miranshah on July 5, followed by the movement of “hundreds” of troops and dozens of tanks and other vehicles to Miranshah from Mir Ali on July 15 and the shelling of Miranshah and Mir Ali on July 16.[100]

The Pakistani forces likely moved forces from Mir Ali to prepare for a stranglehold operation against Beitullah Mehsud, but commanders likely realized their secondary value in threatening Bahadur as well. Responding to the threat, Bahadur organized the aforementioned July 28 suicide bombing against Pakistani forces and July 31 kidnapping of soldiers.[101]

Bahadur had repeatedly indicated his displeasure with the peace agreement in the weeks before he broke it. On June 14, 2009, Bahadur threatened to scrap the deal with the government if operations, conducted reportedly as vengeance for the kidnapping of the Razmak cadets, continued in the Bakakhel and Janikhel areas of Bannu, claiming the February peace deal did not allow the government to conduct operations in those areas.[102] Reports have also emerged indicating that Bahadur has said that Pakistani military operations against Beitullah Mehsud must cease before Bahadur will negotiate with the government, indicating that he may view any operations in North Waziristan as threatening to his existence, regardless of their stated target.[103]

Yet, according to reports and statements from Bahadur’s spokesman, American drone strikes have irritated Bahadur even more than Pakistani military operations. On June 26, Bahadur, along with Nazir, reportedly said that the peace agreement with the Pakistani government had become invalid due to US drone strikes.[104] Bahadur spokesman Abdullah Ahmadi also claimed that 50 drone strikes had killed hundreds of people since the signing of the February 2008 peace agreement with the government and repeated the demand to stop drone attacks after the July 28 suicide bombing. [105]

Ahmadi’s statements against drone strikes in November 2008 showed that such actions irritated Bahadur even before drone strikes in North Waziristan this year, which included a March strike that apparently hit a house in Sara Rogha, South Waziristan, where Bahadur met with Beitullah Mehsud and Nazir and the aforementioned May attack that killed twenty-three militants loyal to Gul Bahadur. [106] Drone strikes threaten Bahadur the most as his inability to defend against, take revenge for, or predict their location decreases his control over North Waziristan.

These series of demands and Bahadur’s willingness to abandon or throw his support behind both the Pakistani government and Beitullah Mehsud show his desire to survive, remain independent and maintain his control over North Waziristan.[107]

6. CONCLUSION

Bahadur remains a jihadi committed first to his own survival, second to the conflict in Afghanistan, third to Beitullah Mehsud, and last to his vision of an Islamist Pakistani state. His background of accruing political power, fluid ideology and alliances, and loyalty to Mullah Omar and Haqqani has given him the tools to continue supporting the fight against the American-led coalition in Afghanistan while compromising on almost everything else.

What does this mean for the current Pakistani military offensive in Waziristan? Bahadur will likely continue to direct some level of violence, including perhaps an increasing use of suicide bomb attacks, in an attempt to bully the Pakistani government into lessening operations in North Waziristan and reducing cooperation with the US on drone strikes. Likewise, the Pakistani government will likely continue limited actions against Bahadur to push him towards negotiations. However, Bahadur and the Pakistani government will probably avoid unchecked hostilities, which both seem to believe would be harmful to their interests.

While striking a non-aggression pact with Bahadur might allow the Pakistani military to achieve greater short-term success in Waziristan, US interests may suffer in the long term. As long as Bahadur maintains his sphere of influence, Taliban leaders such as the Haqqani family have a safe haven from which they can launch attacks against American forces in Afghanistan. And, while Uzbeks and some other foreign fighters have annoyed Bahadur, the Taliban leader continues to work with, or at least allows to reside in or near his territory, some foreign fighters, creating another ungoverned area where terrorists can – and have – plotted attacks against targets in the West. Peace between Bahadur and the Pakistani government may boost Islamabad’s interests in the short term while hurting Western interests in the medium and long term.



[1] “Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (2001-2007),” United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, September 9, 2007, available: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2007.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/EKOI-76W52H-Full_Report.pdf/$File/Full_Report.pdf. 68.
[2] Declan Walsh, “Pakistan orders manhunt for Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud,” The Guardian, June 15, 2009, available: Pakistan orders manhunt for Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud | World news | guardian.co.uk.
[3] “The Afghanistan-Pakistan militant nexus,” BBC News, June 22, 2009, available: BBC News - The Afghan-Pakistan militant nexus (accessed July 21, 2009).
[4]Mushtaq Yusufzai and Malik Mumtaz Khan, “Militants kidnap 10 FC men in NWA,” The News, July 31, 2009, http://thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=23601; Pazir Gul, “Suicide attack on checkpost leaves soldier dead,” DAWN, July 29, 2009, available: http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/...dier-dead-979; Mushtaq Yusufzai, “ Taliban kill militant commander, deputy10 kidnapped FC men freed,” The News, August 1, 2009, available at Taliban kill militant commander, deputy10 kidnapped FC men freed
[5]Mushtaq Yusufzai, Malik Mumtaz Khan, “Warplanes pound militant positions in NWA,” July 1, 2009, accessed via World News Connection Database; “36 including 14 soldiers dead in Waziristan attacks,” Pajhwok Afghan News English, June 30, 2009, available at Nexis.com; Jan Zalewski, “Pakistani Taliban Terminate Peace Agreement in North Waziristan,” World Markets Research Center, June 30, 2009, available at Nexis.com; Salman Masood, “An Accord In Pakistan Is Scrapped By Militants,” The New York Times, July 1, 2009, available at Nexis.com; “36 including 14 soldiers dead in Waziristan attacks,” Pajhwok Afghan News English, June 30, 2009, available: Nexis.com
[6] Rasool Dawar, “Taliban scrap peace deal in Pakistan tribal area,” Associated Press, June 30, 2009, available at Nexis.com.
[7] Pazir Gul, “Suicide attack on checkpost leaves soldier dead,” DAWN, July 29, 2009, available: DAWN.COM | Front Page | Suicide attack on checkpost leaves soldier dead.
[8] Mohsin Abbas, “Captors suspect Canadian 'a spy'; Taliban militants believed to be behind abduction of journalist in northern Pakistan,” The Toronto Star, November 21, 2008, available: Nexis.com; Sadia Sulaiman, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban,” Jamestown Terrorism, April 10, 2009, available: single - The Jamestown Foundation[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews[exact_search]=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34839&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=b173cbe110
[9] Very little information is available on Bahadur’s early years and therefore reports of his education and pre-2000 activities are unverified. Sadia Sulaiman, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban,” Jamestown Terrorism, April 10, 2009, available: single - The Jamestown Foundation[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews[exact_search]=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34839&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=b173cbe110; “The Afghanistan-Pakistan militant nexus,” BBC News, June 22, 2009, available: BBC News - The Afghan-Pakistan militant nexus.
[10] Nadeem Yaqub, “Islamists cut cable TV,”Asia Times Online, June 27, 2000, available:
Asia Times: Islamists cut cable TV
[11] Edith Lederer, “Security Council approves deployment of U.N. experts to help enforce anti-Taliban sanctions,” Associated Press, July 30, 2001, available: Nexis.com.
[12] Khabrain, “Jamiat-i-Talaba-i-Islam Appoints Workers to Shoot UN Monitors on Sight,”
Islamabad Khabrain (Urdu), August 17, 2001. pp 12, accessed via World News Connection Database.; “Religious group said to have set up tribal army to resist UN monitors,” The Nation, August 21, 2001, accessed via World News Connection database.
[13] Unpublished Draft: “Tribe: Wazir – Utmanzai” Naval Postgraduate School: Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, available: Naval Postgraduate School.
[14] Bahadur’s hometown is in a Madda Khel clan region, in the western portion of North Waziristan. Some reports say he and his followers are part of the Tori Khel tribe, yet the Tori Khel reside in eastern North Waziristan according to one map. Rahimullah Yusufzai, “The Impact of Pashtun Tribal Differences on the Pakistani Taliban”,Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, February 11, 2008, available: single - The Jamestown Foundation[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews[exact_search]=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4712&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=02f39cd67e; “Wazirs – Ahmadzai,” Naval Postgraduate School: Program for Conflict and Cultural Studies, February 10, 2009, available: Naval Postgraduate School - Page or Document Not Found Sadia Sulaiman, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban,” Jamestown Terrorism, April 10, 2009, available: single - The Jamestown Foundation[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews[exact_search]=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34839&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=b173cbe110; Noor ul Haq, Rashid Ahmed Khan, and Maqsudul Hasan Nuri “Federally Administered Tribal
Areas of Pakistan,” Islamabad Policy Research Institute, available: http://ipripak.org/papers/federally.shtml; Unpublished Draft: “Tribe: Wazir – Utmanzai” Naval Postgraduate School: Program for Culture and Conflict Studies. Naval Postgraduate School.
[15] “The Afghanistan-Pakistan militant nexus,” BBC News, June 22, 2009, available: BBC News - The Afghan-Pakistan militant nexus
[16] Interview with Nazir conducted by As-Sahab and posted on many jihadi web forums. The interview was translated by SITE Intelligence Group, April 7, 2009; Chris Harnisch, “Question Mark of South Waziristan: Biography and Analysis of Maulvi Nazir Ahmad,” IranTracker.org, July 17, 2009, available: Analysis | IranTracker .
[17] Ismail Khan and Jane Perlez, “Airstrike Kills Militant Tied To Al Qaeda In Pakistan,” The New York Times, November 23, 2008, available: Nexis.com
[18] “Taliban ban foreign journalists in North Waziristan,”Daily Times, August 27, 2008, available at Nexis.com.
[19] Mohsin Abbas, “Captors suspect Canadian 'a spy'; Taliban militants believed to be behind abduction of journalist in northern Pakistan,” The Toronto Star, November 21, 2008, available: Nexis.com; Janullah Hashimzada, “Canadian female journalist kidnapped by TTP,” Pajhwok Afghan News, November 16, 2008, available: Nexis.com.
[20] Saeed Shah, “Taliban abduct hundreds of schoolboys,” Globe and Mail, June 2, 2009. Available via Nexis.
[21] Sadia Sulaiman, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban,” Jamestown Terrorism, April 10, 2009, available: single - The Jamestown Foundation[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews[exact_search]=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34839&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=b173cbe110
[22] Hunt Janin, The pursuit of learning in the Islamic world, 610-2003 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2006). 137.
[23] Patrick Bannerman, Islam in Perspective: A Guide to Islamic Society, Politics and Law (London: Routledge Kegan & Paul, 1989), 110.
[24] See Ahmad Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 88-94.
[25] See Ahmad Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.),88-94.
[26] Interview with Nazir conducted by As-Sahab and posted on many jihadi web forums. The interview was translated by Site Intel Group, April 7, 2009; Chris Harnisch, “Question Mark of South Waziristan: Biography and Analysis of Maulvi Nazir Ahmad,” IranTracker.org, July 17, 2009, available: Analysis | IranTracker .
[27] Hassan Abbas, “South Waziristan’s Maulvi Nazir: The New Face of the Taliban,” The Jamestown Foundation, May 14, 2007. Available: The Evolution of Jihadi Electronic Counter-Measures - The Jamestown Foundation[tt_news]=4147&tx_ttnews[backPid]=182&no_cache=1; Chris Harnisch, “Question Mark of South Waziristan: Biography and Analysis of Maulvi Nazir Ahmad,” IranTracker.org, July 17, 2009, available: Analysis | IranTracker.
[28] Bahadur abided by Noor’s declaration of a ceasefire in June 2006 (“Suicide killer 'takes out' 5 Pak soldiers,” The Times of India, June 27, 2006, available: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/a.../1686230.cms); other sources have reported previous joint efforts, specifically in January 2007, between the two leaders: Haji Pazir Gul and Zulfiqar Ali, “Suicide bomber kills five in N. Waziristan,” DAWN, January 22, 2007, available: Suicide bomber kills five in N. Waziristan -DAWN - Top Stories; January 23, 2007.
[29] Behroz Khan, “Pakistan: Tension Mounting Between Local Taliban; Foreigners in Waziristan,” The News, August 1, 2006. Available: The World News Connection; “Taliban slap taxes in Miramshah”, Dawn, October 22, 2006, available: Taliban slap taxes in Miramshah -DAWN - Top Stories; October 23, 2006.
[30] Nadeem Yaqub, “Islamists cut cable TV,”Asia Times Online, June 27, 2000, available:
Asia Times: Islamists cut cable TV
[31] “Pakistan Taleban groups form allied council,” Geo TV News, February 25, 2009, available: Nexis.com
[32] “Top Taliban commander splits from Mehsud,”ANI , October 19, 2008, available: Nexis.com
[33] Interview with Nazir conducted by As-Sahab and posted on many jihadi web forums. The interview was translated by Site Intel Group, April 7, 2009. Chris Harnisch, “Question Mark of South Waziristan: Biography and Analysis of Maulvi Nazir Ahmad,” IranTracker.org, July 17, 2009, available: Analysis | IranTracker..
[34] “We shall fight along with Pakistan army for country's defence: Taliban,”Ausaf (Pakistan), December 10, 2008, available at Nexis.com
[35] Mushtaq Yusufzai. “Taleban chief says will support Pakistan army if India attacks,” The News, December 23, 2008, available: Nexis.com.
[36] Abdur Rehman, “Dynamism of Pakistan’s Civil Society:Religious-Secular Rivalry and its Resources,” Journal of International Development and Cooperation, Vol.12, No.2, 2006, pp. 47–70. (45); “We shall fight along with Pakistan army for country's defence: Taliban,”Ausaf (Pakistan), December 10, 2008, available: Nexis.com.
[37] Nadeem Yaqub, “Islamists cut cable TV,”Asia Times Online, June 27, 2000, available:
Asia Times: Islamists cut cable TV
[38] K J M Varma, “Pak launches new operation against ultras, casualties increase.” Press Trust of India, March 18, 2004, available: Nexis.com.
[39] Afzal Khan, “Pakistan’s Hunt For Al-qaeda In South Waziristan,” Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, April 22, 2004; “Pakistan conducts operation in tribal region to arrest foreign suspect,” Xinhua, January 15, 2004, available: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/20...t_2465468.htm; Carlotta Gall, “Pakistanis Pursue Qaeda Forces In Offensive on Afghan Border,” The New York Times, March 7, 2005, available: Pakistanis Pursue Qaeda Forces In Offensive on Afghan Border - New York Times
[40] Einar Wigen, “Islamic Jihad Union: al-Qaeda’s Key to the Turkic World?” Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, February 23, 2009, available: http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive...87_122609a.pdf. 18; Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Viking Penguin, 2008), 347.
[41] Einar Wigen, “Islamic Jihad Union: al-Qaeda’s Key to the Turkic World?” Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, February 23, 2009, available: http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive...87_122609a.pdf. 10.
[42] Sources differ regarding the date of the split, however most estimates agree that it occurred in 2002.
[43] Einar Wigen, “Islamic Jihad Union: al-Qaeda’s Key to the Turkic World?” Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, February 23, 2009, available: http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive...87_122609a.pdf. 11-20.
[44] “Foreign fighters moving from Pakistan to Afghanistan,” Indo-Asian News Service, available: Nexis.com
[45] “Foreign fighters moving from Pakistan to Afghanistan,” Indo-Asian News Service. August 1, 2006,,available: Nexis.com
[46] The Iraqi fighter Abu Obkash and the Egyptian militant Abu Nasr allegedly irritated Bahadur and his allies the most. See: Foreign fighters moving from Pakistan to Afghanistan,”Indo-Asian News Service. August 1, 2006, available: Nexis.com; Behroz Khan, “Pakistan: Tension Mounting Between Local Taliban; Foreigners in Waziristan,” The News, August 1, 2006. Available: The World News Connection; Sadia Sulaiman, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban,” Jamestown Terrorism, April 10, 2009, available: single - The Jamestown Foundation[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews[exact_search]=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34839&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=b173cbe110; “Behroz Khan, “Jerga hopeful of evicting foreigners from Waziristan.” The News. September 4, 2006, available: Nexis.com
[47] “Pakistan TV show discusses US media's concerns about "leaderless drift," Geo TV News, July 10, 2008, available: Nexis.com; Sadia Sulaiman, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban,” Jamestown Terrorism, April 10, 2009, available: single - The Jamestown Foundation[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews[exact_search]=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34839&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=b173cbe110
[48] “Clash between Taleban, foreign militants averted,” Dawn News, March 10, 2007, available: Clash between Taliban, foreign militants averted -DAWN - Top Stories; March 11, 2007 Ghulam Hasnain, “Musharraf risks civil war as he invades the Al-Qaeda badlands,” The Times Online, available: Musharraf risks civil war as he invades the Al-Qaeda badlands - Times Online.
[49] Behroz Khan, “Pakistan: Report Terms Arab National Present in Waziristan 'Mystery Man'”, The News, October 13, 2006, accessed via World News Connection Database.
[50] “Clash between Taleban, foreign militants averted,” Dawn News, March 10, 2007, available: Clash between Taliban, foreign militants averted -DAWN - Top Stories; March 11, 2007 Ghulam Hasnain, “Musharraf risks civil war as he invades the Al-Qaeda badlands,” The Times Online, July 27, 2009, available: Musharraf risks civil war as he invades the Al-Qaeda badlands - Times Online.
[51] Syed Saleem Shahzad, “US strike hits Pakistan's raw nerve,” Asia Times, June 13, 2008, available: Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan
[52] Mushtaq Yusufzai,“Taleban detain colleague over funds embezzlement,” The News, December 25, 2008, available: Nexis.com
[53] Mustaq Yusufzai, “Taliban detain colleague over funds embezzlement,” The News, October 25, 2008, available: http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=143043
[54] “Pakistan Weekly Roundup on Jihad, Terrorism 29 Aug - 4 Sep,” The News, October 17, 2007, accessed via World News Connection Database.
[55] “Militant leaders call on followers to take over Islamabad,” The Press Trust of India, January 28, 2008, available: Nexis.com.
[56] “Militants own up to attacks,” Dawn News, July 22, 2007, available: Militants own up to attacks -DAWN - Top Stories; July 22, 2007 Carlotta Gall and Salmon Massod, “At Least 40 Militants Dead as Pakistani Military Storms Mosque After Talks Fail,” New York Times, July 10, 2007, available: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/10/wo...0mosque&st=cse
[57] Khaliq also appears to have worked alongside Maulvi Saddiq Noor, a North Waziristan leader occasionally allied with Bahadur, see: Syed Saleem Shahzad, “US strike hits Pakistan's raw nerve,” Asia Times, June 13, 2008, available: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JF13Df01.html; for information on his suicide bombing views: “13 militants killed in Miranshah,” The News, July 22, 2007, available: 13 militants killed in Miranshah
[58] “Pak-Afghan Taliban join hands to counter US’s Afghan surge,” Hindustan Times, March 27, 2009, available: Nexis.com
[59] Einar Wigen, “Islamic Jihad Union: al-Qaeda’s Key to the Turkic World?” Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, February 23, 2009, available: http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive...87_122609a.pdf. 17.
[60] Nadeem Sarwar, “"Good" and "bad" Taliban unite in Pakistan's tribal region,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 30, 2009, available: Nexis.com; “Pakistan Taleban groups form allied council,” Geo TV News, February 25, 2009, available: Nexis.com
[61] “Pak-Afghan Taliban join hands to counter US’s Afghan surge,” Hindustan Times, March 27, 2009, available: Nexis.com; Sadia Sulaiman, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban,” Jamestown Terrorism, April 10, 2009, available: single - The Jamestown Foundation[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews[exact_search]=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34839&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=b173cbe110
[62] Pazir Gul, “New group erodes Baitullah's hold over militants,” Dawn, July 3, 2008, available: Nexis.com; Sadia Sulaiman “Empowering “Soft” Taliban Over “Hard” Taliban: Pakistan’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” Jamestown Terrorism, July 25, 2008, available: single - The Jamestown Foundation[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews[exact_search]=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=5080&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=ad0cf1fb6d; Sadia Sulaiman, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban,” Jamestown Terrorism, April 10, 2009, available: single - The Jamestown Foundation[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews[exact_search]=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34839&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=b173cbe110
[63] Afzal Khan, “Reviving the North Waziristan Peace Accord May Stabilize Tribal Pakistan.” Jamestown Terrorism Focus. March 4, 2008, available: single - The Jamestown Foundation[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews[exact_search]=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4748&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=5906189b0b
[64] “Al-Qaeda propaganda chief killed in Pakistan strike,” AFP, November 1, 2008. Available: http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5...BdvQ6Y097hhUQ; Bill Roggio, “US strikes Haqqani Network in North Waziristan,” The Long War Journal, April 4, 2009, available: US strikes Haqqani Network in North Waziristan - The Long War Journal
[65] “Taliban warns of reprisals as Pakistan protests US drone attacks,” Agence France Presse November 20, 2008, available: Nexis.com
[66] Ismail Khan and Jane Perlez, “Airstrike Kills Militant Tied To Al Qaeda In Pakistan,” The New York Times, November 23, 2008, available: Nexis.com
[67] Pir Zubair Shah, “25 Militants Are Killed In Attack In Pakistan,” The New York Times, May 17, 2009; Malik Mumtaz and Mushtaq Yusufzai, “US air strike kills six in NWA,”The News, September 5, 2008,.available: Nexis.com
[68] Ismail Khan and Jane Perlez, “Airstrike Kills Militant Tied To Al Qaeda In Pakistan,” The New York Times, November 23, 2008, available: Nexis.com
[69] Afzal Khan, “Pakistan's Second Miltary Foray Into Waziristan Repeats Past Mistakes,” Jamestown Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 1 No. 32, June 15, 2004. Available: single - The Jamestown Foundation[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=waziristan&tx_ttnews[pointer]=11&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=29966&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=4e92a364a7 ; Ahmed, Akbar S.. Resistance and Control in Pakistan. New York: Routledge, 2004. 17.
[70] Afzal Khan, “Pakistan's Second Miltary Foray Into Waziristan Repeats Past Mistakes,” Jamestown Eurasia Daily Monitor, June 15, 2004, available: single - The Jamestown Foundation[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=waziristan&tx_ttnews[pointer]=11&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=29966&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=4e92a364a7
[71] Tarique Niazi, “The Taliban's Turf War in South Waziristan,” Jamestown Terrorism Focus, April 10, 2007. Available: single - The Jamestown Foundation[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=waziristan&tx_ttnews[pointer]=5&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4074&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=664dd9dda2
[72] Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Pakistan: Report Reveals Names of Signatories of Waziristan Peace Accord,” The News, October 10, 2006, accessed via the World News Connection.
[73] “Waziristan peace effectively Talibanising area: UK paper,” The Daily Times, October 28, 2006, available: Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan
[74] Tom Hussain, “Taliban factional clash looms on horizon,” The National (UAE), June 15, 2009, available: Taliban factional clash looms on horizon - The National Newspaper Sadia Sulaiman, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban,” Jamestown Terrorism, April 10, 2009, available: single - The Jamestown Foundation[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews[exact_search]=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34839&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=b173cbe110; Ismail Khan, “Time to revisit Waziristan deal?” Dawn, December 23, 2006, available:
Time to revisit Waziristan deal? -DAWN - Top Stories; December 23, 2006
[75] Tom Hussain, “Taliban factional clash looms on horizon,” The National (UAE), June 15, 2009. Available: Taliban factional clash looms on horizon - The National Newspaper
[76] “Clash between Taleban, foreign militants averted.” Dawn News, March 11, 2007, available: Nexis.com.
[77] “Efforts to revive Pakistani government's peace accord with militants stall,” Xinhua, July 25, 2007, available: Nexis.com; Rahimullah Yusufzai, “A formidable enemy,” Newsline, July 2009, available: A Formidable Enemy
[78] “Militants own up to attacks,” Dawn News, July 22, 2007, available: Militants own up to attacks -DAWN - Top Stories; July 22, 2007
[79]Bill Roggio, “Pakistan: Negotiating with the Taliban, again,” Long War Journal, July 20, 2007, available:
Pakistan: Negotiating with the Taliban, again - The Long War Journal
[80] Rahimullah Yusufzai, “The Impact of Pashtun Tribal Differences on the Pakistani Taliban”,Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, February 11, 2008, available: single - The Jamestown Foundation[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews[exact_search]=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4712&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=02f39cd67e;
[81] Militants announce unilateral ceasefire during Eid, Pajhwok Afghan News, available: Nexis.com
[82] Sadia Sulaiman, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban,” Jamestown Terrorism, April 10, 2009, available: single - The Jamestown Foundation[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews[exact_search]=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34839&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=b173cbe110
[83] “Pro-govt militants, tribal elders join hands against Mehsud,” The Press Trust of India, July 8, 2008,available: Nexis.com
[84] Bill Roggio, “Pakistan places bounties on Baitullah and other senior Taliban leaders,” The Long War Journal, June 28, 2008, available:
Pakistan places bounties on Baitullah and other senior Taliban leaders - The Long War Journal
[85] Sadia Sulaiman, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban,” Jamestown Terrorism, April 10, 2009, available: single - The Jamestown Foundation[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews[exact_search]=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34839&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=b173cbe110
[86] “Mehsud challenged by new militant bloc.” Daily Times. July 1, 2008, available: Nexis.com
[87] “Taleban concerned over anti-Mehsud pamphlets,” Daily Times, July 15 2008, available: Nexis.com
[88] Pazir Gul, “New group erodes Baitullah's hold over militants,” July 3, 2008, available: Nexis.com
[89] Pazir Gul, “New group erodes Baitullah's hold over militants,” July 3, 2008, available: Nexis.com
[90] “Three security men die in roadside bomb blast in Pakistan's tribal region,” Xinhua, June 26, 2009, available: Nexis.com
[91] Mushtaq Yusufzai, “Top militant commanders resolve rift,”The News, February 21, 2009, available: Nexis.com
[92] Nadeem Sarwar, “"Good" and "bad" Taliban unite in Pakistan's tribal region,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 30, 2009, available: Nexis.com
[93] Hamid Mir,“Taliban threaten attack on Islamabad,”The News, February 11, 2009, available: Nexis.com
[94] “Pak students freed from Taliban captivity,” Pajhwok Afghan News, June 2, 2009, available: Nexis.com.
[95] “65 Taliban killed in Bannu and South Waziristan,” Daily Times, June 14, 2009.
[96] Mushtaq Yusufzai, Malik Mumtaz Khan, “Warplanes pound militant positions in NWA,” The News, July 1, 2009, accessed via the World News Connection; “36 including 14 soldiers dead in Waziristan attacks,” Pajhwok Afghan News English, June 30, 2009, available: Nexis.com; Jan Zalewski, “Pakistani Taliban Terminate Peace Agreement in North Waziristan,” World Markets Research Center, June 30, 2009, available: Nexis.com; Salman Masood, “An Accord In Pakistan Is Scrapped By Militants,” The New York Times, July 1, 2009, available: Nexis.com; “36 including 14 soldiers dead in Waziristan attacks,” Pajhwok Afghan News English, June 30, 2009, available: Nexis.com
[97] Rasool Dawar, “Taliban scrap peace deal in Pakistan tribal area,” Associated Press, June 30, 2009.,available: Nexis.com
[98] Mushtaq Yusufzai, Malik Mumtaz Khan, “Warplanes pound militant positions in NWA,” available: the World News Connection, July 1, 2009; “36 including 14 soldiers dead in Waziristan attacks,” Pajhwok Afghan News English, June 30, 2009, available: Nexis.com; Mushtaq Yusufzai and Malik Mumtaz Khan, “Army rules out operation in NWA,” The News, July 2, 2009, available: Army rules out operation in NWA.
[99] Mushtaq Yusufzai and Malik Mumtaz Khan, “Army rules out operation in NWA,” The News, July 2, 2009, available: Army rules out operation in NWA.
[100] “Stray missiles kill seven civilians in NWA,” The News, July 6, 2009, available: http://thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=23120; Alamgir Bhittani, “Air strike, rocket attacks in Waziristan,” DAWN, July 16, 2009, available: http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/...n-679;“Three tribesmen die in Waziristan mine blast,” DAWN, July 17, 2009, available: DAWN.COM | Front Page | Three tribesmen die in Waziristan mine blast.
[101] Mushtaq Yusufzai and Malik Mumtaz Khan, “Militants kidnap 10 FC men in NWA,” The News, July 31, 2009, http://thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=23601; Pazir Gul, “Suicide attack on checkpost leaves soldier dead,” DAWN, July 29, 2009 available: http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/...dier-dead-979; Mushtaq Yusufzai, “ Taliban kill militant commander, deputy10 kidnapped FC men freed,” The News, August 1, 2009, available: Taliban kill militant commander, deputy10 kidnapped FC men freed
[102] Mushtaq Yusufzai and Irfan Burki, “Jets pound Baitullah's stronghold, 12 killed,” The News, June 14, 2009, available: Nexis.com
[103] Rahimullah Yusufzai, “A formidable enemy,” Newsline, July 2009, available: A Formidable Enemy
[104] “Three security men die in roadside bomb blast in Pakistan's tribal region,” Xinhua, June 26, 2009, available: Nexis.com
[105] Rahimullah Yusufzai, “A formidable enemy,” Newsline, July 2009, available: http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewsJul20...july2009.html; Pazir Gul, “Suicide attack on checkpost leaves soldier dead,” DAWN, July 28, 2009, available: DAWN.COM | Front Page | Suicide attack on checkpost leaves soldier dead.
[106] Pashtun Shinwari, “US missile attack kills 12 in Waziristan,” Pajhwok Afghan News, March 3, 2009, available: Nexis.com; Pir Zubair Shah, “25 Militants Are Killed In Attack In Pakistan,” The New York Times, May 17, 2009.
[107] Hamid Mir, “Pakistan: Article Cautions Govt Against US Interference in Internal Affairs,” Jang, June 9, 2009. Available on the World News Connection

[Darweshkhel]

yes I do are you looking for a particular period of time?

[Fish]

Kandahar city map here:

[IMG]http://nationalpostnews.files.wordpress.com/2010/05/fo0527_kandahar-eps.jpg[/IMG]

Can you please send the link to this map, I'm not able to view it. It's so tiny under this post.

[Fish]

Fish its on the page itself. Look at previous pages of this topic.

It's still tiny how do I get to click on it to get a bigger size of it? I really want to see this map!!

[Darweshkhel]

Afghanistan Analyst Bibliography
5th Edition 2010

1. Ethnic Groups
2. Conflict and Mobilization: War, Ethnicity, Jihad, Taliban, Factions, “Warlords,” etc… (Late 1970s to the present)
3. Islam: Political Islam, Sharia, “Jihad”, Sects and Religious Affairs
4. State-Building: The International Community, Reconstruction, Security, Economy, Government and Development
5. Policy: Announcements, Recommendations and Criticisms
6. Opium: Cultivation, Drug Use and Trafficking
7. Land: Environment, Agriculture, Property Issues and Natural Resources
8. Human Rights
9. Women, Gender and Family
10. Military: Operations, Civil-Military Relations, PRTs and COIN
11. Security Sector: DDR, Militias, Afghan National Army and Police, PMCs and Security Contractors
12. Population Movements: Refugees, IDPs and Migration
13. Health and Medicine
14. Education
15. Macro and Micro Economics
16. Public Opinion: Interviews, Study Groups, Polls and Surveys
17. Periodicals and Academic Journals

Published by
http://afghanistan-analyst.org

Check for updated versions of this bibliography at
http://afghanistan-analyst.org/bibliography.aspx

[Darweshkhel]

Tribal Culture, Pashtunwali

new links!

Alikozai Tribal Dynamics. A Very Unusual Durrani Tribe.pdf

Ishaqzai Tribe.pdf

Pashtun Tribal Dynamics.pdf

Jirga System in Tribal Life.pdf

Importance of Tribal Structures and Pakhtunwali in Afghanistan.pdf

How tribal are the Taliban.pdf

Operations in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas.pdf

Pashto (Cultural Orientation).pdf

Pashtun Cultural Factors Limiting Warlord Development.pdf

Pashtunwalis Relevance as a Tool for Solving the Afghan Crisis.pdf

Pukhtu.pdf

Religious Extremism and Militancy in the Pashtun Areas.pdf

The Panjpai Relationship With the Other Durranis.pdf

The Pashtun Tribal System.pdf

Tribal Law of Pashtunwali and Women's Legislative Authority.pdf

Tribal Security System (Arbakai) in Southeast Afghanistan.pdf

Tribes and Warlords in Southern Afghanistan, 1980-2005.pdf

The 1897 Revolt and Tirah Valley Operations from the Pashtun Perspective.pdf

[Darweshkhel]

East Afghanistan (Pakistans Tribal Areas)

[ATTACH]2519[/ATTACH]

[ATTACH]2520[/ATTACH]

[ATTACH]2521[/ATTACH]

[ATTACH]2522[/ATTACH]

[ATTACH]2523[/ATTACH]

[ATTACH]2524[/ATTACH]

[ATTACH]2525[/ATTACH]

[ATTACH]2526[/ATTACH]

[ATTACH]2527[/ATTACH]

[ATTACH]2528[/ATTACH]

[ATTACH]2529[/ATTACH]

[ATTACH]2530[/ATTACH]

[ATTACH]2531[/ATTACH]

[ATTACH]2532[/ATTACH]

[Darweshkhel]

new links

Respectable Warlords (Politics of State-Building).pdf

Village Institutions in the Perception of National and International Actors in Afghanistan.pdf

Local Governance in Warsaj and Farkhar Districts.pdf

Legal Pluralism in Afghanistan.pdf

Understanding Local Violence. Security Arrangements in Kandahar, Kunduz and Paktia.pdf

Where is the Village (Local Perceptions and development Approaches in Kunduz Province).pdf

Livelihoods in the Asqalan and Sufi-Qarayateem Canal Irrigation Systems in the Kunduz River Basi.pdf

On the Concept of 'Village' in Northeastern Afghanistan. Explorations from Kunduz and Takhar Pro.pdf

Afghanistan’s New Democratic Parties. A Means to Organise Democratisation.pdf

From Warlords to Peacelords.pdf

Failure of a Clerical Proto-State (Hazarajat 1979 - 1984).pdf

[RanadahRanadah]

Thank you useful information

[Haris]

Maps

1964 Provincial Map:

http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/AfghanistanProvincial_1964_lg.jpg

1967 Provincial Map:

http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/AfghanistanProvincial_1967_lg.jpg

2001 Provincial Map:

http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/AfghanistanProvincial_2001_lg.jpg

2009 Provincial Map:

http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/AfghanistanProvincial_2009_lg.jpg

2010 Provincial Map:

http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/AfghanistanProvincial_2010_lg.jpg

Population Density Map:

http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Afghanistan_Demography_lg.jpg

Cultural-Historical Zone Map:

http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Afghanistan_GeogCulturalDivisions_lg.jpg

Ethnic Map:

http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Afghanistan_Ethnic_lg.jpg

Language Map:

http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Afghanistan_Languages_lg.jpg

Religion Map:

http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Afghanistan_Religion_lg.jpg

Tribal Map:

http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Afghanistan_Tribes_lg.jpg

[pashtun_rise]

Latest update is that US is gonna attack pashtun areas in pakistan including peshawer in few upcoming days....they ve declared war within pakistan now.

[arslan]

Here is the good news for every one thanks for the educational posting check the Education News in Pakistan