Tweet
Published in 1986, ‘Facts are Facts’ by the late Wali Khan was an instant hit. ‘Facts are Facts’ is an attempt to contest text book versions of Pakistan’s history. In a bid to generate debate, the Viewpoint is serializing this text
Mullahs, Khans and the Muslim league
In a previous chapter I had observed that the foundation for the Muslim League in the Frontier Province was laid by the Mullahs. The President of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Sarhad, Maulana Mohammad Shuaib was the President of the Muslim League. The Secretary of the Jamiat was also the League Secretary. These two Mullahs had a direct line to Sir George Cunningham. But the British realized that they had better separate the spiritual from the temporal. The political and worldly affairs were assigned to the Khan Bahadurs and Jagirdars, while the spiritual and religious to the Mullahs and Pirs. It is interesting to see that these agents of Cunningham later became leaders of the Muslim League; their names were: Khan Bahadur Kuli Khan, Khan Bahadur Ghulam Haider Khan of Sherpao, Nawab Zafar Khan and Taj Ali from Bannu became immortalized in this context. In this manner the Pirs and Mullahs independently joined the Muslim League. Pir Sahib Manki Shareef, Pir Zakoori and other Mullahs played political games from a religious base, impelled and applauded by the British.
One added advantage of working with these Mullahs was that the tribals could also be used to work for the British, because no government official was allowed to enter these areas. Since there was a news black-out, there was no other means of influencing the inhabitants of the tribal areas.
Cunningham saw that the servile state to which the Mullahs had been reduced, made them ideal for performing all his dirty tasks. He, therefore, started using them against the Khudai Khidmatgars. Cunningham wrote that at one time the Mullahs of Yusufzai were anti-government. Now, thanks to the new policy, they switched their loyalty every day. First they were anti-USSR, then anti-German, anti-Japan, anti-Hindu, and, finally, anti-Congress. The anti-Congress sentiment was greatly welcome because it meant pro-Muslim League! The British government identified themselves with the victory of the Muslim League:
The success of the Muslim League in these by- elections was generally accepted as being a victory for the British government over the subversive elements in the country [ Governor's report, 24 August 1943].
The Khudai Khidmatgars were also creating problems for the British. They launched civil disobedience and resigned from the Government. The area was brought under Governor's rule. This was a province with the largest Muslim majority. During the last elections the Muslim League did not exist in the Frontier Province. Therefore there was no possibility of even a single member being elected from that party. This was a big disappointment for the British. In his letter dated 16 January 1940, the Viceroy wrote that Jinnah came to see him. Referring to Dr Khan Sahib's resignation he asked whether in the Frontier Province there was any possibility of another party forming the Government? Jinnah requested that he be allowed to consult with his colleagues before answering this question. He also said that it would be a good idea to request the Governor to take special interest in this matter. One month later, Jinnah told the Viceroy that he had spoken with other leaders of the League. They felt that they were not capable of forming the Government by themselves. But if Governor Cunningham cooperated with them they might give it a shot. Then Jinnah enumerated the advantages of forming the Government. If this Government were to be formed it would be a slap on the face of the Congress.
The second advantage would be that the news that a Muslim majority province had formed a non-Congress Government, would spread like wild fire. Jinnah added that he was most anxious if possible to see this through, because he was confident that there could be no more salutary lesson for the Congress and no better advertisement of their real position in India. The entire world would realize that a non-Congress Ministry has been established in the NWFP. He was, therefore, most anxious to bring this matter to a successful conclusion.
The political situation in India may be described as follows. The British, and its ally the Muslim League, both wanted it to be widely known that the Congress was a Hindu movement. The Muslim League was the one and only representative of the Muslims. The fact that the Frontier Province was governed by another party, the Khudai Khidmatgars, destroyed the very basis of their argument. Therefore the British were hell bent on throwing the Frontier into the arms of the League. The Viceroy assured Mr. Jinnah that he would consult with Governor Cunningham and then get back to him.
Another incident related to the above events is narrated by Iskander Mirza. At that time he was the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar. The following is an incident from his autobiography. The Nawab of Bhopal had invited him for a tiger hunt. On his return he went to see Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, who sent him to Quaid-i-Azam. This incident occurred in March 1943. Iskander Mirza wrote that Jinnah had already established a social contact with his mother. First he asked him whether he was a Muslim. He said, "Since the days of the Prophet.”‘ Then he asked, "Do you consider me the leader of the Indian Muslims?" He said, "Yes." Jinnah averred that the League had not formed the Government in a single province in the country. "But if you tried, a Muslim League Government could be formed in the Frontier Province." Iskander Mirza said that he was only a Deputy Commissioner. This task could be accomplished by none other than the Governor. He added that the Muslim League did not exist in that province, and its leader Sardar Aurangzeb Khan was a very corrupt individual. Jinnah asked him to leave aside Aurangzeb's strength and weaknesses. No matter what the organizational condition of the Muslim League, it was imperative that it form the Government. As a Muslim, it was his duty to make it happen.
Iskander Mirza wrote that later, when Sir George Cunningham returned from his tour of Kabul, he sent for him. No sooner had he sat down than Cunningham started speaking about the tremendous pressure he was under to form a new Government in the Frontier Province. He said that the Government of India wanted to prove that the Frontier was not with the Congress. Those were the times when, as a result of the Quit India Movement, several members of the Assembly had been thrown in prison without the benefit of a trial. The Governor was having a field day! He invited Aurangzeb Khan to form the Government. Iskander Mirza wrote that he did not have any faith in Aurangzeb Khan. There was only one individual worthy of trust, Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar of Peshawar. At that time, he was with the Ahrar political party and opposed to the Muslim League and was close to the Congress. Iskander Mirza wrote that Nishtar was not very partial to Jinnah Sahib either. He was a witness to Jinnah being cursed by Nishtar at the Mahabat Khan Mosque. Iskander Mirza called Nishtar and appealed to him in the name of Islam. Upon his insistence, Nishtar left the movement and joined the Muslim League.
This manner he became a Minister in the Aurangzeb Cabinet. Iskander Mirza wrote, "This Aurangzeb who used to grovel at my feet became the Chief Minister due to my efforts." On the subject of Aurangzeb, Cunningham wrote: Aurangzeb is extremely amenable and anxious to do what I want. He seems to have forgotten that the function of a Minister is to advise the Governor. Nearly every file comes from him with a note, "I solicit the advice of H.E. the Governor." [Cunningham's diary. 19 July 1943].
Aurangzeb and his companions knew where the real seat of power was located. To have enabled the Muslim League to form the Government from an Assembly where there was not even a single person elected from their party was a task that could have been accomplished only by the British and their Deputy Commissioners. Dissension arose among the party members. First, a bitter enmity started between Aurangzeb Khan and the Provincial President Khan Bahadur Saadullah Khan. When Cunningham saw the condition of the Government, he realized that such a deplorable state of affairs could damage the Muslim League. In his diary dated 27 May 1944, he wrote:
There is no doubt that the name of the Muslim League Administration is simply mud nowadays owing to the scandalous way in which they buy votes. In order to increase their numbers in the Assembly, the Muslim League had started illegal practice.
After one year of their Government, Cunningham tried to release the Khudai Khidmatgars Assembly members one by one. On the other hand, factions started forming within the Muslim League which resulted in a two-way split. One was Aurangzeb Khan's ruling party, and the other that of Saadullah Khan, along with the people who had received no political kickbacks.
These skirmishes continued. In November 1944, Saadullah Khan informed Jinnah that he could no longer support the Ministry and that, if a no-confidence motion was moved, he would vote in favour of it. [Erland Jansson, India, Pakistan or Pakhtoonistan, p. 131].
The Governor was making every effort to keep the Government alive. For that reason he did not call the 1944 Autumn Session. His excuse was that there was no work for the Assembly. The Secretary of the Congress Parliamentary Party presented the Governor with a emorandum containing twenty signatures requesting that the Assembly be called to debate the no-confidence motion against Aurangzeb and his Cabinet. The Governor rejected the memorandum. In the spring session of 1945 when the Assembly was reluctantly called, the no- confidence vote went through, with Saadullah’s anti- Government vote.
Cunningham and his junior officers were aware of the damage done to the Muslim League by the Aurangzeb Government. This bargain proved very costly because it resulted in the Muslim League acquiring a bad name and its breaking up into several splinter groups. But the British were still unwilling to concede the Province to the Congress or the Khudai Khidmatgars. The British policy was to brazen it out by using official agents to worm their way into the Province and the tribal areas.
(To be continued)
The book in PDF form can be accessed at: http://www.awaminationalparty.org/bo...tsarefacts.pdf
Mullahs, Khans and the Muslim league
In a previous chapter I had observed that the foundation for the Muslim League in the Frontier Province was laid by the Mullahs. The President of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Sarhad, Maulana Mohammad Shuaib was the President of the Muslim League. The Secretary of the Jamiat was also the League Secretary. These two Mullahs had a direct line to Sir George Cunningham. But the British realized that they had better separate the spiritual from the temporal. The political and worldly affairs were assigned to the Khan Bahadurs and Jagirdars, while the spiritual and religious to the Mullahs and Pirs. It is interesting to see that these agents of Cunningham later became leaders of the Muslim League; their names were: Khan Bahadur Kuli Khan, Khan Bahadur Ghulam Haider Khan of Sherpao, Nawab Zafar Khan and Taj Ali from Bannu became immortalized in this context. In this manner the Pirs and Mullahs independently joined the Muslim League. Pir Sahib Manki Shareef, Pir Zakoori and other Mullahs played political games from a religious base, impelled and applauded by the British.
One added advantage of working with these Mullahs was that the tribals could also be used to work for the British, because no government official was allowed to enter these areas. Since there was a news black-out, there was no other means of influencing the inhabitants of the tribal areas.
Cunningham saw that the servile state to which the Mullahs had been reduced, made them ideal for performing all his dirty tasks. He, therefore, started using them against the Khudai Khidmatgars. Cunningham wrote that at one time the Mullahs of Yusufzai were anti-government. Now, thanks to the new policy, they switched their loyalty every day. First they were anti-USSR, then anti-German, anti-Japan, anti-Hindu, and, finally, anti-Congress. The anti-Congress sentiment was greatly welcome because it meant pro-Muslim League! The British government identified themselves with the victory of the Muslim League:
The success of the Muslim League in these by- elections was generally accepted as being a victory for the British government over the subversive elements in the country [ Governor's report, 24 August 1943].
The Khudai Khidmatgars were also creating problems for the British. They launched civil disobedience and resigned from the Government. The area was brought under Governor's rule. This was a province with the largest Muslim majority. During the last elections the Muslim League did not exist in the Frontier Province. Therefore there was no possibility of even a single member being elected from that party. This was a big disappointment for the British. In his letter dated 16 January 1940, the Viceroy wrote that Jinnah came to see him. Referring to Dr Khan Sahib's resignation he asked whether in the Frontier Province there was any possibility of another party forming the Government? Jinnah requested that he be allowed to consult with his colleagues before answering this question. He also said that it would be a good idea to request the Governor to take special interest in this matter. One month later, Jinnah told the Viceroy that he had spoken with other leaders of the League. They felt that they were not capable of forming the Government by themselves. But if Governor Cunningham cooperated with them they might give it a shot. Then Jinnah enumerated the advantages of forming the Government. If this Government were to be formed it would be a slap on the face of the Congress.
The second advantage would be that the news that a Muslim majority province had formed a non-Congress Government, would spread like wild fire. Jinnah added that he was most anxious if possible to see this through, because he was confident that there could be no more salutary lesson for the Congress and no better advertisement of their real position in India. The entire world would realize that a non-Congress Ministry has been established in the NWFP. He was, therefore, most anxious to bring this matter to a successful conclusion.
The political situation in India may be described as follows. The British, and its ally the Muslim League, both wanted it to be widely known that the Congress was a Hindu movement. The Muslim League was the one and only representative of the Muslims. The fact that the Frontier Province was governed by another party, the Khudai Khidmatgars, destroyed the very basis of their argument. Therefore the British were hell bent on throwing the Frontier into the arms of the League. The Viceroy assured Mr. Jinnah that he would consult with Governor Cunningham and then get back to him.
Another incident related to the above events is narrated by Iskander Mirza. At that time he was the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar. The following is an incident from his autobiography. The Nawab of Bhopal had invited him for a tiger hunt. On his return he went to see Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, who sent him to Quaid-i-Azam. This incident occurred in March 1943. Iskander Mirza wrote that Jinnah had already established a social contact with his mother. First he asked him whether he was a Muslim. He said, "Since the days of the Prophet.”‘ Then he asked, "Do you consider me the leader of the Indian Muslims?" He said, "Yes." Jinnah averred that the League had not formed the Government in a single province in the country. "But if you tried, a Muslim League Government could be formed in the Frontier Province." Iskander Mirza said that he was only a Deputy Commissioner. This task could be accomplished by none other than the Governor. He added that the Muslim League did not exist in that province, and its leader Sardar Aurangzeb Khan was a very corrupt individual. Jinnah asked him to leave aside Aurangzeb's strength and weaknesses. No matter what the organizational condition of the Muslim League, it was imperative that it form the Government. As a Muslim, it was his duty to make it happen.
Iskander Mirza wrote that later, when Sir George Cunningham returned from his tour of Kabul, he sent for him. No sooner had he sat down than Cunningham started speaking about the tremendous pressure he was under to form a new Government in the Frontier Province. He said that the Government of India wanted to prove that the Frontier was not with the Congress. Those were the times when, as a result of the Quit India Movement, several members of the Assembly had been thrown in prison without the benefit of a trial. The Governor was having a field day! He invited Aurangzeb Khan to form the Government. Iskander Mirza wrote that he did not have any faith in Aurangzeb Khan. There was only one individual worthy of trust, Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar of Peshawar. At that time, he was with the Ahrar political party and opposed to the Muslim League and was close to the Congress. Iskander Mirza wrote that Nishtar was not very partial to Jinnah Sahib either. He was a witness to Jinnah being cursed by Nishtar at the Mahabat Khan Mosque. Iskander Mirza called Nishtar and appealed to him in the name of Islam. Upon his insistence, Nishtar left the movement and joined the Muslim League.
This manner he became a Minister in the Aurangzeb Cabinet. Iskander Mirza wrote, "This Aurangzeb who used to grovel at my feet became the Chief Minister due to my efforts." On the subject of Aurangzeb, Cunningham wrote: Aurangzeb is extremely amenable and anxious to do what I want. He seems to have forgotten that the function of a Minister is to advise the Governor. Nearly every file comes from him with a note, "I solicit the advice of H.E. the Governor." [Cunningham's diary. 19 July 1943].
Aurangzeb and his companions knew where the real seat of power was located. To have enabled the Muslim League to form the Government from an Assembly where there was not even a single person elected from their party was a task that could have been accomplished only by the British and their Deputy Commissioners. Dissension arose among the party members. First, a bitter enmity started between Aurangzeb Khan and the Provincial President Khan Bahadur Saadullah Khan. When Cunningham saw the condition of the Government, he realized that such a deplorable state of affairs could damage the Muslim League. In his diary dated 27 May 1944, he wrote:
There is no doubt that the name of the Muslim League Administration is simply mud nowadays owing to the scandalous way in which they buy votes. In order to increase their numbers in the Assembly, the Muslim League had started illegal practice.
After one year of their Government, Cunningham tried to release the Khudai Khidmatgars Assembly members one by one. On the other hand, factions started forming within the Muslim League which resulted in a two-way split. One was Aurangzeb Khan's ruling party, and the other that of Saadullah Khan, along with the people who had received no political kickbacks.
These skirmishes continued. In November 1944, Saadullah Khan informed Jinnah that he could no longer support the Ministry and that, if a no-confidence motion was moved, he would vote in favour of it. [Erland Jansson, India, Pakistan or Pakhtoonistan, p. 131].
The Governor was making every effort to keep the Government alive. For that reason he did not call the 1944 Autumn Session. His excuse was that there was no work for the Assembly. The Secretary of the Congress Parliamentary Party presented the Governor with a emorandum containing twenty signatures requesting that the Assembly be called to debate the no-confidence motion against Aurangzeb and his Cabinet. The Governor rejected the memorandum. In the spring session of 1945 when the Assembly was reluctantly called, the no- confidence vote went through, with Saadullah’s anti- Government vote.
Cunningham and his junior officers were aware of the damage done to the Muslim League by the Aurangzeb Government. This bargain proved very costly because it resulted in the Muslim League acquiring a bad name and its breaking up into several splinter groups. But the British were still unwilling to concede the Province to the Congress or the Khudai Khidmatgars. The British policy was to brazen it out by using official agents to worm their way into the Province and the tribal areas.
(To be continued)
The book in PDF form can be accessed at: http://www.awaminationalparty.org/bo...tsarefacts.pdf
Comment