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The Atlantic Alliance and the Sino-Islamic Nexus:
From the Hindu Kush to the Shores of Tripoli
by Tony Corn
Download the Full Article: The Atlantic Alliance and the Sino-Islamic Nexus
Of all the theses and sub-theses put forward by Samuel Huntington in his seminal article on The Clash of Civilizations (1993), none turned out to be more controversial than his assertion concerning the emergence of a Sino-Islamic nexus based on an "arms-for-oil" quid pro quo, and composed of three core states: China, Pakistan and Iran. Yet, in less than two decades, the Sino-Islamic nexus has both broadened and deepened well beyond anything imagined by Huntington.
The "Chinafrica" phenomenon is but the most recent development. Following the adoption of a new Africa policy in 2006, China has managed in just a few years to overtake both the former colonial powers (Britain and France) and the United States to become Africa's main trading partner.
In 2011, for the first time in history, a Chinese warship entered the Mediterranean - ostensibly to help evacuate 36,000 nationals from Libya. In the not-too-distant future, China may well seek to secure a naval base in Tripoli for the very same reasons that led France in 2009 to secure a naval base in Abu Dhabi. As of this writing, France and Britain are the only two European countries which appear to have realized a) that Beijing's determination to protect its nationals and promote its interests will logically lead China to seek a permanent military presence "West of Suez," and b) that Libya, the country with the largest oil reserves in Africa, happens to be run by a dictator who expressed support for a Sino-Islamic nexus as early as 1994.
With most of Europe asleep at the wheel, NATO's performance in Libya has been so far rather uneven, prompting outgoing Defense Secretary Robert Gates to warn that the Atlantic Alliance is facing a "dim, if not dismal" future. The danger is that this kind of untimely pronouncement could quickly become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
At this particular juncture, U.S. policy-makers ought to realize that what Britain and France need most from America is not military support so much as moral support. Just like President Bush, after the 1991 Gulf War, was able to say, "By God, we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all," at the end of the Libyan affair, Britain and France must be in a position to say: "By God, we've kicked the Suez syndrome once and for all."
Though it is too early to say how China will try to take advantage of the "Arab Spring" to extend its reach in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), it is not too early for Washington to launch a strategic communication campaign designed to heighten the situational awareness of the rest of Europe by providing a comprehensive "mapping" of the ever-expanding Sino-Islamic nexus, both functionally and geographically.
For contrary to what many Washington observers seem to believe, the main problem with Europeans these days is neither "military capability" nor "political will" as such but, first and foremost, "geostrategic illiteracy."
Fearful that Asia might experience by 2014 the kind of cataclysm that Europe went through in 1914, the initial reaction of most European allies to America's idea of a Global NATO (first put forward in 2006) was a resounding "no entangling alliance." Yet, if the past five years have shown anything, it is that, irrespective of whether the Western Alliance decides to "move East" or not, an energy-hungry East is increasingly determined to "move West."
The idea, widespread in most European capitals, that Europe could somehow step outside History and just watch from the sidelines as the "Pacific Century" unfolds, is a dangerous illusion. Rather than indulge in half-baked criticisms of NATO's performance in Afghanistan, the Pentagon ought to highlight instead this fundamental fact of life: Europe may not be a priori interested in a Global NATO, but Global China is increasingly interested in Europe's own backyard.
Download the Full Article: The Atlantic Alliance and the Sino-Islamic Nexus
Dr. Tony Corn taught European Studies at the U.S. Foreign Service Institute and worked in public diplomacy in Brussels and Washington. The opinions expressed here are the author's own and do not represent the views of the U.S. Department of State.
From the Hindu Kush to the Shores of Tripoli
by Tony Corn
Download the Full Article: The Atlantic Alliance and the Sino-Islamic Nexus
Of all the theses and sub-theses put forward by Samuel Huntington in his seminal article on The Clash of Civilizations (1993), none turned out to be more controversial than his assertion concerning the emergence of a Sino-Islamic nexus based on an "arms-for-oil" quid pro quo, and composed of three core states: China, Pakistan and Iran. Yet, in less than two decades, the Sino-Islamic nexus has both broadened and deepened well beyond anything imagined by Huntington.
The "Chinafrica" phenomenon is but the most recent development. Following the adoption of a new Africa policy in 2006, China has managed in just a few years to overtake both the former colonial powers (Britain and France) and the United States to become Africa's main trading partner.
In 2011, for the first time in history, a Chinese warship entered the Mediterranean - ostensibly to help evacuate 36,000 nationals from Libya. In the not-too-distant future, China may well seek to secure a naval base in Tripoli for the very same reasons that led France in 2009 to secure a naval base in Abu Dhabi. As of this writing, France and Britain are the only two European countries which appear to have realized a) that Beijing's determination to protect its nationals and promote its interests will logically lead China to seek a permanent military presence "West of Suez," and b) that Libya, the country with the largest oil reserves in Africa, happens to be run by a dictator who expressed support for a Sino-Islamic nexus as early as 1994.
With most of Europe asleep at the wheel, NATO's performance in Libya has been so far rather uneven, prompting outgoing Defense Secretary Robert Gates to warn that the Atlantic Alliance is facing a "dim, if not dismal" future. The danger is that this kind of untimely pronouncement could quickly become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
At this particular juncture, U.S. policy-makers ought to realize that what Britain and France need most from America is not military support so much as moral support. Just like President Bush, after the 1991 Gulf War, was able to say, "By God, we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all," at the end of the Libyan affair, Britain and France must be in a position to say: "By God, we've kicked the Suez syndrome once and for all."
Though it is too early to say how China will try to take advantage of the "Arab Spring" to extend its reach in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), it is not too early for Washington to launch a strategic communication campaign designed to heighten the situational awareness of the rest of Europe by providing a comprehensive "mapping" of the ever-expanding Sino-Islamic nexus, both functionally and geographically.
For contrary to what many Washington observers seem to believe, the main problem with Europeans these days is neither "military capability" nor "political will" as such but, first and foremost, "geostrategic illiteracy."
Fearful that Asia might experience by 2014 the kind of cataclysm that Europe went through in 1914, the initial reaction of most European allies to America's idea of a Global NATO (first put forward in 2006) was a resounding "no entangling alliance." Yet, if the past five years have shown anything, it is that, irrespective of whether the Western Alliance decides to "move East" or not, an energy-hungry East is increasingly determined to "move West."
The idea, widespread in most European capitals, that Europe could somehow step outside History and just watch from the sidelines as the "Pacific Century" unfolds, is a dangerous illusion. Rather than indulge in half-baked criticisms of NATO's performance in Afghanistan, the Pentagon ought to highlight instead this fundamental fact of life: Europe may not be a priori interested in a Global NATO, but Global China is increasingly interested in Europe's own backyard.
Download the Full Article: The Atlantic Alliance and the Sino-Islamic Nexus
Dr. Tony Corn taught European Studies at the U.S. Foreign Service Institute and worked in public diplomacy in Brussels and Washington. The opinions expressed here are the author's own and do not represent the views of the U.S. Department of State.
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