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Taliban Move Into Kandahar City - WSJ.com
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan—The Taliban insurgency in southern Afghanistan is turning urban, as the American military surge in their rural heartland drives militants into the maze of Kandahar, the nation's second-largest city.
The U.S. offensives that began in August in the countryside around Kandahar were meant to secure this city of nearly a million people by eliminating Taliban strongholds in surrounding districts.
Instead, the insurgents have staged a string of high-profile attacks within the city.
"The Taliban are more active in the city than at any time since 2001," says Hajji Atta Mohammed, a former police general who heads the Kandahar council of former mujahedeen commanders. "They've brought the war inside Kandahar."
Bullet-riddled and blasted-out buildings on Kandahar's main road bear testament to the Taliban's two-day assault on key government installations on May 7 and May 8—a coordinated attempt to take over the city that Afghan security forces repelled only thanks to American intervention.
Hitting Kandahar
Recent Taliban strikes:
U.S. military officials say the assault, though high-profile, was actually a win for the Afghans. In the wake of the assault, American military officials said the outcome of the fighting—which caused more insurgent than Afghan police casualties—was a setback for the Taliban.
"They came with a plan, they came equipped, and the Afghan national police, with our backstop, was able to defeat them," said U.S. Army Lt. Col. Christopher Beck, commander of the unit responsible for the part of Kandahar city where most of the fighting occurred that weekend, the 1st Special Troops Battalion of the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.
Some Afghans, however, don't like what they are seeing.
"The enemy is smart. The enemy is always a step ahead," says Kandahar governor, Tooryalai Wesa.
In previous days, the Taliban assassinated Kandahar's police chief in his own headquarters, and spirited some 500 militants from the city's main prison. In both cases, the insurgents relied on inside help from turncoat officials.
Almost every day, Taliban squads on motorbikes assassinate Kandaharis suspected of collaborating with the government or the U.S. military.
In neighborhoods just off the city's main roads, the Taliban routinely erect mobile checkpoints, examining the contents of residents' pockets and searching their cellphone address books for signs of links with the infidels.
"We're hit when the insurgents are shooting, and we're hit when the government is shooting. We're always afraid," says Mohammed Ismail Agha, a grocer who spent much of May 7 cowering behind his shop's refrigerator as Taliban fighters who took over a nearby shopping mall tried to seize the neighboring police station, peppering the adjoining buildings with bullets.
"It's worse than it's ever been," echoed street vendor Hajji Agha.
The Kandahar municipal administration, up against Taliban pledges to kill anyone working for the government, has been able to fill only 52 out of its 119 budgeted positions, says deputy mayor Hajji Mohammad Nassim.
Mr. Nassim's own position, filled this spring after a monthslong hiatus, is especially precarious: his two predecessors were killed by the Taliban last year.
The Taliban's move into Kandahar city comes as the U.S. military reports of progress in southern Afghanistan, where most of the 30,000 surge troops were deployed last year.
The coalition's operations have cleared out the Taliban from some of their historic strongholds in the rural districts of Zhari, Panjway and Arghandab around Kandahar city—districts where until late last year the Taliban essentially ran a parallel government, dispensing justice at Islamic courts and collecting taxes.
Military commanders cite achievements in Kandahar and neighboring Helmand province as proof that the current counterinsurgency strategy is working, pointing to these advances as a reason why troop withdrawals slated by President Barack Obama for July should be minimal in scope.
"Whereas last year it was worse in the districts than it was in the city…the paradigm has reversed now," says U.S. Army Maj. Gen. James L. Terry, the commander of coalition forces in south Afghanistan and of the 10th Mountain Division. "Now we have to put more effort in the city."
American commanders argue that depriving the Taliban of their "soft power" as de-facto rulers of the countryside will eventually alienate the insurgents from the population, undermining their ability to operate inside the city.
Yet, military officials also acknowledge the Taliban's success so far in intimidating Kandahar's residents, and in diminishing the sense of security inside the metropolis.
"Frankly, it's a battle of perceptions right now," Gen. Terry says. "If we're here through another fighting season, and we've at least lost none of the gains that we've made, Afghan people's perception will start to change again….The campaign is not over."
The Taliban have made a deliberate decision to center their war effort on Kandahar city after finding it hard to counter the U.S. military onslaught in the rural districts, says Hajji Toorjan, a senior Taliban commander from Arghandab who decided to reconcile with the government earlier this year.
"Cities are easier targets," says Mr. Toorjan, who now lives in a small, baked-mud safe house operated by Afghan intelligence.
In the thickly populated metropolis, he says, the U.S. can't easily use air power, artillery and airborne surveillance, and insurgents face fewer difficulties in hiding their fighters or evacuating the wounded.
Despite his own embrace of the government, Mr. Toorjan says he's certain of an eventual Taliban victory: "It's impossible for them to lose."
One of his former fighters, 19-year-old Najibullah, recently had a first-hand taste of just how thoroughly the city is infiltrated by the Taliban. He left the safe house to pick up fresh clothes from his home in Kandahar's sprawling Loya Wilayah neighborhood.
As he was heading back, two masked Taliban on a motorcycle blocked his way; one opened fire with a Kalashnikov assault rifle. Luckily for Mr. Najibullah, the gun jammed after the first bullet tore through his left leg.
"It's easy for them to know who we are and where we are," Mr. Najibullah says.
Write to Yaroslav Trofimov at yaroslav.trofimov@wsj.com
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan—The Taliban insurgency in southern Afghanistan is turning urban, as the American military surge in their rural heartland drives militants into the maze of Kandahar, the nation's second-largest city.
The U.S. offensives that began in August in the countryside around Kandahar were meant to secure this city of nearly a million people by eliminating Taliban strongholds in surrounding districts.
Instead, the insurgents have staged a string of high-profile attacks within the city.
"The Taliban are more active in the city than at any time since 2001," says Hajji Atta Mohammed, a former police general who heads the Kandahar council of former mujahedeen commanders. "They've brought the war inside Kandahar."
Bullet-riddled and blasted-out buildings on Kandahar's main road bear testament to the Taliban's two-day assault on key government installations on May 7 and May 8—a coordinated attempt to take over the city that Afghan security forces repelled only thanks to American intervention.
Hitting Kandahar
Recent Taliban strikes:
- April 2-3The Taliban join protests over a Quran burning, attacking the governor's compound.
- April 7Attack on a police training center leaves six dead.
- April 15Insurgents infiltrate police headquarters and kill police chief.
- April 24Taliban tunnel 500 militants out of main prison.
- May 7-8Insurgents take over several buildings near government and police offices.
- May 26IED kills six U.S. Army soldiers.
U.S. military officials say the assault, though high-profile, was actually a win for the Afghans. In the wake of the assault, American military officials said the outcome of the fighting—which caused more insurgent than Afghan police casualties—was a setback for the Taliban.
"They came with a plan, they came equipped, and the Afghan national police, with our backstop, was able to defeat them," said U.S. Army Lt. Col. Christopher Beck, commander of the unit responsible for the part of Kandahar city where most of the fighting occurred that weekend, the 1st Special Troops Battalion of the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.
Some Afghans, however, don't like what they are seeing.
"The enemy is smart. The enemy is always a step ahead," says Kandahar governor, Tooryalai Wesa.
In previous days, the Taliban assassinated Kandahar's police chief in his own headquarters, and spirited some 500 militants from the city's main prison. In both cases, the insurgents relied on inside help from turncoat officials.
Almost every day, Taliban squads on motorbikes assassinate Kandaharis suspected of collaborating with the government or the U.S. military.
In neighborhoods just off the city's main roads, the Taliban routinely erect mobile checkpoints, examining the contents of residents' pockets and searching their cellphone address books for signs of links with the infidels.
"We're hit when the insurgents are shooting, and we're hit when the government is shooting. We're always afraid," says Mohammed Ismail Agha, a grocer who spent much of May 7 cowering behind his shop's refrigerator as Taliban fighters who took over a nearby shopping mall tried to seize the neighboring police station, peppering the adjoining buildings with bullets.
"It's worse than it's ever been," echoed street vendor Hajji Agha.
The Kandahar municipal administration, up against Taliban pledges to kill anyone working for the government, has been able to fill only 52 out of its 119 budgeted positions, says deputy mayor Hajji Mohammad Nassim.
Mr. Nassim's own position, filled this spring after a monthslong hiatus, is especially precarious: his two predecessors were killed by the Taliban last year.
The Taliban's move into Kandahar city comes as the U.S. military reports of progress in southern Afghanistan, where most of the 30,000 surge troops were deployed last year.
The coalition's operations have cleared out the Taliban from some of their historic strongholds in the rural districts of Zhari, Panjway and Arghandab around Kandahar city—districts where until late last year the Taliban essentially ran a parallel government, dispensing justice at Islamic courts and collecting taxes.
Military commanders cite achievements in Kandahar and neighboring Helmand province as proof that the current counterinsurgency strategy is working, pointing to these advances as a reason why troop withdrawals slated by President Barack Obama for July should be minimal in scope.
"Whereas last year it was worse in the districts than it was in the city…the paradigm has reversed now," says U.S. Army Maj. Gen. James L. Terry, the commander of coalition forces in south Afghanistan and of the 10th Mountain Division. "Now we have to put more effort in the city."
American commanders argue that depriving the Taliban of their "soft power" as de-facto rulers of the countryside will eventually alienate the insurgents from the population, undermining their ability to operate inside the city.
Yet, military officials also acknowledge the Taliban's success so far in intimidating Kandahar's residents, and in diminishing the sense of security inside the metropolis.
"Frankly, it's a battle of perceptions right now," Gen. Terry says. "If we're here through another fighting season, and we've at least lost none of the gains that we've made, Afghan people's perception will start to change again….The campaign is not over."
The Taliban have made a deliberate decision to center their war effort on Kandahar city after finding it hard to counter the U.S. military onslaught in the rural districts, says Hajji Toorjan, a senior Taliban commander from Arghandab who decided to reconcile with the government earlier this year.
"Cities are easier targets," says Mr. Toorjan, who now lives in a small, baked-mud safe house operated by Afghan intelligence.
In the thickly populated metropolis, he says, the U.S. can't easily use air power, artillery and airborne surveillance, and insurgents face fewer difficulties in hiding their fighters or evacuating the wounded.
Despite his own embrace of the government, Mr. Toorjan says he's certain of an eventual Taliban victory: "It's impossible for them to lose."
One of his former fighters, 19-year-old Najibullah, recently had a first-hand taste of just how thoroughly the city is infiltrated by the Taliban. He left the safe house to pick up fresh clothes from his home in Kandahar's sprawling Loya Wilayah neighborhood.
As he was heading back, two masked Taliban on a motorcycle blocked his way; one opened fire with a Kalashnikov assault rifle. Luckily for Mr. Najibullah, the gun jammed after the first bullet tore through his left leg.
"It's easy for them to know who we are and where we are," Mr. Najibullah says.
Write to Yaroslav Trofimov at yaroslav.trofimov@wsj.com
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