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Recent events in Egypt show that when Islamic movements collaborate with a central government/outside power supplied military that the citizens that compromise or work within the system often end up in jail or dead. Muhammad Morsi might provide some good personal commentary on that.
I have no idea if the insurgents understand the arc of history or if their handlers/leadership are relying purely on instinct and the stubborn Pashtun proclivity to not give in. If it is history that they are turning to, then the following might be (should be?) what drives their concerns if they accept Kabul's overtures:
We can see that when Najib Ahmadzai was in power, (I recall in my youth) that he attempted a similar salvage of his governance. He began to speak in Islamic language and quote the Quran and Hadith in his speeches. Government scholars began to issue proclamations to counter the message of Azzam. At the same time, he was reaching out to foreign powers including the West that backed his adversaries in preserved letters that sought help to repeat another attempt to crush his religious internal resistance that would threaten them eventually. He did himself a major injustice by ignoring the true underlying cause of why that would happen. Najib's modern supporters attempt to claim he was prescient and somehow was so smart he knew the future was bleak. The reality was that he was one of many autocrats that understood the power of religious movements and their relationships to insurgencies in the Islamic world. He was smart enough to understand that BOTH Russian and Western inoculation/interventionalism in the Muslim world were the true fuel for these movements. In any case, he was attempting to lull them into a period of respite so his government (which was on life support) could recover a little bit and then resume another attempt to implement the Marxist social program.
Local governments have provided simulations/historical precedent for these sorts of insurgencies to not trust a central government that is backed by one of the outside major powers.
This is the story of Abdulhalim Nazarzada:
Death Of A Fugitive: Abduhalim Nazarzoda, Tajik General Blamed For Recent Violence
When Tajikistan was dealing with its own Islamic insurgency of sorts, General Nazarzada was a figure that movement which decided to work with the government in a way that is proposed by the Kabul government.
Here is a bit more detail:
Another article here:
Tajikistan’s Government Uses Recent Violence to Neutralize Opposition - Jamestown
Gives more detail about how the sequence of true events actually seems to be
1) Islamic insurgents were lured into a power sharing arrangement/government peace initiative ---> 2) In the back ground plans were going on to disarm and then eventually neutralize this group which had been operational since the 1990s and did not have Saudi links or any of the usual nonsense spewed at these local/internal movements who were truly chafing against Russian backed/US interest laden autocrats attempting to remove Islam out of the lexicon of their nation state ---->3) They launched false claims against the general --->4 ) pretext was used to kill him.
Here is some more evidence to buttress that:
And
And
So in summary, historical motivations exist in abundance that may explain why the insurgents refuse to work with the Kabul government. They pretty much boil down to
1) Whenever these groups work within western frameworks and paradigms attempts are made to kill, maim, discredit, jail or murder their members (ala Egypt, multiple coups in Turkey until Erdogen neutralized these internal forces, and the close by regional example of Tajikistan and other Istan states above.
2) The Kabul government if pretty much following Najib's and Tajikistan's President' Rahmon's playbook in attempting to coax the ally toward the bargaining table. In English there is a misaal of sorts "Welcome to my parlor said the Spider to the Fly." And the context of the aforementioned history may have nudged older members of the insurgency to view Kabul's invitations in these ways.
Afghanistan certainly is a different environment than these other cited regions where religion intersects the lives of nearly every party. The joke in my father's day was that all the fighting parties, Marxists, Royalists, Insurgents etc would all briefly put down their weapons for the prayer and then resume their fight right afterwards. It could very well be that forces like Mojadidi/Sayyaf and others would never allow a situation like that implemented by General Sisi in Egypt, coup planners in Turkey, or President Rahmon in Tajikistan. To that end though, the insurgents may say that these potentially sympathetic players have little to no power and have proven that when outside/world pressure was applied internal independence was compromised in multiple instances. This may also explain why they have stated that they will in no uncertain terms have negotiations with the Kabul government since it requires outside force to stand up but that they prefer to talk to the "hidden hand" or the "true power behind the throne."
I have no idea if the insurgents understand the arc of history or if their handlers/leadership are relying purely on instinct and the stubborn Pashtun proclivity to not give in. If it is history that they are turning to, then the following might be (should be?) what drives their concerns if they accept Kabul's overtures:
We can see that when Najib Ahmadzai was in power, (I recall in my youth) that he attempted a similar salvage of his governance. He began to speak in Islamic language and quote the Quran and Hadith in his speeches. Government scholars began to issue proclamations to counter the message of Azzam. At the same time, he was reaching out to foreign powers including the West that backed his adversaries in preserved letters that sought help to repeat another attempt to crush his religious internal resistance that would threaten them eventually. He did himself a major injustice by ignoring the true underlying cause of why that would happen. Najib's modern supporters attempt to claim he was prescient and somehow was so smart he knew the future was bleak. The reality was that he was one of many autocrats that understood the power of religious movements and their relationships to insurgencies in the Islamic world. He was smart enough to understand that BOTH Russian and Western inoculation/interventionalism in the Muslim world were the true fuel for these movements. In any case, he was attempting to lull them into a period of respite so his government (which was on life support) could recover a little bit and then resume another attempt to implement the Marxist social program.
Local governments have provided simulations/historical precedent for these sorts of insurgencies to not trust a central government that is backed by one of the outside major powers.
This is the story of Abdulhalim Nazarzada:
Death Of A Fugitive: Abduhalim Nazarzoda, Tajik General Blamed For Recent Violence
When Tajikistan was dealing with its own Islamic insurgency of sorts, General Nazarzada was a figure that movement which decided to work with the government in a way that is proposed by the Kabul government.
Nazarzoda joined the Defense Ministry in 1997, after the government signed a power-sharing deal with the Islamist-led opposition that ended the five-year civil war.
Some likened Nazarzoda to Halimov, who criticized Rahmon's crackdown on Islamic practices on videos posted on YouTube.
Nazarzoda, however, was not seen as a particularly religious person, although he performed a Hajj pilgrimage in the early 1990s, a trip that earned him a nickname, Hoji Halim.
Those who doubt he had a motive ask what he stood to gain by attacking a rural police headquarters if he was unhappy with the government's policies on religion.
Nazarzoda, however, was not seen as a particularly religious person, although he performed a Hajj pilgrimage in the early 1990s, a trip that earned him a nickname, Hoji Halim.
Those who doubt he had a motive ask what he stood to gain by attacking a rural police headquarters if he was unhappy with the government's policies on religion.
Tajikistan’s Government Uses Recent Violence to Neutralize Opposition - Jamestown
Gives more detail about how the sequence of true events actually seems to be
1) Islamic insurgents were lured into a power sharing arrangement/government peace initiative ---> 2) In the back ground plans were going on to disarm and then eventually neutralize this group which had been operational since the 1990s and did not have Saudi links or any of the usual nonsense spewed at these local/internal movements who were truly chafing against Russian backed/US interest laden autocrats attempting to remove Islam out of the lexicon of their nation state ---->3) They launched false claims against the general --->4 ) pretext was used to kill him.
Here is some more evidence to buttress that:
Given the IRPT’s stated commitment to a multi-party system and gradualist approach to reform in Tajikistan, the accusations of the party’s involvement in the early-September armed attacks are difficult to justify; and the regime has changed its story a number of times. President Rahmon initially labeled Major-General Nazarzoda an “Islamic State sympathizer,” who tried to lead a coup against the government (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 7). Although Tajikistani officials highlighted Nazarzoda’s civil war–era membership in the party (which was then a key coalition member of the United Tajik Opposition), they only formally accused the IRPT of involvement in the September 4 attacks after having neutralized Nazarzoda and his ability to offer a different story.
Instead of posing a real threat to the regime, the September attacks offered an opportunity to remove a potentially disloyal commander and to completely eliminate the country’s leading opposition party. Nazarzoda was one of the last remaining United Tajik Opposition commanders in government. The 1997 peace deal allocated 30 percent of government posts to the opposition. But since then, the regime has arrested, killed and exiled most of these former commanders. Therefore, rather than plots by outside forces, struggles within the Tajikistani state itself ultimately caused the recent outbreak of violence in this Central Asian republic.
And
Nazarzoda’s defection legitimized the regime’s final move to eliminate the IRPT.
1) Whenever these groups work within western frameworks and paradigms attempts are made to kill, maim, discredit, jail or murder their members (ala Egypt, multiple coups in Turkey until Erdogen neutralized these internal forces, and the close by regional example of Tajikistan and other Istan states above.
2) The Kabul government if pretty much following Najib's and Tajikistan's President' Rahmon's playbook in attempting to coax the ally toward the bargaining table. In English there is a misaal of sorts "Welcome to my parlor said the Spider to the Fly." And the context of the aforementioned history may have nudged older members of the insurgency to view Kabul's invitations in these ways.
Afghanistan certainly is a different environment than these other cited regions where religion intersects the lives of nearly every party. The joke in my father's day was that all the fighting parties, Marxists, Royalists, Insurgents etc would all briefly put down their weapons for the prayer and then resume their fight right afterwards. It could very well be that forces like Mojadidi/Sayyaf and others would never allow a situation like that implemented by General Sisi in Egypt, coup planners in Turkey, or President Rahmon in Tajikistan. To that end though, the insurgents may say that these potentially sympathetic players have little to no power and have proven that when outside/world pressure was applied internal independence was compromised in multiple instances. This may also explain why they have stated that they will in no uncertain terms have negotiations with the Kabul government since it requires outside force to stand up but that they prefer to talk to the "hidden hand" or the "true power behind the throne."
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