Tweet
Originally posted by marwat
View Post
i said you fall flat.
that's it, it says opposite of what you are claiming pointing the article. the other baqwas he made up from his pichwara. he did not present any single source from where he is collecting the data. you would hardly find any thing about the ghost author. and everyone know globalresearch credibility is not more than www.riazhaq.com , www.zaidhamid.pk
it's not some organization or some research center, it's a personal website of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michel_Chossudovsky.
you need to look at here too
dude what can i say now, why are you pointing me of ad homenim fallacy when you itself a guilty.
that's it, it says opposite of what you are claiming pointing the article. the other baqwas he made up from his pichwara. he did not present any single source from where he is collecting the data. you would hardly find any thing about the ghost author. and everyone know globalresearch credibility is not more than www.riazhaq.com , www.zaidhamid.pk
it's not some organization or some research center, it's a personal website of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michel_Chossudovsky.
you need to look at here too
dude what can i say now, why are you pointing me of ad homenim fallacy when you itself a guilty.
The rest is just ad hominem garbage which is very typical of paki education because you cant debate rationally.
So with that, lets look at the UN report:
p.98
In 2008, farmers earned US$ 732 million from opium,
mainly in southern and western Afghanistan.
mainly in southern and western Afghanistan.
The estimated value of opiate trafficking for Afghanistan was US$
3.4 billion in 2008.
3.4 billion in 2008.
You already said that the Taliban earned 125 million:
125million/3.4 billion = about 4%
732 million/3.4 billion = about 21%
so where is the rest of the 75% going to?
Back to the UN report:
p101
The term ‘anti-government elements’ (AGE) permits simultaneous
reference to a wide range of actors that are inhibiting
the development of the Afghan state. However, it also
obscures the varying motivations of AGE and the role shifts
of individuals and groups. For example, a wealthy southern
landowner may occupy a local government post, preside
over sharecroppers who farm opium on his land, and support
the insurgency in order to protect his interests from
government encroachment. This individual might be considered
an official, an insurgent and a drug trader simultaneously.
Faced with these category overlaps, it may be more
productive to examine how different behaviours interact
(criminality, insurgency and official governance), rather
than how individuals interact.
reference to a wide range of actors that are inhibiting
the development of the Afghan state. However, it also
obscures the varying motivations of AGE and the role shifts
of individuals and groups. For example, a wealthy southern
landowner may occupy a local government post, preside
over sharecroppers who farm opium on his land, and support
the insurgency in order to protect his interests from
government encroachment. This individual might be considered
an official, an insurgent and a drug trader simultaneously.
Faced with these category overlaps, it may be more
productive to examine how different behaviours interact
(criminality, insurgency and official governance), rather
than how individuals interact.
A number of warlords also enjoy a degree of influence
within government structures and with international coalition
countries. For example, Human Rights Watch estimated
that 60 per cent of the Members of Parliament had
links to warlordism in 2005. Control over territory or
resources is maintained (and legitimized to some extent)
when warlords enter the political process and are appointed
to key government posts, such as by becoming governors,
ministers, police chiefs or military officers.43 In the south
for example, several important governorships, such as in
Uruzgan and Hilmand, were granted to prominent commanders.
Entry into national politics has done little to curb
warlords’ power and many consider that they continue to
be an obstacle to coherent government control of the country.
within government structures and with international coalition
countries. For example, Human Rights Watch estimated
that 60 per cent of the Members of Parliament had
links to warlordism in 2005. Control over territory or
resources is maintained (and legitimized to some extent)
when warlords enter the political process and are appointed
to key government posts, such as by becoming governors,
ministers, police chiefs or military officers.43 In the south
for example, several important governorships, such as in
Uruzgan and Hilmand, were granted to prominent commanders.
Entry into national politics has done little to curb
warlords’ power and many consider that they continue to
be an obstacle to coherent government control of the country.
Afghanistan currently ranks in the second lowest percentile
on the World Bank’s corruption index.293 A significant
component of this index is based on the activities of corruption
prone government agencies. Survey after survey
reveals the Afghan perception of law enforcement and
courts as among the most corrupt institutions in the country.294
A 2006 poll by the Asia Foundation found that 77
per cent of Afghans believed corruption was a problem at
the national level.295
In Afghanistan, there is corruption among low level law
enforcement officers, but also members of the judiciary and
senior government officials. As one author put it “There are
government officials at the district, provincial, and national
levels involved in drug-trafficking, who are more interested in making money than in serving their populations”. 296 In
other words, there are serious accusations that officials are
receiving kickbacks from organized crime groups in return
for protection and some may have a direct involvement in
the drug trade.
At the outset, it is important to make a rough functional
distinction between low-level/common corruption and highlevel
so-called “grand corruption” in Afghanistan. The majority
of corruption in Afghanistan is low-level, such as “gift
payments” to public officials (such as law enforcement and
court officers) and to other service providers, including in
the private sector. Related to the opium economy, it involves
inter alia bribes on the roads and/or border crossings. The
use of the adjective “low-level” does not mean harmless, This
corruption of course has a negative impact/ In the above
examples it drives up the costs of transportation and deprives
the Afghan government of much needed funds.
High-level or “grand” corruption refers to corrupt acts performed
by politicians and other top state officials (including
those in administrative positions). In the Afghan
context, segments of the state apparatus have effectively
been “captured” by a specific client group, organized crime.
In this sense it is “not only a failure of state institutions but
also a means for enrichment and empowerment of political
elites.
on the World Bank’s corruption index.293 A significant
component of this index is based on the activities of corruption
prone government agencies. Survey after survey
reveals the Afghan perception of law enforcement and
courts as among the most corrupt institutions in the country.294
A 2006 poll by the Asia Foundation found that 77
per cent of Afghans believed corruption was a problem at
the national level.295
In Afghanistan, there is corruption among low level law
enforcement officers, but also members of the judiciary and
senior government officials. As one author put it “There are
government officials at the district, provincial, and national
levels involved in drug-trafficking, who are more interested in making money than in serving their populations”. 296 In
other words, there are serious accusations that officials are
receiving kickbacks from organized crime groups in return
for protection and some may have a direct involvement in
the drug trade.
At the outset, it is important to make a rough functional
distinction between low-level/common corruption and highlevel
so-called “grand corruption” in Afghanistan. The majority
of corruption in Afghanistan is low-level, such as “gift
payments” to public officials (such as law enforcement and
court officers) and to other service providers, including in
the private sector. Related to the opium economy, it involves
inter alia bribes on the roads and/or border crossings. The
use of the adjective “low-level” does not mean harmless, This
corruption of course has a negative impact/ In the above
examples it drives up the costs of transportation and deprives
the Afghan government of much needed funds.
High-level or “grand” corruption refers to corrupt acts performed
by politicians and other top state officials (including
those in administrative positions). In the Afghan
context, segments of the state apparatus have effectively
been “captured” by a specific client group, organized crime.
In this sense it is “not only a failure of state institutions but
also a means for enrichment and empowerment of political
elites.
Comment