In depth on ANSF

[BarakzaiAbdali]

The harsh reality of ANSF's performance by a reasonable source not affiliated with the government:

https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org...ive-in-kunduz/

Some key quotes:

AAN’s co-director Thomas Ruttig argues that the fighting underlined some of the well-known weaknesses of the ANSF: a lack of coordination between different forces (army, police, local police), possibly exacerbated by recruitment problems that are hidden both by corruption (producing ‘ghost soldiers’ and ‘ghost policemen’) and the current reporting system. The fighting also showed the Taleban able to mount large and simultaneous operations in different areas, but also that they were still a long away from a military victory.

On the other hand, the ANSF victory does not seem to be as complete as Afghan media have reported.

Local observers told AAN that the Taleban also occupied a former United States Special Forces base in Imam Saheb district. It was not clear whether it had been handed over to Afghan forces or abandoned.

Noticed far less by at least the international media, also other provinces experienced some heavy fighting simultaneous to that in Kunduz. Further west, in Qaisar district of Faryab province, another long-standing focus of insurgent activity, the Taleban reportedly made some gains, although both sides claimed they had inflicted casualties on their opponents. But the commander of the local ANA corps confirmed that security forces had to retreat in some areas after Afghan Local Police (ALP) fighters surrendered, or defected, to the insurgents, and spoke about a lack of coordination between the ALP and the regular Afghan National Police (ANP). Fighting also took place in the province’s Pashtunkot district. In Farah and Kunar, hundreds of Taleban attacked and stormed police posts, although without threatening larger population centres.

ANSF have suffered record casualties this year, with the figure of killed or wounded increasing by 70 per cent in the first 15 weeks of 2015, compared to the same period last year.

Simultaneously, more government officials were attacked in assassination attempts, in Kabul,Kandahar, Nangrahar (here and here), Paktia and Laghman. On 26 April, the second (acting) police chief of Uruzgan province was killed within six weeks. The numerous attacks and assassination attempts, however, do not constitute a peak but rather normal even though often under-reported practice.

This fighting, however, raised – or reinforced – some points of concern with regard to the readiness of the ANSF. The first is how the Taleban were able to stage such a massive attack, which necessitated pulling together large numbers of fighters prior to it, and still caught the government forces by surprise.

Judging from Afghan media reports, it was the ANP and ALP that bore the brunt of the Kunduz fighting on the government’s side up to Monday, 27 April. This hints at coordination problems and puts in question at least the Afghan government and NATO’s claims that the ANSF are able to effectively resist the insurgency. The continuing lack of a new, legitimate defence minister may well have exacerbated these problems.

he ANA also continues to be ridden with corruption, as an on-going investigation by the Afghan government into what looks to have been a widespread fuel procurement scandal shows. MPs and the Administrative Board of the parliament’s lower house alleged in mid-April that this had had immediate effects on the ANA’s ability to operate and that, during the Taleban ambush in Jurm district in April, the embattled Afghan soldiers were unable to retreat because “their vehicles’ fuel was sold out by the corrupt and the plunderers,” as the house’s deputy secretary, Erfanullah Erfan,said. A member of the Wolesi Jirga’s economic committee had earlier confirmed:
I have witnessed a scene in Farah province in which the Afghan National Army soldiers could not move because their vehicle was out of fuel.

The Taleban have also shown, not only their presence, but ability to hit various areas simultaneously, in one province and in various provinces. With all caution with respect to the figures given, they seem to again be able to pull together large formations of fighters, possibly as a result of the fact that, after the end of the ISAF mission, there is less danger of them coming under NATO air assault. (See also the above mentioned statement that NATO fighter jets were sent to Kunduz, but apparently did not directly take part in the fighting.)

They still enjoy support in the significant pockets of the province populated by Pashtuns, particularly so after the Pashtun population in the north became targets of Northern Alliance fighters and officials who are dominating the political and military scene throughout the region from 2001 onwards, leading to many northern Pashtuns feeling sidelined in the ‘new Afghanistan.’ (On this, see early reports by Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group as well as AAN reports here and here.) This feeling might even have been exacerbated by the growing influence of Uzbek-dominated Jombesh after its leader General Abdul Rashid Dostum became vice president in the current government. AAN has also been reporting for years about (often ethnically-based) ALP units persecuting members of other ethnic groups (only a few examples here and here; more in our freshly composed Kunduz dossier, here).

In contrast to those ALP units, the Taleban are often seen as less abusive, as AAN has been told repeatedly (see for example here and here). For the same reasons, they also remain popular among parts of the population for their system of ‘justice,’ as opposed to the corrupt (and ethnically biased) government courts and have gained a say in the education system, influencing curricula and the choice of teachers.

[BarakzaiAbdali]

The key is analysis is good data. Always try to ask yourself, what is the source, where does it emanate from, and how dependable is it?

Its actually pretty predictable. These terms like "sympathizers" of one side or the other are accusations used for the following purpose:

In any war, there is a propaganda effort, it often relies on a narrative that is promulgated by those with a vested interest. The idea is to convince a restive population about an idea to such an extent so as to overwhelm them with a narrative replete with disinformation. The narrative in Dhiem's day was "the Saigon government is invincible and the Cong are going to fall in a matter of months once Russo Chinese support ceases!" We saw how that panned out. The same went for the Bhagdad narrative. Now we have this new narrative by governmental soothsayers regarding the imminent demise of the Taliban.

If facts, unbiased analytic, and other sources paint a different picture than said propaganda then it shakes the foundation of the new narrative... therefore, these have to be hidden and those that are their purveyors have to be silenced. One way to do this , in this instance, for example, is to hurl the charge of "Taliban sympathizer" and load that accusation with further threats even to the point of threatening violence or loss of livelihood. Its almost laughable were it not to paint a picture of saddening despair and almost be diagnostic of sociopathy.

These voices have a much harder time with the source is someone named Thomas Ruttig... after all, if Ron Paul, or Thomas Ruttig relies on facts, ground level reporting not affiliated with a biased NATO funded media, etc etc. whatever to do with and about Thomas Ruttig?

No need to worry, those of you that have no vested monetary interest or personal axe to grind should ignore the cacophony of shrill voices trying to paint a nonsensical picture that makes very very little sense.

For instance, the Kabul government narrative boils down to paradoxical claims, ie.

ANSF and ANA and ALP are amazing, they are somehow to the level of a first order, first rate, aggressive, professional military force.

Yet somehow this first rate, well funded, well equipped genius force somehow required a few thousand NATO troops to stick around to fly sorties over Kunduz and what not? Both claims cannot be simultaneously true - that NATO needs to stick around, yet ANA is like an invincible fighting force operating on its own.

In summary, just ignore the insults and the jibes and even the veiled threats. Let them instead motivate you to keep trying to find the truth and amplify the signal to noise ratio.

[marwat]

you have quoted the ethnic imbalance found inside ANSF, MoD is not sitting duck and trying to address this.

The ANA, in particular, is plagued by ethnic and
regional imbalances and fissures that dampen
unit cohesion. Command positions within the
ANA are disproportionately filled with individuals
from the northern regions of Afghanistan, Tajiks
in particular. ISAF has made a substantial effort
to reduce the Tajik domination of command
posts. In 2008, approximately 70 percent of Afghan
commanders were Tajiks. As of 2012, that
number had been reduced to 40 percent. This
move was intended to appease ethnic Pashtuns
in Afghanistan, although even within the Pashtun
ethnic group there is an imbalance: the ANA has
disproportionately recruited Pashtuns from the
northern and central regions, with very few emanating
from the south (ibid.).

(Smith et al., 2013; Jones and Crane, 2013: 7)
from the paper "The Afghan National Security Forces Beyond 2014: Will They Be Ready?"

ANSF is weak and they have still a long way to move forward, but they are capable of fighting insurgency, point to be noted however the government lacks a clear strategy.

[BarakzaiAbdali]

you have quoted the ethnic imbalance found inside ANSF, MoD is not sitting duck and trying to address this.

(Smith et al., 2013; Jones and Crane, 2013: 7)
from the paper "The Afghan National Security Forces Beyond 2014: Will They Be Ready?"

ANSF is weak and they have still a long way to move forward, but they are capable of fighting insurgency, point to be noted however the government lacks a clear strategy.

Thank you for the reference, I found it here:
http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/wp-...imer-No.-2.pdf

It seems to contradict or at least elucidate on your bolded by me commentary above.

In its discussion/conclusion section it makes it imperitive that financial support and other forms of aid/training support be provided as a caveat to the statement you make. Or at least that is what page 8 leaves on. There is a lot of criticism leveled at Karzai in its final pages as well.

The problem with the paper is what is not in the print, but between the lines. It is the deeply unsettling implications that Scahill and others demonstrated (e.g. I keep referring to Gardez).

The ANP has also encountered difficulties addressing ethnic imbalance within its ranks. Like he ANA, it has been unable to recruit large numbers of southern Pashtuns, and northerners, particularly Tajiks, dominate the senior ranks (Planty and Perito, 2013: 6). Ethnic imbalance is particularly problematic for everyday policing functions, as ANP units in the south are often unable to communicate with local citizens. They also tend to be viewed as outsiders, making their job even more difficult. This alienation is further exacerbated by the high levels of corruption and ANP involvement in illicit activity such as the drug trade.

That is from page 7

The unsettling implication is that a new order is being enforced at the barrell end of a gun and it is being done in the most malevolent way to benefit the goals of ISAF, NATO, and a particular few on both sides of the durand line. These unsavory people's argument is that war is not won with roses and chocolate. I understand this more than anyone else.

So what this reeks of is the idea that foreign money can arm one ethnic group or caste or faction to rule over and brutalize another into submission.

The problem for pro Pashtun ascendancy folks is that they have to reconcile this with the fact that the ones being brutalized, as the paper implies, and the provinces that are on fire, as the paper lists, are Pashtun ones, particularly southern Pashtun.

So what they are essentially saying is they want to live by Tacitus's quote of how Roman rule operated when he Tacitus said of the Romans:
"They created desolation and called it peace."

Which is fine, but then this same crowd has to justify the fact that they are willing to subjugate, alienate, and murder Pashtuns (a large chunk of the south) to accomplish their view of what the world should look like.

It is very true that enough brutality and enough destruction can win a war or or at least temporarily pacify a population (e.g. Hama in the last century under Hafez Assad or Anatolia under the Young Turks) - but often enough this is only a temporary win and these problems emerge again decades later.

On a moral level, I prefer to not see these unsavory thugs and drugees murdering pashtuns to accomplish the Kiplingesque goals of failed in the West, Khans in the East emigres with potbellies and theories sitting in Kabul.

To reconcile this reality, these people have to invent the idea that every Pashtun involved in the insurgency is secretly Hamid Gul or some other garbage and nonsense despite Refsdahl's utterly clear documentary showing Safi Pashtuns amongst others with Afghan dialects and histories fighting for the insurgency. I guess the id, ego, and superego have to reconcile eachother somehow since no human being wants to admit that their hands are bloody for secondary gain.

[Insight]

you have quoted the ethnic imbalance found inside ANSF, MoD is not sitting duck and trying to address this.

(Smith et al., 2013; Jones and Crane, 2013: 7)
from the paper "The Afghan National Security Forces Beyond 2014: Will They Be Ready?"

ANSF is weak and they have still a long way to move forward, but they are capable of fighting insurgency, point to be noted however the government lacks a clear strategy.

It would be appreciated if you could provide the sources or facts for your statements.

An issue here pointed out in the OP is that people, like the Kabul regime, tend to make grand statements without giving any facts.

Im talking about the comments in this thread. http://www.pashtunforums.com/showthread.php?t=46417

[marwat]

It would be appreciated if you could provide the sources or facts for your statements.

An issue here pointed out in the OP is that people, like the Kabul regime, tend to make grand statements without giving any facts.

Im talking about the comments in this thread. http://www.pashtunforums.com/showthread.php?t=46417

source is already there, which statement are you talking about? i am not getting you