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Background of Nehru visit to NWFP and FATA, Bacha Khan, Olaf Careo, and Muslim League

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  • Background of Nehru visit to NWFP and FATA, Bacha Khan, Olaf Careo, and Muslim League

    Pakis and their Pathan cronies contend that the visit by Nehru and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan of NWFP(North-West Frontier Province) now called Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) had been violently opposed by the people of FATA. Few people know about the real background of the visit and the motives of various actors involved in the controversy. Here I will try to explain them.

    There were four main parties in this conflict.

    (1) Ghaffar Khan, Dr. Khan Saib (brother of Ghaffar Khan) and Nehru---and the parties that these personalities represented namely Khudayi Khidmatgars(KKs) and Congress. Ghaffar Khan and Dr. Khan Saib were reform minded Pashtun leaders that wanted the well being and betterment of the lot of Pashtuns. They were of the view that the Maliki system and FCR(Frontier Crimes Regulation) that British had imposed on the people of FATA were inhuman and were causing retrogression, backwardness, and promotion of corruption in Pashtun tribal society. They wanted reform in FATA preferably its integration into the settled areas of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa.

    Nehru was a democratic leader with socialist leaning and a great supporter and promoter of the cause of the common masses and the peasantry which was living in miserable conditions under the yolk of a feudal order in which many were Muslims overwhelmingly associated with Muslim League.

    It should be mentioned that FATA since the British time is living under a draconian system initially devised by the British Raj. The sole beneficiary of this system till this day have been the federal govt, the tribal maliks, and political agents, not to mention the governor of the NWFP as representative of the federal government, the British Raj and later foreign powers.

    The victims of this system are the people of FATA who are at the mercy of political agents and tribal Maliks.

    (2) British colonialists and Olaf Careo had their own imperial designs and were looking for the post world war II colonial order of the world. In particular they were concerned as how they are going to secure their interests after the probable exit from the Subcontinent after the WW II. Additionally, they wanted to protect their control over the ME and influence in South Asia and Central Asia and the wider region. British and other Western powers had identified USSR as their rival and competitor that they wanted to contain by having a pro-West order in South Asia after their exit from the region.

    (3) Tribal Maliks, political agents, and federal and provincial authorities were mere tools of colonialism concerned mainly with their privileges, which they try to do to this day.

    (4) Muslim League sarcastically called Motor League because of the domination of the British allied feudal lords and landed gentry in it as well as the traditional religious leaders mostly allied with the Barelvi order were British cronies and were concerned with safeguarding their narrow feudal interests and political power vis-a-vis the common masses and the popular political parties through the exploitation of religious sentiments and alignment with British interests.

    These were the factors and interests that lead to the conflict. The views of Ghaffar Khan, Nehru, and Congress and Khudai Khidmathgar are contained in the following letter by Nehru to Olaf Careo outlining what are the views of KK and Congress about reforms in FATA. As can be seen every word in the letter suggest good intentions on the part of Nehru and Ghaffar Khan. British on the other hand wanted to retain the old structure for their imperial designs.


    520 page 814 (excerpts)
    Pandit Nehru to Sir O.Caroe(North-West Frontier Province)
    Enclosure to No. 520


    NEW DELHI, 24 October 1946

    Note on my tour in the Tribal Areas of the North-West Frontier (October 16th to 21st, 1946) *see note below
    ..

    6. In considering the future, two basic factors have to be borne in mind.
    (1) It is probable that land routes between India and Afghanistan will develop in importance. India, which for a long stretch of years has been more or less isolated on its land frontier, is now bound to develop closer relations with its neighbours both on the North-West and North-East. A far greater volume of trade and passenger traffic will flow in both directions. A growing air traffic across the frontier will also make a difference. It is possible also, though this will take some time, that railway lines might be constructed so as to ultimately to connect the Chinese railway system through India with the Western Asian railway system and Europe. All these factors will tend to upset the traditional economy of the Frontier Areas. They are likely to have far-reaching consequences in the social structure of the Tribes.

    (2) It seems to me, though I speak with partial knowledge, that a class conflict is slowly developing and interests of most of the Maliks or Tribal leaders and the greater part of the population. In a sense this will be a conflict between the haves and the havenots. Any policy that is framed by us will, to some extent, have to take this into consideration.

    Do we support the existing social structure, in other words do we support the semi-feudal heads as against the mass of the population, or do we help the poorer people to progress even though this might be opposed by the Maliks and their like? As far as I know, official policy thus far has been to deal with and support the Maliks and we have ignored the others. Probably this was the only feasible policy in the past. It was much simpler to deal with them; but it may not be so simple in the future and we may have to choose. I have no doubt that we should not try to preserve in any way the same feudal structure or to help the Maliks to retain their special positon where this comes in the way of the development of the people generally. Probably our system of paying allowances to the Tribes is chiefly beneficial to these Maliks.


    7. This system of paying allowances has been rightly described as a kind of hush-money or blackmail. It may have been a lesser evil, but obviously it is something that is not desirable. It is often said that if a part of this money had been used for developing the area, a major change might have taken place by now. Apart from this, payment of money in this way is demoralising to the giver and the taker alike. Inevitably, it leads to corruption and to a lowering of the tone of the public service. Perhaps it is difficult to stop this payment suddenly, but I have no doubt that it will have to be stopped some time or other and the money utilised for better purposes which benefit the mass of the population.

    8. It is said that any educational or like approach is resented by the Tribal people as they consider this an attempt to penetrate and infiltrate. This is understandable. Probably if the approach was made in a different way and after some kind of psychological change had taken place, it could not be so resented. An immediate approach which is likely to be appreciated and to do immense good is through the films. Naturally these films will be of an educational character. They could even be used for literacy campaigns as well as to broaden the horizon of the Pathan in regard to India and the world.

    9. It seems essential to me that the barriers which had been erected around the Tribal Areas preventing free movements should be largely done away with. People from the Frontier Province should be allowed to go there and people from the Tribal Areas should be allowed to come to the Frontier Province. There are some risks in this, but those risks have to be taken. With this freedom of movement a wider appreciation of each other will necessarily follow. I understand that some steps forward in this direction have already been taken. I am glad of this.

    10. Most of the officers of the Political Service have been drawn from a special cadre and they have specialized in this particular work. Apparently they are interchangeable with officers serving in the Indian States, though there is an essential dis-similarity between the two kinds of work. They have undoubtedly specialized in the Frontier areas and know a great deal about the Tribal people and their problems. Nevertheless, it seems to me that living cut off from the wider currents in India, they have become limited in outlook. As with all permanent services, they are convinced that their old way of dealing with things is the right way and any radical change will be harmful. While this applies to most permanent services, it applies in particular to those serving in the Frontier who deal with a particular set of problems and often lack awareness of the big changes that are taking place all over the world and in India in particular. This limited outlook must come in the way of dealing with the problems in conformity with modern standards.

    11. This note does not pretend to deal with any basic problem. It is just an attempt to note down some impressions. I have many other impressions and many other ideas, but I should like to consider them more fully and to discuss them with others before I say much about them...
    ...

    13. I found soon enough after my arrival in the Frontier that I was surrounded by a kind of hostile atmosphere. There was courtesy enough for which I am grateful, but at every step I was reminded that I had come against the wishes of the official heirarchy and that I would be responsible myself for the consequences.

    14. The incidents that occurred later on during the tour confirmed this impression. I knew even before my visit to the Frontier that considerable agitation had been carried out by the Muslim League in opposition to my visit. That did not matter much though the kind of statements that were being made by certain Mullahs and others were highly provocative and false. I had hoped that the announcement of the inclusion of members of the Muslim League in the Interim Government might make a difference. So far as I was concerned, I had no desire to speak on political party issues. On arrival at Peshawar I learnt of the violence indulged in by Muslim Leaguers under the direct leadership of one of their prominent men. This was an extraordinary incident occurring as it did in an area where no such thing had happened previously, and normally the entry of people is regulated. It seems to indicate either gross mis-management or a passive acquiescence, if nothing more, in what took place. There had been so much talk about demonstrations etc and so many warnings by officials that at any rate they should have been fully prepared. I cannot imagine that they could not have stopped this exhibition of crude violence near the aerodrome if they had so wished it.

    ..
    16. The fact that at Jhandola, where my programme had been fixed up rather suddenly, I had a warm welcome, stood out rather prominently. It contrasted with the places where my visit had been pre-arranged.
    ..

    18.The most remarkable incident, however, occured just as we were leaving Malakand. We had been told previously that a group of persons were waiting outside the gate to create trouble. This informaton had been passed on to the Political Agent who was with us. When we started, the Political Agent's car preceded us. Immediately after emerging from the gate of the Agency, we saw two buses full of persons standing across the road and partly blocking it and about two or three dozen persons standing by the road-side. Immediately our car was stoned. The Political Agent obviously saw what was happening but he took no step. His car slowly proceeded. The men in the buses came down and surrounded our car, smashed all the glass and made a dangerous and murderous attack upon us. Meanwhile the Political Agent calmly proceeded ahead leaving us completely isolated in the hands of this relatively small and hostile crowd.

    Ultimately we got through when Dr. Khan Sahib took a revolver from the orderly in the car and brandished it about without firing it. The sight of this one revolver was quite sufficient to frighten the crowd who made way for us for pass. Indeed some of them were so frightened that they fell down as they were going back. This showed how easy it was to deal with this crowd. It was pure chance that we were not seriously injured (although Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan was badly hurt) or even murdered.
    Last edited by Toramana; 04-20-2015, 12:07 AM.

  • #2
    Who was Olaf Careo and what was his role in the future imperial-colonial agenda and planning of world powers in anti-USSR pole.

    (1) Below is a short wikipedia article about his life and career.


    Sir Olaf Kirkpatrick Kruuse Caroe KCSI KCIE (15 November 1892 – 23 November 1981) was an administrator in British India. He later became a writer on the Middle East and Asia.

    He(Olaf Careo) was Governor of the North-West Frontier Province, from 1946 to just before the Partition of India in 1947. Subject to accusations that he was too close to the Muslim League,[1] he encountered opposition from Congress Party politicians,[2] and was replaced in mid-1947 by Rob Lockhart as Governor.

    Son of the architect William Douglas Caroe, and Grace Desborough Rendall, he was educated at Winchester College and Magdalen College, Oxford,[3] where he read classics. He served in the army in the Punjab in World War I, and joined the Indian Civil Service in 1919.[4]

    He subsequently held a number of positions in the Indian Political Service, where he was influential in foreign policy, and an active administrator in North-West Frontier Province.

    After returning from India in 1947, he wrote extensively. His strategic ideas proved influential:

    “At about this time there were those in Washington, looking for ways to secure the oil resources and practice containment in the middle east. The formulations of Sir Olaf Caroe attracted attention and soon found favour in official circles. His article in the March 1949 number of Round Table and his 1951 book, Wells of Power, led to invitations from the state and defence departments to visit Washington.[5]

    (2) The Viceroy Study Group
    He addresses these issues mainly through the geopolitical work of the Indian administrator and Orientalist Sir Olaf Kirkpatrick Caroe (1892–1981), the Indian government's wartime Foreign Secretary. By 1942, Caroe had become convinced that policy-makers in Britain failed to understand what he regarded as an enduring geopolitical reality—the strategic significance of the Middle East and of India—and underestimated the potential post-war threats to Western interests in Asia posed by the Soviet Union and China. In response, Caroe established a ‘Viceroy's Study Group’—a strategic ‘brains trust’ of British India—to consider post-war India's likely security problems.
    Last edited by Toramana; 04-19-2015, 11:52 PM.

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