Tweet
Afghanistan: India losing to Pakistan? By Jan Assakzai
The Frontier Post
In the aftermath of the Kabul Conference, there has been a flurry of activities by high American officials to assure India that the US realignment with Pakistan on Afghanistan is not at the cost of New Dehli and that it is not a “zero sum game”, to quote Richard Holbrooke, the top US diplomat for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
India is though not located in geographically proximity to Afghanistan as Pakistan is, New Delhi is an important regional power who has some levers to pull in Afghanistan. Indian thinking on Afghanistan is shaped by two underlying dynamics: the first is to deny Islamabad an extension of its border into Afghanistan realised in “strategic depth”. The second signifies its long-term quest to have access to Central Asia’s energy resources in order to meet its ever increasing energy needs due to rapid economic growth of the country.
In order to gain influence in Afghanistan, India was backing the non-Pakhtun ethnic/political groups who served as proxy not only for India but also for Russia and Iran.
In post US invasion of Afghanistan, India pumped billions into development aid into the country to get a leverage. As far as Pakhtun ethnic group (the largest single ethnic group and, for many, the majority ethnic group as well) is concerned, India had limited choice.
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the US diplomats, experts intelligence and strategic community who closely worked with Pakistan’s intelligence agencies particularly the ISI, bought into Rawalpindi’s line that Pakhtun/Afghan nationalists needed to be sidelined and the focus needed to be on the Pakhtun extremists (including some non Pakhtuns right wing individuals).
As a result of out of nearly 1.5 million Pakhtun nationalists, who were not welcome in Pakistan, nearly 7 million ended up in India and the rest moved to Gulf States, Europe and North America. But they did not have any political role in the changed geo-political context.
Since there was no centre left Pakhtun leadership in Afghanistan, India was ended up backing every group that was against Pakistan’s proxy: the Mujahideen, and later on the Taliban. However, with the advent of the US forces in Afghanistan and removal of Taliban for the first time Pakhtun-centre-left leadership appeared, this time with the support of the west particularly the US to the consternation of Pakistan. India also supported Hamid Karzai.
Interestingly, Islamabad has always suspected Pakhtun nationalists on either side of the Durand Line as Indian agents, and prevented tooth and nail their coming to power not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan. However, Islamabad lost control of the TTP to al-Qaeda in Pakistan and also its Taliban proxy prior to Sept 11 came under the spell of Al Qaeda than their mentor: the agencies. As a result Islamabad slightly altered its strategy and allowed Pakhtun nationalists to come to power after the rise of the Pakistani Taliban.
A marginal shift also came in Afghanistan: Pakistan for the first time backed centre left Pakhtun leadership of Karzai while trying to enlist the proxy elements of the Taliban in the post US Afghanistan but not for total dominance of the government.
But initially with Karzai at the helm of affairs, India got realigned with the US and started to pour in development aid. New Delhi has heavily relied on development/economic component of leverage-creating-tool and buying influence in Afghanistan. Wheres Pakistan has always employed the coercive component of leverage-buying arsenal: militarily supporting proxy in Afghanistan which has proved to be more effective than development aid.
Traditionally, India has good relations with Pakhtun communities both in Pakistan and Afghanistan as compared to Pakistan which has only supported religio-political parties or the Pakhtun extreme right on both sides of the border, to facilitate its strategic dominance in Afghanistan through proxies.
However, as the draw down got closer, Islamabad convinced the US that without Pakistan’s support, Washington cannot gracefully exit Afghanistan and that practically it can help the US on both sides of the border: eliminating extremists/militants on eastern side of the Durand Line and providing intelligence on the Afghan Taliban on the western side of the Durand line. So the US realigned with Pakistan.
India did not want to be left out of this realignment. It did not want to see its huge investment in Afghanistan evaporated in thin air. Fearing it may lose to Pakistan in post US Afghanistan, India overcame the post Bombay blasts stalemate and started negotiations with Islamabad so as to directly deal with Pakistan on Afghanistan.
However, India seeing Pakistan aggressively manoeuvring to restore its dominance in post US Afghanistan as mush as possible, increased the pressure on Islamabad as well: recently it accused the ISI of direct links with the Bombay attacks.
With the US dependent on Pakistan, India fears that the Taliban would come to the centre stage once again and the US will acknowledge Pakistan’s dominance in Afghanistan hence help Islamabad, by default, to achieve its much elusive “strategic depth”. This is why both US Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke and the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen went to New Delhi recently to assure India that its understanding with Pakistan over Afghanistan is not at the cost of Indian interest.
But the US is in extremely difficult position: It wants a balance between India and Pakistan and also closely works with Pakistan which means the balance is broken at least for the short term, till the US concludes its draw down from Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, India’s hands are tied on Afghanistan for the time being. There is one hope if, according to India, there is a realignment with Russia and Iran, it may force the US to acknowledge their interest. To gauge the mood of Russia, high profile Indian official is scheduled to visit Moscow to talk to Russia over Afghanistan.
Moscow and New Delhi’s self interest in Afghanistan demands that the Taliban leadership should not be co-opted in the post-US dispensation. Whereas Moscow feels threatened from the extremist infrastructure in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, is concerned about possible spill over to its “near and abroad” region in Central Asia and drug issue.
Though the US recently struck several deals with Russia which include Moscow’s support over Afghanistan for backing Russia’s modernisation programme, yet it is likely to be a nightmare scenario for the US if Russia, India and Iran forged any understanding on Afghanistan, as the US already has plenty of problems of its own in Afghanistan.
That said, India, Russia and Iran are likely to be up against a formidable alliance of realigned US, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey over Afghanistan, though. But India is particularly no match to Pakistan when it comes to Afghanistan. Indian interests in Afghanistan are exposed to Pakistani proxy elements like sitting ducks. The proximity of Pakistan to Afghanistan, is another Pakistani asset that New Delhi is up against.
For Pakistan, Afghanistan is within its sphere of influence and has granted itself right to counter Indian moves whatever it takes. New Delhi has no much options in Afghanistan except strategically shifting its Afghan policy: employing the military component of diplomacy; in other words, buying influence through armed proxy. But the down side of this option is: it will simply force Pakistan’s Afghan policy makers jump through the roof and turn Afghanistan into a virtual battle field. This being a costly option, India will continue to find its hand tied between bad and worse options on Afghanistan.
In conclusion, the dynamic of Pakistan and Indian rivalry is likely to keep things sweltering in Afghanistan and likely sever as riason d’tere for Islamabad to hold onto its best asset: militant infrastructure in Pakistan-Afghanistan border for long time to come. For its part, India frustratingly is likely to put up with its influence waning in Afghanistan not by weeks but by days.
janassakzai200@gmail.com
The Frontier Post
In the aftermath of the Kabul Conference, there has been a flurry of activities by high American officials to assure India that the US realignment with Pakistan on Afghanistan is not at the cost of New Dehli and that it is not a “zero sum game”, to quote Richard Holbrooke, the top US diplomat for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
India is though not located in geographically proximity to Afghanistan as Pakistan is, New Delhi is an important regional power who has some levers to pull in Afghanistan. Indian thinking on Afghanistan is shaped by two underlying dynamics: the first is to deny Islamabad an extension of its border into Afghanistan realised in “strategic depth”. The second signifies its long-term quest to have access to Central Asia’s energy resources in order to meet its ever increasing energy needs due to rapid economic growth of the country.
In order to gain influence in Afghanistan, India was backing the non-Pakhtun ethnic/political groups who served as proxy not only for India but also for Russia and Iran.
In post US invasion of Afghanistan, India pumped billions into development aid into the country to get a leverage. As far as Pakhtun ethnic group (the largest single ethnic group and, for many, the majority ethnic group as well) is concerned, India had limited choice.
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the US diplomats, experts intelligence and strategic community who closely worked with Pakistan’s intelligence agencies particularly the ISI, bought into Rawalpindi’s line that Pakhtun/Afghan nationalists needed to be sidelined and the focus needed to be on the Pakhtun extremists (including some non Pakhtuns right wing individuals).
As a result of out of nearly 1.5 million Pakhtun nationalists, who were not welcome in Pakistan, nearly 7 million ended up in India and the rest moved to Gulf States, Europe and North America. But they did not have any political role in the changed geo-political context.
Since there was no centre left Pakhtun leadership in Afghanistan, India was ended up backing every group that was against Pakistan’s proxy: the Mujahideen, and later on the Taliban. However, with the advent of the US forces in Afghanistan and removal of Taliban for the first time Pakhtun-centre-left leadership appeared, this time with the support of the west particularly the US to the consternation of Pakistan. India also supported Hamid Karzai.
Interestingly, Islamabad has always suspected Pakhtun nationalists on either side of the Durand Line as Indian agents, and prevented tooth and nail their coming to power not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan. However, Islamabad lost control of the TTP to al-Qaeda in Pakistan and also its Taliban proxy prior to Sept 11 came under the spell of Al Qaeda than their mentor: the agencies. As a result Islamabad slightly altered its strategy and allowed Pakhtun nationalists to come to power after the rise of the Pakistani Taliban.
A marginal shift also came in Afghanistan: Pakistan for the first time backed centre left Pakhtun leadership of Karzai while trying to enlist the proxy elements of the Taliban in the post US Afghanistan but not for total dominance of the government.
But initially with Karzai at the helm of affairs, India got realigned with the US and started to pour in development aid. New Delhi has heavily relied on development/economic component of leverage-creating-tool and buying influence in Afghanistan. Wheres Pakistan has always employed the coercive component of leverage-buying arsenal: militarily supporting proxy in Afghanistan which has proved to be more effective than development aid.
Traditionally, India has good relations with Pakhtun communities both in Pakistan and Afghanistan as compared to Pakistan which has only supported religio-political parties or the Pakhtun extreme right on both sides of the border, to facilitate its strategic dominance in Afghanistan through proxies.
However, as the draw down got closer, Islamabad convinced the US that without Pakistan’s support, Washington cannot gracefully exit Afghanistan and that practically it can help the US on both sides of the border: eliminating extremists/militants on eastern side of the Durand Line and providing intelligence on the Afghan Taliban on the western side of the Durand line. So the US realigned with Pakistan.
India did not want to be left out of this realignment. It did not want to see its huge investment in Afghanistan evaporated in thin air. Fearing it may lose to Pakistan in post US Afghanistan, India overcame the post Bombay blasts stalemate and started negotiations with Islamabad so as to directly deal with Pakistan on Afghanistan.
However, India seeing Pakistan aggressively manoeuvring to restore its dominance in post US Afghanistan as mush as possible, increased the pressure on Islamabad as well: recently it accused the ISI of direct links with the Bombay attacks.
With the US dependent on Pakistan, India fears that the Taliban would come to the centre stage once again and the US will acknowledge Pakistan’s dominance in Afghanistan hence help Islamabad, by default, to achieve its much elusive “strategic depth”. This is why both US Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke and the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen went to New Delhi recently to assure India that its understanding with Pakistan over Afghanistan is not at the cost of Indian interest.
But the US is in extremely difficult position: It wants a balance between India and Pakistan and also closely works with Pakistan which means the balance is broken at least for the short term, till the US concludes its draw down from Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, India’s hands are tied on Afghanistan for the time being. There is one hope if, according to India, there is a realignment with Russia and Iran, it may force the US to acknowledge their interest. To gauge the mood of Russia, high profile Indian official is scheduled to visit Moscow to talk to Russia over Afghanistan.
Moscow and New Delhi’s self interest in Afghanistan demands that the Taliban leadership should not be co-opted in the post-US dispensation. Whereas Moscow feels threatened from the extremist infrastructure in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, is concerned about possible spill over to its “near and abroad” region in Central Asia and drug issue.
Though the US recently struck several deals with Russia which include Moscow’s support over Afghanistan for backing Russia’s modernisation programme, yet it is likely to be a nightmare scenario for the US if Russia, India and Iran forged any understanding on Afghanistan, as the US already has plenty of problems of its own in Afghanistan.
That said, India, Russia and Iran are likely to be up against a formidable alliance of realigned US, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey over Afghanistan, though. But India is particularly no match to Pakistan when it comes to Afghanistan. Indian interests in Afghanistan are exposed to Pakistani proxy elements like sitting ducks. The proximity of Pakistan to Afghanistan, is another Pakistani asset that New Delhi is up against.
For Pakistan, Afghanistan is within its sphere of influence and has granted itself right to counter Indian moves whatever it takes. New Delhi has no much options in Afghanistan except strategically shifting its Afghan policy: employing the military component of diplomacy; in other words, buying influence through armed proxy. But the down side of this option is: it will simply force Pakistan’s Afghan policy makers jump through the roof and turn Afghanistan into a virtual battle field. This being a costly option, India will continue to find its hand tied between bad and worse options on Afghanistan.
In conclusion, the dynamic of Pakistan and Indian rivalry is likely to keep things sweltering in Afghanistan and likely sever as riason d’tere for Islamabad to hold onto its best asset: militant infrastructure in Pakistan-Afghanistan border for long time to come. For its part, India frustratingly is likely to put up with its influence waning in Afghanistan not by weeks but by days.
janassakzai200@gmail.com
Comment