Afghans to Alter the Government

[Toramana]

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/14/world/asia/afghans-to-alter-the-government-constitution-following-election.html?smid=fb-share

KABUL, Afghanistan — The deal that Secretary of State John Kerry brokered to ease the Afghan election crisis with a sweeping audit of the vote was quietly built on an even more profound reshaping of the entire government system, American and Afghan officials confirmed Sunday: The sides have agreed to gradually create an empowered prime minister post after years of an all-encompassing presidency.

Nearly a decade after American officials pushed a Constitution that enshrined near-dictatorial powers for the president, it is a tacit admission that changing to a more parliamentary system — a fraught undertaking at any time — is now seen as crucial to holding the country together after years of mounting political crises and ethnic and f.

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[tor_khan]

Can't the developing world do anything for themselves without being reliant on 'US brokered' deals? ... complete lack of any independence ...

A joint government might satisfy some power hungry egos in the short term but doesn't guarantee the end the political rivalries. At the press conference with Kerry although Ghani seemed upbeat, the handshakes and the facial expressions on Abdullah looked stained. ... makes you wonder if he would enjoy a lesser position should he be beaten in another recount ... or if this is just about waiting and biding time ...

[Al-Afghani]

Can't the developing world do anything for themselves without being reliant on 'US brokered' deals? ... complete lack of any independence ...

Yes, they can. But it will result in thousands of civilian deaths, because civil war is always looming on the horizon.

[Herat]

Yes, they can. But it will result in thousands of civilian deaths, because civil war is always looming on the horizon.

There seems to be but a single sine qua non for independence: national cohesion, something that Afghanistan has never had (except in wars against foreigners), does not have, nor ever will have; not even a semblance. Maintaining a centralized government is pretty much a guaranteed recipe for civil war post US withdrawal but I suspect that decentralization is destined a la Iraq. In short, there is no hope for Afghanistan. I hope the TajikUzbekHazara warlords are observing the Kurds in Iraq well for that is the strategy they need to adopt this time: defending only the non-Pashtun territories, even in the face of the prospect of losing Kabul, and eventually declaring independence as the Kurds will do. That was the ultimate mistake of the last civil war: everyone was competing for the albatross of a central government in Kabul; had they simply defended their own ethnic territories, more than a decade, possibly much more depending on how much longer this failed state lives, of suffering could have been avoided, including, I surmise, the NATO war against the tribal Pashtuns.

[Friends of Baloch]

That was the ultimate mistake of the last civil war: everyone was competing for the albatross of a central government in Kabul; had they simply defended their own ethnic territories, more than a decade, possibly much more depending on how much longer this failed state lives, of suffering could have been avoided, including, I surmise, the NATO war against the tribal Pashtuns.

Mistake? They were fighting to control Kabul and all Afghanistan because they were the generation of Afghans that grew up in the 1960s to mid 1970s, the time when Afghanistan was on the right track of a modernising and progressive country. They knew what Afghanistan was before the coup and Soviet invasion rolled the country back several decades so for them all of it was worth fighting for.

Plus, Massoud, Rabbani, Ismail Khan, Atta Nur, Muhsini etc, the whole lot of the Tajik leaders and commanders were all committed Islamists, not Tajik separatists. Their ideology at that time was different from what some revisionists now like to write about them on the internet.

[Herat]

Mistake? They were fighting to control Kabul and all Afghanistan because they were the generation of Afghans that grew up in the 1960s to mid 1970s, the time when Afghanistan was on the right track of a modernising and progressive country. They knew what Afghanistan was before the coup and Soviet invasion rolled the country back several decades so for them all of it was worth fighting for.

Plus, Massoud, Rabbani, Ismail Khan, Atta Nur, Muhsini etc, the whole lot of the Tajik leaders and commanders were all committed Islamists, not Tajik separatists. Their ideology at that time was different from what some revisionists now like to write about them on the internet.

Yes mistake, it was absurd for those morons to think the Pashtun population would accept them, even more absurd than the idea of the non-Pashtuns obediently accepting Taliban rule again. Happily, that absurd zeitgeist seems to have come to an end tough my friend: the non-Pashtun warlords have been pushing and lobbying for decentralization for a reason you know, I think they have finally seen the writing on the wall, that is, Afghanistan cannot work. At least I hope so.

[Friends of Baloch]

Yes mistake, it was absurd for those morons to think the Pashtun population would accept them, even more absurd than the idea of the non-Pashtuns obediently accepting Taliban rule again. Happily, that absurd zeitgeist seems to have come to an end tough my friend: the non-Pashtun warlords have been pushing and lobbying for decentralization for a reason you know, I think they have finally seen the writing on the wall, that is, Afghanistan cannot work. At least I hope so.

Tajik population of Afghanistan doesnt share a geographically contiguous territory where they are in majorities. Tajiks and Uzbeks left alone together will not be able to coexist in a break away state because of the hostility of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan towards each other, the state repression against Tajiks in Uzbekistan, and the fear the ruling cliques in both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have towards what they see as religous extremism of Tajiks and Uzbeks of Afghanistan. All these combined will serve to inflame divisions among Uzbeks and Tajiks of Afghanistan if they were to break away into their own state, divisions which they do not currently feel influenced by because of Afghanistan's bigger ethnic plurality and its own internal issues.

Look at Tajikistan, it is one of the poorest countries in the World and Uzbekistan is ready to invade it at any time if these two countries do not resolve their conflict over water resources in future. Uzbekistan is hostile to Tajiks and doesnt recognize their true size or existence in their country, even though Tajiks are majority in Bukhara and Samarqand.

Neither Tajikistan or Uzbekistan want anything to do with Tajiks or Uzbeks in Afghanistan, whom they see as religious fanatics and radicals that will spread extremism to Central Asia and upset the secularism of the post-Soviet ruling cliques that control these countries. They will intervene only to use Afghan Tajiks and Uzbeks against each other so that they keep away from their own borders.

Even Iranian leaders will not want to absorb anything beyond Herat city. But oridinary Iranians have become distant from their own revolution and Iran is full of westernised and secularist communities for which Herati society would seem backwards and conservative by standards seen in Tehran. Ordinary Iranians dont care about Herat and would not feel at home there. They are happy that a border separates their new Pahlavi made modern Iran from Herat.

So what will your proposed state be and look like? I am intrigued.

[Herat]

Tajik population of Afghanistan doesnt share a geographically contiguous territory where they are in majorities. Tajiks and Uzbeks left alone together will not be able to coexist in a break away state because of the hostility of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan towards each other, the state repression against Tajiks in Uzbekistan, and the fear the ruling cliques in both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have towards what they see as religous extremism of Tajiks and Uzbeks of Afghanistan. All these combined will serve to inflame divisions among Uzbeks and Tajiks of Afghanistan if they were to break away into their own state, divisions which they do not currently feel influenced by because of Afghanistan's bigger ethnic plurality and its own internal issues.

Look at Tajikistan, it is one of the poorest countries in the World and Uzbekistan is ready to invade it at any time if these two countries do not resolve their conflict over water resources in future. Uzbekistan is hostile to Tajiks and doesnt recognize their true size or existence in their country, even though Tajiks are majority in Bukhara and Samarqand.

Neither Tajikistan or Uzbekistan want anything to do with Tajiks or Uzbeks in Afghanistan, whom they see as religious fanatics and radicals that will spread extremism to Central Asia and upset the secularism of the post-Soviet ruling cliques that control these countries. They will intervene only to use Afghan Tajiks and Uzbeks against each other so that they keep away from their own borders.

Even Iranian leaders will not want to absorb anything beyond Herat city. But oridinary Iranians have become distant from their own revolution and Iran is full of westernised and secularist communities for which Herati society would seem backwards and conservative by standards seen in Tehran. Ordinary Iranians dont care about Herat and would not feel at home there. They are happy that a border separates their new Pahlavi made modern Iran from Herat.

So what will your proposed state be and look like? I am intrigued.

Ah, this old argument again but its a red herring my friend: whether Tajiks and Uzbeks will be able to coexist or not has no bearing whatsoever on the fact that:

1. Afghanistan is a failed state
2. It is so largely because of its ethnic heterogeneity conducive to civil strife and stifling of national cohesion

Point 2 isn't just my personal contention either, the strong correlation between ethnic heterogeneity and ethnic conflict is well established the world over and is causal from an evolutionary perspective (there also seems to be a correlation between ethnic homogeneity and some economic measures but that's another story). The classic piece of literature on the issue is "The Ethnic Phenomenon" by Pierre Van Den Berghe. Two recent experiments in living corroborating the perspective has been the balkanization of the Ukraine along ethnic lines and the upcoming fate of Iraq and Syria.
http://www.amazon.com/The-Ethnic-Phe...nic+phenomenon

Moreover, I am in favor of further balkanization of the non-Pashtun state after it has formed along ethnic lines if possible - it would be better for the Uzbeks of the North-West to secede, what they do (whether forming a mini state or joining Uzbekistan) is up to them - leaving a large melting pot of Tajiks and Hazaras, which if too fails, then let it balkanize once more, so be it! The most significant political pattern of the modern world has been the formation of ethnic states followed by mutually beneficial economic integration of neighboring states (this pattern makes excellent sense from an evolutionary perspective as the best form of social organization in human history but I do not have the patience to explain all of that), it is time our wretched region becomes a part of this pattern!

[Tamim]

Plus, Massoud, Rabbani, Ismail Khan, Atta Nur, Muhsini etc, the whole lot of the Tajik leaders and commanders were all committed Islamists, not Tajik separatists. Their ideology at that time was different from what some revisionists now like to write about them on the internet.

This is the as succinct as one can get when trying to tell non-Pashtuns why a division of Afghanistan is not plausible.

You will run into other problems that will come out of the religion vs culture dichotomy.

I think our Tajik brothers are forgetting that Dr. Abdullah is not only Muslim, but also a Pashtun, from his father's side.

[Toramana]

I partly agree with Herat.

The relevant question isn't whether the fragmentation along ethnic lines will stop and the successor states will be viable or not after the the division into Pashtun or non-Pashtun regions. The important question, rather, is, can the present political impasse with roots in ethnic aspiration be resolved peacefully and a post-monarchical, post-communist, post-Taleban, post-withdrawal (and post-Pashtun lead if you would like to say) order be put in place that is acceptable to all groups?

Issues of sovereignty, ethnic identity, and political participation are not always resolved rationally and peacefully. The fear of the continuation of ethnic conflict or non-viability of the resulting states or quasi-states will not force the different factions to avoid conflict.

Having said that, one may invest some hope in the ability of the leaders and factions to implement the plan Kerry has mediated and manage the transition from a centralized towards a decentralized arrangement to the satisfaction of all.

[Toramana]

Furthermore, one should also take into account the external factors and actors that will try to take advantage of the conflict and exacerbate it. And such external factors/actors are many.

[Tamim]

The idea of bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan is being done with the rational that the problems exist only due to ethnic lines.

There are other factors that exist within the different ethnicities.

So, the logical step for those who have to dish the money to keep Afghanistan afloat is to keep Afghanistan together.

Only war give way to new borders.

[Tamim]

Here is the question: how does Dr Abdullah plan on keep his promise that he made during his speech to his supporters the day following the release of the preliminary results?

Was this on his mind when he look out of touch at the news conference with Kerry and Ghani?

[Toramana]

Here come the anomalies of the democratic principle. Theoretically, democracy should give representation to people and reduce friction and conflict but in the absence of any constitutional consensus, democratic process may lead to division instead of unity/cohesion. The 1971 elections of Pakistan are an example when the Bangali majority won the election but the West Pakistani elite was not ready to live under Bangali rule. Result was war and division of the country.

Now look at the case of Afghanistan. According to the principle of democracy, those who get the majority vote have the right to rule. But would that be justified and lead to the desired situation? The fact is, Abdullah Abdullah has secured 44% vote, which is half of the total vote. The important point about that vote is, 80% of it comes from the specific ethnic region(s) and negating the aspiration behind the vote can lead to dangerous consequences for Afghanistan.

Herein is the rational for agreeing to what Abdullah Abdullah and the constituency he represents say and desire and also the justification for the plan Kerry has mediated. I hope both sides stick to the plan and further negotiate and improve the power-sharing formula.

It is very important that Pashtuns start looking inwardly focusing on their own areas and problems. A 180 degree re-orientation from the 20th Century thinking and understanding of the situation is required. They should understand that 19th or 20th Century order cannot be re-established and things cannot be reversed. So much has change in the world. And a lot is going to change.

[BarakzaiAbdali]

Here is the question: how does Dr Abdullah plan on keep his promise that he made during his speech to his supporters the day following the release of the preliminary results?

Was this on his mind when he look out of touch at the news conference with Kerry and Ghani?

The goal of Graham, McCain, and Rohrabacher amongst others was to guide towards what we are seeing now.

In essence, the Presidency, and possibly Ghani, will be weakened tremendously.

Abdullah may have even seen a defeat coming, and may have been legitimately beaten, but Saleh and co were intent upon pushing the system to the brink knowing each and every player is beholden, at the end of the day, to American largesse.

We had already seen in recent years that Rohrabacher and others had clashed with Karzai and in Rohrabacher's case they decided US interests were more vigorously pushed by backing Saleh et al.

http://news.antiwar.com/2014/07/14/a...en-presidency/