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The grievance of Pakhtuns
S Iftikhar Murshed
Sunday, May 04, 2014
From Print Edition
19 17 2 0
The grievance of Pakhtuns
Sophocles, one of the three ancient Greek tragedians whose plays have survived the ravages of time, was convinced that “Of all the ills afflicting men the worst is the lack of judgement.”
The tragedy of contemporary Pakistan is that its leaders have seldom taken decisions based on a sound appraisal of facts. Nowhere is this more apparent than the misplaced notion that the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan is exclusively supported by and represents the Pakhtun tribes of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. This is just not true.
Tribal and non-tribal Pakhtuns alike resent being associated with the Taliban. They look upon the TTP as an agglomeration of murderous groups of thugs which include not only Pakhtuns but also Punjabis, Arabs, Uzbeks, Tajiks and an assortment of other extremists. Ordinary Pakhtuns reject the Wahabi/jihadist worldview of the Taliban which they say is completely at variance with their code of honour or Pakhtunwali.
Despite this, the formulation in the consensus resolution adopted by the All Parties Conference convened by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on September 9, 2013 read: “In the APC in September 2011, it was declared that ‘Give peace a chance’ would be the guiding principle henceforth and that dialogue must be initiated to negotiate peace with our own people in the Tribal Areas.” This was callous and insensitive because it is the tribal Pakhtuns who have been the primary victims of unimaginable atrocities perpetrated by the TTP and Al-Qaeda.
Forgotten were the sacrifices rendered by the tribesmen who laid down their lives when they took up arms against the TTP such as the Salarzai of Bajaur, the Ali Khel of Orakzai, the Tori and Bangash of Kurram, the Tapa Mohmand of Badaber, and the tribal leaders of Darra Adam Khel. All this did not make any difference to the leaders of the political parties who participated in the conference. The resolution reposed “full confidence” in the prime minister and authorised him to initiate talks “with all stakeholders forthwith.”
The talks eventually commenced on February 6 and in the joint statement issued on the conclusion of the inaugural session the government’s team of negotiators insisted that the deliberations would be “limited to the insurgency affected areas.” The connotations were sinister and implied that Islamabad was willing to cede control of some of the tribal agencies to the militants. This, after all, was what had happened in Swat in 2009 and, furthermore, the APC resolution had not only exonerated the TTP for the slaughter of an estimated 50,000 people but had also elevated the outlawed group to the status of a ‘stakeholder’ that was entitled to have a say in the future of the country.
Some of the most ruthless fighters among the Taliban on both sides of the Durand Line have been non-Pakhtuns. On August 8, 1998 Mazar-e-Sharif was recaptured by the Taliban. To reach the centre of the city, the Taliban sent in suicide squads. Jeep-loads of their fighters, each following the other after short intervals, were sent into Mazar-e-Sharif. The first four or five vehicles were destroyed by Northern Alliance rocket fire but each succeeded in advancing some distance toward the city centre. When this was finally reached, the Taliban ground forces entered the town and what followed was fierce fighting unparalleled in its savagery even by Afghan standards.
I was in Kandahar at the time for a meeting with Mullah Omar when the one-legged governor of the city, Mullah Hassan Rehmani, made the startling disclosure that “it was our Punjabi brothers from Pakistan, not the Afghan Pakhtuns, who fought the most fiercely in Mazar-e-Sharif. We tried to restrain them because excesses violate our code, Pakhtunwali.” He explained that ethnicity was never important for the Taliban. They were entirely a volunteer movement and anyone who shared their ideology was welcome to join regardless of his ethnic affiliations.
Nine years later, in December 2007, the TTP was established by Baitullah Mehsud. Like its Afghan counterpart it is also a multiethnic coalition of extremist outfits. Yet in one broad sweep the APC consensus resolution has stigmatised the Fata Pakhtuns by portraying the TTP as “our own people in the tribal areas.” But respected analysts such as Khalid Aziz believe that “the Pakhtun is prone to religious extremism and readily accepts membership into millenarian movements to resist reform of a centralising state...This is because he fears that his social conduct, ‘Pakhtunwali,’ will be endangered and he will lose his identity.”
It is said that the lives of the Pakhtuns, from the cradle to the grave, are tailored in accordance with the dictates of Pakhtunwali. But this norm of social conduct has never been codified. It has always been oral and has been transmitted verbally from generation to generation. The only written references to this code of honour are to be found in Pashto folk poetry known as tappa. Here again one runs into difficulties because a huge number of the important tappa have also been oral.
This is corroborated by scholars such as Farhat Taj who are convinced that “it was the non-Pushtuns, who reduced the code into writing in accordance with their own fanciful understanding of Pakhtunwali. These were the mighty of the age who confronted Pakhtun resistance to their power...They had a vested interest to write and interpret the Pakhtun code in line with their own objectives.”
Pakhtuns concede that there is nothing in their code that is permanent except the institution of the jirga which is always convened for taking decisions on matters of public importance. Such gatherings are inclusive and are invariably held in an easily accessible place to ensure maximum participation. In this sense, Pakhtun norms are democratic and relatively flexible. Yet there has hardly been any change or progress in the socio-cultural milieu as though the region is ensnared in a mysterious time wrap.
The reason is that the Taliban have killed hundreds of tribal leaders and imposed their absurd interpretation of Islam in the area. They have all but demolished Pakhtun culture. For instance whether or not women should be veiled, attend school or university, seek employment have always been issues that are decided exclusively by the Pakhtun family. But all this has been replaced by a Wahabi way of life.
Despite the continuing terrorist attacks by the TTP, the political leadership of the country has still not abandoned the futile talks with the outlawed group. The reason is not hard to find. The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf chief, Imran Khan, said it all when, during a pre-election rally, in Rahimyar Khan in April 2013 he appealed to the Taliban to put their violent agenda on ice till he came into power. He pledged that within 13 days he would ensure that their demands were met and there would be no further need for them to perpetrate terrorist acts.
In his final days Mirza Ali Khan (1897-1960), better known as the Fakir of Ipi, was asked whether the relentless guerrilla war he had waged against the British through the 1930s till their departure in 1947 was for religion or for freedom. He gazed pensively into the distance for a short while and then answered that his entire struggle was for the liberation of the tribal Pakhtuns. This is what the government must keep in mind as it presses ahead with the peace negotiations with the TTP.
The writer is the publisher of Criterion Quarterly.
Email: iftimurshed@gmail.com
S Iftikhar Murshed
Sunday, May 04, 2014
From Print Edition
19 17 2 0
The grievance of Pakhtuns
Sophocles, one of the three ancient Greek tragedians whose plays have survived the ravages of time, was convinced that “Of all the ills afflicting men the worst is the lack of judgement.”
The tragedy of contemporary Pakistan is that its leaders have seldom taken decisions based on a sound appraisal of facts. Nowhere is this more apparent than the misplaced notion that the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan is exclusively supported by and represents the Pakhtun tribes of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. This is just not true.
Tribal and non-tribal Pakhtuns alike resent being associated with the Taliban. They look upon the TTP as an agglomeration of murderous groups of thugs which include not only Pakhtuns but also Punjabis, Arabs, Uzbeks, Tajiks and an assortment of other extremists. Ordinary Pakhtuns reject the Wahabi/jihadist worldview of the Taliban which they say is completely at variance with their code of honour or Pakhtunwali.
Despite this, the formulation in the consensus resolution adopted by the All Parties Conference convened by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on September 9, 2013 read: “In the APC in September 2011, it was declared that ‘Give peace a chance’ would be the guiding principle henceforth and that dialogue must be initiated to negotiate peace with our own people in the Tribal Areas.” This was callous and insensitive because it is the tribal Pakhtuns who have been the primary victims of unimaginable atrocities perpetrated by the TTP and Al-Qaeda.
Forgotten were the sacrifices rendered by the tribesmen who laid down their lives when they took up arms against the TTP such as the Salarzai of Bajaur, the Ali Khel of Orakzai, the Tori and Bangash of Kurram, the Tapa Mohmand of Badaber, and the tribal leaders of Darra Adam Khel. All this did not make any difference to the leaders of the political parties who participated in the conference. The resolution reposed “full confidence” in the prime minister and authorised him to initiate talks “with all stakeholders forthwith.”
The talks eventually commenced on February 6 and in the joint statement issued on the conclusion of the inaugural session the government’s team of negotiators insisted that the deliberations would be “limited to the insurgency affected areas.” The connotations were sinister and implied that Islamabad was willing to cede control of some of the tribal agencies to the militants. This, after all, was what had happened in Swat in 2009 and, furthermore, the APC resolution had not only exonerated the TTP for the slaughter of an estimated 50,000 people but had also elevated the outlawed group to the status of a ‘stakeholder’ that was entitled to have a say in the future of the country.
Some of the most ruthless fighters among the Taliban on both sides of the Durand Line have been non-Pakhtuns. On August 8, 1998 Mazar-e-Sharif was recaptured by the Taliban. To reach the centre of the city, the Taliban sent in suicide squads. Jeep-loads of their fighters, each following the other after short intervals, were sent into Mazar-e-Sharif. The first four or five vehicles were destroyed by Northern Alliance rocket fire but each succeeded in advancing some distance toward the city centre. When this was finally reached, the Taliban ground forces entered the town and what followed was fierce fighting unparalleled in its savagery even by Afghan standards.
I was in Kandahar at the time for a meeting with Mullah Omar when the one-legged governor of the city, Mullah Hassan Rehmani, made the startling disclosure that “it was our Punjabi brothers from Pakistan, not the Afghan Pakhtuns, who fought the most fiercely in Mazar-e-Sharif. We tried to restrain them because excesses violate our code, Pakhtunwali.” He explained that ethnicity was never important for the Taliban. They were entirely a volunteer movement and anyone who shared their ideology was welcome to join regardless of his ethnic affiliations.
Nine years later, in December 2007, the TTP was established by Baitullah Mehsud. Like its Afghan counterpart it is also a multiethnic coalition of extremist outfits. Yet in one broad sweep the APC consensus resolution has stigmatised the Fata Pakhtuns by portraying the TTP as “our own people in the tribal areas.” But respected analysts such as Khalid Aziz believe that “the Pakhtun is prone to religious extremism and readily accepts membership into millenarian movements to resist reform of a centralising state...This is because he fears that his social conduct, ‘Pakhtunwali,’ will be endangered and he will lose his identity.”
It is said that the lives of the Pakhtuns, from the cradle to the grave, are tailored in accordance with the dictates of Pakhtunwali. But this norm of social conduct has never been codified. It has always been oral and has been transmitted verbally from generation to generation. The only written references to this code of honour are to be found in Pashto folk poetry known as tappa. Here again one runs into difficulties because a huge number of the important tappa have also been oral.
This is corroborated by scholars such as Farhat Taj who are convinced that “it was the non-Pushtuns, who reduced the code into writing in accordance with their own fanciful understanding of Pakhtunwali. These were the mighty of the age who confronted Pakhtun resistance to their power...They had a vested interest to write and interpret the Pakhtun code in line with their own objectives.”
Pakhtuns concede that there is nothing in their code that is permanent except the institution of the jirga which is always convened for taking decisions on matters of public importance. Such gatherings are inclusive and are invariably held in an easily accessible place to ensure maximum participation. In this sense, Pakhtun norms are democratic and relatively flexible. Yet there has hardly been any change or progress in the socio-cultural milieu as though the region is ensnared in a mysterious time wrap.
The reason is that the Taliban have killed hundreds of tribal leaders and imposed their absurd interpretation of Islam in the area. They have all but demolished Pakhtun culture. For instance whether or not women should be veiled, attend school or university, seek employment have always been issues that are decided exclusively by the Pakhtun family. But all this has been replaced by a Wahabi way of life.
Despite the continuing terrorist attacks by the TTP, the political leadership of the country has still not abandoned the futile talks with the outlawed group. The reason is not hard to find. The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf chief, Imran Khan, said it all when, during a pre-election rally, in Rahimyar Khan in April 2013 he appealed to the Taliban to put their violent agenda on ice till he came into power. He pledged that within 13 days he would ensure that their demands were met and there would be no further need for them to perpetrate terrorist acts.
In his final days Mirza Ali Khan (1897-1960), better known as the Fakir of Ipi, was asked whether the relentless guerrilla war he had waged against the British through the 1930s till their departure in 1947 was for religion or for freedom. He gazed pensively into the distance for a short while and then answered that his entire struggle was for the liberation of the tribal Pakhtuns. This is what the government must keep in mind as it presses ahead with the peace negotiations with the TTP.
The writer is the publisher of Criterion Quarterly.
Email: iftimurshed@gmail.com
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