Partition plan proves Afghan wake-up call
By James Lamont in New Delhi
Published: July 15 2010 17:47 | Last updated: July 15 2010 17:47
“Partition” is a haunting word in India. South Asia has yet to recover from the split of British India 63 years ago and the creation of Pakistan.
Yet as the security establishment in New Delhi weighs options for when Nato finally withdraws from Afghanistan, a voice from outside has electrified debate by throwing the very word into the mix.
Robert Blackwill, the former US ambassador to New Delhi, is dear to the hawks in India’s defence establishment. His doubts about the success of the current counter-insurgency operation in Afghanistan are widely shared, as is his deep distrust of Pakistan.
So his suggestion that Afghanistan be partitioned quickly became the talk of the town in New Delhi, the Indian capital, this month.
In an article on Politico, the US website, Mr Blackwill argues that the Obama administration’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan is heading for failure. The best option is to split the country in two: the governable north, representing 60 per cent of the population, and the Pashtun, Taliban-infiltrated, south.
“There are no quick, easy and cost-free ways to escape the current deadly quagmire,” Mr Blackwill argues. “But with all its problems, de facto partition offers the best available US alternative to strategic defeat.”
Under his plan, the US military force would be reduced to as few as 40,000 troops who would be used to defend the north of Afghanistan, leaving the so-called Pashtun-belt in the south to Taliban rule. Air power would continue to be trained against al-Qaeda hideouts in the mountainous border region with Pakistan.
But south Asia still bears the scars of the division of British India into Hindu majority India and Muslim majority Pakistan in 1947. Partition caused one of the largest migrations in history, tore communities apart and has been blamed for many ills since.
Wishing the same for Afghanistan seems far-fetched. India has always insisted on Afghanistan’s territorial integrity. It deeply opposes Pakistan’s doctrine of strategic depth that gives it claim on a big chunk of its neighbour. It also prizes historic ties with Pashtun communities, and would not like to see them abandoned to extremist rule.
Yet, while Mr Blackwill’s partition proposal may be obnoxious to the Indian security establishment at first sight, it may not be entirely so. Rather than giving Pakistan strategic depth in south Afghanistan, partition may give Islamabad a worse headache than it already has. The Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban are quite different to the forces that once marshalled against Soviet occupation, and plainly less controlled by Pakistan.
With Nato gone, tribal militants may force Pakistan’s generals to shift troops from eastern to western borders.
Like their counterparts in Islamabad, India’s leaders are planning for the day when Nato forces no longer patrol Afghanistan’s southern provinces.
Before he left this summer for his new posting in Kabul, Gautam Mukhopadhaya, India’s new ambassador to Afghanistan, gave assurances in New Delhi that India’s strategy on the ground would survive with or without a US military presence.
Such a response to the outcome of the war in Afghanistan, often interpreted as nonchalance, bemuses the west as it loses soldiers trying to bring stability in south Asia. But India’s reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan are carefully designed to withstand a pull-out of western troops. Its officials argue that strong alliances with local actors guarantee New Delhi’s lasting influence, as does its $1bn (€770m, £650m) aid programme.
Behind the veil of Indian misgiving, a post-Nato plan for Afghanistan is hard to discern. Some propose Afghanistan’s neutrality, non-interference by neighbours, a shrunken United Nations force in Kabul and an international conference in the Afghan capital. But the reality is the alternatives are few.
Partition is a crude option, but one that offers short-term relief to the US from an increasingly unpopular war back home.
Mr Blackwill’s proposal is a wake-up call to Afghanistan, and regional powers, that unless realities on the ground change, south Asia may face its second big redraw of national boundaries in a hurried western exit so reminiscent of the first.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2010. You may share using our article tools. Please don't cut articles from FT.com and redistribute by email or post to the web.
By James Lamont in New Delhi
Published: July 15 2010 17:47 | Last updated: July 15 2010 17:47
“Partition” is a haunting word in India. South Asia has yet to recover from the split of British India 63 years ago and the creation of Pakistan.
Yet as the security establishment in New Delhi weighs options for when Nato finally withdraws from Afghanistan, a voice from outside has electrified debate by throwing the very word into the mix.
Robert Blackwill, the former US ambassador to New Delhi, is dear to the hawks in India’s defence establishment. His doubts about the success of the current counter-insurgency operation in Afghanistan are widely shared, as is his deep distrust of Pakistan.
So his suggestion that Afghanistan be partitioned quickly became the talk of the town in New Delhi, the Indian capital, this month.
In an article on Politico, the US website, Mr Blackwill argues that the Obama administration’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan is heading for failure. The best option is to split the country in two: the governable north, representing 60 per cent of the population, and the Pashtun, Taliban-infiltrated, south.
“There are no quick, easy and cost-free ways to escape the current deadly quagmire,” Mr Blackwill argues. “But with all its problems, de facto partition offers the best available US alternative to strategic defeat.”
Under his plan, the US military force would be reduced to as few as 40,000 troops who would be used to defend the north of Afghanistan, leaving the so-called Pashtun-belt in the south to Taliban rule. Air power would continue to be trained against al-Qaeda hideouts in the mountainous border region with Pakistan.
But south Asia still bears the scars of the division of British India into Hindu majority India and Muslim majority Pakistan in 1947. Partition caused one of the largest migrations in history, tore communities apart and has been blamed for many ills since.
Wishing the same for Afghanistan seems far-fetched. India has always insisted on Afghanistan’s territorial integrity. It deeply opposes Pakistan’s doctrine of strategic depth that gives it claim on a big chunk of its neighbour. It also prizes historic ties with Pashtun communities, and would not like to see them abandoned to extremist rule.
Yet, while Mr Blackwill’s partition proposal may be obnoxious to the Indian security establishment at first sight, it may not be entirely so. Rather than giving Pakistan strategic depth in south Afghanistan, partition may give Islamabad a worse headache than it already has. The Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban are quite different to the forces that once marshalled against Soviet occupation, and plainly less controlled by Pakistan.
With Nato gone, tribal militants may force Pakistan’s generals to shift troops from eastern to western borders.
Like their counterparts in Islamabad, India’s leaders are planning for the day when Nato forces no longer patrol Afghanistan’s southern provinces.
Before he left this summer for his new posting in Kabul, Gautam Mukhopadhaya, India’s new ambassador to Afghanistan, gave assurances in New Delhi that India’s strategy on the ground would survive with or without a US military presence.
Such a response to the outcome of the war in Afghanistan, often interpreted as nonchalance, bemuses the west as it loses soldiers trying to bring stability in south Asia. But India’s reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan are carefully designed to withstand a pull-out of western troops. Its officials argue that strong alliances with local actors guarantee New Delhi’s lasting influence, as does its $1bn (€770m, £650m) aid programme.
Behind the veil of Indian misgiving, a post-Nato plan for Afghanistan is hard to discern. Some propose Afghanistan’s neutrality, non-interference by neighbours, a shrunken United Nations force in Kabul and an international conference in the Afghan capital. But the reality is the alternatives are few.
Partition is a crude option, but one that offers short-term relief to the US from an increasingly unpopular war back home.
Mr Blackwill’s proposal is a wake-up call to Afghanistan, and regional powers, that unless realities on the ground change, south Asia may face its second big redraw of national boundaries in a hurried western exit so reminiscent of the first.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2010. You may share using our article tools. Please don't cut articles from FT.com and redistribute by email or post to the web.
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