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Enter Gulbuddin, Afghan calculus changes
By M K Bhadrakumar – January 16, 2014
Afghanistan is bound to be the key agenda item at the upcoming US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue at Washington. The US will be keen to know what ‘additionality’ Pakistan is bringing to the table — and what is the price tag. Kabul will be keenly watching whether any US-Pakistani deal ensues. A cat-and-mouse game lies ahead.
President Barack Obama is yet to announce the post-2014 US deployment, which is linked to the signing of the US-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement [BSA]. A Xinhua report exuded optimism that the BSA might be signed “in near future, possibly within days.” But that seems unlikely. The sharp criticism by President Hamid Karzai over the latest incident of civilian killings in a US strike suggests that the US-Afghan rift is only widening.
On the other hand, the Obama administration seems to be veering round to the view that Karzai means what he says, namely, that it should be the prerogative of his successor (to be elected after the polls in April) to decide whether to sign the BSA or not. No amount of US pressure has worked so far. Thus, the April elections become a defining moment for regional security. The possibility is that the presidential election will go into a runoff, which could be in May.
Meanwhile, we have the surprise announcement earlier this week by the old Mujahideen war horse Gulbuddin Hekmatyar that his party Hezb-i-Islami is willing to participate in the elections. Gulbuddin has a chequered past in a tumultuous career stretching over four decades in Afghan politics, and he has had Pakistani and Iranian mentors.
In essence, Gulbuddin indicates that he is dissociating from the rejectionist stance taken by Taliban regarding the political process. It is an open secret that Hezb-i-Islami has been keeping close contacts with Karzai and people associated with the party are members of the cabinet of ministers. Taken together, Karzai’s standoff with the Obama administration assumes an altogether new meaning. Things look far more profound than a mere standoff.
Consider the following. Gulbuddin has consistently voiced opposition to continued US troop presence in Afghanistan. He also has a legacy of opposing US imperialism. But at the very core, he is an Afghan nationalist. On the other hand, Gulbuddin’s role on the centre stage will suit Karzai and Pakistan (and Iran).
Gulbuddin’s power base is among the eastern Ghilzai Pashtuns and he could be of much help in isolating the hardline irreconcilable elements within the Taliban (who originated from the southern Kandahar region) and in stabilizing the Afghan-Pakistan border regions. To be sure, Gulbuddin’s involvement in the political process also helps ameliorate Pashtun alienation.
At the same time, Gulbuddin lived in Iran for over five years after fleeing Afghanistan following the defeat at the hands of the Taliban in 1996, and his return to Afghanistan after the overthrow of the Taliban regime circa 2002 was most certainly with Iranian blessing.
Indeed, Karzai has often voiced confidence that left to themselves, Afghans will find a way forward through their native ways of coalition-building. He has consistently pooh-poohed the thesis that the US stands between Afghanistan and the deluge. But his voice gets drowned in the cacophony of doomsday predictions by self-styled western commentators who (like their Soviet-era peer group) have a poor opinion of the Afghan mettle.
Arguably, Karzai’s approach to national reconciliation has striking similarities with what Dr. Najibullah wanted to pursue after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. Najib failed because of the Cold War setting and the lack of international support in that twilight period when Soviet Union was in hopeless drift.
But the external environment today is different. To be sure, the appearance of Gulbuddin changes the power calculus. Afghan politics will gain much traction if Gulbuddin gets involved in the April elections.
By M K Bhadrakumar – January 16, 2014
Afghanistan is bound to be the key agenda item at the upcoming US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue at Washington. The US will be keen to know what ‘additionality’ Pakistan is bringing to the table — and what is the price tag. Kabul will be keenly watching whether any US-Pakistani deal ensues. A cat-and-mouse game lies ahead.
President Barack Obama is yet to announce the post-2014 US deployment, which is linked to the signing of the US-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement [BSA]. A Xinhua report exuded optimism that the BSA might be signed “in near future, possibly within days.” But that seems unlikely. The sharp criticism by President Hamid Karzai over the latest incident of civilian killings in a US strike suggests that the US-Afghan rift is only widening.
On the other hand, the Obama administration seems to be veering round to the view that Karzai means what he says, namely, that it should be the prerogative of his successor (to be elected after the polls in April) to decide whether to sign the BSA or not. No amount of US pressure has worked so far. Thus, the April elections become a defining moment for regional security. The possibility is that the presidential election will go into a runoff, which could be in May.
Meanwhile, we have the surprise announcement earlier this week by the old Mujahideen war horse Gulbuddin Hekmatyar that his party Hezb-i-Islami is willing to participate in the elections. Gulbuddin has a chequered past in a tumultuous career stretching over four decades in Afghan politics, and he has had Pakistani and Iranian mentors.
In essence, Gulbuddin indicates that he is dissociating from the rejectionist stance taken by Taliban regarding the political process. It is an open secret that Hezb-i-Islami has been keeping close contacts with Karzai and people associated with the party are members of the cabinet of ministers. Taken together, Karzai’s standoff with the Obama administration assumes an altogether new meaning. Things look far more profound than a mere standoff.
Consider the following. Gulbuddin has consistently voiced opposition to continued US troop presence in Afghanistan. He also has a legacy of opposing US imperialism. But at the very core, he is an Afghan nationalist. On the other hand, Gulbuddin’s role on the centre stage will suit Karzai and Pakistan (and Iran).
Gulbuddin’s power base is among the eastern Ghilzai Pashtuns and he could be of much help in isolating the hardline irreconcilable elements within the Taliban (who originated from the southern Kandahar region) and in stabilizing the Afghan-Pakistan border regions. To be sure, Gulbuddin’s involvement in the political process also helps ameliorate Pashtun alienation.
At the same time, Gulbuddin lived in Iran for over five years after fleeing Afghanistan following the defeat at the hands of the Taliban in 1996, and his return to Afghanistan after the overthrow of the Taliban regime circa 2002 was most certainly with Iranian blessing.
Indeed, Karzai has often voiced confidence that left to themselves, Afghans will find a way forward through their native ways of coalition-building. He has consistently pooh-poohed the thesis that the US stands between Afghanistan and the deluge. But his voice gets drowned in the cacophony of doomsday predictions by self-styled western commentators who (like their Soviet-era peer group) have a poor opinion of the Afghan mettle.
Arguably, Karzai’s approach to national reconciliation has striking similarities with what Dr. Najibullah wanted to pursue after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. Najib failed because of the Cold War setting and the lack of international support in that twilight period when Soviet Union was in hopeless drift.
But the external environment today is different. To be sure, the appearance of Gulbuddin changes the power calculus. Afghan politics will gain much traction if Gulbuddin gets involved in the April elections.
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