Tweet
http://history.state.gov/historicald...2-54v11p2/d873
please read this document
please read this document
While many people are correctly focused on the documents released by Julian Assange and Edward Snowden, I might point out that there are many publicly available documents that provide interesting historical context as well as current information. Americans have been led to believe that our fight in Afghanistan is about noble intentions, girls' schools, women’s rights, “building a secure and stable Afghanistan”, “remarkable development progress”, etc. None of this was ever true, and ever more Americans are waking up to that. I’ve written on this aspect of the war many times before. But what few people know is that American foreign policy in the region is dominated by a vision of taking Afghanistan and merging it with Pakistan, with Islamabad as the capital. That was derailed somewhat by 9/11. But once the Taliban was swept away and Al Qaeda was pushed into Yemen, Pakistan and elsewhere, the policy of feeding Afghanistan to Pakistan came back out. That’s the dirty secret here. That’s the real reason for continued American involvement. State is trying to betray Afghans into being swallowed up by Pakistan as was Balochistan. It’s an old policy that apparently hasn’t been reviewed for its wisdom or viability. It is driven by corporate money now—energy, pipeline, mineral and weapons manufacturers. When all of these forces come together as one concentration of capital, you may very well get a war or regime change or “stabilization” or counter insurgency as a policy outcome even if that war is idiotic on its face to the people who have to fight it and pay for it.
America has always favored Pakistan over Afghanistan. The above link is just one of many publicly available documents that show how the Department of State really thinks. One of the things that is interesting in these early documents is that American aid is being used to leverage Afghanistan, particularly military aid in the 1950s. It clearly has nothing to do with noble intentions. The goal then was to get Afghanistan and Pakistan to merge into one country. It seems they almost had Afghans under king Zahir Shah to buy into it. If you look at a map, Afghanistan is landlocked and that probably is why the people at State decided that Afghanistan was too weak to favor over Pakistan in the 1950s. There was also the immediate historic precedent of Balochistan, a freestanding country before Pakistan existed being forced at gunpoint, to “merge” into newly created Pakistan. This is conveniently forgotten by American diplomats who fret over the plight of Afghans so unconvincingly. Pakistanis have been murdering Balochis with American supplied weapons for decades, and US officials crying about the plight of women in Afghanistan somehow don’t notice.
The candor with which the old documents discuss the Pashto issue is remarkable. They talk freely across many of these communiques about different constituencies in Afghanistan and know exactly who they are and what they want. During the Afghan Soviet war, that knowledge and candor vanished and it was all about “freedom” for Afghanistan. Freedom to do what, became part of “Greater Pakistan”? Watching a hearing in Congress the other day, all one could hear from State, USAID or DoD people was rhetoric about Afghan women in Afghan politics and their “gains” as well as the usual theater of little girls' schools and “gains” there. They talked glowingly of the ANSF’s abilities and “gains” there and every other misleading characterization they could throw up. It was all dressed up as being “noble”. Conversation about minorities, especially the very people who fought alongside Americans to oust the Taliban, is limited to rather flawed elections and women’s rights. But no one in Afghanistan ever asked the US for those things. They just wanted the Taliban off their backs.
Another striking thing about the old cables, at a glance, is that, in the 1950s, the US Government is the source of all aid here and NOT the private sector. A page turned when it was decided to let private capital begin to influence events beginning with the arms merchants in the 1980s. When large concentrations of capital began to move things in Afghanistan, the tide of history began to go in a much worse direction. Enter Charlie Wilson, General Dynamics, Robin Raphel, UNOCAL, etc. and, presto, you get the Taliban which was, for years, favored by US policy.
There are essential contradictions throughout US policy in the region. There is no unity between words and deeds from Washington. We are there allegedly for some kind of freedom in Afghanistan, even though we had a lot to do with inflicting the Taliban rule on Afghanistan, and we are returning Afghanistan to them. We want to improve the condition of women in Afghanistan, even though we have actually caused much greater suffering for women across the country, to the point where Afghan feminists are demanding that the US no longer use Afghan women as an excuse for staying on. We are supposedly in Afghanistan on these noble missions as expressed by our diplomats and government officials, but we cause effects that are exactly the opposite, killing indiscriminately, pretending that this is an insurgency, not a civil war, and making believe that Pakistan is an “ally” or “partner”. The training of the Afghan Army has been deliberately ineffective and our diplomats are pretending that they are doing well. The supplies that could be given to them as we downsize are being burned and destroyed instead. (American policy makers are very well aware that, as Afghans realize what is going on, there will likely be many more serious “green on blue” attacks.) At the same time, America is doubling down on its commitments to Pakistan, a policy that diplomats know very well is deeply unpopular among Americans. But they push on with the same lies in Congress and to the media. When you go in front of the Congress and describe gains for women in Afghanistan, you are lying. Period. When you describe Pakistan as an ally or partner, you are lying. When you describe a post-2014 American military presence to defend “gains” in Afghanistan, you are lying.
Watch or scan through this video of a recent hearing and observe as various government officials try to paint a picture of “gains” in Afghanistan. They spend two hours defining a host of showboat programs that they admit, have little or no oversight, and are, in reality, rubbish. The impression being painted by these people is a situation in Afghanistan that has isolated problems and challenges, but, by and large, everything is okey dokey. At one point, about 1:35:06 in a link listed below, the question is asked, “What is the endgame?” This was particularly interesting because the answer was divided in two and the larger, strategic endgame was punted off and never answered. The answer given:
“There’s two questions and the larger endgame, I’ll yield to Ambassador Dobbins for. [punt] That’s a policy question. With respect to the 100 million...for elections, we’re looking for an election that Afghans are happy with, secure, stable and democratic Afghanistan that governs its population justly and secures its geographic space.”
Cute. The missing part of the answer is in the old documents linked above. Our foreign policy stewards want to “merge” Afghanistan with Pakistan and have Islamabad rule the entire entity. They want to do that for reasons that a glance at the map tells you is in the best interests of the massive corporate mining and energy extraction interests, and weapons dealers as well can appreciate. Pakistan is not landlocked like Afghanistan. But Afghanistan is where much of the geologic wealth lies buried. Pakistan also offers corrupt fascist generals and a well entrenched class of kleptocrats which represents an elite that corporations traditionally prefer to deal with. This is actually an old pattern. Remember Chile?
If you can watch this presentation from beginning to end, you’re a strong person. Lesser mortals, like myself, have to stop it and puke. These officials are all so very concerned for women’s rights! Right. You really don’t have to watch the whole thing because you can get the idea after a few minutes. But if you like to vomit…
Hearing: Afghanistan 2014: Year of Transition - YouTube
Now watch the short story and see what happens when one congressman asks two simple questions: 1. How much money is all of this costing the taxpayer? 2. How many Americans have been killed in Afghanistan this year?
http://blogs.wsj.co/washwire/2013/12...cials-stumped/
They don’t know. They can tell you specific numbers that they invent and programs they inflate to make it seem as if we are making gains, but the total cost is a mystery! In the old documents, US diplomats clearly knew that programs desired by both Pakistan and Afghanistan were too costly to implement and use vague promises of aid for leverage. That’s certainly changed. Now, they clearly don’t care what the cost is. They will spend it, no matter what, on cosmetic phony programs that have nothing to do with their real intentions. The real intention is to screw the very people they claim that they want to help into becoming victims of Pakistan’s kleptocracy. It’s good to be able to print your own phony money! Once more, I invoke that great Sex Pistol, Johnny Rotten when he asked: “Ever get the feeling you’ve been had?”
One of the many misleading statements in the hearing was the assertion that: “either we do this right or we do it again”, from the very same witness who ducked the larger strategic vision that is keeping America in Afghanistan. There are many more options on the menu, such as effectively leveraging Pakistan by encouraging dissent and ending all aid, reinstating a Balochi national entity, or simply get out (GTFO) of both Pakistan and Afghanistan. But the situation is deliberately hacked down to a simple binary choice, either do it right (our way) or do it again, (our way). I cannot possibly heap enough contempt on this bloody minded characterization. I’d like to present these *******s with a simple, stark, existential binary choice of my own.
America has always favored Pakistan over Afghanistan. The above link is just one of many publicly available documents that show how the Department of State really thinks. One of the things that is interesting in these early documents is that American aid is being used to leverage Afghanistan, particularly military aid in the 1950s. It clearly has nothing to do with noble intentions. The goal then was to get Afghanistan and Pakistan to merge into one country. It seems they almost had Afghans under king Zahir Shah to buy into it. If you look at a map, Afghanistan is landlocked and that probably is why the people at State decided that Afghanistan was too weak to favor over Pakistan in the 1950s. There was also the immediate historic precedent of Balochistan, a freestanding country before Pakistan existed being forced at gunpoint, to “merge” into newly created Pakistan. This is conveniently forgotten by American diplomats who fret over the plight of Afghans so unconvincingly. Pakistanis have been murdering Balochis with American supplied weapons for decades, and US officials crying about the plight of women in Afghanistan somehow don’t notice.
The candor with which the old documents discuss the Pashto issue is remarkable. They talk freely across many of these communiques about different constituencies in Afghanistan and know exactly who they are and what they want. During the Afghan Soviet war, that knowledge and candor vanished and it was all about “freedom” for Afghanistan. Freedom to do what, became part of “Greater Pakistan”? Watching a hearing in Congress the other day, all one could hear from State, USAID or DoD people was rhetoric about Afghan women in Afghan politics and their “gains” as well as the usual theater of little girls' schools and “gains” there. They talked glowingly of the ANSF’s abilities and “gains” there and every other misleading characterization they could throw up. It was all dressed up as being “noble”. Conversation about minorities, especially the very people who fought alongside Americans to oust the Taliban, is limited to rather flawed elections and women’s rights. But no one in Afghanistan ever asked the US for those things. They just wanted the Taliban off their backs.
Another striking thing about the old cables, at a glance, is that, in the 1950s, the US Government is the source of all aid here and NOT the private sector. A page turned when it was decided to let private capital begin to influence events beginning with the arms merchants in the 1980s. When large concentrations of capital began to move things in Afghanistan, the tide of history began to go in a much worse direction. Enter Charlie Wilson, General Dynamics, Robin Raphel, UNOCAL, etc. and, presto, you get the Taliban which was, for years, favored by US policy.
There are essential contradictions throughout US policy in the region. There is no unity between words and deeds from Washington. We are there allegedly for some kind of freedom in Afghanistan, even though we had a lot to do with inflicting the Taliban rule on Afghanistan, and we are returning Afghanistan to them. We want to improve the condition of women in Afghanistan, even though we have actually caused much greater suffering for women across the country, to the point where Afghan feminists are demanding that the US no longer use Afghan women as an excuse for staying on. We are supposedly in Afghanistan on these noble missions as expressed by our diplomats and government officials, but we cause effects that are exactly the opposite, killing indiscriminately, pretending that this is an insurgency, not a civil war, and making believe that Pakistan is an “ally” or “partner”. The training of the Afghan Army has been deliberately ineffective and our diplomats are pretending that they are doing well. The supplies that could be given to them as we downsize are being burned and destroyed instead. (American policy makers are very well aware that, as Afghans realize what is going on, there will likely be many more serious “green on blue” attacks.) At the same time, America is doubling down on its commitments to Pakistan, a policy that diplomats know very well is deeply unpopular among Americans. But they push on with the same lies in Congress and to the media. When you go in front of the Congress and describe gains for women in Afghanistan, you are lying. Period. When you describe Pakistan as an ally or partner, you are lying. When you describe a post-2014 American military presence to defend “gains” in Afghanistan, you are lying.
Watch or scan through this video of a recent hearing and observe as various government officials try to paint a picture of “gains” in Afghanistan. They spend two hours defining a host of showboat programs that they admit, have little or no oversight, and are, in reality, rubbish. The impression being painted by these people is a situation in Afghanistan that has isolated problems and challenges, but, by and large, everything is okey dokey. At one point, about 1:35:06 in a link listed below, the question is asked, “What is the endgame?” This was particularly interesting because the answer was divided in two and the larger, strategic endgame was punted off and never answered. The answer given:
“There’s two questions and the larger endgame, I’ll yield to Ambassador Dobbins for. [punt] That’s a policy question. With respect to the 100 million...for elections, we’re looking for an election that Afghans are happy with, secure, stable and democratic Afghanistan that governs its population justly and secures its geographic space.”
Cute. The missing part of the answer is in the old documents linked above. Our foreign policy stewards want to “merge” Afghanistan with Pakistan and have Islamabad rule the entire entity. They want to do that for reasons that a glance at the map tells you is in the best interests of the massive corporate mining and energy extraction interests, and weapons dealers as well can appreciate. Pakistan is not landlocked like Afghanistan. But Afghanistan is where much of the geologic wealth lies buried. Pakistan also offers corrupt fascist generals and a well entrenched class of kleptocrats which represents an elite that corporations traditionally prefer to deal with. This is actually an old pattern. Remember Chile?
If you can watch this presentation from beginning to end, you’re a strong person. Lesser mortals, like myself, have to stop it and puke. These officials are all so very concerned for women’s rights! Right. You really don’t have to watch the whole thing because you can get the idea after a few minutes. But if you like to vomit…
Hearing: Afghanistan 2014: Year of Transition - YouTube
Now watch the short story and see what happens when one congressman asks two simple questions: 1. How much money is all of this costing the taxpayer? 2. How many Americans have been killed in Afghanistan this year?
http://blogs.wsj.co/washwire/2013/12...cials-stumped/
They don’t know. They can tell you specific numbers that they invent and programs they inflate to make it seem as if we are making gains, but the total cost is a mystery! In the old documents, US diplomats clearly knew that programs desired by both Pakistan and Afghanistan were too costly to implement and use vague promises of aid for leverage. That’s certainly changed. Now, they clearly don’t care what the cost is. They will spend it, no matter what, on cosmetic phony programs that have nothing to do with their real intentions. The real intention is to screw the very people they claim that they want to help into becoming victims of Pakistan’s kleptocracy. It’s good to be able to print your own phony money! Once more, I invoke that great Sex Pistol, Johnny Rotten when he asked: “Ever get the feeling you’ve been had?”
One of the many misleading statements in the hearing was the assertion that: “either we do this right or we do it again”, from the very same witness who ducked the larger strategic vision that is keeping America in Afghanistan. There are many more options on the menu, such as effectively leveraging Pakistan by encouraging dissent and ending all aid, reinstating a Balochi national entity, or simply get out (GTFO) of both Pakistan and Afghanistan. But the situation is deliberately hacked down to a simple binary choice, either do it right (our way) or do it again, (our way). I cannot possibly heap enough contempt on this bloody minded characterization. I’d like to present these *******s with a simple, stark, existential binary choice of my own.
Comment