Tweet
Post-US Afghanistan and likely scenarios in Q&A guide
Jan Assakzai
A keen reader based in Peshawar sent my few questions regarding the future scenarios likely unfolding in post-US Afghanistan. I have attempted to speculate as to what likely will be the shape of things in Afghanistan and potential impact on Pakistan or on what the US call Afg-Pak region. For the benefit of wider readers, I would like to share these questions in Q&A guide.
Q-Is US against only al Qaeda or Taliban too ?
A-The US has no problem with the Taliban as long as it did not harm Washington’s interest by sheltering al Qaeda organisation. The Taliban despite the general anti- American Jehadi rhetorics, do not have the intent, strategic, operational and tactical ability to attack the US interest all over the world including homeland security as opposed to al Qaeda organisation which is a threat both strategic and tactical. Although Afghan Taliban are multi- faceted and diffused phenomenon, presumably, they are confining themselves to Afghanistan’s borders, the Pakistani Taliban and Punjabi Taliban are more of a threat to the US, from Washington stand point.
So the qualified answer is no as the US has also kind of bought into the narrative of Pakistan based think tanks that the Afghan Taliban or indigenous movement that can not be wiped out militarily, thus inadvertently creating a self fulfilling prophecy that the Taliban are a kind of Viet Cong of Vietnam.
But if to go by the present landscape of militancy on the either side of the Durand Line, there seems to be a loose command structure with the powerful left-over-of al Qaeda organisation on the top linked by the Afghan, the Pakistani ( both the Pakhtun and the Punjabi ) Taliban with sub units having an operational freedom to act within their area depending solely on their operational ability not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan.
The Afghan Taliban will continue to draw ideological inspiration form the al Qaeda (Wahabbi) & Devbanddi strands (coupled with anti US, Israel, Christian and sectarian narratives) thus will be beholden to the pull of transnational organisation and movement(s) and the likes have simply shifted to Pakistan. Practically it means they would continue to pull off surprises in international relations impacting the West and US in particular.
Secondly, the Afghan Taliban are dependent on Pakistan for logistics, material and societal support thus will be beholden to the pull of Islamabad. That means they will be easy to be manipulated underscoring their vulnerability as well Islamabad’s strength if some thing goes south in relations between the US and Islamabad.
Q- If Taliban regime had not sheltered or supported al Qaeda would US have attacked the Taliban govt in Afghanistan following 9/11 ?
A- Absolutely, the Taliban regime would have been in Afghanistan as well the Somalian extremists if the later did not join al Qaeda movement and posed threat to its neighbouring countries in the horn of Africa.
Q- Suppose if US gets succeed in dismantling al Qaeda ( which is its stated aim ) and get assured that it will be no more threat to its (US ) interests would it be still much interested in the elimination of the Afghan Taliban or will least care about it ?
A- The threat of al Qaeda has evolved. Though the organisation has been dislodged from Afghanistan but al Qaeda as a movement has moved into Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Thus the US scope of operation against al Qaeda should widen focusing on Pakistan, and these countries. Remember that does not mean involving conventional deployment of large number of troops but special operations units on their own or collaborating with local forces to take action against the al Qaeda. As the US is currently doing in Somali, in Yemen and partly in Pakistan.
(Pakistan is helping out the US in fighting against al Qaeda and providing Intelligence help for drone attacks- though its cooperation is not as 100 percent as Saudi or Egyptian governments’ is who have a zero tolerance policy and have largely hunted down the al Qaeda; for Islamabad it does want to raise the cost for the US in fighting al Qaeda for geo-politial and strategic reasons). That said, the Taliban if confined to Afghanistan, may not be in the firing line compared to al Qaeda, Pakistani Taliban (both the Pakhtuns and Punjabi extremists).
Q-What will be the grounds / interests on which US will continue helping Afghan government against the Taliban?
A- From the US point of view, it has hugely invested in Afghanistan in blood and money and must not strategically abandon the country as it did in 1990s which created a strategic Tsunami for the US culminating in Sept 11 attacks.
Washington will try to strategically engage in Afghanistan and support whichever government takes over but with big caveats:
First, much depends on current strategy (if) it achieves its aim: secure population centres; develop elite army and police units to carry anti insurgency fight; and soften the reconcilable Taliban with the help of Pakistan to coalesce with the Afghan government.
There are certain movements though not a shift in its strategy as yet, for example: the Republicans criticised President Obama for draw down deadline, the Iraqi draw down is touted as parallel now : living at least
100, 000 troops in Afghanistan beyond 2011; secondly on the Kandahar operation front, the Afghan police elite force is showing some sign of progress. (Also remember, the objective of Marjah and Kandahar operation were nerve meant to defeat the Taliban but to secure population centres, break Taliban’s logistical supply line, provide alternative socio- economic governance model). But progress within the current resources and strategy and time frame is unlikely to be enough, unless goals of the strategy is redefined and time frame is extended.
Second, Iran’s role is going to be very important: If relations between the US and Iraq remain frosty, Tehran can make things difficult for the US through its proxy levers as it it is trying to do in Iraq thus forcing Washington to remain engage militarily at least for next couple of years.
But it also all boils down to the US grand strategic interest at the global level. No matter what ever shape things take place in Afghanistan, and may be in Iraq as well in the longer run, for the US, any pay off in terms of keeping bulk of its military forces in these two countries is less than the potential advantage of bringing back its troops to international system.
In other words the troops have to come home no matter what; it is just a matter of few months may be a year or two here and there. Thus the US engagement is likely to be strategic, diplomatic with few military bases.
Q- If US withdraws after achieving its target (dismantling al Qeada ) what will be the scenario of the Afg-pak region?
A-If the US troops withdraw from Afghanistan, the central government will continue to rely on neighboring state's goodwill not to pull the rug under its feet, particularly Pakistan. Pakistan has the potential to impose a military reality. Islamabad is the only country that has penetrated the Afghan Taliban and for it the Taliban are transparent so Islamabad can fugue out in advance the strategy and tactics of the Afghan Taliban groups.
The US and other regional countries do not have linguistic and intelligence asset in the Afghan Taliban ranks nor they have the potential compared to Pakistan. This is why they need to fill in the intelligence gap by drafting Pakistan’s support.
As far as Pakistan is concerned, common sense would dictate that Islamabad would not seek a overwhelming dominance of the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan as it has problem of the TTP, the al Qaeda remnants and Punjabi Taliban who will simply re-establishes bases in Kandahar and Jalalabad as was the case before the invasion of the US in 2001, even if the Afghan army and police are powerful enough deny them sanctuaries.
The Taliban before 2001 did not want to remove the anti-Pakistan elements from Afghanistan. Even today, Pakistan can not stop the free moments of the Baloch insurgents, the LeT, the TTP Swat and the rest in and out of Afghanistan. Think of the scenario what will happen when the Taliban take over the control of the neighbouring provinces. But unfortunately the strategic policies of Pakistan’s establishment has been bereft of long term interest of the country.
Pakistan is likely more vulnerable: there is no simple solution to Punjabi Taliban. It has outgrown the threat of the predominately Pakhtun TTP. The army though by and large successfully contained the TTP in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and partly in FATA- which are sparsely populated; militants were clustered around training camps and large compounds; and politically it was easy for the army to launch operations there.
However, it could not achieve its objective of securing Punjab by containing the Pakhtun brand of the TTP. (Although at least the army needs ten years to completely eradicate the threat of militants in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provided it continues to target the TTP with vigour).
But for the army it is very difficult challenge to conduct counterinsurgency operations in Punjab, given the dense population centers and small, inconspicuous and dispersed militant cells that are responsible for carrying out the attacks. The agencies and the police are facing Intelligence gap problem. They can warn of attacks but could not successfully thwart them.
Army’s other-urban-centres focused operations can be referred to as good lesson:
historically, the army was successful when it went after the MQM in early 1990s focusing on only one city, one organisation that had/has military wing that is largely less well organised, and less ideologically motivated and is more a financially motivated gang with very little tactical training.
Second example was Lal Mosque operation, the army though killed well entrenched militants, it also killed seminary students and civilians raising the political cost of the military operation sky high.
But given the attacks of militants in Punjab in recent years, militant threat has far greater level of tactical expertise and is more diffuse.The army is simply not prepared for fighting counter insurgency operations in urban population centres. Complicating the task is its deployment on the eastern border with India.
Thus leaving the militants alone would simply increase the threat to the core of Pakistan and taking military operation will cause further anarchy and raise political cost allowing the army sleep walking into the extremists trap: who would love to have an operation as it will cause more erosion of the state write and polarisation of the society.
Either way Pakistan core is on the greater risk of becoming the epicentre of transnational jehadi landscape once the sanctuaries in FATA are denied posing far greater threat to Pakistan’s internal security, to regional peace and international community at large than thus far acknowledged.
For India, in the meantime, the prospects of political settlement for the top Taliban leadership would mean sleep less nights seeing Islamabad's friendly militants are the main opposition to be co-opted in Afghanistan. New Delhi simply can not see the Taliban again controlling Afghanistan. So far it has only relied upon political and economic pulls to influence the situation in Afghanistan.
If it decided to raise military stakes shifting strategic policy on Afghanistan, it will simply turn Afghanistan into battleground as for Islamabad, a foot hold in Afghanistan is imperative for its extension of strategic depth to secure its eastern border from hostile New Delhi. Thus it can not allow India militarily fishing in its “strategic depth”.
From another angle, for India Pakistan’s potential internal anarchy would also means more room for the militants to maneuver and more focus on India to target. Thus it may prefer not to implement the talk of raising military stakes in Afghanistan and it may not want to see a further erosion of Pakistan’s ability to contain militancy as well. Hence India’s hands would be tied between bad and worse options on Afghanistan, and for that matter on Pakistan as well.
Q- Would the Afghan Taliban be pacified and defeated or they will continue their activities with strength after US and NATO withdrawal ?
A-The Taliban can be contained IF the US improvise its counter insurgency by securing the population centres along the ring road enough from internal and external threats, by training enough Afghan army and police units to continue counter insurgency strategy once they withdraw , by incentivising Islamabad to give up on militant infrastructure. However, the insurgency will loose vigour if the elements of the Taliban see Islamabad chocking their ability to rest, regroup and resupply in Pakistan.
The likely scenario would be Pakistan might recognise Karzai as post US Afghan leader with pro Pakistani Taliban joining the coalition. If this happens it will mark a shift in Pakistan’s establishment policy as it will for the first time be supporting the Pakhtun centre Left, beside the Pakhtun extremist Right. It would have greater implication for the Pakhtun centre Left in Afghanistan.(see below for more explanation). The left over of the Taliban groups may continue to fight but Kabul and Islamabad can leave with any low level of insurgency, provided it has no organised state sponsor’s backing.
Q- Would Karzai government hold up to the Taliban resistance or not after US/ NATO departure ?
A- Again it depends of the conditions the US and Pakistan creates or fail to create in coming year or years but the Karzai government will hold up to any resistance. For the Taliban‘s operational ability is based on IEDs, deployment of lightly armed units, and targeting soft targets. Their main success is in employing the tactic of terror and intimidation and capitalising on the fact that people have not alternative socio-economic-military alternative thus far.
Besides, if leaders like Karzai form political groups in the south, the centre left Pakthun political forces will simply challenge the Taliban in every street of Southern Afghanistan. For this I will give the example of Balochistan’s Pakhtun areas where the centre left nationalists have been challenging the narratives of the Taliban head on (as is the case of Pakhtun centre left in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa who have bravely stood to the threat of the Taliban).
The Taliban in these areas (Swat situation was different, however) could not openly take over as compared to the situation in FATA where the Pakhtun centre left political forces have not been allowed to operate to challenge the extreme Pakhtun Right- not only the Pakistani local version but also the Afghan version.
As I believe (contrary to the popular myth) either version of the Taliban do not enjoy the support of the Pakhtuns on either side of the Durand line .
Q- If Karzai government opted to hold talks with Taliban what will be the agenda of such talks and its outcome ? what impacts in case it is accepted by the Kabul government.
A-The Taliban might want more concessions: Islamising the constitution according to their version, establishment of their Qazaia system or judiciary, insisting on symbolic acts like growing beard in offices, establishing prayers in public, a bit of religious policing provision, veil for women etc. But the biggest pressure will be whether they accept the one-man-one-vote- system as they know that Pakhtuns would not support their Wahabbi and Deobandi ideas and thus will not vote them in any Westminster or the US presidential style of democracy.
Hence, they would demand every thing under the sun but will compromise on may things as they are equally amenable to pressure from different quarters including Saudi Arabia which has realigned with Islamabad and the US on Afghanistan, besides Pakistan.
The US and Pakistan can greatly alter the situation in case they support the secular Pakhtun centre left on either side of the border which is equally amenable to all concerns of Islamabad (and the US) including Durand line, Pakhtunistan boggy, giving up on Indian presence along Pakistan Afghanistan border, and denying sanctuary for Baloch insurgents etc.
But such embrace needs courage, vision and leadership on Pakistan’s establishment-side to radically alter its over 30 years of policy of promoting militancy and extremism on either side of the Durand Line, stop suspecting and labelling the Pakhtun centre Left as Indian agents.
However, this scenario is extremely unlikely as it would imply an over haul on many levels: reforming its own DNA, getting rid of the ideological streak it inherited from Zia’s era, strategically delinking its operatives with militant groups so on and so forth.
Q-In talks some compromises and concessions are given by the parties to each other so some demands of the Taliban will be definitely accommodated- what can be such demands and what be there impacts in case of its acceptance by Kabul government ?
A- Apart from symbolic demands and gestures, their main demands of the foreign troops would stand dissolved. However, some cabinet posts, including governorships will allure them. But I think the most likely scenario could be a Pakistani style MMA government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa-a kind of hybrid of their version with that of Karzai’s version of governance as the skeleton would have already been developed by the US and NATO particularly in the south population centres like Kandahar, Helmand , Jalalabad etc.
Ultimately, for Kabul it would have simply a price it has to pay to accommodate proxy and insurgents alike due to its inherent geographical, military and economic vulnerability. Thus Afghanistan would be another litmus test for the battle of ideals of the Pakhtun centre left, the extreme Right, on one hand, and the sponsors of these two domineering forces, on the other hand.
Who will win depends on Afghanistan becoming a 21st century nation state with the help of huge investment in money, energy and commitment by the developed nations of the would which seems at the moment a far cry.
Which ever way Afghanistan goes, I hope it become at least Yemen, not Somalia.
janassakzai200@gamil.com
Jan Assakzai
A keen reader based in Peshawar sent my few questions regarding the future scenarios likely unfolding in post-US Afghanistan. I have attempted to speculate as to what likely will be the shape of things in Afghanistan and potential impact on Pakistan or on what the US call Afg-Pak region. For the benefit of wider readers, I would like to share these questions in Q&A guide.
Q-Is US against only al Qaeda or Taliban too ?
A-The US has no problem with the Taliban as long as it did not harm Washington’s interest by sheltering al Qaeda organisation. The Taliban despite the general anti- American Jehadi rhetorics, do not have the intent, strategic, operational and tactical ability to attack the US interest all over the world including homeland security as opposed to al Qaeda organisation which is a threat both strategic and tactical. Although Afghan Taliban are multi- faceted and diffused phenomenon, presumably, they are confining themselves to Afghanistan’s borders, the Pakistani Taliban and Punjabi Taliban are more of a threat to the US, from Washington stand point.
So the qualified answer is no as the US has also kind of bought into the narrative of Pakistan based think tanks that the Afghan Taliban or indigenous movement that can not be wiped out militarily, thus inadvertently creating a self fulfilling prophecy that the Taliban are a kind of Viet Cong of Vietnam.
But if to go by the present landscape of militancy on the either side of the Durand Line, there seems to be a loose command structure with the powerful left-over-of al Qaeda organisation on the top linked by the Afghan, the Pakistani ( both the Pakhtun and the Punjabi ) Taliban with sub units having an operational freedom to act within their area depending solely on their operational ability not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan.
The Afghan Taliban will continue to draw ideological inspiration form the al Qaeda (Wahabbi) & Devbanddi strands (coupled with anti US, Israel, Christian and sectarian narratives) thus will be beholden to the pull of transnational organisation and movement(s) and the likes have simply shifted to Pakistan. Practically it means they would continue to pull off surprises in international relations impacting the West and US in particular.
Secondly, the Afghan Taliban are dependent on Pakistan for logistics, material and societal support thus will be beholden to the pull of Islamabad. That means they will be easy to be manipulated underscoring their vulnerability as well Islamabad’s strength if some thing goes south in relations between the US and Islamabad.
Q- If Taliban regime had not sheltered or supported al Qaeda would US have attacked the Taliban govt in Afghanistan following 9/11 ?
A- Absolutely, the Taliban regime would have been in Afghanistan as well the Somalian extremists if the later did not join al Qaeda movement and posed threat to its neighbouring countries in the horn of Africa.
Q- Suppose if US gets succeed in dismantling al Qaeda ( which is its stated aim ) and get assured that it will be no more threat to its (US ) interests would it be still much interested in the elimination of the Afghan Taliban or will least care about it ?
A- The threat of al Qaeda has evolved. Though the organisation has been dislodged from Afghanistan but al Qaeda as a movement has moved into Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Thus the US scope of operation against al Qaeda should widen focusing on Pakistan, and these countries. Remember that does not mean involving conventional deployment of large number of troops but special operations units on their own or collaborating with local forces to take action against the al Qaeda. As the US is currently doing in Somali, in Yemen and partly in Pakistan.
(Pakistan is helping out the US in fighting against al Qaeda and providing Intelligence help for drone attacks- though its cooperation is not as 100 percent as Saudi or Egyptian governments’ is who have a zero tolerance policy and have largely hunted down the al Qaeda; for Islamabad it does want to raise the cost for the US in fighting al Qaeda for geo-politial and strategic reasons). That said, the Taliban if confined to Afghanistan, may not be in the firing line compared to al Qaeda, Pakistani Taliban (both the Pakhtuns and Punjabi extremists).
Q-What will be the grounds / interests on which US will continue helping Afghan government against the Taliban?
A- From the US point of view, it has hugely invested in Afghanistan in blood and money and must not strategically abandon the country as it did in 1990s which created a strategic Tsunami for the US culminating in Sept 11 attacks.
Washington will try to strategically engage in Afghanistan and support whichever government takes over but with big caveats:
First, much depends on current strategy (if) it achieves its aim: secure population centres; develop elite army and police units to carry anti insurgency fight; and soften the reconcilable Taliban with the help of Pakistan to coalesce with the Afghan government.
There are certain movements though not a shift in its strategy as yet, for example: the Republicans criticised President Obama for draw down deadline, the Iraqi draw down is touted as parallel now : living at least
100, 000 troops in Afghanistan beyond 2011; secondly on the Kandahar operation front, the Afghan police elite force is showing some sign of progress. (Also remember, the objective of Marjah and Kandahar operation were nerve meant to defeat the Taliban but to secure population centres, break Taliban’s logistical supply line, provide alternative socio- economic governance model). But progress within the current resources and strategy and time frame is unlikely to be enough, unless goals of the strategy is redefined and time frame is extended.
Second, Iran’s role is going to be very important: If relations between the US and Iraq remain frosty, Tehran can make things difficult for the US through its proxy levers as it it is trying to do in Iraq thus forcing Washington to remain engage militarily at least for next couple of years.
But it also all boils down to the US grand strategic interest at the global level. No matter what ever shape things take place in Afghanistan, and may be in Iraq as well in the longer run, for the US, any pay off in terms of keeping bulk of its military forces in these two countries is less than the potential advantage of bringing back its troops to international system.
In other words the troops have to come home no matter what; it is just a matter of few months may be a year or two here and there. Thus the US engagement is likely to be strategic, diplomatic with few military bases.
Q- If US withdraws after achieving its target (dismantling al Qeada ) what will be the scenario of the Afg-pak region?
A-If the US troops withdraw from Afghanistan, the central government will continue to rely on neighboring state's goodwill not to pull the rug under its feet, particularly Pakistan. Pakistan has the potential to impose a military reality. Islamabad is the only country that has penetrated the Afghan Taliban and for it the Taliban are transparent so Islamabad can fugue out in advance the strategy and tactics of the Afghan Taliban groups.
The US and other regional countries do not have linguistic and intelligence asset in the Afghan Taliban ranks nor they have the potential compared to Pakistan. This is why they need to fill in the intelligence gap by drafting Pakistan’s support.
As far as Pakistan is concerned, common sense would dictate that Islamabad would not seek a overwhelming dominance of the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan as it has problem of the TTP, the al Qaeda remnants and Punjabi Taliban who will simply re-establishes bases in Kandahar and Jalalabad as was the case before the invasion of the US in 2001, even if the Afghan army and police are powerful enough deny them sanctuaries.
The Taliban before 2001 did not want to remove the anti-Pakistan elements from Afghanistan. Even today, Pakistan can not stop the free moments of the Baloch insurgents, the LeT, the TTP Swat and the rest in and out of Afghanistan. Think of the scenario what will happen when the Taliban take over the control of the neighbouring provinces. But unfortunately the strategic policies of Pakistan’s establishment has been bereft of long term interest of the country.
Pakistan is likely more vulnerable: there is no simple solution to Punjabi Taliban. It has outgrown the threat of the predominately Pakhtun TTP. The army though by and large successfully contained the TTP in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and partly in FATA- which are sparsely populated; militants were clustered around training camps and large compounds; and politically it was easy for the army to launch operations there.
However, it could not achieve its objective of securing Punjab by containing the Pakhtun brand of the TTP. (Although at least the army needs ten years to completely eradicate the threat of militants in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provided it continues to target the TTP with vigour).
But for the army it is very difficult challenge to conduct counterinsurgency operations in Punjab, given the dense population centers and small, inconspicuous and dispersed militant cells that are responsible for carrying out the attacks. The agencies and the police are facing Intelligence gap problem. They can warn of attacks but could not successfully thwart them.
Army’s other-urban-centres focused operations can be referred to as good lesson:
historically, the army was successful when it went after the MQM in early 1990s focusing on only one city, one organisation that had/has military wing that is largely less well organised, and less ideologically motivated and is more a financially motivated gang with very little tactical training.
Second example was Lal Mosque operation, the army though killed well entrenched militants, it also killed seminary students and civilians raising the political cost of the military operation sky high.
But given the attacks of militants in Punjab in recent years, militant threat has far greater level of tactical expertise and is more diffuse.The army is simply not prepared for fighting counter insurgency operations in urban population centres. Complicating the task is its deployment on the eastern border with India.
Thus leaving the militants alone would simply increase the threat to the core of Pakistan and taking military operation will cause further anarchy and raise political cost allowing the army sleep walking into the extremists trap: who would love to have an operation as it will cause more erosion of the state write and polarisation of the society.
Either way Pakistan core is on the greater risk of becoming the epicentre of transnational jehadi landscape once the sanctuaries in FATA are denied posing far greater threat to Pakistan’s internal security, to regional peace and international community at large than thus far acknowledged.
For India, in the meantime, the prospects of political settlement for the top Taliban leadership would mean sleep less nights seeing Islamabad's friendly militants are the main opposition to be co-opted in Afghanistan. New Delhi simply can not see the Taliban again controlling Afghanistan. So far it has only relied upon political and economic pulls to influence the situation in Afghanistan.
If it decided to raise military stakes shifting strategic policy on Afghanistan, it will simply turn Afghanistan into battleground as for Islamabad, a foot hold in Afghanistan is imperative for its extension of strategic depth to secure its eastern border from hostile New Delhi. Thus it can not allow India militarily fishing in its “strategic depth”.
From another angle, for India Pakistan’s potential internal anarchy would also means more room for the militants to maneuver and more focus on India to target. Thus it may prefer not to implement the talk of raising military stakes in Afghanistan and it may not want to see a further erosion of Pakistan’s ability to contain militancy as well. Hence India’s hands would be tied between bad and worse options on Afghanistan, and for that matter on Pakistan as well.
Q- Would the Afghan Taliban be pacified and defeated or they will continue their activities with strength after US and NATO withdrawal ?
A-The Taliban can be contained IF the US improvise its counter insurgency by securing the population centres along the ring road enough from internal and external threats, by training enough Afghan army and police units to continue counter insurgency strategy once they withdraw , by incentivising Islamabad to give up on militant infrastructure. However, the insurgency will loose vigour if the elements of the Taliban see Islamabad chocking their ability to rest, regroup and resupply in Pakistan.
The likely scenario would be Pakistan might recognise Karzai as post US Afghan leader with pro Pakistani Taliban joining the coalition. If this happens it will mark a shift in Pakistan’s establishment policy as it will for the first time be supporting the Pakhtun centre Left, beside the Pakhtun extremist Right. It would have greater implication for the Pakhtun centre Left in Afghanistan.(see below for more explanation). The left over of the Taliban groups may continue to fight but Kabul and Islamabad can leave with any low level of insurgency, provided it has no organised state sponsor’s backing.
Q- Would Karzai government hold up to the Taliban resistance or not after US/ NATO departure ?
A- Again it depends of the conditions the US and Pakistan creates or fail to create in coming year or years but the Karzai government will hold up to any resistance. For the Taliban‘s operational ability is based on IEDs, deployment of lightly armed units, and targeting soft targets. Their main success is in employing the tactic of terror and intimidation and capitalising on the fact that people have not alternative socio-economic-military alternative thus far.
Besides, if leaders like Karzai form political groups in the south, the centre left Pakthun political forces will simply challenge the Taliban in every street of Southern Afghanistan. For this I will give the example of Balochistan’s Pakhtun areas where the centre left nationalists have been challenging the narratives of the Taliban head on (as is the case of Pakhtun centre left in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa who have bravely stood to the threat of the Taliban).
The Taliban in these areas (Swat situation was different, however) could not openly take over as compared to the situation in FATA where the Pakhtun centre left political forces have not been allowed to operate to challenge the extreme Pakhtun Right- not only the Pakistani local version but also the Afghan version.
As I believe (contrary to the popular myth) either version of the Taliban do not enjoy the support of the Pakhtuns on either side of the Durand line .
Q- If Karzai government opted to hold talks with Taliban what will be the agenda of such talks and its outcome ? what impacts in case it is accepted by the Kabul government.
A-The Taliban might want more concessions: Islamising the constitution according to their version, establishment of their Qazaia system or judiciary, insisting on symbolic acts like growing beard in offices, establishing prayers in public, a bit of religious policing provision, veil for women etc. But the biggest pressure will be whether they accept the one-man-one-vote- system as they know that Pakhtuns would not support their Wahabbi and Deobandi ideas and thus will not vote them in any Westminster or the US presidential style of democracy.
Hence, they would demand every thing under the sun but will compromise on may things as they are equally amenable to pressure from different quarters including Saudi Arabia which has realigned with Islamabad and the US on Afghanistan, besides Pakistan.
The US and Pakistan can greatly alter the situation in case they support the secular Pakhtun centre left on either side of the border which is equally amenable to all concerns of Islamabad (and the US) including Durand line, Pakhtunistan boggy, giving up on Indian presence along Pakistan Afghanistan border, and denying sanctuary for Baloch insurgents etc.
But such embrace needs courage, vision and leadership on Pakistan’s establishment-side to radically alter its over 30 years of policy of promoting militancy and extremism on either side of the Durand Line, stop suspecting and labelling the Pakhtun centre Left as Indian agents.
However, this scenario is extremely unlikely as it would imply an over haul on many levels: reforming its own DNA, getting rid of the ideological streak it inherited from Zia’s era, strategically delinking its operatives with militant groups so on and so forth.
Q-In talks some compromises and concessions are given by the parties to each other so some demands of the Taliban will be definitely accommodated- what can be such demands and what be there impacts in case of its acceptance by Kabul government ?
A- Apart from symbolic demands and gestures, their main demands of the foreign troops would stand dissolved. However, some cabinet posts, including governorships will allure them. But I think the most likely scenario could be a Pakistani style MMA government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa-a kind of hybrid of their version with that of Karzai’s version of governance as the skeleton would have already been developed by the US and NATO particularly in the south population centres like Kandahar, Helmand , Jalalabad etc.
Ultimately, for Kabul it would have simply a price it has to pay to accommodate proxy and insurgents alike due to its inherent geographical, military and economic vulnerability. Thus Afghanistan would be another litmus test for the battle of ideals of the Pakhtun centre left, the extreme Right, on one hand, and the sponsors of these two domineering forces, on the other hand.
Who will win depends on Afghanistan becoming a 21st century nation state with the help of huge investment in money, energy and commitment by the developed nations of the would which seems at the moment a far cry.
Which ever way Afghanistan goes, I hope it become at least Yemen, not Somalia.
janassakzai200@gamil.com
Comment