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The Frontier Post
Pakistan seems to have started positioning itself for gaining a key place in the negotiating table between Karzai’s government and the US, on the one hand, and the Taliban, on the other. It seems as if Pakistan is helping Karzai in reaching out to the Taliban under its influence.
Pakistan’s establishment’s dual policy: supporting the US against the Taliban while maintaing ties with the Afghan Taliban has paid off. Pakistan has found itself realigned with the US, Saudi Arabia and Turkey and got convinced Washington that it can help broker a deal with elements of the Taliban.
Washington realised that Pakistan’s leverage over the Afghan Taliban can help the US with its draw down plan of 2001 thus it seized the opportunity Pakistan afforded. The US has of late diverged the fight against the al Qaeda with that of the Taliban. It bought into Pakistan’s understanding that a negotiated settlement be found of Afghan insurgency. Thus comes Pakistan’s influence with the Taliban into play.
Pakistan has been supporting its favorite Taliban who could be used as bargaining chip in any future negotiation. On top of this list is Commander Jalanuddin Haqqani group. The group operates from North Waziristan and has operational reach as far off as Kabul.
The media has rumored that Islamabad has already started talks with the Haqqani network. This move indicates that the Haqqani network could be part of an effort to appease the Taliban and suggests that by helping Kabul — perhaps with the backing of the United State Pakistan is trying to appease Karzai and its Afghan proxies as a means to try and achieve an influence in the post US Afghanistan dispensation, though the stated reasons for these initial contacts are their possible use as part of reconciliation process between Kabul and their Taliban opposition.
There has been much discussion in Afghanistan and Pakistan since the June 6 resignation of Interior Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar (an intelligence official during the Marxist regime) and the head of the Afghan intelligence service, the National Directorate of Security, Amrullah Saleh (an ethnic Tajik who used to be a senior member of the Northern Alliance, the historical opponent of the Taliban). But the main reason likely is that it was Islamabad that had raised a complaint with Karzai against his intelligence chief. Hence Karzai removed him.
Nonetheless, it is not clear how much influence Pakistan has with the Afghan Taliban. There are three types of Afghan Taliban. First is the top leadership led by Mullah Mohammad Omar. It is unknown if he is still under the influence of al Qaeda. Though there have been some suggestions from high ranking Taliban officials that they do not share al Qaeda’s transnational agenda: attacks beyond Afghanistan. Rather they limit themselves within the geographical boundaries of Afghanistan.
The second type is the Taliban commanders who are fighting in the field in different provinces of Afghanistan. They are the bedrock of insurgency who actually constitute the operational ability of the Taliban. Pakistan defiantly enjoys some influence with these commanders as they very much depend on Pakistan for their logistics, supplies, sanctuary, families’ protection and societal contacts.
Another element are some Taliban tribal commanders who again cannot operate without the sphere of Pakistan’s Afghan assets. It has been rumoured that the Taliban may have trust deficit with Islamabad because of Gen Musharraf siding with the US against the Taliban in Afghanistan. It may be true to a lesser extent:
Pakistan had already lost some degree of trust with Mullah Mohammad Omar who of late was more under the influence of al Qaeda than Islamabad. It seems exaggerated as well because the movers and shakers of the insurgency of the Taliban are the commanders including Jalaluddin Haqqni with whom Pakistan has considerable influence.
Before the US surge in Afghanistan, it was obvious that the US strategy was not effective enough to break the insurgency. Pakistan must have repaired any trust deficit with the important elements of the Taliban.
This time around Pakistan might have a modest expectations though it may wish to see an Afghanistan of 1994-2000 when almost the entire country fell under the rule of the Taliban. However, Islamabad understands that with the US strategic presence, and other powerful neighbours like Iran, India, Russia, their interests have to be taken care of as well.
But Islamabad is facing a dilemma which has never been in the past while dominating Afghanistan through its leverage over the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan’s Pakhtun population has for the first time seen the fallout the Taliban militancy in the region: Emirate of Waziristan and militant infrastructure, and they continue to live under the fear and intimidation of the militants. They clearly blame Islamabad’s strategic policies in Afghanistan i.e. supporting militancy for gaining influence in Afghanistan to achieve “strategic depth”.
While seeking cooperation of Haqqni network is imperative for strategic reasons, Islamabad needs to ensure that such moves do not lead to cracks within its relations with the Pakhtuns.
At a time when Pakistan is trying to buy for a dominance, it cannot afford to lose support from the Pakhtun citizens; doing so would work to the Pakistan’s enemies’ advantage.
In other words, Islamabad is being forced to strike a difficult balance between its proxy Taliban and fellow Pakhtun citizens in Pakistan. These pro-Taliban delicate overtures by Islamabad are thus extremely risky moves and may push the moderate Pakhtuns in anti-Pakistan camp. janassakzai200@gmail.com
Pakistan seems to have started positioning itself for gaining a key place in the negotiating table between Karzai’s government and the US, on the one hand, and the Taliban, on the other. It seems as if Pakistan is helping Karzai in reaching out to the Taliban under its influence.
Pakistan’s establishment’s dual policy: supporting the US against the Taliban while maintaing ties with the Afghan Taliban has paid off. Pakistan has found itself realigned with the US, Saudi Arabia and Turkey and got convinced Washington that it can help broker a deal with elements of the Taliban.
Washington realised that Pakistan’s leverage over the Afghan Taliban can help the US with its draw down plan of 2001 thus it seized the opportunity Pakistan afforded. The US has of late diverged the fight against the al Qaeda with that of the Taliban. It bought into Pakistan’s understanding that a negotiated settlement be found of Afghan insurgency. Thus comes Pakistan’s influence with the Taliban into play.
Pakistan has been supporting its favorite Taliban who could be used as bargaining chip in any future negotiation. On top of this list is Commander Jalanuddin Haqqani group. The group operates from North Waziristan and has operational reach as far off as Kabul.
The media has rumored that Islamabad has already started talks with the Haqqani network. This move indicates that the Haqqani network could be part of an effort to appease the Taliban and suggests that by helping Kabul — perhaps with the backing of the United State Pakistan is trying to appease Karzai and its Afghan proxies as a means to try and achieve an influence in the post US Afghanistan dispensation, though the stated reasons for these initial contacts are their possible use as part of reconciliation process between Kabul and their Taliban opposition.
There has been much discussion in Afghanistan and Pakistan since the June 6 resignation of Interior Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar (an intelligence official during the Marxist regime) and the head of the Afghan intelligence service, the National Directorate of Security, Amrullah Saleh (an ethnic Tajik who used to be a senior member of the Northern Alliance, the historical opponent of the Taliban). But the main reason likely is that it was Islamabad that had raised a complaint with Karzai against his intelligence chief. Hence Karzai removed him.
Nonetheless, it is not clear how much influence Pakistan has with the Afghan Taliban. There are three types of Afghan Taliban. First is the top leadership led by Mullah Mohammad Omar. It is unknown if he is still under the influence of al Qaeda. Though there have been some suggestions from high ranking Taliban officials that they do not share al Qaeda’s transnational agenda: attacks beyond Afghanistan. Rather they limit themselves within the geographical boundaries of Afghanistan.
The second type is the Taliban commanders who are fighting in the field in different provinces of Afghanistan. They are the bedrock of insurgency who actually constitute the operational ability of the Taliban. Pakistan defiantly enjoys some influence with these commanders as they very much depend on Pakistan for their logistics, supplies, sanctuary, families’ protection and societal contacts.
Another element are some Taliban tribal commanders who again cannot operate without the sphere of Pakistan’s Afghan assets. It has been rumoured that the Taliban may have trust deficit with Islamabad because of Gen Musharraf siding with the US against the Taliban in Afghanistan. It may be true to a lesser extent:
Pakistan had already lost some degree of trust with Mullah Mohammad Omar who of late was more under the influence of al Qaeda than Islamabad. It seems exaggerated as well because the movers and shakers of the insurgency of the Taliban are the commanders including Jalaluddin Haqqni with whom Pakistan has considerable influence.
Before the US surge in Afghanistan, it was obvious that the US strategy was not effective enough to break the insurgency. Pakistan must have repaired any trust deficit with the important elements of the Taliban.
This time around Pakistan might have a modest expectations though it may wish to see an Afghanistan of 1994-2000 when almost the entire country fell under the rule of the Taliban. However, Islamabad understands that with the US strategic presence, and other powerful neighbours like Iran, India, Russia, their interests have to be taken care of as well.
But Islamabad is facing a dilemma which has never been in the past while dominating Afghanistan through its leverage over the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan’s Pakhtun population has for the first time seen the fallout the Taliban militancy in the region: Emirate of Waziristan and militant infrastructure, and they continue to live under the fear and intimidation of the militants. They clearly blame Islamabad’s strategic policies in Afghanistan i.e. supporting militancy for gaining influence in Afghanistan to achieve “strategic depth”.
While seeking cooperation of Haqqni network is imperative for strategic reasons, Islamabad needs to ensure that such moves do not lead to cracks within its relations with the Pakhtuns.
At a time when Pakistan is trying to buy for a dominance, it cannot afford to lose support from the Pakhtun citizens; doing so would work to the Pakistan’s enemies’ advantage.
In other words, Islamabad is being forced to strike a difficult balance between its proxy Taliban and fellow Pakhtun citizens in Pakistan. These pro-Taliban delicate overtures by Islamabad are thus extremely risky moves and may push the moderate Pakhtuns in anti-Pakistan camp. janassakzai200@gmail.com
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