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COMMENT: Traditional mechanism of intelligence in Afghanistan —Musa Khan Jalalzai
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default...-12-2012_pg3_3
Writing on Afghan intelligence mechanism and its way of operation, recruitment, collection of information and analysis is a difficult task as there is little information available in public domain. In this small article, an addition to philosophical and technical argument, I will try to elucidate some data about the way intelligence agencies operate in Afghanistan. As we all know, the way of operation and concept of intelligence has ultimately changed after the 9/11 and the US invasion of Afghanistan, but the NDS and its sister agencies still follow the old, traditional way of intelligence mechanism, information gathering and analysis. Their way of operation, way of investigation and information gathering is not working effectively in countering the Taliban insurgency in the country, as they are mostly unable to collect reliable military information from the Southern and Eastern parts of the country. They have no access to information in provinces like Kunar, Nooristan, Logar, Paktia and Khost as majority of their members are non-Pashtuns and are confined to their headquarters.
The National Directorate of Security (NDS) operates in Kabul, and some parts of Southern and Northern Afghanistan. It is comprised of more than 30 departments mostly based in Northern provinces. People working in all intelligence agencies of the country including the NDS are more than 35,000 while its private informers are thought to be over 50,000. NDS enjoys full legal powers; it investigates, detains, prosecutes and judges suspects. Intelligence officials in Kabul say they are aware of ethnic and sectarian loyalties within the agencies, but are trying to improve the operational capabilities, information process and ethnic concordance.
Normally, good intelligence management begins with a professional way of intelligence gathering, analysis and proper determination of what needs to be known. When data is collected, it is evaluated and transformed into a practical form. Unfortunately, the Afghan intelligence agencies lack this way of professional intelligence management. They have no proper information analysis centre where collected information is analysed, processed and specified. Majority of its provincial chiefs have no basic knowledge of counterinsurgency and intelligence information process. Rate of corruption is very high while there is no accountability system to control the rogue elements within the intelligence infrastructure. Every intelligence chief before leaving the NDS office transfers millions of dollars into his personal accounts from secret funds and purchases properties in the US, Europe and Dubai.
In all democratic nations, intelligence agencies are under the control of government and accountable to law, but in Afghanistan, the case is different. The NDS is out of control and above the law. Experts warn that lack of accountability, institutional and parliamentary supervision in Afghanistan has done more harm to the state. Unfortunately, in parliament or at any other political and governmental forum, the issue of torture and atrocities of the NDS against the citizens have never been debated.
In his recent book, the former Director General RAW, Major General VK Singh describes the check and balance system in intelligence infrastructure of a country: “Intelligence and security agencies exist in all nations. However, they suffer from peculiar diseases. After some time, they become so big that they after devour their creators. This phenomenon occurs more often in totalitarian regimes or military dictatorship than in democracies, when the other organ of the state — legislature and judiciary — and the fourth estate act as a check on the executive. Without this system of check and balance, there is a great danger of intelligence and security agencies becoming a law into them.” In the case of the NDS and KHAD, we have experienced the same thing, and presently, they are free to arrest, kill and torture any Afghan citizen when they want. Media is under their control while from 2010 to 2012, on several occasions, they banned it from broadcasting live images of tortured Afghans in their private secret prisons.
The issue of thousands of missing persons still needs to be investigated. The KHAD and NDS forcefully making innocent Afghans disappear, keep them underground and torture them to death. The issue of foreign influence in their ranks and file raises many questions while it is on record that intelligence agencies of neighbouring states fund their favourite officers within the NDS. Experts say that this unlawful interference caused the failure of the US and NATO forces in undermining insurgency and terrorism in Afghanistan. The Wall Street Journal recently quoted an Afghan official in the presidential palace that Iran has truly influenced a considerable number of influential Afghans in different ways, which is more risky than suicide terrorism. Iran provides funds to various projects and expands intelligence networks across Afghanistan, moving to fill the gap after the NATO withdrawal by the end of 2014.
As we all know, social media has changed the concept of intelligence information gathering. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and other networks are useful sources of intelligence collection. A recent report of facebook newsroom revealed that more than 800 million people use it across the world while some 900 million interact with various groups, friends and communities. On facebook, reportedly, more than 250 million photos are uploaded per day. The report further reveals that 500 million users use apps on facebook and about seven million apps and sites are connected with the mobile facebook. Several intelligence agencies of developed nations use social media for spying. In Afghanistan, the case is different as the use of social media for collecting intelligence information is limited. Two percent of people use the internet, mobile phones and facebook. Intelligence officials and workers have been facing the same problem for three decades; therefore, gathering intelligence information through social media is impossible. Finally, Afghanistan needs to change the old traditional way of intelligence collection and create ethnic balance in its intelligence infrastructure.
The writer is author of Policing in Multicultural Britain, can be reached at: zai.musakhan222@gmail.com
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default...-12-2012_pg3_3
Writing on Afghan intelligence mechanism and its way of operation, recruitment, collection of information and analysis is a difficult task as there is little information available in public domain. In this small article, an addition to philosophical and technical argument, I will try to elucidate some data about the way intelligence agencies operate in Afghanistan. As we all know, the way of operation and concept of intelligence has ultimately changed after the 9/11 and the US invasion of Afghanistan, but the NDS and its sister agencies still follow the old, traditional way of intelligence mechanism, information gathering and analysis. Their way of operation, way of investigation and information gathering is not working effectively in countering the Taliban insurgency in the country, as they are mostly unable to collect reliable military information from the Southern and Eastern parts of the country. They have no access to information in provinces like Kunar, Nooristan, Logar, Paktia and Khost as majority of their members are non-Pashtuns and are confined to their headquarters.
The National Directorate of Security (NDS) operates in Kabul, and some parts of Southern and Northern Afghanistan. It is comprised of more than 30 departments mostly based in Northern provinces. People working in all intelligence agencies of the country including the NDS are more than 35,000 while its private informers are thought to be over 50,000. NDS enjoys full legal powers; it investigates, detains, prosecutes and judges suspects. Intelligence officials in Kabul say they are aware of ethnic and sectarian loyalties within the agencies, but are trying to improve the operational capabilities, information process and ethnic concordance.
Normally, good intelligence management begins with a professional way of intelligence gathering, analysis and proper determination of what needs to be known. When data is collected, it is evaluated and transformed into a practical form. Unfortunately, the Afghan intelligence agencies lack this way of professional intelligence management. They have no proper information analysis centre where collected information is analysed, processed and specified. Majority of its provincial chiefs have no basic knowledge of counterinsurgency and intelligence information process. Rate of corruption is very high while there is no accountability system to control the rogue elements within the intelligence infrastructure. Every intelligence chief before leaving the NDS office transfers millions of dollars into his personal accounts from secret funds and purchases properties in the US, Europe and Dubai.
In all democratic nations, intelligence agencies are under the control of government and accountable to law, but in Afghanistan, the case is different. The NDS is out of control and above the law. Experts warn that lack of accountability, institutional and parliamentary supervision in Afghanistan has done more harm to the state. Unfortunately, in parliament or at any other political and governmental forum, the issue of torture and atrocities of the NDS against the citizens have never been debated.
In his recent book, the former Director General RAW, Major General VK Singh describes the check and balance system in intelligence infrastructure of a country: “Intelligence and security agencies exist in all nations. However, they suffer from peculiar diseases. After some time, they become so big that they after devour their creators. This phenomenon occurs more often in totalitarian regimes or military dictatorship than in democracies, when the other organ of the state — legislature and judiciary — and the fourth estate act as a check on the executive. Without this system of check and balance, there is a great danger of intelligence and security agencies becoming a law into them.” In the case of the NDS and KHAD, we have experienced the same thing, and presently, they are free to arrest, kill and torture any Afghan citizen when they want. Media is under their control while from 2010 to 2012, on several occasions, they banned it from broadcasting live images of tortured Afghans in their private secret prisons.
The issue of thousands of missing persons still needs to be investigated. The KHAD and NDS forcefully making innocent Afghans disappear, keep them underground and torture them to death. The issue of foreign influence in their ranks and file raises many questions while it is on record that intelligence agencies of neighbouring states fund their favourite officers within the NDS. Experts say that this unlawful interference caused the failure of the US and NATO forces in undermining insurgency and terrorism in Afghanistan. The Wall Street Journal recently quoted an Afghan official in the presidential palace that Iran has truly influenced a considerable number of influential Afghans in different ways, which is more risky than suicide terrorism. Iran provides funds to various projects and expands intelligence networks across Afghanistan, moving to fill the gap after the NATO withdrawal by the end of 2014.
As we all know, social media has changed the concept of intelligence information gathering. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and other networks are useful sources of intelligence collection. A recent report of facebook newsroom revealed that more than 800 million people use it across the world while some 900 million interact with various groups, friends and communities. On facebook, reportedly, more than 250 million photos are uploaded per day. The report further reveals that 500 million users use apps on facebook and about seven million apps and sites are connected with the mobile facebook. Several intelligence agencies of developed nations use social media for spying. In Afghanistan, the case is different as the use of social media for collecting intelligence information is limited. Two percent of people use the internet, mobile phones and facebook. Intelligence officials and workers have been facing the same problem for three decades; therefore, gathering intelligence information through social media is impossible. Finally, Afghanistan needs to change the old traditional way of intelligence collection and create ethnic balance in its intelligence infrastructure.
The writer is author of Policing in Multicultural Britain, can be reached at: zai.musakhan222@gmail.com
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