Wardak Security Transition was Irresponsible

[Haris]

Wardak Security Transition Was
Irresponsible: Governor





Afghanistan's governor of the central Maiden Wardak province
claimed Thursday that the security transition in the province was
irresponsible because the Afghan security forces are not ready.


Speaking in a advisory meeting to review the overall security situation in
Wardak province, the provincial governor Mohammad Halim Fedae said that
his province was not ready for the security transition which started in
January.


He claimed that the handover of security responsibility to Afghan forces by
the Nato soldiers was irresponsible because the Afghans were not fully
trained and equipped for what the situation required. Fedae said the
upcoming fourth transition is likely to face similar challenges.


"Unfortunately, the transition process was irresponsible. They say that
security is not good in Wardak, Maidan and Logar province but they still
want us to get ready for fourth phase of transition," Fedae told the
attendees of the meeting.


Local security officials including, provincial police chief, commander of
Police 303 Spinghar zone, commander of 203 Army Corps and other local
security officials were present.


The security officials agreed that the situation is not good in Wardak,
however intensive clearing operations are underway to clear insurgents
from populated areas and more efforts to better train and equip Afghan
security forces are underway.




http://tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/7...ible-governor-

[Haris]

Months after Americans leave, an Afghan
base in disrepair

JALREZ VALLEY, AFGHANISTAN — After U.S. soldiers left Combat Outpost
Conlon in February — packing up weapons, generators and portable toilets
— their Afghan successors rushed to the American barracks and command
center, eager to inspect their inheritance.

The Afghans renamed Conlon in Dari and scrawled Koran verses on the
walls. The base was now theirs, and they were proud.

Months later, it’s a dismal scene. The 240 Afghan soldiers are down to
three hours of electricity a day. Almost all of their vehicles have broken
down. They don’t have the night-vision goggles needed to guard their base
after sunset.

As the Taliban ramped up its attacks in eastern Afghanistan’s Wardak
province this spring, the Afghan soldiers here came to a painful conclusion:
They were not ready to take on the fight alone. But it was too late — the
Americans were not coming back.

The transition of Combat Outpost Conlon to Afghan control — marked by a
flag-raising ceremony and a visit from top U.S. military brass — was an
early milestone in the NATO drawdown that will continue through 2014.

But Afghan officials worry that the problems plaguing Conlon could be
replicated across the country as the U.S. military hands over authority,
leaving 200,000 Afghan soldiers without the equipment or wherewithal to
defeat a resilient enemy.

“The Americans left too early, and they left without giving us what we
need,” said Lt. Col. Hamidullah Kohdamany, the battalion commander.

U.S. officials say that after years of depending on Americans for tactical
and logistical support, Afghan soldiers often struggle to adapt to a sudden
surge in responsibility.

“They’ve just never had to rely on their own leaders. They’ve always had
the Americans for a backstop,” said Lt. Col. Clint Cox, the head of the U.S.
military advisory team that oversees Afghan units in Wardak province. “It’s
going to take some time. It’s just like with children — sometimes it takes a
hard lesson for them to learn.”

In 2009, President Obama’s first “surge” troops constructed Combat
Outpost Conlon in the Jalrez Valley, a Taliban stronghold 50 miles from
Kabul. The soldiers called Jalrez the “Valley of Death” after being attacked
repeatedly while patrolling local villages.

But they made quick progress, reopening roads and bazaars once controlled
by the insurgency. The effort was seen as an affirmation of the president’s
war strategy — early proof that with more troops, counterinsurgency could
work in even the toughest places.

In 2011, U.S. military officials announced that Conlon — named after Pfc.
Paul E. Conlon, who was killed in the area in 2008 — would receive another
distinction: It would become one of the first American bases in Wardak to
be handed over to Afghan control. In February of this year, after the
flag-raising ceremony, Afghan officials changed the name of Conlon to
Khote Ashru, or “Ashru’s home,” named after an ancestor of the local tribe.

Soldiers from the Afghan 203rd Corps rushed to claim the tiny rooms that
once housed American troops.

“Wardak has always been a laboratory for the coalition forces,” said
Mohammad Halim Fidai, the province’s governor. “Sometimes the
experiments work. Sometimes they don’t.”

Fidai and the top Afghan army officials in the province say the transition
experiment at Khote Ashru has failed not because the troops aren’t
courageous or capable, but because they don’t have the resources that
existed when Americans shared the base, or the training to maintain
equipment.

Walking around Khote Ashru last week, Gen. Seziq Raziq, the corps
commander in charge of southeastern Afghanistan, inspected what was left
of the base’s vehicles. Two pickups were attacked this year and were in
disrepair. One Humvee was shot during an ambush this month and was
rendered useless. The 240 men here are now left with only one armored
truck.

Then Raziq walked to the radio tower, which the soldiers lack the fuel to
run. Instead, they use their cellphones to discuss operational plans, even
though they know that the Taliban taps those conversations.

“These men don’t know how to fix these things when they break,” Raziq
said. “American contractors used to fix them for us, but they are gone.”

Now, troops patrolling the area near the base return before dusk because
the Afghan army has no provision for night-vision goggles, which the troops
borrowed from the Americans when the base was shared. The patrols —
adapted from U.S. counterinsurgency theory — are not as common as they
once were, and Afghan soldiers say they are of little consequence.

“The enemy has gotten stronger since the Americans left, and their morale
is up,” Kohdamany said.

“We talk to the local people a lot. But it’s like talking to a donkey. No
matter what we say, they support the Taliban,” said Capt. Azizullah, the
top commander on the base, who like many Afghans uses only one name.

Many sentences at Khote Ashru now begin with “When the Americans were
here . . . ”

“When the Americans were here, we had air support and close
coordination,” said Azizullah.

“When the Americans were here, we got their advice every day. They were
with us on so many patrols,” said Lt. Ahmed Zia Muradi.

Now, even physical relics of the former U.S. presence are scant — just a
few English scrawlings on blast barriers and barracks walls that the base’s
new owners struggle to decipher.

“Motivation,” reads one.

“Through these doors misery has walked,” reads another.

In less than two months, the only other American base in Jalrez, Combat
Outpost Garda, will be transferred to Afghan control, ending the last
chapter of the three-year U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in the valley.

Three more bases in the surrounding area will be transferred in the coming
months.

To many U.S. officials, it’s a symbol of progress: Afghans filling the void in
places Americans were always destined to leave.

In April 2011, a similar transition took place at Combat Outpost Tangi,
about 10 miles from the Jalrez Valley. Within several months, Afghan
soldiers abandoned that base, saying it was too dangerous to maintain. In
September, the Taliban released a video of dozens of insurgents entering
the vacant base on motorcycles, carrying assault rifles and grenade
launchers.

“These are the brave mujaheddin of Tangi who through sacrifice and valor
cleansed the occupiers and crusaders,” a man says in the video.

Afghan officials said they don’t expect either Garda or Conlon to fall into
the hands of the Taliban, but they acknowledge the challenges ahead. The
Americans, too, are well aware of the risk.

“These Afghan leaders are going to have to step up. If they choose to let
discipline fall off, the enemy is going to have a vote,” Cox said.

If logistical problems persist, the Afghan army will have no choice but to
close some of its bases, including Khote Ashru, leaving the Taliban more
room to maneuver.

Raziq felt the lack of resources most acutely several months ago when
eight of his men were killed by improvised explosive devices 50 miles north
of Jalrez. Their bodies were strewn across a narrow road not far from an

Afghan army base, but Raziq did not have a helicopter to pick up the
remains. It took 24 hours for an American helicopter to retrieve them.

“It’s our responsibility and we couldn’t take care of it,” he said. “It was a
great sadness.”

The young men of Khote Ashru are diligent about watching the perimeter,
defending against the horrible scenario that lurks in the minds of many
soldiers: the possibility that a mass of insurgents could emerge from a
cluster of nearby trees and bushes and attempt to overtake the base.

All day long, soldiers stare at the dense brush through binoculars. When
night comes, they squint into darkness, taking a break occasionally to etch
their own words into the plywood observation tower, just as the Americans
did.

One soldier scrawled a line from a famous Afghan poem in Dari.

“Flower, don’t be proud of yourself. Eventually you will fade.”



http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/...zSX_story.html



Wardak is a strategically important province. The people will either support no-one or support the Taliban. They will not support the Americans and their grossly corrupt & incompetent ANA/ANP puppets.

Before the Americans stepped up their campaigns in the province post-2006, the area was relatively safe. There were few NATO casualties. Now, it is among the highest ranked provinces for NATO casualties. Before 2006, you did not have to fear of frangyaan invading your home in the dead of night. You could go to sleep without the sounds of gunfire. Your wife wouldn't be randomly searched by perverted foreigners. Your tribesmen would not be interrogated & disrespected. Your friends & family would not be caught in the crossfire. Your home would not be demolished to make way for military outposts. Your local mosque would not be shelled by foreigners. You did not have to emigrate to Kabul or other provinces. There was relative stability. The Taliban did not drastically alter the lives of the locals. Things went on much the same as they always did. That all changed with the arrival of the Americans. Just the other day yet another boy from my village was shot dead by them.

I am not a Talib supporter and the locals do not all automatically support the Taliban either (for various reasons). However they are the only ones who brought stability to that area. Hence, you can expect that with the handing over of responsibility to the ANA & local police forces and the withdrawal of the Americans, whatever little government/NATO control there is in the area will erode almost completely.

[randolph85]

if after 11 years these forces don't have their **** together, its pretty much useless.