Why the Taliban Are Winning

[Shah-i-Kot]

http://battleland.blogs.time.com/201...n-are-winning/


Why the Taliban Are Winning

By Mark Thompson | @MarkThompson_DC | June 21, 2012 |




Navy SEAL Reed Kitchen concludes that after 10 months in eastern Afghanistan last year, the U.S. military is using the wrong yardsticks to measure progress:

Let’s rewrite our metrics of success to reflect our effect on the population, with measures such as: economic activity at bazaars, unsolicited enemy reporting from villagers, and longevity of local officials; as opposed to the input metrics of enemy killed, dollars spent, and Afghan troops trained.

Good after-action report on his tour over at Small Wars Journal.


Read more: http://battleland.blogs.time.com/201...#ixzz1yXxdsXUI

[Shah-i-Kot]

The insurgents operated in small teams across the countryside with relative impunity. Sleeping in the mountains or as house guests at night, the Taliban spent the entirety of their days in the villages – not maintaining and defending outposts where they could enjoy the comforts of western civilization. They were unimpeded by burdensome equipment and had relatively infrequent contact with their commanders, at least compared with our daily reports and operational approvals. The Taliban leadership had an inherently decentralized command structure, managing fighters and shadow government officials spread over hundreds of square kilometers and countless villages. However, the regional commander and shadow governors were remarkably in tune with the district’s populace and made earnest efforts at gaining their support through regular interaction – not “drive by shuras” after flying in from Kabul or the provincial capital. Likewise, the Taliban had an omnipresence that was felt by coalition forces and villagers alike. They possessed an uncanny ability to act as puppet masters over the populace, issuing decrees and administering justice based on persistent verification – not sporadic visits like absentee Afghan officials or “day tripping” coalition forces who neither spoke the language nor had spent enough time in the villages to understand the complex social dynamics.
Indeed, some villagers preferred the Taliban’s predictability to even the most well-intentioned soldier behind the ballistic glass of an armored vehicle. They laughed at our heavy protective equipment saying we hid behind ceramic plates and camouflage, almost as if they admired the Taliban as underdogs – the classic image of a mujahedeen fighter with an AK-47 slung across his back comes to mind. The Taliban senior leadership clearly communicated their intent of controlling Afghanistan through an Islamic state, a narrative that was well understood down to rank and file fighters and villagers.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/things-i-learned-from-people-who-tried-to-kill-me

[JattApache]

Unknownprince, horrible troll stop that.