Back in October 2011, I attempted to summarise Pakistan’s options in Afghanistan in light of the evolving situation then. The article is available at: http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp...-10-2011_pg3_5. The present attempt is to see how many of the assumptions I made then have come true and to reassess Pakistan’s options in relation to the new situation. The idea is not so much to stress what went wrong but to see how things can be set right in the interests of all stakeholders in Afghanistan. The focus of course will be on the play of interests of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.
Begin by noting that the worst possible outcome of the Afghan conflict for Pakistan is at hand. Its key lies in the US determination to keep a few thousand Special Forces troops in Afghanistan for the next 10 years, complete with two or more dedicated airbases that will house drones and other fighters to protect them. In addition, the US and its allies will fund the Afghan national Army (ANA) for the next 10 years as it takes over security duties from US troops. The new US strategy is minimalist in deployment and works on the basis of denial of control of areas to the
Begin by noting that the worst possible outcome of the Afghan conflict for Pakistan is at hand. Its key lies in the US determination to keep a few thousand Special Forces troops in Afghanistan for the next 10 years, complete with two or more dedicated airbases that will house drones and other fighters to protect them. In addition, the US and its allies will fund the Afghan national Army (ANA) for the next 10 years as it takes over security duties from US troops. The new US strategy is minimalist in deployment and works on the basis of denial of control of areas to the
