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Looking for Taliban equivalents
Bestowing artificial legitimacy on aliens?
By Ali Arqam
In a recent opinion piece, Mr Nadir Hassan has drawn
parallels between the present-day Taliban and the
resistance movements in the federally administrated
tribal areas (FATA) in the remote past. The writer asserts
that he does not condone the Taliban atrocities but,
unfortunately, he appears to rationalise that madness by
his attempt to impart legitimacy of sorts by trying to tie
them to the past struggles in that region.
Mr Hasan has focused on the anti-colonial, conservative
religious figure, the Faqir of Ipi and has compared the
Faqir of Ipi’s rebellion against the British Raj with the
Taliban. The similarities between the two movements – if
the Taliban can be called one - are far and few in
between and the comparison is valid only in a very
limited scope, if at all.
The writer has, for example, exaggerated the reach and
influence of the Faqir’s uprising by calling it one of the
‘most successful rebellions’ which was actually not the
case. The fact is the movement by the Faqir of Ipi was
quite limited and neither had the capacity to nor did
extend outside Waziristan. Like the Taliban’s Pakistani
backers, the Faqir’s uprising had its foreign supporters in
Germans and Italians. However, unlike the Taliban’s
handlers, the Germans and Italians were aware that even
with unlimited supplies he could not gather more than a
thousand adherents or carry out a serious and sustained
assault on British forces. The Faqir’s did conduct the
classic hit-and-run guerrilla attacks against the British but
really had no strategy to expand the scope of their
rebellion, including tying it to the larger independence
struggle in British India.
Unlike the highly Arabised and Pakistan-trained Taliban,
the Faqir of Ipi’s movement was indigenous in nature,
characteristics, norms, scope and influence. It was not
driven by an anti-imperial ideology or any mooted anti-
colonial phenomena. It erupted on the issue of handing
over a Hindu minor girl to her parents by the British
administration, following a complaint against a tribal man
for abducting, converting to Islam and marrying the girl.
The action taken by the British administration, of course,
was highly commendable, especially when compared
today with the complicity of present-day political and civil
administration and the inaction of judiciary in similar
cases.
The steps taken by the British administration were
nonetheless conceived as an attack on the tribal code as
well as against religious norms. The outrage against the
perceived British excesses morphed into a decade-long
insurgency. The indigenous nature of the revolt by default
had to tap the traditional bastions of native culture and
power i.e. the jirga (political assembly), hujra (social
assembly) and the mosque (religious assembly). The
former two power centres overshadowed or at least
remained at par with the mosque – an exact opposite of
the way Taliban movement evolved and prosecuted war.
The Faqir’s men worked with the existing socio-political
structures, which is in stark contrast with the Taliban
zealots blowing up jirgas and decimating the tribal elders
and their hujras. Not a shred of historical evidence
suggests that the Faqir’s men went on a killing spree
against the tribal leaders, common people, music or
poetry recitals, village fairs and play areas, bazaars,
shrines or mosques.
The very distinct composition of Taliban-ian Islam (as the
writer asserted) is the attempt to bring down the existing
socio-political structure and to extend their control by
inflicting a puritanical version of Islam and waging a jihad
against fellow Muslims considered guilty of idolatry, grave
worshipping and adultery. Imposing rigorous prohibitions
on music, dance and all forms of arts, and enforce
punishments for not observing Islamic rituals, challenging
tribal hierarchy and insisting on socio-religious equality of
the people to win over support.
In his pursuance of finding out an equivalent from the
region to dispel the impression of considering the Taliban
as an unprecedented phenomena, he missed that the
Faqir of Ipi was not a mullah; he was associated with a
Sufi clan, a disciple of Pir Naqib of Charbagh, which
makes him a Barelvi. Thus, his version of religion was
more in line with the local interpretation of Islam (for
instance, it is apparent from the use of music in his war
parties).
Also, if he had researched about the descendants of the
Faqir of Ipi, he may have found that the successor of the
Faqir, his nephew, Niaz Ali Khan, was known for his
conciliatory approach in tribal disputes, and his sons
Abdul Jaleel, Abdul Wali and others were often inveighed
by the local mullahs for inertness toward the religiously
glorified war of Afghanistan and the current uproar in
FATA.
The Faqir of Ipi’s opposition to the idea of Pakistan came
from the political leanings favoured towards Congress
and its allies in frontier region, the Khudai Khidmatgars.
His support of the Pashtunistan was first influenced by
this and later by his contacts in the Afghan Government,
which lost grounds after Badshah Khan took an oath of
allegiance to Pakistan and his military commander later
surrendered to Pakistan.
Taliban roots in political and religious movements on
Pashtun lands can be traced to the Wahhabi-influenced
movement of Syed Ahmed of Bareli, who sought political
control by declaring himself the vanguard of Islam,
imposed centralised Sharia Laws, changing Pashtun
traditions and norms with their version of Islam and
challenging the traditional authority of Pashtun elders as
well as the religious clergy by assigning themselves the
authorities to arbitrate disputes and collect religious tax,
as Zakat and Ushr. These steps by Syed Ahmed and his
disciples from across India and among Pashtuns were
rejected by the traditional Pashtun leadership as well as
clergy. The alien movement ensued in an utter failure
Local tribal elders and people of FATA have the same
feelings of agony towards the aliens and monsters aka
Taliban; it is state support for perceived strategic
interests which have enabled them to continue their
beleaguering of FATA.
The writer is a freelance journalist and can be reached at
twitter.com/aliarqam
Bestowing artificial legitimacy on aliens?
By Ali Arqam
In a recent opinion piece, Mr Nadir Hassan has drawn
parallels between the present-day Taliban and the
resistance movements in the federally administrated
tribal areas (FATA) in the remote past. The writer asserts
that he does not condone the Taliban atrocities but,
unfortunately, he appears to rationalise that madness by
his attempt to impart legitimacy of sorts by trying to tie
them to the past struggles in that region.
Mr Hasan has focused on the anti-colonial, conservative
religious figure, the Faqir of Ipi and has compared the
Faqir of Ipi’s rebellion against the British Raj with the
Taliban. The similarities between the two movements – if
the Taliban can be called one - are far and few in
between and the comparison is valid only in a very
limited scope, if at all.
The writer has, for example, exaggerated the reach and
influence of the Faqir’s uprising by calling it one of the
‘most successful rebellions’ which was actually not the
case. The fact is the movement by the Faqir of Ipi was
quite limited and neither had the capacity to nor did
extend outside Waziristan. Like the Taliban’s Pakistani
backers, the Faqir’s uprising had its foreign supporters in
Germans and Italians. However, unlike the Taliban’s
handlers, the Germans and Italians were aware that even
with unlimited supplies he could not gather more than a
thousand adherents or carry out a serious and sustained
assault on British forces. The Faqir’s did conduct the
classic hit-and-run guerrilla attacks against the British but
really had no strategy to expand the scope of their
rebellion, including tying it to the larger independence
struggle in British India.
Unlike the highly Arabised and Pakistan-trained Taliban,
the Faqir of Ipi’s movement was indigenous in nature,
characteristics, norms, scope and influence. It was not
driven by an anti-imperial ideology or any mooted anti-
colonial phenomena. It erupted on the issue of handing
over a Hindu minor girl to her parents by the British
administration, following a complaint against a tribal man
for abducting, converting to Islam and marrying the girl.
The action taken by the British administration, of course,
was highly commendable, especially when compared
today with the complicity of present-day political and civil
administration and the inaction of judiciary in similar
cases.
The steps taken by the British administration were
nonetheless conceived as an attack on the tribal code as
well as against religious norms. The outrage against the
perceived British excesses morphed into a decade-long
insurgency. The indigenous nature of the revolt by default
had to tap the traditional bastions of native culture and
power i.e. the jirga (political assembly), hujra (social
assembly) and the mosque (religious assembly). The
former two power centres overshadowed or at least
remained at par with the mosque – an exact opposite of
the way Taliban movement evolved and prosecuted war.
The Faqir’s men worked with the existing socio-political
structures, which is in stark contrast with the Taliban
zealots blowing up jirgas and decimating the tribal elders
and their hujras. Not a shred of historical evidence
suggests that the Faqir’s men went on a killing spree
against the tribal leaders, common people, music or
poetry recitals, village fairs and play areas, bazaars,
shrines or mosques.
The very distinct composition of Taliban-ian Islam (as the
writer asserted) is the attempt to bring down the existing
socio-political structure and to extend their control by
inflicting a puritanical version of Islam and waging a jihad
against fellow Muslims considered guilty of idolatry, grave
worshipping and adultery. Imposing rigorous prohibitions
on music, dance and all forms of arts, and enforce
punishments for not observing Islamic rituals, challenging
tribal hierarchy and insisting on socio-religious equality of
the people to win over support.
In his pursuance of finding out an equivalent from the
region to dispel the impression of considering the Taliban
as an unprecedented phenomena, he missed that the
Faqir of Ipi was not a mullah; he was associated with a
Sufi clan, a disciple of Pir Naqib of Charbagh, which
makes him a Barelvi. Thus, his version of religion was
more in line with the local interpretation of Islam (for
instance, it is apparent from the use of music in his war
parties).
Also, if he had researched about the descendants of the
Faqir of Ipi, he may have found that the successor of the
Faqir, his nephew, Niaz Ali Khan, was known for his
conciliatory approach in tribal disputes, and his sons
Abdul Jaleel, Abdul Wali and others were often inveighed
by the local mullahs for inertness toward the religiously
glorified war of Afghanistan and the current uproar in
FATA.
The Faqir of Ipi’s opposition to the idea of Pakistan came
from the political leanings favoured towards Congress
and its allies in frontier region, the Khudai Khidmatgars.
His support of the Pashtunistan was first influenced by
this and later by his contacts in the Afghan Government,
which lost grounds after Badshah Khan took an oath of
allegiance to Pakistan and his military commander later
surrendered to Pakistan.
Taliban roots in political and religious movements on
Pashtun lands can be traced to the Wahhabi-influenced
movement of Syed Ahmed of Bareli, who sought political
control by declaring himself the vanguard of Islam,
imposed centralised Sharia Laws, changing Pashtun
traditions and norms with their version of Islam and
challenging the traditional authority of Pashtun elders as
well as the religious clergy by assigning themselves the
authorities to arbitrate disputes and collect religious tax,
as Zakat and Ushr. These steps by Syed Ahmed and his
disciples from across India and among Pashtuns were
rejected by the traditional Pashtun leadership as well as
clergy. The alien movement ensued in an utter failure
Local tribal elders and people of FATA have the same
feelings of agony towards the aliens and monsters aka
Taliban; it is state support for perceived strategic
interests which have enabled them to continue their
beleaguering of FATA.
The writer is a freelance journalist and can be reached at
twitter.com/aliarqam
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