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  • Insight into the Fata mind

    Insight into the Fata mind

    RECENTLY, the Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme (CAMP) issued its annual survey of the perceptions held by the tribesmen of Fata.

    Understanding FATA — Volume 5 provides a comprehensive insight into the minds of Fata’s population. The credit for creating awareness in this regard about Fata goes to the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) for funding the initiative and to CAMP for ably executing the task under dangerous conditions.


    In this three-part series, I will discuss some of the results relating to conflict, constitutional change, views about politicians and the priorities of the people of Fata.


    Surveys of this sort are the staple of policymakers, especially when they are uncertain about what reforms to initiate for improving the people’s lives. The survey is also important in another sense: Pakistan is geopolitically divided into a core and a periphery and the lack of awareness of what is happening in the periphery can lead to the destabilisation of the country.


    We saw this happen in East Pakistan in 1971. The findings provide a bird’s eye view of current perceptions in one peripheral area that ought to be heeded for strengthening national solidarity.


    It may be noted that Pakistan’s core is based on territories within the Punjab and Sindh provinces. They contain Pakistan’s demographic, industrial, commercial and agricultural heartland. From Punjab in the north, this region extends southward through Sindh province, flowing along the Indus River valley into the Thar desert.


    “This means Pakistan’s core is hard by the Indian border, leaving no meaningful terrain barriers to invasion. (Indeed, the Punjabi population straddles the Indian-Pakistani border much as the Pakhtun population straddles the Pakistani-Afghan border). This narrow strip of flat land is inherently vulnerable to India, Pakistan’s arch-rival to the east, a geographic arrangement that was no accident of the British partition,” notes the report.


    Thus, suffering from both geographic and demographic disadvantages, i.e. India — and with no strategic depth to speak of — Pakistan is extremely anxious about its security in the east and is forced to look to the Afghan border both out of concern for its depth and in search of opportunity. Fata, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan form the periphery around the Pakistani heartland and while the core is ever conscious of what happens within that periphery, it has not dealt with it with wisdom so far.


    If geography determines strategic choices, then we should listen to it. Instead, we have considered trumping geopolitical limitations by forming alliances to upgrade our military to prepare for wars.


    The situation of a country such as ours, that had a much larger India shadowing us in West Pakistan on the eastern flank and an East Pakistan that was surrounded on all sides by it, should have impelled us to reach a détente with our bigger neighbour. We, of course, thought otherwise and paid the price by losing the eastern half.


    In many ways the current situation shows that we have become almost blind or indifferent to the challenges facing us in Fata, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.


    The survey on Fata could thus not have come at a better time to give our policymakers abundant food for thought. It is remarkable that a region and people who have borne the brunt of violence and death for the last 12 years should collectively speak with the wisdom and maturity that they exhibit in this report.


    Regarding the constitutional future of Fata, 22 per cent of the 4,000 respondents wanted integration with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the main reason being that both regions contained Pakhtun-majority populations. Eleven per cent of the respondents wanted the existing status quo to be maintained, and 15 per cent of these explained that the conduct of governance in the provinces was not of a quality that would lead to betterment.


    Meanwhile, 28 per cent of the respondents thought that a separate province for Fata was the only path towards joining the mainstream. They felt that a merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa would lead to them being swamped by its elite. Many thought that by joining Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Fata’s mineral resources would be captured.


    Clearly, then, the future of Fata lies in either of two choices: joining Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or becoming a separate province.


    Perhaps one way out of this dilemma would be to empower political parties to mobilise in Fata as a precursor to a referendum.The survey quotes 71 per cent of the respondents as feeling that the country was not moving in a promising direction. Amongst national politicians, only Imran Khan emerged with high marks. This had nothing to do with performance but with hope and the Fata youth bulge.


    Khan was thought by 18 per cent of the respondents as being the best available leader, followed by Nawaz Sharif who received 15 per cent of the respondents’ confidence. All other leaders scored below four per cent.
    The survey gave a priority list of the tribesmen: 45 per cent voted for security, the same percentage thought that the provision of electricity was equally important, education scored 44 per cent, next came employment at 41 per cent, followed closely by health at 40 per cent. This constitutes a wise wish list indeed.


    In a similar vein, 79 per cent of the tribesmen opposed the presence of the US military in Fata and 68 per cent were against the presence of Al Qaeda, while the Afghan Taliban and the TTP were equally unpopular with 64 per cent and 63 per cent of the total respondents surveyed.


    The message clearly was that foreign groups or practices had no place in Fata. To get rid of these elements, 67 per cent recommended that it should be the Pakistan military’s job.


    The residents of Fata have retained their rationality despite the fact that 19 per cent, or 720,000 of them, have been internally displaced by war at one time or another. Despite this, they are hopeful about the emergence of a national saviour.


    The writer is chairman of the Regional Institute of Policy Research in Peshawar.


    azizkhalid@gmail.com


    DaWn!
    Last edited by haviZsultan; 05-05-2012, 08:49 AM.
    I am the author of Badal, an upcoming fiction novel on the War on Terror. For more information about me visit [URL="http://www.havisultan.com"]www.havisultan.com[/URL]

    Follow me on twitter:
    [url]https://twitter.com/#!/HaviZSultan[/url]

  • #2
    Hmmmm... Pakistan army is often called a banana republic army and what not on this forum... but most people in FATA support using the army to deal with TTP... and majority of tribesmen are against taliban in the survey which proves Taliban are not Pashtun saviours as shadowgovernor claims.

    Not to say army hasn't made mistakes and committed excesses on the local people. You have to win them over.
    I am the author of Badal, an upcoming fiction novel on the War on Terror. For more information about me visit [URL="http://www.havisultan.com"]www.havisultan.com[/URL]

    Follow me on twitter:
    [url]https://twitter.com/#!/HaviZSultan[/url]

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    • #3
      Originally posted by haviZsultan View Post

      Not to say army hasn't made mistakes and committed excesses on the local people. You have to win them over.
      Personally, I think that any outfit claiming to act on behalf of the Pashtuns needs more scrutiny, so Shadowgovernor's view that the Taliban = Pashtun saviours is just one view - not that indifferent to your view that the Pakistan army is somehow rightly guided by some heavenly inspired 'benevolence' and 'morality'.

      Comment


      • #4
        Originally posted by tor_khan View Post
        Personally, I think that any outfit claiming to act on behalf of the Pashtuns needs more scrutiny, so Shadowgovernor's view that the Taliban = Pashtun saviours is just one view - not that indifferent to your view that the Pakistan army is somehow rightly guided by some heavenly inspired 'benevolence' and 'morality'.
        I never said it is rightly guided. But I was stating that people indeed want the army there and are sick of the Taliban. Despite possible human rights violations and other excesses. I stated in my post that the army had made mistakes.

        But this is also true. So while the army is simply not fighting this war in the right way and is not used to fighting conventional war... it is still considered to be a sole solution to the militancy problem despite its failures and despite (often) its mistreatment of locals (Pashtuns) which even many of my sources in Swat reported after Black thunderstorm.

        Blackie... bro I think you just want to disagree with whatever I say. Mind if i call you blackie? :P
        Last edited by haviZsultan; 05-05-2012, 12:20 PM.
        I am the author of Badal, an upcoming fiction novel on the War on Terror. For more information about me visit [URL="http://www.havisultan.com"]www.havisultan.com[/URL]

        Follow me on twitter:
        [url]https://twitter.com/#!/HaviZSultan[/url]

        Comment


        • #5
          Originally posted by tor_khan View Post
          Personally, I think that any outfit claiming to act on behalf of the Pashtuns needs more scrutiny, so Shadowgovernor's view that the Taliban = Pashtun saviours is just one view - not that indifferent to your view that the Pakistan army is somehow rightly guided by some heavenly inspired 'benevolence' and 'morality'.
          Are all Afghans that oppose the NATO occupation war/Karzai regime part of the Taliban? I know you didnt say this, but I think it is also a misinformed perception many have.

          It is obvious that the Taliban are the dominant insurgent/opposition force within Afghanistan like the Viet Minh were in Vietnam, but they are not the only opposition.

          An example of common opposition is seen in Nuristan and Kunar.

          Most of those people there are the just the regular villager.
          Last edited by Shah-i-Kot; 05-05-2012, 12:56 PM.

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          • #6
            the taliban is not an organized military force, every member is just a "regular villager"

            are all afghans that oppose occupation pro taliban? NO
            There are people today who think that admitting God’s absolute greatness decreases the value and importance of humans in the creation, as if God and mankind are rivals competing in greatness and power. Meanwhile I feel that whenever our perception of God’s greatness increases, with it we become greater, because we are the creation of a great God.

            Sayyid Qutb

            Comment


            • #7
              Originally posted by shadowgoverner
              tor khan
              no need to put me in th espot light to make a point.
              the view im presenting is that of common Afghans not some wishful thinkers.
              the question remains; who made some Rap Music loving citizen of the UK the mouthpiece of the common Afghan? What are your sources and where is the evidence that supports them?

              Never have you offered anything more than your word of mouth, which by the way is questionable.
              [QUOTE=Afghanistan2010;658085][B]He is no different [COLOR="Red"]than us[/COLOR][/B],[B]he[COLOR="Red"] blindly believes [/COLOR]in the words [COLOR="Red"]of other men[/COLOR][/B],:[/QUOTE]

              2010 Admitting he's a blind believer not in God, but what other men says.

              Comment


              • #8
                Originally posted by haviZsultan View Post
                I never said it is rightly guided. But I was stating that people indeed want the army there and are sick of the Taliban. Despite possible human rights violations and other excesses. I stated in my post that the army had made mistakes.

                But this is also true. So while the army is simply not fighting this war in the right way and is not used to fighting conventional war... it is still considered to be a sole solution to the militancy problem despite its failures and despite (often) its mistreatment of locals (Pashtuns) which even many of my sources in Swat reported after Black thunderstorm.

                Blackie... bro I think you just want to disagree with whatever I say. Mind if i call you blackie? :P
                1. On the first point, if you are speaking about the Taliban's presence in Waziristan, Swat etc., I would say that you have a point.

                2. On the second matter, I do not actually stand in disagreement with you on every matter just for the sake of it. You have made it clear that you have an open bias in favour of the Pakistan military on your website and that you are willing to stick your neck out in their defence. To me therefore, your postings and wider media campaign has a clear and specific agenda.

                Regardless of that however, it would be dull for me - or anyone else for that matter, to simply nod in passive silence every time someone attempted to minimise the damage caused by an armed force by saying that "it was in excess." Remember those "excesses" amount to the deaths of innocent people, children, women, bread-winners and communities. For most thinking people it doesn't make a difference if those "excesses" are carried out by NATO or the Americans/Brits, the Taliban or the Pakistan Army. All aught to be held to account.

                3. You already called me Blackie, and then ask my permission if you can use that "name" as if somehow I might join in on your joke. When you use Urdu, do you make a distinction between Tum and Aap? Think about it and then figure out what the answer to what you should call me.

                Comment


                • #9
                  Originally posted by randolph85 View Post
                  the taliban is not an organized military force, every member is just a "regular villager"

                  are all afghans that oppose occupation pro taliban? NO
                  The Viet Minh were a guerrilla force and that is the major reason they defeated the US in Vietnam.

                  I actually dont know what you mean by organized military force? Who decides what is what?

                  The Peoples Liberation Army of China arose from a peasantry guerrilla force. Peasants/Villagers. The same holds for Che's fighters. They werent professional soldiers, but regular people who joined his cause.

                  The same holds for all others

                  Anyways, this is a interesting read



                  Guerrilla war lessons not learned

                  May 03, 2012|By Nick Turse

                  Last month, after Afghan militants unleashed sophisticated, synchronized attacks across Afghanistan, including in the capital, the Pentagon was quick to emphasize what hadn’t happened. “I’m not minimizing the seriousness of this, but this was in no way akin to the Tet Offensive,” said Pentagon spokesman George Little.
                  Defense Secretary Leon Panetta weighed in similarly: “There were no tactical gains here. These are isolated attacks that are done for symbolic purposes, and they have not regained any territory.”
                  This reaction reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of guerrilla warfare in general and of the type waged by the Haqqani network in particular. It’s a lesson the United States should have learned decades ago. But more than 40 years after the Vietnam War’s Tet Offensive, and after more than a decade of war in Afghanistan, the U.S. military still doesn’t get it.

                  Story continues below.




                  When Vietnamese revolutionary forces launched the 1968 offensive, attacking the South Vietnamese capital of Saigon as well as nearly 150 other sites, they were hoping to spark a general uprising. What they did instead was give the lie to months of U.S. officials’ optimistic talk about tremendous strategic gains and a foreseeable victory.
                  Just months before Tet, Gen. William Westmoreland had claimed there was a successful end in sight. So how were the Viet Cong able to launch such an assault?
                  In the course of the offensive, some 58,000 revolutionary fighters were killed, and their advance was beaten back. But guerrillas the world over grasped the lesson: In a guerrilla war, it’s crucial to highlight your enemy’s helplessness to stop you, and it doesn’t have to take 58,000 lives to do that.
                  The Haqqanis lost only 39 in demonstrating conclusively that in war-making terms, they are living in 2012, while the Pentagon is stuck in the mind-set of Saigon, 1968.
                  Panetta noted that the Haqqani fighters had not taken territory. But that wasn’t the point. What territory, after all, could the militants have been out to regain by attacking Kabul’s heavily defended diplomatic quarter? The German Embassy? While Panetta granted that the attacks were geared toward symbolic effect, he remained strangely focused on their tactical significance.
                  As in Vietnam, the U.S. military regularly attempts to prove that it’s winning via metrics in Afghanistan. We get reports of enemy captures and body counts, as if the conflict can be won on points, like a boxing match.


                  In Vietnam, Westmoreland and other top U.S. officials were forever seeking an elusive “crossover point,” the moment when their Vietnamese foes would be losing more fighters than they could replace and would have to capitulate. America would win a war of attrition.
                  But that didn’t work in Vietnam, and it’s not working in Afghanistan. More than a decade after U.S. forces swept into Kabul, what began as a ragtag, remnant insurgency has grown stronger and continues to vex the most destructively powerful military on the planet. All America’s tactical gains and captured territory, especially in the Taliban heartland of southern Afghanistan, haven’t brought the country anywhere near victory. America’s trillion-dollar military still is incapable of fully securing even a small “green zone” in the heart of the Afghan capital, much less the rest of the country.
                  Last edited by Shah-i-Kot; 05-05-2012, 11:07 PM.

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