Now, alongside Senator and Representative Paul and Michael Scheuer, another honest man has arisen, breaking ranks with colleague military men that generally know that if they just keep their mouths shut, they can await lucrative oil contracts and private security businesses in retirement. This is not to say that either Paul (father or son), Dr. Scheuer, or Lt. Col. Davis are friends of the Muslim world or of the Afghan people or that they are Mandelaists in uniform. It is merely an assessment of the fact that these men are willing to tell the truth and extricate the republic from the empire to ensure that it does not experience a contract phase or devastating fall like the British or the Romans.
Here is a link to Michael Hasting's discussion of the smear campaign the Pentagon is now initiating to deal with the report leaking:
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics...-read-20120210
And here is a link to the original report.
http://www1.rollingstone.com/extras/RS_REPORT.pdf
It is written in common nearly spoken English parlance and easy to grasp and understand.
There are a few key points that arise from the report:
1) It confirms Dr. Scheuer, head of Alec Station (i.e. the Bin Ladin Unit) of the CIA that, that the American war strategy is merely prolonging an inevitable defeat in Afghanistan. But it expounds on why the strategy is failing. Critical ground level information is incorporated into the report and technical details of military training and arms are provided.
2) It is severly critical of the ANA and ANSF and provides clear examples from recent memory (as recent as 2011) of generalized incompetence. It appears that the average ANA soldier runs his day to day efforts on the precept that: what is good for me is what counts. If he is a Pashtun, he has no moral imperitive that can drive him to face his enemy, who believes that his moral imperitive is to A) free his country from an invader and B) pay obedience to God. One must admit that is hard for the average Afghan in the ANA to reconcile the supposed moral imperitive of keeping Karzai in power with what was just mentioned. The only counter propaganda that has failed to take hold, that would offer any moral imperitive is the one being spun in Kabul's Amrullah Saleh laden circles: "Pakistan is the invader... these black turbaned beasts are Pakistanis who seek to control you." The inherent problem is that the propaganda does not permeate to the local level. The man in Kunar who dons the ANA uniform has neighbors and village colleagues who are "black turbaned." Moreover, the cross over into Quetta and into Waziristan is done regularly by these tribesmen and they have a hard time distinguising their Pashtun brethren just across the border in Angoor Ada from their own fellow villagers. Therefore, its impossible for this narrative to stick.
"To sum: in a number of high profile mission opportunities over the past 11 months the ANA and ANP have numerous times run from the battle, run from rumors, or made secret deals with the Taliban. (classified portions redacted) And I can confirm that this day's snapshot is entirely typical of every other day's totals." (page 41)
2) The media is held accountable for not adhereing to a journalistic code of ethics and of being a part of Eisenhower's proposed "military industrial complex."
3) Read the section on the Iraqi surge efforts. The Lt Colonel confirms everything Scheuer wrote in terms of AQI and Zarqawi's leadership rendering a near fatal blow to AQ in Iraq, turning the Iraqi sunnis against the insurgency due to Zarqawi's blood thirst. This was subsequently confirmed in letters discovered in Iraq written from the central leadership in Pakistan to Iraq (i.e. warnings were given to Zarqawi to tone it down).
This is nearly a verbatim reproduction, from the report, of Michael Scheuer's thesis:
"The Bottom Iraqi Line: from the Iraqi perspective, it was only the nearly two years of overt brutality and mindless slaughter inflicted on the Sunni community by its ostensible Sunni ally AQI that the Iraqi Sunnis were willing to revolt and instead partner with the US. The surge of troops in 2007 did play a role, so there is no attempt to suggest it had no place." (page 66)
4) The Afghan government and, by extension, its US support team has a propagandist view that is attempting to create, whole cloth, out of thin air, a national unity identity. The complex history of the country is merely brushed under the rug. In this set of propaganda, Afghan government officials attempt to trivialize ethnic differences (despite folks like Dr. Sima Samar, a Hazara, crowing loudly against Pashtun ascendency) and claim that the Pashtun sitting in Kandahar feels perfect brotherly love for his countryman in Panjshir. In a comedic fashion, these Afghan emigres that tout this supposed ethnic unity shrug their shoulders and point to the government across the durand line for generating division myths. When facts and figure are cited, shoulders are shrugged and anicdote (not a substitute for evidence) is given by these mouth pieces citing street vendors in Kabul speaking dari and Pashto in unision. The Lt. Colonel has been kind enough to provide the real view in the background:
"Former Deputy Minister of Interior Abdul Hadi Khaled was quoted in Hasht-e Sobh as saying, "national and ethnic differences, which have never been so strong, have reached their peak and there are no guarantees for the future of Afghanistan," and that his government was "sunk in corruption and taken over by mafia networks that is (sic) mainly held responsible for the dire situation in Afghanistan."
4) Contrary to the postings done by the surrogates of the Kabul government, indicating that the Taliban back is being rebroke after having been broken, or that a decapitation maneuver by killing Mullah Omar is all that it will take to defeat the Taliban:
"The Afghan people demonstrate an alarming lack of faith in their government and security forces and according to multiple sources, despite ISAF claims to the contrary, Taliban morale is so strong that most are reported to be utterly convinced they have already won."
Here is a link to Michael Hasting's discussion of the smear campaign the Pentagon is now initiating to deal with the report leaking:
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics...-read-20120210
And here is a link to the original report.
http://www1.rollingstone.com/extras/RS_REPORT.pdf
It is written in common nearly spoken English parlance and easy to grasp and understand.
There are a few key points that arise from the report:
1) It confirms Dr. Scheuer, head of Alec Station (i.e. the Bin Ladin Unit) of the CIA that, that the American war strategy is merely prolonging an inevitable defeat in Afghanistan. But it expounds on why the strategy is failing. Critical ground level information is incorporated into the report and technical details of military training and arms are provided.
2) It is severly critical of the ANA and ANSF and provides clear examples from recent memory (as recent as 2011) of generalized incompetence. It appears that the average ANA soldier runs his day to day efforts on the precept that: what is good for me is what counts. If he is a Pashtun, he has no moral imperitive that can drive him to face his enemy, who believes that his moral imperitive is to A) free his country from an invader and B) pay obedience to God. One must admit that is hard for the average Afghan in the ANA to reconcile the supposed moral imperitive of keeping Karzai in power with what was just mentioned. The only counter propaganda that has failed to take hold, that would offer any moral imperitive is the one being spun in Kabul's Amrullah Saleh laden circles: "Pakistan is the invader... these black turbaned beasts are Pakistanis who seek to control you." The inherent problem is that the propaganda does not permeate to the local level. The man in Kunar who dons the ANA uniform has neighbors and village colleagues who are "black turbaned." Moreover, the cross over into Quetta and into Waziristan is done regularly by these tribesmen and they have a hard time distinguising their Pashtun brethren just across the border in Angoor Ada from their own fellow villagers. Therefore, its impossible for this narrative to stick.
"To sum: in a number of high profile mission opportunities over the past 11 months the ANA and ANP have numerous times run from the battle, run from rumors, or made secret deals with the Taliban. (classified portions redacted) And I can confirm that this day's snapshot is entirely typical of every other day's totals." (page 41)
2) The media is held accountable for not adhereing to a journalistic code of ethics and of being a part of Eisenhower's proposed "military industrial complex."
3) Read the section on the Iraqi surge efforts. The Lt Colonel confirms everything Scheuer wrote in terms of AQI and Zarqawi's leadership rendering a near fatal blow to AQ in Iraq, turning the Iraqi sunnis against the insurgency due to Zarqawi's blood thirst. This was subsequently confirmed in letters discovered in Iraq written from the central leadership in Pakistan to Iraq (i.e. warnings were given to Zarqawi to tone it down).
This is nearly a verbatim reproduction, from the report, of Michael Scheuer's thesis:
"The Bottom Iraqi Line: from the Iraqi perspective, it was only the nearly two years of overt brutality and mindless slaughter inflicted on the Sunni community by its ostensible Sunni ally AQI that the Iraqi Sunnis were willing to revolt and instead partner with the US. The surge of troops in 2007 did play a role, so there is no attempt to suggest it had no place." (page 66)
4) The Afghan government and, by extension, its US support team has a propagandist view that is attempting to create, whole cloth, out of thin air, a national unity identity. The complex history of the country is merely brushed under the rug. In this set of propaganda, Afghan government officials attempt to trivialize ethnic differences (despite folks like Dr. Sima Samar, a Hazara, crowing loudly against Pashtun ascendency) and claim that the Pashtun sitting in Kandahar feels perfect brotherly love for his countryman in Panjshir. In a comedic fashion, these Afghan emigres that tout this supposed ethnic unity shrug their shoulders and point to the government across the durand line for generating division myths. When facts and figure are cited, shoulders are shrugged and anicdote (not a substitute for evidence) is given by these mouth pieces citing street vendors in Kabul speaking dari and Pashto in unision. The Lt. Colonel has been kind enough to provide the real view in the background:
"Former Deputy Minister of Interior Abdul Hadi Khaled was quoted in Hasht-e Sobh as saying, "national and ethnic differences, which have never been so strong, have reached their peak and there are no guarantees for the future of Afghanistan," and that his government was "sunk in corruption and taken over by mafia networks that is (sic) mainly held responsible for the dire situation in Afghanistan."
4) Contrary to the postings done by the surrogates of the Kabul government, indicating that the Taliban back is being rebroke after having been broken, or that a decapitation maneuver by killing Mullah Omar is all that it will take to defeat the Taliban:
"The Afghan people demonstrate an alarming lack of faith in their government and security forces and according to multiple sources, despite ISAF claims to the contrary, Taliban morale is so strong that most are reported to be utterly convinced they have already won."

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