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Afghan ’surge’ cover-up exposed
By M K Bhadrakumar – February 7, 2012
War cover-ups are as ancient as the hills. Every war would have hidden stories to tell. The Afghan war is no exception. A Pakistani friend sent to me the startling first-person singular account by a serving colonel in the US army about the grim ground realities of Afghan war, which blows to smithereens the doctored versions that appear in official US pronouncements.
Lt. Col. Daniel Davis’ account shows that David Petraeus’ famous Afghan ’surge’ has been a failure. The Taliban insurgents control “virtually every piece of land beyond eyeshot” of a US or ISAF military base. President Hamid Karzai’s government has been a disaster and local governments fail to “provide for the basic needs of the people.” Afghan security forces often collude with insurgents.
Afghan forces are nowhere near capable of shouldering the responsibility for security. Davis asks: “In all of the places I visited, the tactical situation was bad to abysmal… How many more men must die in support of a mission that is not succeeding and behind an array of more than seven years of optimistic statements by US senior leaders in Afghanistan? Good question. Yet, those who exuded optimism about the war have done well for themselves. But then, that is one common feature of war cover-ups. Remember Peter O’Toole’s classic film Zulu Dawn?
In real history, though, Lord Chelmsford who led the British troops in the disastrous Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 — British army’ worst ever defeat against an inferior native force in the colonial era — had powerful supporters all the way up to Queen Victoria who showered honours on him, made him full general, awarded him the Golden Stick at Court and appointed him Lieutenant of the Tower of London. The hugely successful life of General Frederic Augustus Thesiger, 2nd Baron Chelmsford GCB, GCVO finally ended in 1905 when he was playing billiards at his club.
Victoria was fond of Chelmsford at a personal level. But for President Barack Obama, it was paramountly a political decision to promote Petraeus as CIA director, given the strong backing the general with the Roman name enjoys among the Republicans. The Afghan war doesn’t figure as a campaign issue in 2012.
The problem with cover-ups is that opportunities to learn hard lessons get wasted. Thus, hardly a year after the Zulu War, Britain slid into the Boer War. If Davis’ expose is properly grasped, there is no reason why America should repeat the same mistake in Syria or Iran.
What gives optimism is that the Pentagon’s Armed Forces Journal found Davis’s opinion important enough to be disseminated. Now, how many militaries would do such a thing? Davis’ article is here.
By M K Bhadrakumar – February 7, 2012
War cover-ups are as ancient as the hills. Every war would have hidden stories to tell. The Afghan war is no exception. A Pakistani friend sent to me the startling first-person singular account by a serving colonel in the US army about the grim ground realities of Afghan war, which blows to smithereens the doctored versions that appear in official US pronouncements.
Lt. Col. Daniel Davis’ account shows that David Petraeus’ famous Afghan ’surge’ has been a failure. The Taliban insurgents control “virtually every piece of land beyond eyeshot” of a US or ISAF military base. President Hamid Karzai’s government has been a disaster and local governments fail to “provide for the basic needs of the people.” Afghan security forces often collude with insurgents.
Afghan forces are nowhere near capable of shouldering the responsibility for security. Davis asks: “In all of the places I visited, the tactical situation was bad to abysmal… How many more men must die in support of a mission that is not succeeding and behind an array of more than seven years of optimistic statements by US senior leaders in Afghanistan? Good question. Yet, those who exuded optimism about the war have done well for themselves. But then, that is one common feature of war cover-ups. Remember Peter O’Toole’s classic film Zulu Dawn?
In real history, though, Lord Chelmsford who led the British troops in the disastrous Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 — British army’ worst ever defeat against an inferior native force in the colonial era — had powerful supporters all the way up to Queen Victoria who showered honours on him, made him full general, awarded him the Golden Stick at Court and appointed him Lieutenant of the Tower of London. The hugely successful life of General Frederic Augustus Thesiger, 2nd Baron Chelmsford GCB, GCVO finally ended in 1905 when he was playing billiards at his club.
Victoria was fond of Chelmsford at a personal level. But for President Barack Obama, it was paramountly a political decision to promote Petraeus as CIA director, given the strong backing the general with the Roman name enjoys among the Republicans. The Afghan war doesn’t figure as a campaign issue in 2012.
The problem with cover-ups is that opportunities to learn hard lessons get wasted. Thus, hardly a year after the Zulu War, Britain slid into the Boer War. If Davis’ expose is properly grasped, there is no reason why America should repeat the same mistake in Syria or Iran.
What gives optimism is that the Pentagon’s Armed Forces Journal found Davis’s opinion important enough to be disseminated. Now, how many militaries would do such a thing? Davis’ article is here.