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Dear Pashtun Friends:
I am an Italian who loves Afghanistan and has followed Afghan politics for many years. I would like to post a short article on the root cause of the Afghanistan war.
To summarize: I believe that in 2001-2002, the Americans imposed Hamid Karzai as a puppet ruler, instead of allowing the Afghan people to exercise political freedom and self-determination, as they falsely claimed:
Source: Dr. K. Gharwal; Austria - Vienna ٤ / ٢ / ١٣٨٨ لمريز ~ 2009-04-24 15:04:50 زېږديز
And here is the article:
The Pashtuns and the Puppet Regime
The June, 2002, National Assembly (Loya Jirga) held in Afghanistan to select the head of state was rigged by the Bush administration, forcing the former king, who had majority support among the delegates, to withdraw from consideration*. This shows that the "Bush freedom agenda" was basically a sham–a political gimmick, a phony; and that Karzai is a U.S. puppet. Once he was installed, the subsequent elections, held without established political parties, were little more than a rubber stamp.
However, many Americans think that the U.S. brought freedom to Afghanistan, and cling to the notion of Afghanistan as "the good war." The original U.S. sin behind the lack of legitimacy of the Karzai regime, although factually incontrovertible, has remained almost unnoticed.
The result is that blame for the situation tends to be placed on other factors, such as corruption and poor governance. Both are essentially a function of government weakness. But a puppet regime is weak virtually by definition.
The decision to sideline the king aggravated the disenfranchisement and oppression of the Pashtun tribes (the majority political element in Afghanistan) occasioned by U.S. support for the Northern Alliance and other warlords. Pashtun civilians in Northern Afghanistan, for example, have been subjected to great brutality in 2001 and 2002–another fact that has remained almost completely unreported.
But as Vartan Gregorian, the great historian of modern Afghanistan, warned in 2001, "Pashtuns won’t easily relinquish two centuries of memory and power. Without a major Pashtun role in the future of Afghanistan, there will be no viable peace." Gregorian also noted that the king was welcome, but not as a U.S. puppet.
It is sufficient to take a look at a map of the insurgency to see that it is practically the same as an ethnic map of Pashtun areas (including the Pashtun areas of Pakistan).
This is why throwing more military forces into the cauldron, and killing more Pashtuns, is not the best solution–and it is hardly a freedom and self-determination solution. It will perpetuate and, indeed, exacerbate a disastrous internal contradiction in U.S. policy.
As for tribal militias, so-called "Arbakai"–villagers armed with rifles–are not much to keep the Taliban at bay. Large scale, heavily armed and lavishly financed militias, like the Uzbeg militia led by the infamous General Dostam, were organized by the Soviets before their pullout in 1989, and proved effective in staving off the collapse of the Soviet-supported regime–until they turned against it.
What is needed is not handing out wads of cash, but a political solution based on reconciliation with the Pashtun tribes. In the words of a British colonial statesman, "An Afghan ruler rules only by the goodwill of the most powerful Afghan tribes" (Sir Olaf Caroe).
It is the fundamental compact of allegiance between the tribes and the central government that needs to be reestablished. Such a compact is not a pipe dream, but something that actually existed as the historical basis of the Afghan state, and which, under the monarchy, afforded Afghanistan generations of progress and peace.
In fact, bribing tribal leaders is utterly incompatible with a genuine political process, just as bribing voters is incompatible with a democratic election. And if the bribing is done by foreigners, the affront is even worse.
Strange and anachronistic as it may seem, even at this late date the royal family are probably the only ones who can hope to do it–although not necessarily any of the king’s sons, and within a republican, not a monarchical framework. The political capital accumulated by the Musahiban in the last century has not dissipated, nor been appropriated by anyone else, least of all poor Hamid Karzai.
They were the last legitimate rulers, and they still are, because of the way the 2002 Loya Jirga was rigged. The old King's grandson, Mostapha Zaher, was his chosen political successor.
The most suitable forum is likely to be a new Loya Jirga, hopefully to be convened by the end of the current presidential term. To have a chance of success, any arrangement will require a fundamental rebalancing of power away from the non-Pashtun actors who have dominated the scene since 2001.
Those actors will resist, if given a chance: and it is precisely by deterring and preventing such resistances that the American military will find more fruitful employment than in savaging the tribes.
However, now that both the old king and his senior cousin, General Abdul Wali, are no longer around, everything will be harder, and the prospects more uncertain.
The Latest AfPak War ยป Counterpunch: Tells the Facts, Names the Names
References:
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/14/op...-missteps.html , retrieved on Feb. 9, 2009. See also "Heavy Hand of US Sparks Anger in Kabul"
by Mark MacKinnon,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security...002/0611us.htm , and three articles by Lyse Doucet, April 28-June 9-June 16, 2002:
BBC News | SOUTH ASIA | Afghanistan's former king holds court
BBC NEWS | South Asia | Afghan ex-king awaits nation's decision
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programme...nt/2048303.stm Afghan wind blows dynasty away
I am an Italian who loves Afghanistan and has followed Afghan politics for many years. I would like to post a short article on the root cause of the Afghanistan war.
To summarize: I believe that in 2001-2002, the Americans imposed Hamid Karzai as a puppet ruler, instead of allowing the Afghan people to exercise political freedom and self-determination, as they falsely claimed:
The truth is that Mr. Karzai and Mr. Khalilzad was adviser from 1996 midle of
2001 by Unocal company, in month october of year 2001 mentioned deceased former
General Abdul Wali his name and he said, Karzai is not so intelligent like his
father, he was asked, why you mentioned this name? former General said, because
he will be put by Mr. Khalilzad as president in Afghanistan
2001 by Unocal company, in month october of year 2001 mentioned deceased former
General Abdul Wali his name and he said, Karzai is not so intelligent like his
father, he was asked, why you mentioned this name? former General said, because
he will be put by Mr. Khalilzad as president in Afghanistan
Source: Dr. K. Gharwal; Austria - Vienna ٤ / ٢ / ١٣٨٨ لمريز ~ 2009-04-24 15:04:50 زېږديز
And here is the article:
The Pashtuns and the Puppet Regime
The June, 2002, National Assembly (Loya Jirga) held in Afghanistan to select the head of state was rigged by the Bush administration, forcing the former king, who had majority support among the delegates, to withdraw from consideration*. This shows that the "Bush freedom agenda" was basically a sham–a political gimmick, a phony; and that Karzai is a U.S. puppet. Once he was installed, the subsequent elections, held without established political parties, were little more than a rubber stamp.
However, many Americans think that the U.S. brought freedom to Afghanistan, and cling to the notion of Afghanistan as "the good war." The original U.S. sin behind the lack of legitimacy of the Karzai regime, although factually incontrovertible, has remained almost unnoticed.
The result is that blame for the situation tends to be placed on other factors, such as corruption and poor governance. Both are essentially a function of government weakness. But a puppet regime is weak virtually by definition.
The decision to sideline the king aggravated the disenfranchisement and oppression of the Pashtun tribes (the majority political element in Afghanistan) occasioned by U.S. support for the Northern Alliance and other warlords. Pashtun civilians in Northern Afghanistan, for example, have been subjected to great brutality in 2001 and 2002–another fact that has remained almost completely unreported.
But as Vartan Gregorian, the great historian of modern Afghanistan, warned in 2001, "Pashtuns won’t easily relinquish two centuries of memory and power. Without a major Pashtun role in the future of Afghanistan, there will be no viable peace." Gregorian also noted that the king was welcome, but not as a U.S. puppet.
It is sufficient to take a look at a map of the insurgency to see that it is practically the same as an ethnic map of Pashtun areas (including the Pashtun areas of Pakistan).
This is why throwing more military forces into the cauldron, and killing more Pashtuns, is not the best solution–and it is hardly a freedom and self-determination solution. It will perpetuate and, indeed, exacerbate a disastrous internal contradiction in U.S. policy.
As for tribal militias, so-called "Arbakai"–villagers armed with rifles–are not much to keep the Taliban at bay. Large scale, heavily armed and lavishly financed militias, like the Uzbeg militia led by the infamous General Dostam, were organized by the Soviets before their pullout in 1989, and proved effective in staving off the collapse of the Soviet-supported regime–until they turned against it.
What is needed is not handing out wads of cash, but a political solution based on reconciliation with the Pashtun tribes. In the words of a British colonial statesman, "An Afghan ruler rules only by the goodwill of the most powerful Afghan tribes" (Sir Olaf Caroe).
It is the fundamental compact of allegiance between the tribes and the central government that needs to be reestablished. Such a compact is not a pipe dream, but something that actually existed as the historical basis of the Afghan state, and which, under the monarchy, afforded Afghanistan generations of progress and peace.
In fact, bribing tribal leaders is utterly incompatible with a genuine political process, just as bribing voters is incompatible with a democratic election. And if the bribing is done by foreigners, the affront is even worse.
Strange and anachronistic as it may seem, even at this late date the royal family are probably the only ones who can hope to do it–although not necessarily any of the king’s sons, and within a republican, not a monarchical framework. The political capital accumulated by the Musahiban in the last century has not dissipated, nor been appropriated by anyone else, least of all poor Hamid Karzai.
They were the last legitimate rulers, and they still are, because of the way the 2002 Loya Jirga was rigged. The old King's grandson, Mostapha Zaher, was his chosen political successor.
The most suitable forum is likely to be a new Loya Jirga, hopefully to be convened by the end of the current presidential term. To have a chance of success, any arrangement will require a fundamental rebalancing of power away from the non-Pashtun actors who have dominated the scene since 2001.
Those actors will resist, if given a chance: and it is precisely by deterring and preventing such resistances that the American military will find more fruitful employment than in savaging the tribes.
However, now that both the old king and his senior cousin, General Abdul Wali, are no longer around, everything will be harder, and the prospects more uncertain.
The Latest AfPak War ยป Counterpunch: Tells the Facts, Names the Names
References:
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/14/op...-missteps.html , retrieved on Feb. 9, 2009. See also "Heavy Hand of US Sparks Anger in Kabul"
by Mark MacKinnon,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security...002/0611us.htm , and three articles by Lyse Doucet, April 28-June 9-June 16, 2002:
BBC News | SOUTH ASIA | Afghanistan's former king holds court
BBC NEWS | South Asia | Afghan ex-king awaits nation's decision
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programme...nt/2048303.stm Afghan wind blows dynasty away
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