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CHARLESTON, W.Va. -- Is the real issue in the purported "war on terror" Pakistan, rather than Afghanistan? After all, we are told, Pakistan harbored Osama bin Laden and probably harbors other al-Qaida leaders, even as it trains Afghan Taliban guerrillas in North Waziristan and sends them to kill American soldiers and Afghan civilians in eastern Afghanistan.
How about a brief lesson in historical geography before we jump to simple conclusions? A look at the historical evolution of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan reveals some fundamental, and often overlooked, realities. Drawn by the British in the late 19th century, the border initially divided "spheres of influence" between British India and Afghanistan. Without regard to the wishes of the people living near the border, it imposed an artificial line seldom recognized by historical tribes and clan networks in the region.
In 1947, the partition of British India into India and Pakistan retained the same internationally recognized border, this time separating western Pakistan from Afghanistan. Crucially, however, Afghanistan never recognized the border -- and still challenges its legality. Indeed, at the time of partition and for some time afterward, there was even a demand for a separate "Pashtunistan" incorporating ethnic Pashtuns who today represent approximately 40 percent of the population of Afghanistan and 20 percent of Pakistan.
Within Afghanistan, Pashtuns historically considered themselves the "true" Afghans. The Taliban -- our ostensible enemy in the purported "war On terror" -- is almost entirely Pashtun. Indeed, the alliance between the United States and northern Afghan dissidents during the military overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 involved ethnic groups who resented Pashtun domination. The United States supported Hamid Karzai as the first Afghan president because he is Pashtun, and therefore could gain the support of "defeated" Pashtuns who retained divided loyalties based on ethnic and tribal networks that spread across the border between eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan (where Karzai had been living while Afghanistan was dominated by the Taliban).
The ethnic character of the Taliban raises questions about its exact relationship to the Islamic faith, despite its adoption of a radical and primitive version of Islam. As many analysts have noted, the Taliban developed its religious ideology while separated from its local clan culture as refugees in western Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. This ideology had little to do with the traditional forms of religious belief with which most Afghans and Pakistanis are familiar.
It is certainly true that Pakistan itself became a "Muslim state" because it feared that if Muslims remained in India after independence was gained in 1947, they would be victimized by majority Hindus, despite India's insistence that it was a secular state. The move toward a separate Muslim state of Pakistan was initially led by very worldly nonreligious leaders who wanted to protect their fellow Muslims in the event of a breakdown of India's secular principles -- not an unrealistic fear, given the rise of a fanatical (although initially small) anti-secular Hindu faction, one of whose members assassinated Indian nationalist leader Mahatma Gandhi because of his efforts to unite Muslims and Hindus.
Pakistan challenged its original secular roots to emphasize religious nationalism in the 1970s because nothing else could effectively gain a common loyalty among its own conflicting ethnic groups and direct attention toward a common enemy: "Hindu India." Indeed, as one Pakistani ethnic group, the Punjabis, dominated the army, civil service and economic sectors, huge resentments arose among other Pakistani ethnic groups, including the Sindhis, Baluchis and Pashtuns. East Pakistan's Bengali citizens even broke off from western Pakistan to form the new state of Bangladesh in 1971 after out-voting the Punjabis in elections and suffering a subsequent bloody repression by the Pakistani army.
In short, ethnicity has often trumped religious identity. There is little doubt that ethnic identity in Afghanistan and Pakistan is intimately connected to religious assumptions and deeply held beliefs -- yet there is also little doubt that ethnic identities have often been the main source of conflict. They vastly complicate efforts to promote a national identity. Indeed, tribal or clan loyalties are usually the basis for the strongest everyday loyalties, until ethnic or religious identity appears to be directly challenged. The U.S. presence in Afghanistan, rightly or wrongly, is often seen to provide a direct challenge to all of these loyalties.
Pakistan, in short, is not the issue. The Pakistani state is divided against itself in multiple ways, and subject to demagogic religious appeals that secular political leaders find hard to challenge. Americans, of all people, should not be surprised by this pattern. No doubt certain factions within the intelligence and military services have badly compromised the U.S. role in Afghanistan, in large part due to the complicated and still disputed border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the need to manipulate Pashtun loyalties to their own advantage.
At some point, we need to recognize our limits. The United States cannot resolve the ethnic and religious dilemmas of modern nationalism in South Asia. As counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen has pointed out, most of the people caught up in groups like the Taliban are "accidental guerrillas." Whatever might be said of some of their leaders, they are not religious fanatics caught up in an international terrorist conspiracy. They have their own local preoccupations, based on a long and difficult history over which they never had control.
Perhaps we should just withdraw and let them work out their own destiny.
Beller, a professor at West Virginia State University, is a Gazette contributing columnist
Gerald Beller: Ethnic rules run Afghan, Pakistani relations - Op-Ed Commentaries - The Charleston Gazette - West Virginia News and Sports -
How about a brief lesson in historical geography before we jump to simple conclusions? A look at the historical evolution of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan reveals some fundamental, and often overlooked, realities. Drawn by the British in the late 19th century, the border initially divided "spheres of influence" between British India and Afghanistan. Without regard to the wishes of the people living near the border, it imposed an artificial line seldom recognized by historical tribes and clan networks in the region.
In 1947, the partition of British India into India and Pakistan retained the same internationally recognized border, this time separating western Pakistan from Afghanistan. Crucially, however, Afghanistan never recognized the border -- and still challenges its legality. Indeed, at the time of partition and for some time afterward, there was even a demand for a separate "Pashtunistan" incorporating ethnic Pashtuns who today represent approximately 40 percent of the population of Afghanistan and 20 percent of Pakistan.
Within Afghanistan, Pashtuns historically considered themselves the "true" Afghans. The Taliban -- our ostensible enemy in the purported "war On terror" -- is almost entirely Pashtun. Indeed, the alliance between the United States and northern Afghan dissidents during the military overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 involved ethnic groups who resented Pashtun domination. The United States supported Hamid Karzai as the first Afghan president because he is Pashtun, and therefore could gain the support of "defeated" Pashtuns who retained divided loyalties based on ethnic and tribal networks that spread across the border between eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan (where Karzai had been living while Afghanistan was dominated by the Taliban).
The ethnic character of the Taliban raises questions about its exact relationship to the Islamic faith, despite its adoption of a radical and primitive version of Islam. As many analysts have noted, the Taliban developed its religious ideology while separated from its local clan culture as refugees in western Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. This ideology had little to do with the traditional forms of religious belief with which most Afghans and Pakistanis are familiar.
It is certainly true that Pakistan itself became a "Muslim state" because it feared that if Muslims remained in India after independence was gained in 1947, they would be victimized by majority Hindus, despite India's insistence that it was a secular state. The move toward a separate Muslim state of Pakistan was initially led by very worldly nonreligious leaders who wanted to protect their fellow Muslims in the event of a breakdown of India's secular principles -- not an unrealistic fear, given the rise of a fanatical (although initially small) anti-secular Hindu faction, one of whose members assassinated Indian nationalist leader Mahatma Gandhi because of his efforts to unite Muslims and Hindus.
Pakistan challenged its original secular roots to emphasize religious nationalism in the 1970s because nothing else could effectively gain a common loyalty among its own conflicting ethnic groups and direct attention toward a common enemy: "Hindu India." Indeed, as one Pakistani ethnic group, the Punjabis, dominated the army, civil service and economic sectors, huge resentments arose among other Pakistani ethnic groups, including the Sindhis, Baluchis and Pashtuns. East Pakistan's Bengali citizens even broke off from western Pakistan to form the new state of Bangladesh in 1971 after out-voting the Punjabis in elections and suffering a subsequent bloody repression by the Pakistani army.
In short, ethnicity has often trumped religious identity. There is little doubt that ethnic identity in Afghanistan and Pakistan is intimately connected to religious assumptions and deeply held beliefs -- yet there is also little doubt that ethnic identities have often been the main source of conflict. They vastly complicate efforts to promote a national identity. Indeed, tribal or clan loyalties are usually the basis for the strongest everyday loyalties, until ethnic or religious identity appears to be directly challenged. The U.S. presence in Afghanistan, rightly or wrongly, is often seen to provide a direct challenge to all of these loyalties.
Pakistan, in short, is not the issue. The Pakistani state is divided against itself in multiple ways, and subject to demagogic religious appeals that secular political leaders find hard to challenge. Americans, of all people, should not be surprised by this pattern. No doubt certain factions within the intelligence and military services have badly compromised the U.S. role in Afghanistan, in large part due to the complicated and still disputed border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the need to manipulate Pashtun loyalties to their own advantage.
At some point, we need to recognize our limits. The United States cannot resolve the ethnic and religious dilemmas of modern nationalism in South Asia. As counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen has pointed out, most of the people caught up in groups like the Taliban are "accidental guerrillas." Whatever might be said of some of their leaders, they are not religious fanatics caught up in an international terrorist conspiracy. They have their own local preoccupations, based on a long and difficult history over which they never had control.
Perhaps we should just withdraw and let them work out their own destiny.
Beller, a professor at West Virginia State University, is a Gazette contributing columnist
Gerald Beller: Ethnic rules run Afghan, Pakistani relations - Op-Ed Commentaries - The Charleston Gazette - West Virginia News and Sports -