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The hornet is dead, near the nest —Dr Mohammad Taqi

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  • The hornet is dead, near the nest —Dr Mohammad Taqi

    COMMENT: The hornet is dead, near the nest —Dr Mohammad Taqi

    The Pakistani brass was caught red-handed and was not given an option to say no to the operation. But the Pakistani deep state still does not get it, for its ideological sympathies are elsewhere

    Doveryai, no proveryai! This Russian proverb, meaning ‘trust, but verify’, popularised by Vladimir Lenin and later by Ronald Reagan, has not rung truer than in the events surrounding the assassination of Osama bin Laden (OBL) earlier this week. And we may see it applied much more intensely in the months to come.

    Phone calls from friends in Abbottabad about an ongoing military action there, were enough to suggest that something big was happening in what the locals had always believed to be an ISI-run facility, but the e-mail news alert from The Wall Street Journal announcing OBL’s death was still a major surprise. Against the norms of punditry, this time one hoped that we were wrong and this was not happening in Pakistan. But it was, and yes, we now stand vindicated: all of us who had been saying and writing for years that the US’s most wanted man was not under the protection of any major Pashtun tribe but was guarded by the clan that has anointed itself as the guardians of Pakistan’s ‘ideological’ and geographical frontiers. It is this same clan that had actually codified in its curriculum that “you are the selected lords; you are the cream of the nation”. Where else could this syllabus have been taught but at the Pakistan Military Academy, Kakul — less than a mile from OBL’s last lair?

    There is no polite way of saying it but these masters of Pakistan’s fortunes got egg on their face and that too with the whole world watching. A Peshawarite calling in on a television show said it most aptly: “Koilay ki dallali mein haath to kalay hotay hein per moonh bhi kala hota hai” (Those, whose business is foul, not only get their hands dirty but a blackened face too). But they still have the nerve to say with a straight face that a million-dollar fortress under their nose had been “off their radar”!

    Not only that but they also have the gall to mobilise the right-wing media to create the smokescreen of sovereignty yet again while simultaneously playing up their ‘role’ in support of the US action in Abbottabad. The world, however, is not buying that in a cantonment city, the army — which keeps track of every inch of land around its facilities — did not know what was going on in the high-walled compound next to its primary training academy. The paid spin masters will have to do better than this. No matter what President Asif Zardari or his ghostwriter is made to say in op-ed articles in US papers, it is the top brass that is under scrutiny. Using the civilian political leadership as the human shield is not going to work, as the calculus has changed dramatically.

    Barack Obama’s token acknowledgment of Pakistan’s non-specific cooperation is being construed by the Pakistani establishment and its minions to imply that the US can be taken for a ride again. It is too early for the specifics to surface but conversations with several sources in Washington and Pakistan point only to the deep mistrust that the US has had vis-à-vis Pakistan. There was no deal initiated by General Shuja Pasha to ‘trade in’ OBL for a bigger Pakistani role in Afghanistan. On the contrary, in response to the chest thumping by the Pakistani security establishment and its ultra right-wing political acolytes, they were confronted with damning evidence about the Haqqani network and possibly the Quetta Shura, while the OBL lead was not shared. The no-fly zone over Pakistan was created through phone calls, minutes after the OBL operation got underway. While the Pakistani brass is clutching at straws like blaming the ‘two Pashtun guards’ for protecting OBL’s compound, it was caught red-handed and was not given an option to say no to the operation. But the Pakistani deep state still does not get it, for its ideological sympathies are elsewhere.

    Hillary Clinton’s nuanced diplomatic statements notwithstanding, the mood of the US leadership is almost reflective of the immediate post-9/11 days and was conveyed well by Senator Carl Levin in his remark: “(Pakistan has) a lot of explaining to do ... I think the army and the intelligence of Pakistan have plenty of questions that they should be answering.” In a complete paradigm shift, any leverage that the Pakistani junta was hoping to gain from the bravado that started with the Raymond Davis affair has been lost completely. What will follow is a steady demand within the US to hold Pakistan’s feet to the fire. While maintaining a semblance of a working relationship, a very tough line will be adopted in private. The question bound to come up is not just why Pakistan was hanging on to OBL but also if there was any connection of its operatives to the 9/11 tragedy.
    From a tactical standpoint, the OBL operation is likely to serve as a template for future action against the jihadist leadership hiding in Pakistan, especially with General David Petraeus assuming his new role in the near future. To get closer to the strategic objective of a certain level of stability within Afghanistan and potentially a political reconciliation there, it is imperative for the US to neutralise the next two key hurdles, i.e. the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network. Both these entities have so far been able to evade the US’s reach, thanks to the Pakistani security establishment’s patronage.

    Members of the Haqqani clan have been roaming freely in the vicinity of Islamabad, Rawalpindi and Peshawar. Khalil Haqqani has conducted several meetings in the previous few months to broker the ‘peace deal’ for the Kurram Agency. It is inconceivable that he could act without the

    knowledge of the Pakistani security agencies. Similarly, Quetta is home to the Pakistan Army’s XII Corps, ISI regional headquarters, the Balochistan Frontier Corps, an army recruitment centre, the Pakistan Air Force base Samungli and the Pakistan Army’s prestigious Command and Staff College. One wonders if the Pakistani brass would still be able to say that they do not know the whereabouts of Mullah Omar.

    A window of opportunity perhaps still exists for Pakistan to make a clean break with the past but its incoherent blame-game and constantly changing story says otherwise. The Pakistani establishment has given the world very little reason to trust it without verifying — unless, of course, another hornet is to be missed hiding near a major nest.

    Source: The Daily Times

  • #2
    ANALYSIS: After Bin Laden: a reflection —Farhat Taj

    The fact that a certain number of Pakhtuns have become religious extremists or have links with Bin Laden is not the most important issue. The most important issue is that the military/intelligence nexus of Pakistan supports such people

    Back in 2007, some tribesmen from Waziristan told me that Osama Bin Laden was comfortably living in some garrison area of Pakistan under the protection of the intelligence establishment of the country and that the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) were the least likely place for his residence in the country. At that time, I agreed he might be under the protection of the intelligence agencies, but was not sure about his exact location in Pakistan — a garrison town of the country or the tribal areas. The tribesmen were confident that the former was the case. Time has proved that their confidence was not baseless. Four years down the road, Osama Bin Laden has been caught and killed in the Abbottabad, a garrison town of Pakistan, by the US in a commando operation on May 2, 2011.

    In the recent past, there was a movement for a Hazara province in response to the renaming of NWFP as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on the demand of the Pakhtun nationalist Awami National Party (ANP). Abbottabad was the centre of the movement. Many Pakhtun nationalists at the time said that ‘hidden forces’ (the intelligence agencies of Pakistan) were supporting the movement to pressurise the ANP led government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in line with the long-term policy of the establishment to suppress the Pakhtun nationalists. Now some Pakhtun nationalists are hinting that an additional reason why the hidden forces were determined to weaken the provincial ANP government’s control over Hazara was that they had to safely keep Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad, the capital of the Hazara region, away from the world’s attention.

    Many non-Pashto speaking people of Hazara may have complaints against the ANP government, but they can always be assured of one thing — the Pakhtun nationalists would never allow any part of Hazara soil to be used as a hideout of global jihadi terrorists like Osama Bin Laden. Many people in Hazara may appreciate it or not, but the hidden forces do understand the inherent incompatibility between the nationalists and the jihadi ‘assets’, be they from the Taliban or al Qaeda. This probably provides part of the explanation for the hidden forces’ support for the Hazara province movement against the democratically elected government of the ANP. The Pakhtun nationalists could not, of course, be trusted with ‘national secrets’ like Bin Laden’s safe stay in Abbottabad or the jihadi strategic games in FATA. Although FATA remains the most well known ‘no-go area’ for the Pakhtun nationalists, parts of Hazara are also off limits for the nationalist ANP government.

    Responding to a question about what the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa police under the ANP government did to thwart the US raid in Abbottabad, the ANP leader, Haji Adil, said that some parts of the province were beyond the control of the provincial police and the area in Abbottabad where Osama was killed by US commandos was one such areas. This lack of provincial police control over some parts of Hazara is explainable in the context of years long presence of jihadi training camps in the area. Hazara is very close to Kashmir, a place that has long remained a jihadi battleground for the military establishment. It was thus important to have a jihadi infrastructure in close proximity to Kashmir. Thus, for example, Mansehra in Hazara has had several large jihadi training camps for years. The training camps are publicly known to many local people but Bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad was secret and unknown to the local people.

    Pakhtun nationalists linked with the ANP and Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party have welcomed the elimination of Osama Bin Laden by the US. Similarly, the Pakhtuns, who are not directly linked with the nationalist parties, have also positively responded to the news that Bin Laden has been killed by the Americans. Speaking to Pashto radio station ‘Mashal’, many tribesmen from Waziristan held Bin Laden responsible for the killing of the tribesmen. While Pakhtuns in villages and towns across FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are reacting positively to the elimination of Bin Laden and even people linked with religious parties remain silent, the Pakistani media has already given a Pakhtun twist to the whole issue by repeatedly highlighting the Pakhtun ethnicity of Bin Laden’s guards and the owner of the house where he lived.

    Interestingly, President Zardari, in his op-ed piece for The Washington Post, in the aftermath of Bin Laden’s killing, also notes that the terror chief was killed in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa instead of Pakistan. This does not seem to be the real President Zardari. The real President Zardai was the one who mentioned — for the first time in history — Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (instead of NWFP) as a federating unit of Pakistan. The Zardari in The Washington Post was, in the words of Mohammad Taqi, a fellow columnist, a civilian “human shield” held out by the military establishment to protect itself from its worldwide criticism following the discovery of the world’s most hunted man in a military area of Pakistan. Moreover, it is also interesting to note that instead of addressing his own people on this important event, the president reached out to the US people through an op-ed.

    I have been writing on these pages that when a state is behind an idea, no matter how crazy it may be, there will always be people behind it. Our state within the state — the establishment — has nurtured religious bigotry over decades. This has affected people all over Pakistan and across all ethnicities. The fact that a certain number of Pakhtuns have become religious extremists or have links with Bin Laden is not the most important issue. The most important issue is that the military/intelligence nexus of Pakistan supports such people, Pakhtun or otherwise, and this has now become the focus of world attention in the aftermath of Bin Laden’s killing.

    Bin Laden’s dramatic killing in the heart of one of Pakistan’s most important garrisons has confronted the security establishment of Pakistan with difficult questions regarding its commitments as an ally in the war on terror. Playing with insignificant issues like ethnic profiling of the Pakhtuns in the aftermath of Bin Laden’s death is not going to deceive people around the world. Success of the US commando action in Abbottabad will encourage the US to keep searching inside Pakistan to destroy more sources of global terrorism. The world will be increasingly on the side of the US and less sympathetic to the security establishment of Pakistan. Difficult times seem to be ahead for Pakistan. Let us see how the establishment will deal with the remaining global terrorists like Ayman Al-Zawahri who might well be inside some other garrison town of Pakistan.

    http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default...7-5-2011_pg3_4

    Comment


    • #3
      Originally posted by Toramana View Post
      ANALYSIS: After Bin Laden: a reflection —Farhat Taj

      The fact that a certain number of Pakhtuns have become religious extremists or have links with Bin Laden is not the most important issue. The most important issue is that the military/intelligence nexus of Pakistan supports such people

      Back in 2007, some tribesmen from Waziristan told me that Osama Bin Laden was comfortably living in some garrison area of Pakistan under the protection of the intelligence establishment of the country and that the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) were the least likely place for his residence in the country. At that time, I agreed he might be under the protection of the intelligence agencies, but was not sure about his exact location in Pakistan — a garrison town of the country or the tribal areas. The tribesmen were confident that the former was the case. Time has proved that their confidence was not baseless. Four years down the road, Osama Bin Laden has been caught and killed in the Abbottabad, a garrison town of Pakistan, by the US in a commando operation on May 2, 2011.

      In the recent past, there was a movement for a Hazara province in response to the renaming of NWFP as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on the demand of the Pakhtun nationalist Awami National Party (ANP). Abbottabad was the centre of the movement. Many Pakhtun nationalists at the time said that ‘hidden forces’ (the intelligence agencies of Pakistan) were supporting the movement to pressurise the ANP led government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in line with the long-term policy of the establishment to suppress the Pakhtun nationalists. Now some Pakhtun nationalists are hinting that an additional reason why the hidden forces were determined to weaken the provincial ANP government’s control over Hazara was that they had to safely keep Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad, the capital of the Hazara region, away from the world’s attention.

      Many non-Pashto speaking people of Hazara may have complaints against the ANP government, but they can always be assured of one thing — the Pakhtun nationalists would never allow any part of Hazara soil to be used as a hideout of global jihadi terrorists like Osama Bin Laden. Many people in Hazara may appreciate it or not, but the hidden forces do understand the inherent incompatibility between the nationalists and the jihadi ‘assets’, be they from the Taliban or al Qaeda. This probably provides part of the explanation for the hidden forces’ support for the Hazara province movement against the democratically elected government of the ANP. The Pakhtun nationalists could not, of course, be trusted with ‘national secrets’ like Bin Laden’s safe stay in Abbottabad or the jihadi strategic games in FATA. Although FATA remains the most well known ‘no-go area’ for the Pakhtun nationalists, parts of Hazara are also off limits for the nationalist ANP government.

      Responding to a question about what the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa police under the ANP government did to thwart the US raid in Abbottabad, the ANP leader, Haji Adil, said that some parts of the province were beyond the control of the provincial police and the area in Abbottabad where Osama was killed by US commandos was one such areas. This lack of provincial police control over some parts of Hazara is explainable in the context of years long presence of jihadi training camps in the area. Hazara is very close to Kashmir, a place that has long remained a jihadi battleground for the military establishment. It was thus important to have a jihadi infrastructure in close proximity to Kashmir. Thus, for example, Mansehra in Hazara has had several large jihadi training camps for years. The training camps are publicly known to many local people but Bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad was secret and unknown to the local people.

      Pakhtun nationalists linked with the ANP and Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party have welcomed the elimination of Osama Bin Laden by the US. Similarly, the Pakhtuns, who are not directly linked with the nationalist parties, have also positively responded to the news that Bin Laden has been killed by the Americans. Speaking to Pashto radio station ‘Mashal’, many tribesmen from Waziristan held Bin Laden responsible for the killing of the tribesmen. While Pakhtuns in villages and towns across FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are reacting positively to the elimination of Bin Laden and even people linked with religious parties remain silent, the Pakistani media has already given a Pakhtun twist to the whole issue by repeatedly highlighting the Pakhtun ethnicity of Bin Laden’s guards and the owner of the house where he lived.

      Interestingly, President Zardari, in his op-ed piece for The Washington Post, in the aftermath of Bin Laden’s killing, also notes that the terror chief was killed in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa instead of Pakistan. This does not seem to be the real President Zardari. The real President Zardai was the one who mentioned — for the first time in history — Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (instead of NWFP) as a federating unit of Pakistan. The Zardari in The Washington Post was, in the words of Mohammad Taqi, a fellow columnist, a civilian “human shield” held out by the military establishment to protect itself from its worldwide criticism following the discovery of the world’s most hunted man in a military area of Pakistan. Moreover, it is also interesting to note that instead of addressing his own people on this important event, the president reached out to the US people through an op-ed.

      I have been writing on these pages that when a state is behind an idea, no matter how crazy it may be, there will always be people behind it. Our state within the state — the establishment — has nurtured religious bigotry over decades. This has affected people all over Pakistan and across all ethnicities. The fact that a certain number of Pakhtuns have become religious extremists or have links with Bin Laden is not the most important issue. The most important issue is that the military/intelligence nexus of Pakistan supports such people, Pakhtun or otherwise, and this has now become the focus of world attention in the aftermath of Bin Laden’s killing.

      Bin Laden’s dramatic killing in the heart of one of Pakistan’s most important garrisons has confronted the security establishment of Pakistan with difficult questions regarding its commitments as an ally in the war on terror. Playing with insignificant issues like ethnic profiling of the Pakhtuns in the aftermath of Bin Laden’s death is not going to deceive people around the world. Success of the US commando action in Abbottabad will encourage the US to keep searching inside Pakistan to destroy more sources of global terrorism. The world will be increasingly on the side of the US and less sympathetic to the security establishment of Pakistan. Difficult times seem to be ahead for Pakistan. Let us see how the establishment will deal with the remaining global terrorists like Ayman Al-Zawahri who might well be inside some other garrison town of Pakistan.

      http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default...7-5-2011_pg3_4
      I was looking for her last name since she forgot it again... oh there it is.... ANDERSEN. Let us reprise her mistakes and note that she once again starts her trashy pieces with: "I met some tribesmen from waziristan..." In her stories its always her meeting some FATA tribesmen as if they look to her as a savior and would so nonchalantly meet with her, a predaay woman.

      On the one hand you posted Scheuer's piece, which completely disagrees with her piece... and now you post her completely nonevidence based trash. :

      Here is a blast from the past:

      **Well, you guys have been asking for the critical analysis... here you go a break down of the AIRRA data and why perpetuating Farhat Taj ANDERSEN's myths are going to lead to brutal stupidity and continued intervention. The article delves into her data and its absolute lack of nuance and misinterpretion.** See reddened and bolded criticism of the data itself below...

      http://www.huffingtonpost.com/wajiha..._b_389408.html

      The New York Times - Getting Pakistan Wrong


      In her December 5, 2009 New York Times article, reporter Sabrina Tavernise looks to history to explain why many Pakistanis are so critical of America. Unfortunately, Tavernise looks to the wrong history, focusing on Pakistan's trauma after the partition with India. Instead, she should have focused on US support for successive Pakistani military dictatorships.
      No doubt, as Tavernise highlights, there are conspiracy theorists in Pakistan, and criticizing America can be a powerful tool to elicit populist support. However, Tavernise's analysis ignores very real grievances regarding American interference in the country.

      It is worth noting that the last US-supported military dictator, General Musharraf, left the stage less than a year and a half ago. He allowed the Taliban to fester, ignored burgeoning economic problems, and institutionalized the military's illegal hold over governance. It is easy to forget that Musharraf's reign was the third period of U.S.-supported dictatorship in Pakistani history.

      The point is that while some Pakistanis might subscribe to outrageous theories, it is disingenuous to paint such a simplistic picture of the vast majority of Pakistanis. Tavernise's report that Pakistan's media outlets "trumpet" conspiracy theories is incomplete. Even a quick skim of major Pakistani television networks and newspapers reveals a robust national debate.

      In this debate, many Pakistani commentators place blame squarely on the Pakistani government for failing to protect its citizens. These commentators also blame Pakistan's military and intelligence agencies for past support of militant organizations.

      Tavernise's article isn't the only example of problematic Pakistan analysis at the New York Times. There is also Scott Shane's December 4, 2009 piece, "C.I.A. to Expand Use of Drones in Pakistan." Shane's piece deprives American readers of an opportunity to truly evaluate U.S. drone missile attacks.

      The article focuses heavily on the thoughts of "one government official," who not-so-surprisingly is an advocate for drone attacks. Shane's article does mention that some counterinsurgency experts question whether the attacks do "more harm than good." However, he doesn't investigate these potential downsides.

      Instead, Shane calls Pakistani press reports of hundreds of civilian casualties "sketchy." He gives more space to the same unnamed "government official" who claims that civilian casualties are "just over 20." The piece references a well-researched New America Foundation report claiming that between 260 to 320 civilians have been killed, but then immediately negates the quote with another quote from the unnamed "government official."

      Setting aside Shane's dependence on an all-knowing secret government source, the negative consequences of drone attacks are real:

      1. CIA drone attacks undermine indigenous Pakistani efforts to combat militants by redirecting popular attention to basic questions of the country's sovereignty.
      2. The attacks push militants away from the tribal areas and deeper into Pakistan's urban centers, dispersing previously consolidated forces.
      3. The attacks result in significant civilian casualties, which consequently increase anti-American sentiments.
      4. Those civilian casualties serve as a powerful recruiting tool for Pakistani Taliban militias.

      Shane also presents a partial sketch of a recent Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy report on the views of 550 residents of the tribal areas where drone attacks occur, authored by anthropologist Farhat Taj -- who claims that professionals in FATA view the drone missiles as "liberators." A more careful look at the survey, however, reveals that the report's findings are so split down the middle as to be inconclusive.

      When asked whether the drone attacks bring about "fear and terror in the common people," 45% of respondents answered in the affirmative. "Fear and terror" are powerful words. When respondents were asked whether they thought the drone strikes were "accurate in their strikes," 48% answered "No," and 42% believed the missiles increased anti-American sentiment in the tribal areas. 100 of those approached declined to answer. These results are at best inconclusive, but by no means provide a solid argument in favor of drone attacks.

      The New York Times needs to do a better job of reporting on the nuanced and diverse views of Pakistani civilians. Not only that, but the newspaper should also be more independent in its coverage of policies like drone missile attacks. More than two-and-a-half thousand Pakistanis have died in terrorist violence, and some three million Swat and South Waziristan residents have become refugees. Pakistani viewpoints deserve better coverage, and American readers deserve better analysis.
      "2 crackheads don't become any better or stronger by sharing the same crack pipe." - Greatest PF quote

      Comment


      • #4
        Yet her nonexistent "tribesmen" none other than maseed and his dad I presume never appear on these videos:

        http://english.aljazeera.net/video/a...315358960.html

        She never has any videography to back up her claims. Its just the same false data that gets slammed with analysis.

        Oh well, that silly ANDERSEN clan.... what can i say, its a nonexistent Bangash tribe clan.
        "2 crackheads don't become any better or stronger by sharing the same crack pipe." - Greatest PF quote

        Comment

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