What accounts for "US loosing" in Afghanistan.

[ghundal]

As you are now doing all you can do (throwing insults), I can see that you can't provide EVIDENCE for the claims you made about Afghanistan. I thought at first, you wished to keep your evidence a secret, but now it seems you just don't have any.

Like always, carry on with the barrage. Wash your mouth afterwards.

You asked for a professional discourse, but ended up only cussing because you FAILED to provide evidence for your claims.

Go along, and sink in delusions with your fellow Flat Earth Society members .

This is what you said in the beginning: I would ask Ghundak and others to conduct their debate in a systematic manner and professionally. No randon biggotary, sentimental talks and anecdotes.- Comrade Pashtun

[ComradePashtun]

Wayeema wooza Khara ahamaqa da evidence sara dee! You piece of a persistence case of dementia. You are worth stepping on getting your miserable life out of you crap eating insenct.

[ComradePashtun]

Sheuer is a CIA analyst who worked in some close cell somewhere, he does not qualify to be a political analysts, his claims are idiotic and outrageous and based on anecdotes like you. You know the saying that "Nothing sways the stupid than the arguements they can't understand." He is no scholar of war and politics or is nrearly an expert on Afghanistan. "Karzai is preparing for early exit." lol

Which claim I made you want me to back up.

BLS has aptly described you to be part of the cheer crowd. Just because Sheuer wrote a book in which he criticises U.S. security policy, he is all of a suden prophetic for dumb aases like you. You are officially an idiot.

[ghundal]

ALL CLAIMS YOU MADE

I could care less what BLS said about me to you in your chit-chat. I hope he refutes the points made in the article I posted with evidence, unlike you. This remains to be seen.

Don't try to escape .I will wait till the time you provide evidence. I mean I don't know when that will happen, but I am reasonable.

[BLS_1919v2.0]

Ghundal for the love of God stop repeating the post. Do you know how irritating you sound? BTW your post is fallacious...since none of us ever said we are against Sheur. I may agree with some of his points and disagree with others. I don't know why are you splitting hairs on the initial post of Comrades. Since he has presented a viewpoint in regards to a certain time frame. How do you want him to prove that 90s were different than today, when fundamentally there were completely different political actors and scenarios? Shall he provide you with a time machine back then?

Now I will read this article and send a reply. In the meantime, ask this Sheur for sources since he has made claims as well.

Now Comrade, refrain from bad language. As irritating and redundant he is, there is no reason to use such words. Manana.

[BLS_1919v2.0]

Now in regards to the article. First point, it is looking like NATO strategy's are not going the way they thought and I think politically they are definitely losing the battle. In regards to the political leaders not meaning to win....I will ask your friend Michael Scheur to back this up. If they did not mean to win, then why were they there? Are the political actors of 2011 the same as those on 2001? Do we really even know the real objectives or reasons they are there? To me it seems like they have geo-political reasons meshed with other corporations profiteering from the war, as well as a future place for abundant minerals. So if we take this into focus, then we don't know yet, what the future holds. As of now they are not succeeding. However the future is different....it is predicated on the economic situation in US, China, Russia, India, etc (for this read up on Marc Faber, Celente, Max Keiser, Rubini). These are the countries which will probably have the bigger stakes in that state. One has to wonder what they have in mind, and where does Afghanistan stand in the likely date of withdrawal?

What would a unilateral punitive expedition entail? Can he be more specific? Is he considering black ops? BTW if this were to succeed and the only goal on the political institutions of US were to 'teach the islamists a lesson" then what stopped them from doing so?

I can't speak for Bin Laden, so I will leave it at that. I don't know what Sheur is talking about in regards to nation building and the west? Could he be more specific? It worked during the Marshall plan (vis a vis US interests), they managed to get what they needed from the Balkans. I assume he wasn't talking about Iraq, since he most probably (Bin Laden) said "wait" prior to the Iraq war. Again clarity would help.

Oh if Taliban want power, then it begs the question..how will Taliban get to power? What is the future of Afghanistan in a post-NATO scenario? Where do the regional neighbours stand? It is obvious Karzai is heavily dependent on NATO and without them, he wont stay in power. That is beside the point. What matters is the aftermath. In that case, who are the other internal political players in Afghanistan, their allies and what do the people want? How will Talibs address the issue of reconciliation in that country? It Taliban are just concerned with power, then who will counter them (if there are any)? Will the people of Afghanistan accept their rule?

I don't see the point in Graham, since I Scheur is right here...you can't restart in Afghanistan, since the problems today and US's ineffectiveness go hand in hand with their mistakes of leaving that country so haphazardly in the 90s.

Pakistan Army is now stuck cleaning its own mess, that they happily sided with. If US is suffering blowback rest assured Pakistan army is going through a similar phase. If US is pushing them, well then that is their daoossee and the fact that they are taking hefty sums of your nation's money, they better fork out.

I agree that there is an issue with so-called successes in Afghanistan's quality of life, but such improvements have come and from what I hear a lot in the North. I don't agree with his correlation of positive trend with insurgency and accomplishment. It is a weak statistic. First of all, the improvements were barely in the South where there was an insurgency, rather US and Pakistan's own policies accumulated to the point that the insurgency increased. Their over-concentration of forces in Iraq didn't help their cause either.

The other stuff is his take on the character of 23 million plus people...again this is something Afghans should be asked....not for him to question their motivation to fight wars or not.


He needs to work on his history, because the last successful empire to neutralize Afghans were the British. While the Pashtuns did defeat them in 2/3 wars, they politically lost out, and strategically were hampered. This was the beginning of the problems for Afghans.

[BarakzaiAbdali]

Now in regards to the article. First point, it is looking like NATO strategy's are not going the way they thought and I think politically they are definitely losing the battle. In regards to the political leaders not meaning to win....I will ask your friend Michael Scheur to back this up. If they did not mean to win, then why were they there? Are the political actors of 2011 the same as those on 2001? Do we really even know the real objectives or reasons they are there? To me it seems like they have geo-political reasons meshed with other corporations profiteering from the war, as well as a future place for abundant minerals. So if we take this into focus, then we don't know yet, what the future holds. As of now they are not succeeding. However the future is different....it is predicated on the economic situation in US, China, Russia, India, etc (for this read up on Marc Faber, Celente, Max Keiser, Rubini). These are the countries which will probably have the bigger stakes in that state. One has to wonder what they have in mind, and where does Afghanistan stand in the likely date of withdrawal?

What would a unilateral punitive expedition entail? Can he be more specific? Is he considering black ops? BTW if this were to succeed and the only goal on the political institutions of US were to 'teach the islamists a lesson" then what stopped them from doing so?

I can't speak for Bin Laden, so I will leave it at that. I don't know what Sheur is talking about in regards to nation building and the west? Could he be more specific? It worked during the Marshall plan (vis a vis US interests), they managed to get what they needed from the Balkans. I assume he wasn't talking about Iraq, since he most probably (Bin Laden) said "wait" prior to the Iraq war. Again clarity would help.

Oh if Taliban want power, then it begs the question..how will Taliban get to power? What is the future of Afghanistan in a post-NATO scenario? Where do the regional neighbours stand? It is obvious Karzai is heavily dependent on NATO and without them, he wont stay in power. That is beside the point. What matters is the aftermath. In that case, who are the other internal political players in Afghanistan, their allies and what do the people want? How will Talibs address the issue of reconciliation in that country? It Taliban are just concerned with power, then who will counter them (if there are any)? Will the people of Afghanistan accept their rule?

I don't see the point in Graham, since I Scheur is right here...you can't restart in Afghanistan, since the problems today and US's ineffectiveness go hand in hand with their mistakes of leaving that country so haphazardly in the 90s.

Pakistan Army is now stuck cleaning its own mess, that they happily sided with. If US is suffering blowback rest assured Pakistan army is going through a similar phase. If US is pushing them, well then that is their daoossee and the fact that they are taking hefty sums of your nation's money, they better fork out.

I agree that there is an issue with so-called successes in Afghanistan's quality of life, but such improvements have come and from what I hear a lot in the North. I don't agree with his correlation of positive trend with insurgency and accomplishment. It is a weak statistic. First of all, the improvements were barely in the South where there was an insurgency, rather US and Pakistan's own policies accumulated to the point that the insurgency increased. Their over-concentration of forces in Iraq didn't help their cause either.

The other stuff is his take on the character of 23 million plus people...again this is something Afghans should be asked....not for him to question their motivation to fight wars or not.


He needs to work on his history, because the last successful empire to neutralize Afghans were the British. While the Pashtuns did defeat them in 2/3 wars, they politically lost out, and strategically were hampered. This was the beginning of the problems for Afghans.

post war Germany and current war Afghanistan are hardly alike for the basis of any similar Marshall Plan.
The Cato institute did a great job rebutting this fallacious line of reasoning:

http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3870

"The failures are not so surprising if one studies the Marshall Plan experience in detail. If massive government spending could work anywhere, it was in 1948 Europe: Skilled labor was largely available, the rule of law and property rights had a long history, and the customs of a commercial society were recoverable. All it needed was physical capital. But even under those circumstances, there is no real evidence that the Marshall Plan alone was responsible for Europe's regeneration. U.S. assistance never exceeded 5 percent of the GDP of any recipient nation, and there seemed to be an inverse relationship between economic aid and economic recovery. In fact, France, Germany, and Italy all began to grow before the onset of the Marshall Plan, and Great Britain, the largest recipient of aid, performed the most poorly.

The real lesson of the Marshall Plan is that the rule of law, property rights, free markets, and an entrepreneurial culture are what are necessary for economic success. Afghanistan has none of these things. And well-meaning senators in Washington can't make it otherwise."

Punitive expedition is preferrable because the worldwide Islamic Insurgency has now near mythical Robin Hoodesque figures and inspiration in the form of the gentlemen he mentions. The only possible benefit of nation building and occupation is to be able to "see into central asia and beyond." However, this then entails continued and costly empire building that we are beginning to be unable to sustain as it affects quality of life here at home in order to sustain this model. Its like the progression of a star from its phases to Red Giant. The US, as it expands and spreads itself thin is having to cut funding internally to key facets of what were always its leading creative market. For instance I can personally attest to the fact that the NIH budge has been held stable by this tomfoolery.

Regarding economic investment, I disagree, USAID has been supporting agricultural marketing and production support to the southern provinces. This report from 2005 details many resources they threw into southern Afghanistan. Sarah Chayes has also pushed many private investors into her own private endeavors in Kandahar and details avidly how her relationship with Brothers Karzai deteriorated and dissapointed her as well.

http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACG169.pdf

Also the British did not and could not hold onto southern Afghanistan. At best the British experience under Lord Roberts, who engineered a massive punitive expedition there, supports his conclusion.

Regarding the Pakistani Army, agreed. They are destroying themselves for a few bungalows. They either have to take a stand with the FATA fighters and physically inhibit the drones, and understand a Cambodia style situation may occur in response with ANA troops and Americans being forced to cross over (Bin Ladin's dream scenario) or they have to take a complete neutrality stance.

[BLS_1919v2.0]

post war Germany and current war Afghanistan are hardly alike for the basis of any similar Marshall Plan.
The Cato institute did a great job rebutting this fallacious line of reasoning:

http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3870

"The failures are not so surprising if one studies the Marshall Plan experience in detail. If massive government spending could work anywhere, it was in 1948 Europe: Skilled labor was largely available, the rule of law and property rights had a long history, and the customs of a commercial society were recoverable. All it needed was physical capital. But even under those circumstances, there is no real evidence that the Marshall Plan alone was responsible for Europe's regeneration. U.S. assistance never exceeded 5 percent of the GDP of any recipient nation, and there seemed to be an inverse relationship between economic aid and economic recovery. In fact, France, Germany, and Italy all began to grow before the onset of the Marshall Plan, and Great Britain, the largest recipient of aid, performed the most poorly.

The real lesson of the Marshall Plan is that the rule of law, property rights, free markets, and an entrepreneurial culture are what are necessary for economic success. Afghanistan has none of these things. And well-meaning senators in Washington can't make it otherwise."

Punitive expedition is preferrable because the worldwide Islamic Insurgency has now near mythical Robin Hoodesque figures and inspiration in the form of the gentlemen he mentions.

Regarding economic investment, I disagree, USAID has been supporting agricultural marketing and production support to the southern provinces. This report from 2005 details many resources they threw into southern Afghanistan. Sarah Chayes has also pushed many private investors into her own private endeavors in Kandahar and details avidly how her relationship with Brothers Karzai deteriorated and dissapointed her as well.

http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACG169.pdf

Also the British did not and could not hold onto southern Afghanistan. At best the British experience under Lord Roberts, who engineered a massive punitive expedition there, supports his conclusion.

Regarding the Pakistani Army, agreed. They are destroying themselves for a few bungalows. They either have to take a stand with the FATA fighters and physically inhibit the drones, and understand a Cambodia style situation may occur in response with ANA troops and Americans being forced to cross over (Bin Ladin's dream scenario) or they have to take a complete neutrality stance.

Barakzai I didn't say it was a success, but it did to an extent maintain US interests in the region. I am more libertarian than even the CATO so I can see their point of view on it. French did even worse, they used their money and supported their military in Vietnam. What I alluded to in my questioning, was what nation building did he have in mind? A little specifics would help.

I am aware that the Marshall plan will not work in Afghanistan. I did not in any way say that it should be adopted. So I don't know why you felt the need to point that out.

BA, he has to first define the parameters of punitive expeditions before I can assess (with my limited knowledge) them. I can't go blindly into it. One needs to be specific.

Did those investments increase insurgency or where they a failure for different reasons? These are two different things. Scheur's trendline is not by this standard workable or usable.

British did not need to hold on to Afghanistan, they did what they had t do with Pashtuns. They politically divided them, took away their strategic areas, contained Russian influence and took away Afghanistan's right to foreign policy. That is success.

[BarakzaiAbdali]

Barakzai I didn't say it was a success, but it did to an extent maintain US interests in the region. I am more libertarian than even the CATO so I can see their point of view on it. French did even worse, they used their money and supported their military in Vietnam. What I alluded to in my questioning, was what nation building did he have in mind? A little specifics would help.

I am aware that the Marshall plan will not work in Afghanistan. I did not in any way say that it should be adopted. So I don't know why you felt the need to point that out.

BA, he has to first define the parameters of punitive expeditions before I can assess (with my limited knowledge) them. I can't go blindly into it. One needs to be specific.

Did those investments increase insurgency or where they a failure for different reasons? These are two different things. Scheur's trendline is not by this standard workable or usable.

British did not need to hold on to Afghanistan, they did what they had t do with Pashtuns. They politically divided them, took away their strategic areas, contained Russian influence and took away Afghanistan's right to foreign policy. That is success.

I see your point wrorre.
I think when one reads Hubris, one understands what his definition of punitive is.

In the Afghan context it meant: There was no need to let the Taliban and AQ scatter their forces for 2 months after the initial 9/11 trigger event. The CIA et al knew UBL's location and, in his opinion, ought to have devastated anything that walked within minutes to days of the dots being connected. He doesnt believe in a Russian style ground force invasion to clear and hold... rather his view is that US firepower, quiet simply, ought to be utilized indiscriminantly. This is why he wrote once: Go Roman or go home. I think UBLs subsequent statements support this.. in Jalalabad the latter was laughing about how he was able to relocate his forces and live to fight another day. Another example was when local forces were allowed to raid Tora Bora as opposed to what ought to, in his view, have been decimating US firepower to destroy the opponent.

I think militarily it makes sense, right? I mean if I had the US arsenal, and I saw a national threat, and I knew the UN was a useless carcass that inhibited rather then strengthened my hand (see how in Libya the UN supporting nations are running out of bombs to drop on Libya and need the US to reassert its lead role) why not go Roman if I choose to fight?

I tend to agree with his moral viewpoint though that the US interventions in various regions --> created the blowback that is UBL --> led to the latter astutely utilizing Afghanistan as a sandtrap for the US empire --> we will likely fight a lengthy war of attrition. To stop the vicious cycle we ought not to intervene when we have no national interest.

[BarakzaiAbdali]

Barakzai I didn't say it was a success, but it did to an extent maintain US interests in the region. I am more libertarian than even the CATO so I can see their point of view on it. French did even worse, they used their money and supported their military in Vietnam. What I alluded to in my questioning, was what nation building did he have in mind? A little specifics would help.

I am aware that the Marshall plan will not work in Afghanistan. I did not in any way say that it should be adopted. So I don't know why you felt the need to point that out.

BA, he has to first define the parameters of punitive expeditions before I can assess (with my limited knowledge) them. I can't go blindly into it. One needs to be specific.

Did those investments increase insurgency or where they a failure for different reasons? These are two different things. Scheur's trendline is not by this standard workable or usable.

British did not need to hold on to Afghanistan, they did what they had t do with Pashtuns. They politically divided them, took away their strategic areas, contained Russian influence and took away Afghanistan's right to foreign policy. That is success.

Regarding the british I think he might as well define that as a success. The key is that they did all of this after realizing the expenses of attempting to hold onto Kandahar and Kabul to no avail.

The US however, is neither taking the Genghis approach nor the British's approach. Rather, it is dancing like a Gulliver getting micro cuts to its legs and is confused and dazed by what the heck to do in a place where your ally is using you to kill his enemies, only to create more fuel for what you were trying to repel with goodwill.

Its insanity to stay there for any civilized superpower. I think this is going to drag on for another 10 years or so. In the body, one worries because low level inflammation can always lead to dysplasia which itself then is a precursor to cancer. This messalaah is the same for the US presence.

[BLS_1919v2.0]

I see your point wrorre.
I think when one reads Hubris, one understands what his definition of punitive is.

In the Afghan context it meant: There was no need to let the Taliban and AQ scatter their forces for 2 months after the initial 9/11 trigger event. The CIA et al knew UBL's location and, in his opinion, ought to have devastated anything that walked within minutes to days of the dots being connected. He doesnt believe in a Russian style ground force invasion to clear and hold... rather his view is that US firepower, quiet simply, ought to be utilized indiscriminantly. This is why he wrote once: Go Roman or go home. I think UBLs subsequent statements support this.. in Jalalabad the latter was laughing about how he was able to relocate his forces and live to fight another day. Another example was when local forces were allowed to raid Tora Bora as opposed to what ought to, in his view, have been decimating US firepower to destroy the opponent.

I think militarily it makes sense, right? I mean if I had the US arsenal, and I saw a national threat, and I knew the UN was a useless carcass that inhibited rather then strengthened my hand (see how in Libya the UN supporting nations are running out of bombs to drop on Libya and need the US to reassert its lead role) why not go Roman if I choose to fight?

I tend to agree with his moral viewpoint though that the US interventions in various regions --> created the blowback that is UBL --> led to the latter astutely utilizing Afghanistan as a sandtrap for the US empire --> we will likely fight a lengthy war of attrition. To stop the vicious cycle we ought not to intervene when we have no national interest.

Fair enough. I don't though see, why Ghundal would support such an expedition because go Roman would be far more brutal (albeit short). Remember in today's world, one can't really go Roman. Times have changed and with it military tactics. Rome could do what it did due to the nature of wars being fought then...I doubt guerilla warfare would help that...if we take the world as the ground for punitive expeditions and Islamist militants (to loosely borrow their term). Having said that, this is under the assumption that was and is the primary motivation for this war. I personally don't agree with that, as I believe US had other intentions (by US i mean on the state level, military interests, corporate profiteering, etc)....and it is due to this myriad of interests and regional tug, that Afghanistan/Pashtunkhwa is going through a fog of war. One has to be careful.

On principle that is a fair point, but US has far surpassed that and now is in the position of blow back. This is something they can't get out of, and quite frankly will happen whether or not Afghanistan is in the mix. US has extended far too wide during and following the cold war. While on principle we can all go the Ron Paul (whom I greatly admire) but realistically it will take a far more painful route. Again I suggest you check out Chalmers Johnson, where he discusses the Roman republic to empire and the similarities of US. He talks about the sacrificing of the republic for the empire, which is what, realistically, is the route US has chosen. For how long and how far they go...Allah u aalim. A lot of it depends on their own economy.

[BLS_1919v2.0]

Regarding the british I think he might as well define that as a success. The key is that they did all of this after realizing the expenses of attempting to hold onto Kandahar and Kabul to no avail.

The US however, is neither taking the Genghis approach nor the British's approach. Rather, it is dancing like a Gulliver getting micro cuts to its legs and is confused and dazed by what the heck to do in a place where your ally is using you to kill his enemies, only to create more fuel for what you were trying to repel with goodwill.

Its insanity to stay there for any civilized superpower. I think this is going to drag on for another 10 years or so. In the body, one worries because low level inflammation can always lead to dysplasia which itself then is a precursor to cancer. This messalaah is the same for the US presence.

Like I said wrora it all depends on what the real motivations of this war are. If we know them, then everything adds up. If not we can assume that they are on the losing path. At the end of the day, we don't live in the times of British raj or cold war, so the political scenario has changed. If we take into account a US failure, we are looking at multiple and possibly simultaneous changes..an economic global downturn (larger than one today), new political powers, possible failed states that were propped up by US, complete geographic changes...etc. It isn't as simple as packing bags and off they go. Ao ka tsenga?

[BarakzaiAbdali]

Fair enough. I don't though see, why Ghundal would support such an expedition because go Roman would be far more brutal (albeit short). Remember in today's world, one can't really go Roman. Times have changed and with it military tactics. Rome could do what it did due to the nature of wars being fought then...I doubt guerilla warfare would help that...if we take the world as the ground for punitive expeditions and Islamist militants (to loosely borrow their term). Having said that, this is under the assumption that was and is the primary motivation for this war. I personally don't agree with that, as I believe US had other intentions (by US i mean on the state level, military interests, corporate profiteering, etc)....and it is due to this myriad of interests and regional tug, that Afghanistan/Pashtunkhwa is going through a fog of war. One has to be careful.

On principle that is a fair point, but US has far surpassed that and now is in the position of blow back. This is something they can't get out of, and quite frankly will happen whether or not Afghanistan is in the mix. US has extended far too wide during and following the cold war. While on principle we can all go the Ron Paul (whom I greatly admire) but realistically it will take a far more painful route. Again I suggest you check out Chalmers Johnson, where he discusses the Roman republic to empire and the similarities of US. He talks about the sacrificing of the republic for the empire, which is what, realistically, is the route US has chosen. For how long and how far they go...Allah u aalim. A lot of it depends on their own economy.

I dont think Ghundal meant that from what I read. My impression is that he did not fully discuss things with you, as what you write above is sensible.

I think his contention is that there are simple, plain as day facts:
1) There is an Afghan insurgency based in southern Afghanistan, fought for by Afghans, and not all that glitters is ISI gold.
2) The goals of a Guerilla "win" are different than that of an empire's "mission accomplished statement."
3) Karzai is unpalatable to a large swathe of people primarily because of repetitions being made (e.g. urging Wesa to support Warlord Razzaq) of pre Taliban "mujahideen" commander corruption are glaring.

I think he also meant that the US is fighting in a terrain Romans and Greeks would be comfortable in (ie Going Roman) but that the modern superpower is not so comfortable in.

Regarding the republic being sacrificed, you captured the words right out of my own mouth. We see this here at home day in and out. Life has changed tremendously in terms of values, execution of constitutional norms, etc in a status of unending war that has become the "new" economic driver versus what was formerly technological prowess.

[BLS_1919v2.0]

I dont think Ghundal meant that from what I read. My impression is that he did not fully discuss things with you, as what you write above is sensible.

I think his contention is that there are simple, plain as day facts:
1) There is an Afghan insurgency based in southern Afghanistan, fought for by Afghans, and not all that glitters is ISI gold.
2) The goals of a Guerilla "win" are different than that of an empire's "mission accomplished statement."
3) Karzai is unpalatable to a large swathe of people primarily because of repetitions being made (e.g. urging Wesa to support Warlord Razzaq) of pre Taliban "mujahideen" commander corruption are glaring.

I think he also meant that the US is fighting in a terrain Romans and Greeks would be comfortable in (ie Going Roman) but that the modern superpower is not so comfortable in.

Regarding the republic being sacrificed, you captured the words right out of my own mouth. We see this here at home day in and out. Life has changed tremendously in terms of values, execution of constitutional norms, etc in a status of unending war that has become the "new" economic driver versus what was formerly technological prowess.

Maybe so, but one can't oversimplify things. In doing so we do a disservice to our people and are being insincere...wouldn't you say?

1) There is an element of truth on both sides...an insurgency and Pakistan trying to be overly clever. Bare in mind when I mention ISI, it doesn't mean they pull every string, since it is not possible, but they do want to maintain some of their leverage. That doesn't mean they won't suffer blowback or be entirely successful. We just have to acknowledge the certain dynamics in that region. It is only fair.

2) Well that is obvious, they both are fighting from fundamentally different positions with different goals in mind.
3) Karzai's fault are pretty clear, I don't think we need to go over that. However, he isn't the only one, nor should be made as such. I feel like sometimes people fixate on him entirely, when their are other entities as well.

I suggest you check out the youtube clips of Chalmers Johnson for more on the subject...very interesting and tragic things. It reminds me of what Washington said about standing armies.

[BarakzaiAbdali]

Like I said wrora it all depends on what the real motivations of this war are. If we know them, then everything adds up. If not we can assume that they are on the losing path. At the end of the day, we don't live in the times of British raj or cold war, so the political scenario has changed. If we take into account a US failure, we are looking at multiple and possibly simultaneous changes..an economic global downturn (larger than one today), new political powers, possible failed states that were propped up by US, complete geographic changes...etc. It isn't as simple as packing bags and off they go. Ao ka tsenga?

Well, they were forced to pack their bags and leave Vietnam and I dont think the world collapsed in Vietnam when that happened. In fact, as Paul points out, the subsequent stability has actually created a viable trade partner for the US. Unfortunately, a similar mistake was made in the pre Gulf war 90s. Jim Baker and others were completely against UBL and any Islamic ascendency in the Arabian peninsula when he latter offered to deal with the Iraq situation via an intra Arab manner. The response of Baker and Co created the mess we find ourselves in today when we stationed troops there. Paul once noted that UBL himself, when he heard Jim Baker felt him an unpalatable choice because he might make oil rocket up to over 100 dollars/barrall, said "what will we do? we have to sell it, we cannot drink it." His point was a smart one: they needed to sell the oil, they new the US/West was THE market, but they simply wanted a fair and not inflated price for it... and this hundred dollar a barrell contention was absurd. Now, the irony is that oil has gone over that price multiple times.