Arab Imperialism or Occupation?

[BarakzaiAbdali]

I've recently started reading the latest book by Mike Scheuer, CIA Alec Station Creator, called Osama Bin Ladin. Chapter 2, entitled "Apprenticeship" Mike sheds quiet a bit of light on the role of Arab funding, combat operations, and involvement in the Afghan struggle against Russia. In general he appears to be debunking this red herring posed by Nationalists, but sheds quiet a bit of light on political involvement of various parties.

In order to unclutter Toramana Wrorre's appreciation thread, I thought the discussion could be moved here.

I will discuss more after a hearty lunch with my brother in law, but some tantalizing hints of what is to come:

Dr. Scheuer provides is the contrast between the agenda of Prince Turki Al Faisal head of the Saudi's CIA equivalent (General Intelligence Directorate) and the mujahideen under Bin Ladin. He delivers an excellent crushing blow to the Nationalist propaganda by clearly delving into Sheikh Abdul Azzam's literature and what was preferred by the latter which will blow your mind.

[graveyardofempires]

arab imperialism doesnt exist
some people use it as a code word to attack Islam.

[BarakzaiAbdali]

arab imperialism doesnt exist
some people use it as a code word to attack Islam.

Agreed. As it relates to Afghans and Afghanistan, I am finding that what you say is true per my recent beginning in reading up on it. This thread was started to seal the deal and provide literature to kill that canard so as to speak. That way the discussion does not spill over and that red herring is not used against people to kill valuable discussion or per ad hominem.

*I cannot really comment on Arab interventionalism or conquests in other lands as my readings have been limited to Arab lands in the time of the Prophet and Caliphs and the recent Afghan conflicts/Afghan history. However, I think that is OK, because that is what we are discussing here... not Iranian Arab relations... but Pashtun-Islamic-Arab interactions.

[ScimitarXEdge]

arab imperialism doesnt exist
some people use it as a code word to attack Islam.

exactly, it's a divide and rule tactic. pitting one Muslim group after another, same with Shi'a and Sunni politics.

this all needs to stop.

[BarakzaiAbdali]

exactly, it's a divide and rule tactic. pitting one Muslim group after another, same with Shi'a and Sunni politics.

this all needs to stop.

I agree and now we can set aside the nonfactual elements and use this area to really force a valid, evidence based, historical discussion. The focus ought to stay on Afghans and Afghanistan and this flimsly evidence behind this charge.

[ScimitarXEdge]

exactly BarakzaiAbdali wrora, the So called Nationalists are internalizing Perso-Arab psychological anxieties of Persian Nationalists in an attempt to forge a rift with Pakhtuns and their Islamic Heritage. Historically Pakhtun-Arab relations have never been at odds on an ethnic level; we've never had an Arab vs. Pakhtun rivalry, in fact there was Arab-Pakhtun cooperation against Iranian aggression historically (Mir Wais Khan Hotak's revolution for example). Even the radicalized Arabs of these days are a minority situation and not an ethnic derived issue. These people are trying to create a conflict that isn't there to work in fabor Capitalist Hegemonic Imperialism and their divide and rule tactics

just look at the semantics they use "Camelism" , "Arab Honor", etc etc are all derived from orientalists writing.

Nevermind that millions of Afghan Nomads have Camels!!

[ScimitarXEdge]

I agree and now we can set aside the nonfactual elements and use this area to really force a valid, evidence based, historical discussion. The focus ought to stay on Afghans and Afghanistan and this flimsly evidence behind this charge.

I agree it's time we call Toramana and similar ilk out on their claims. I want to see one historical evidence of Arab Ethnic based conquest to subjugate Pakhtoons

[ScimitarXEdge]

and by evidence .....I don't mean creative or rather hyperbolic reinterpretations of historical events.

[ScimitarXEdge]

Notice that you know who has been completely silent through out the tenure of this thread.


makes you wonder.

[randolph85]

arab nationalism failed decades ago, even the nationalists couldn't get along with each other.

look at what happened to the united arab republic.

[BarakzaiAbdali]

arab nationalism failed decades ago, even the nationalists couldn't get along with each other.

look at what happened to the united arab republic.

Very valid anecdotal point. I did not think of that. Thank you.

[BarakzaiAbdali]

Part 1: subsequent parts in coming days

So to be fair, let us define interventionalism versus imperialism in a simple, quick way. Interventionalism can come in many forms and does not have to be solely in the case of hard military power application. Usage of soft power (e.g. funding a foreign military, propping up tyrannies, etc.) is also interventionalism. Imperialism generally manifests with some element of hard power involved.

Therefore, we must say, to be viewed as consistent and fair, that Saudi Arabia and various Arab factions executed interventionist policies in Afghanistan. However, the general charge made by Toramana Wrorre is that actually, this was and is a brand of Arab Imperialism. One thing that is conveniently ignored is that the degree of interventionalism of the Arab states is rarely analyzed in comparison to the interventionalism of Pakistan, India, Iran, Russia, America, etc or in light of native Pashtun/Afghan goals. The goal appears to be to focus the assault on the Islamic nature of the jihad and then link that to Arabism as a pretext for taking away legitimacy for the current Afghan insurgency.

For the sake of a timely discussion, I want to focus on that era that the ANP party and Afghan Mellat are obsessed with: the years starting in the middle of the 1970s to the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. In general though, we must keep in mind that for the nationalist, the charge of interventionalism and Arab imperialism does not begin or end there… they include the period of Uthman ibn Affan’s incursions into Afghanistan as the initiating time period of Arab/Islamic imperialism and interventionalism. I think this is problematic because the Pashtun personae, as shown in the Ahmad Shah Abdali article that I wrote, and as shown in the interactions between Mir Wais Neka and Meccan authorities on his famous hajj, Islamic thought has formed an integral part of the Pashtun personae.

**I am happy that Osho and Baygham wrorryaan have openly taken the initiative and contradicted Toramana wrorre in regard to this linkage between Pashtuns and religion; i.e. they have reiterated time and time again that they are an unrepresentative minority. That is an honesty that we need to applaud and not attack. To buttress this, I refer you to the prior Tribal Analysis Center review of the role religion plays when the non Islamic peoples intervene in Pashtun territory:**

http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/...%20Mullahs.pdf

So let us examine Michael Scheuer’s response and characterization of Arab influence in that essential time period between the fall of Zahir Shah and the return of Omar Hotak to the battle zone. This discussion is derived from the Chapter Apprenticeship in Mike’s new book: Osama Bin Ladin.

“Those who have written about him seem unable to comprehend how essential the Red Army’s defeat in Afghanistan was and is to bin Ladin, as well as to the Islamist movement and Muslims generally.”

And of course Dr. Scheuer’s key evidence derived analysis that should make all Afghans celebrate, as none can take that great victory over the communist superpower from our brethren back home who actually did win that war:

“That non-Afghan Muslim fighters contributed little to the Soviets’ defeat is also true. The investigative journalist Camille Tawil has written—correctly in my view—that the contribution to the victory by non-Afghan Muslims equaled a ‘drop in the ocean compared to the Afghan mujahideen’”

The link between Saudi intelligence and whether Osama bin Ladin was sent as agent there on their behalf:

That he was an actual agent is an unsubstantiated claim for the archive of Saudi intelligence documents and bin Ladin’s own historical writings alongside the writings of others that witnessed his entrance onto the scene:

“His former sister in law says Osama ‘left quickly – there were no farewell parties’…. While bin Ladin’s exact arrival date in Pakistan is of little consequence, the claim by the journalist Ahmad Muwaffaq Zaydan – who had ample pre 9/11 access to al-Qaeda and its leaders—that Osama arrived ‘only two weeks after the invasion’ is probably close to the mark.”

But he did accommodate them and work alongside of Saudi Intelligence as he was “working in cooperation with Saudi Prince Turki, then chief of the Saudi intelligence service…”

Moreover, this explained by the fact that Osama had “moved easily among the Gulf’s royal and business elite…” and had “grown up among them”… “his shuttling of funds between the Gulf and Pakistan contributed to the Afghans’ ultimate success…”

Regarding Toramana Wrorre’s assertion of working with the Saudi CIA equivalent, DIG, Scheuer confirms some element of a relationship:

“bin Ladin also worked with the Saudi embassy in Islamabad and met with Saudi interior minister Prince Nayef.”

Ahmed Badeeb, Prince Turki’s chief of staff at DIG notes “He was our man. He was doing all that we asked of him.”

HOWEVER, Scheuer goes on to note:

“at this point, Osama was not alienated from his native country, its religious authorities, or its ruling family despite his unease with the al-Saud’s blatant corruption.”

ENTER ABDULLAH AZZAM

This is where the ANP/Afghan Mellat narrative goes awry regarding an Arabization agenda and the idea that the Afghans were susceptible and stupid, easily misled, and pawns in an Arab chess game:

Besides Azzam, Bin Laden criticized other scholars from his home country for advocacy devoid of action, i.e. words did not match deeds:

“He said the scholars were frightened and maintained that the ‘Russians cannot be resisted’…’Almost twenty years ago,’ bin Laden wrote in 2006, ‘I used to visit our scholars and shaykhs, asking them to take part in the jihad….many of them came up with excuses.’”

WHO LED WHO? AFGHAN LEADING ARABS OR VICE VERSA?

It appears that the war was led by Afghans and the strategy was devised by them as well, incorporating, not being led by Arab fighters:

Regarding the creation of the Arab contributing front Makhtab al Kadhamat:

“Some volunteers were assigned combat roles and sent to various Afghan field commanders for training and eventual deployment; joining the forces led by Gulbuddin Hekmetyar and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf”

USAGE OF PASHTUN BLOOD AND TREASURE??? A MYTH DEBUNKED

Anyone who has read on the Afghan Jihad has heard about Abdullah Azzam. The latter was so intertwined into the war there and was the ideological father of the modern global movement that his death to a car bomb in Peshawar is symbolic of his deep ties that developed.

So let us read a key, crucial, and fascinating factoid that debunks the ideology that it was Pashtun blood that Azzam sought to exploit. I was blown away when I read this as it changed my completely from an ethnocentric one based on myths I have been told about Azzams pure affinity for Pashtuns, to an evidence based one:

“Bin Ladin began moving away from Azzam in 1986—Although his funding for the MK continued through 1988. At issue was what role the Tajik Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud should play in the jihad and how Arab and other non-Afghan volunteers should be handled. Azzam was a great champion of Massoud, believing he was the best commander in Afghanistan and ‘the hero of Islam….[and] the hope of the whole [Islamic] nation’ Bin Ladin at the time felt no personal animosity toward Massoud—his friend Abu Ubaydah, had fought with him—but bin Ladin’s closest Afghan colleagues were Pashtun leaders such as Khalis, Sayyaf, Haqqani, Hekmetyar, and others… He did not concur with Azzam’s position that a greater percentage of incoming Arab aid should go to Massoud.”

So this quote is key, it destroyed the ANP claim for a number of reasons:

1. Abdullah Azzam, the primordial Arab jihadist sided with Massoud… however of note, he and Bin Ladin did not have animosity over this and the latter continued to refer to the former as one of the greatest modern Imams. All of us on the Kabul Kandahar side of the line know the outcome of this. This disagreement is notable because it shows that the Arabs themselves were not all united behind one ideology and were thinking strategically and not about Pan Arabism or a DIG agenda.
2. The name Sayyaf should ring a bell. Sayyaf serves in the parliament in the Karzai government.

Additionally, Scheuer goes on to note:

“Shaykh Azzam preferred to parcel out the non-Afghan volunteers designed for combat to the Islamist Afghan groups… a small percentage joined Yunis Khalis and Jalaluddin Haqqani.”

“Bin Ladin formulated a plan that would keep the Arab volunteers together…”

Once again, key quotes because it shows that the Pashtuns were in charge of strategy and the Arabs were FOOT SOLDIERS/Mercernaries. Basically, this was a struggle by and for Afghans. Bin Ladin recognized this and adjusted tactics and strategy. To buttress this:

“Bin Laden had come to oppose the distribution of Arab volunteers to Afghan commanders in part because he claimed the latter treated the volunteers as guests and kept them from going into the battle field…”

“The reality is the Afghan field commanders were not eager to have Arabs in their units because they were undisciplined, unwilling to take commands from Afghans they thought religiously inferior, and, more than anything, were seeking martyrdom at the earliest possible opportunity…Thus Arabs were disruptive elements in Afghan units, and endangered both the safety of their comrades and the success of operations.”

So once again, we see that Afghan leadership, specifically Pashtun leadership balked at having Arabs in their units… this evidence just about crucifies the reverse paradigm touted by ANP/Afghan Mellat that the Arabs led and the Afghans followed or that the Arabs directed and the Afghans ran into the head of battle like mentally handicapped automatons.

A quote from an Afghan commander should suffice to drive the point home:

“’They (the arabs) were not organized.’ Commander Saznur of the IULA said, ‘and only wanted to become martyrs.’ While Afghans certainly are willing to die for God’s cause if necessary, they much prefer to die in bed as very old men.”

Basically, it was Afghans directing and Arabs haphazardly running, undisciplined, into the thick of war… this is like cyanide poison to the nationalist narrative of an Arab Svengali like hold that Abdul Azzam and Bin Ladin had, on behalf of Saudi Intelligence, over the “easily convinced” Pashtuns. Based on the above, this theory is absurd because Azzam and Bin Ladin did not agree on certain elements of strategy, and Arabs were forced to either sit on the sidelines by Pashtuns/Afghans or became cannon fodder themselves.

Finally Scheuer goes on to discuss the confirmed witness reports of Bin Ladin himself fighting from the front and then defending from the rear… an act that shows he was hardly a Svengali under the tutelage of greater Svengali (Zahwari or DIG). The man basically was willing to die alongside and even be directed by Afghans.

*The chapter is pretty long and excellent stats and facts and figures follow that continue to hammer multiple nails in the coffin of this supposed Arab imperialism. In the coming days I will add to this body of evidence from the chapter with these facts/figures.

*Key also is that Arab interventionalism equitable to Western inteventionalism is also now sidelined. An equitable comparison would be that of the American insurgency/revolution that was aided with a fraction of French help and some Hessian mercernaries. The interventionalism was certainly a fact, but could not in any affective way employ an outcome of Arab imperialism or diminish the fact that the Afghan insurgency was fueled by Afghan sentiments alone.

More to come in the days ahead.

[ScimitarXEdge]

One thing to note; the conflicts of the Khilafa during those times in the region of what is NOW known as Afghanistan was not ever with native Afghans themselves but thei Sassanid regencies stationed in the various satrapies of the East. Yet again an example of how False claimants of Pashtun nationalism will internalize Perso-Arabic animosity as their springboard.

Secondly it should be noted that much of the Arab Mujahideen that came were also heavily radicalized with doctrines which espoused takfir, very reminiscent of the early Khajirites, these individuals did not deem others religiously inferior because of being not Arab, but not being literalists or as radicalized as they were. These same varieties such as Ayman Al-Zawahiri deemed even other Egyptians, and scholars of the Arab world, religiously inferior on account of not advocatiing indscriminately slaughtering Muslims who even if they were practicing and for the most part devout Muslims, were not as literalistic as they were.

[Alchemist]

Notice that you know who has been completely silent through out the tenure of this thread.


makes you wonder.

Especially Toromana.

If he has any sense of honor he should be here and "inform" of us the missing "other side" of the story. I mean, what exactly is it that he and baygham wish to wash off of pashtun identity? Why they consider the religion of Islam foreign to Pashtuns?

If they can't even openly debate their central thesis then they shouldn't waste others time ...some people just come here to play chess with others and pretty soon it becomes more about their egos than the real issues...next thing u know he is make a career out of his "camelism" theory lol ...

tobaa....