New Ideas for Lasting Peace and Stability in Afghanistan

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This is the executive summary of a paper written in April 17, 2009 by Ahmed Durani based in Canada :

"An Outside the-Box Look at Afghanistan New Ideas For Lasting Peace And Stability"

Executive Summary

The situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating rapidly and the probability of any improvement in the near future is very slim. Moreover, the implementation of the current strategy isat best a band aid solution that will not provide long term peace and stability in Afghanistan and the region. The reason for this situation is that the basic principles of the strategy and the mindset behind it deal only with the outward
symptoms of the problem and do not factor in many core issues. The assumption in this document is that these problems are either not understood sufficiently or ignored completely. In either case the outcome is the same, which are the current stalemate, more misery and suffering for the people of Afghanistan.

For the success of any strategy, it is required to correctly identify the problems before moving forward. In the context of Afghanistan, success means lasting peace, stability, reconciliation, justice and coming together for the common good, and to achieve that with less damage, less loss of life and less misery. It does not mean the defeat of one group or another, but rather to create conditions for the people to transition from conflict to peace. The solutions should be proposed after the identification of problems.

Problem identification

- Some of the core issues are as follows:

1. The current strategy is not based on winning the hearts and minds of the people, which is so fundamental to bringing peace and stability. It is grounded in arrogance, condescension, (and as perceived by many) punishment, and revenge.

2. In Afghanistan as well as in the rest of the Muslim world at large, there is no formal separation between the state and religion. State institutions and the religion of Islam are inseparably intertwined. This fundamental fact has been ignored in dealing with Afghanistan, its people and its institutions.

3. The Afghan Code commonly referred to as Pashtoonwali is ignored and is not given the consideration that is proportional to is strength in the Afghan so ciety. Specifically those elements of the Code that deal with conflict resolution that have successfully regulated the affairs of the community for centuries and millennia.

4. The primary unit in the Afghan society (especially in predominantly Pashtoon areas) is not the individual person, but is the family and lineage (Plareena).

5. There is demographic imbalance in the strategy for the benefit of certain sectors of the Afghan Society based on ethnicity, region, level of education and gender. Such favouritism is not conducive to reconciliation, which is basic to long term peace and stability. In reality, it widens the existing seams and fissures in the society and impedes progress.

6. The issue of refugees, especially the internally displaced people (IDP s), is not addressed. It is ironic that most of the IDP s are from areas where there is relative peace and security and yet they are camped in areas which are considered as war zones.

7. The Afghan people have been through a lot of suffering in the past 3 decades and they have many physical and emotional scars as individuals and as families. There is a lot of anger and hurt in the society that need to be addressed appropriately in order for any progress to be made. Yet the current mindset does not give priority to this basic need which is at the foundation of the hierarchy of needs, and should be addressed first. This issue requires a bottom up approach while the strategy operates in a top down mode and deals with high level improvements in state institutions ignores the base level needs, assuming they either do not exist or will go away.

8. Radical and extremist ideologies are alien to the Afghan culture and are not acceptable to the people, especially if they are imported from abroad, irrespective of the origin. Afghans are xenophobic and generally do not trust outsiders and their motives. However, when anger, hurt feelings and humiliation perpetuates in a society, it becomes a fertile ground for extremism, and some people do go over the
edge and embrace it.

9. Al-Qa eda and other extremist elementsfromthe fringes of political Islam have been more successful than the government and their foreign allies in manipulating this anger and advancing their agenda. They are more knowledgeable than their adversaries about the Afghan Code and how to utilize it to their advantage.

An Alternative Solution

It is clear that the above factors have not been taken into consideration in formulating the solutions and strategy for the situation, and that explains the failure of the past seven years and waste of tremendous resources. On the other hand, if there is genuine intention and interest in bringing lasting peace and stability to Afghanistan and the region, it is never too late to take these basic facts into consideration and factor them into any proposed solutions for success. If there indeed is such a willingness and determination, then the following suggestions and ideas should be given serious consideration. Any solution that is based on these ideas will be successful and will result in lasting peace and stability:

1. In order to adequately address the anger of the Afghan population, the Afghan State assumes collective responsibility (on behalf of the state, political parties, militias and paramilitary groups involved in the war, and all the individuals and groups who have been accused of alleged atrocities) for the damage and suffering of the past three decades. It formally and publically apologizes to the people of Afghanistan and, using the tools within the Afghan Code, promises to compensate the people and take remedial and mitigating actions.

2. The State recalls a Loya Jirga that adequately represents the entire spectrum of the Afghan Society, and is genuinely empowered to establish the modalities and terms for the apology and compensations and to address all the issues stated above in hierarchical steps leading to general amnesty, declaration of country wide ceasefire and the process of reconciliation.

3. The Loya Jirga asks the International community to help Afghanistan politically, financially and materially to overcome the obstacles in the process of reconciliation.

4. The Afghan State renegotiates with UN, Coalition, NATO and the Islamic Conference, the terms of reference for foreign forces that are presently deployed to Afghanistan, and the timelines of their replacement by peace keepers from those Muslim countries that are not involved in the Afghan conflict.

5. The Loya Jirga discusses and agrees upon necessary solutions to the issuesof refugees, IDPs, narcotics,ethnic grievances and trust building. It requests the help of the international community and regional
countries if deemed necessary.

6. The Loya Jirga discusses and agrees upon Afghanistan srelationships with neighbouring countries and the role it will play in the region and in the community of nations.

Consequences of this alternative

All of this can be achieved using the greatly neglected conflict resolution tools that are already existing within the Afghan Code and have been proven in practice for thousands of years. Implementing this proposal will be the most effective way of reaching the declared objectives of all those who want to help Afghanistan to overcome its current challenges:

1. It will provide an outlet for the accumulated anger of the Afghan people and will kick start the healing process that is a pre-requisite for any solution.

2. It will provide the necessary funds and resources to those who actually need them most. These resources will go directly to the people at the village level which suffer from extreme poverty and unemployment, who are most vulnerable to recruitment by the extremists.

3. It will be a significant economic stimulus for the rural economy and will create employment and job opportunities in the areas where most needed and desirable. It will empower the population and counter the negative effects (victimhood and dependence mindset) promoted by the current humanitarian aid programs.

4. When the people at the village level have jobs and see real hope for a better future, they will not be forced to take desperate actions. The pool will dry up for those extremists who are fishing for recruitment to their radical causes and the population will not be susceptible to outside manipulation.

5. It will provide a viable exit strategy for the Coalition and NATO forces from the Afghan quagmire.

6. It will reduce the trust deficit between the Government and its allies one side and the population on the other.

7. In the long run this alternative is more cost effective and economical for all parties resulting in greatly reduced casualties and loss of life.

8. It will create many opportunities for the future to build upon the good will that will be created.

These are just a just a few, but worthwhile, benefits of this alternative and should be seriously considered for implementation.