Former Afghan spy chief slams Taliban talks

[Khidr]

KIMBERLY DOZIER
The Associated Press
Thursday, December 9, 2010; 3:53 PM


WASHINGTON -- Peace talks with the Taliban will lead to disaster unless the insurgent group is disarmed first, Afghanistan's former intelligence chief said Thursday.

Amrullah Saleh, who headed Afghanistan's spy agency from 2004 until earlier this year, said the key to peace with the Taliban is cutting off their support from Pakistan and disarming and dismantling the group before allowing them to operate as a normal political party.

"Demobilize them, disarm them, take their headquarters out of the Pakistani intelligence's basements," Saleh said. "Force the Taliban to play according to the script of democracy," he added, predicting the party would ultimately fail, "in a country where law rules, not the gun ... not the law of intimidation."
Saleh said the United States should give Pakistan a deadline of July 2011 to pursue top insurgents inside their borders or threaten to send in U.S. troops to do the job.

Saleh, who headed the Afghan National Directorate of Security until he resigned last June from Afghan President Hamid Karzai's government, warned an audience at the National Press Club that failure to cut off Pakistani support would allow the Taliban to only pretend to make peace, then sweep back to power after NATO troops leave.

The former spy chief's comments display the dissension at the highest levels of Afghan political society over whether to engage the Taliban in talks, or keep fighting them. His criticism of Pakistan also highlights the widespread suspicion among Afghanistan's elites that the neighboring power continues to allow militants to flourish inside Afghanistan.

U.S. officials have said that such a deal is key to drawing down U.S. and NATO troops, starting in July 2011, with eventual handover to Afghan forces in 2014.
Saleh said this year's surge of U.S. troops had accomplished a "temporary effect" of securing some territory, but failed to change the "fundamentals."
"The Taliban leadership has not been captured or killed," he said. "Al-Qaida has not been defeated."

He added: "The current strategy still believes Pakistan is honest, or at least 50 percent honest." Still, he predicted Pakistan would continue to support the Taliban and other proxies to try to maintain influence in Afghanistan.

Saleh ran Afghanistan's intelligence service after serving in the mostly ethnic Tajik Afghan Northern Alliance, which battled the Taliban before the U.S.
invasion. Many members of Tajik regions together with other Afghan minorities have warned of another Afghan civil war if Karzai makes a deal with Taliban.
Saleh criticized his former administration, without naming Karzai, claiming that "political Kabul" was out of touch with the rest of the country, and too often publicly at odds with NATO.

Several Pakistani officials listening to Saleh's speech at the Jamestown Foundation's annual Terrorism Conference grimaced at his remarks.
One Pakistani official approached Saleh afterward and asked privately whether Saleh respected the fact that the Pakistani intelligence service had lost 550 officers since the war on terror began in 2001.

Haq, former head of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, said neither Pakistan nor the west had managed to defeat the Taliban with what he called a militarized counterinsurgency strategy. Within Pakistan, he said, the civilian government had failed to backfill the areas the army had won back from the militants.

He said western policies of hunting al Qaida on the ground in Afghanistan, and by drone in Pakistan, has simply fueled their recruitment.

The official said Saleh acknowledged this was true, but insisted more cooperation between the two countries was needed and stood by his claims that Pakistan supports the Taliban.

The Pakistani said he ended the chat saying he was glad Saleh had at least backed talks with the Taliban, with conditions. The official related his comments on condition of anonymity, as he was not authorized to speak to the media.

One of Pakistan's former spy chiefs, who also spoke at the conference, predicted the only way to drive a wage between the Taliban and al-Qaida is peace talks offering the insurgents a way to leave fighting and join the governing process in Afghanistan.

Retired Pakistani Gen. Ehsan ul Haq said peace talks with the Taliban were the only way to drive the group apart from Al-Qaida. Haq said as long as the two groups were comrades at arms, they would continue to cooperate despite their differences.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...0903901_2.html

[Khidr]

It's no surprise that Amrullah Saleh, the former head of Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security, was jettisoned by Hamid Karzai back in June (or resigned, depending on the telling), ostensibly for failing to thwart a bomb attack. As Saleh made clear during a speech at a Jamestown Foundation conference on Thursday, he believes Karzai's signature strategy for ending the war, reconciliation with the Taliban, will lead to disaster. And he said the Afghan leader's drive to pursue this strategy shows just how detached his administration is from the reality on the ground.

Western officials had long viewed Saleh, an ethnic Tajik, as one of the most intelligent, trustworthy, and effective members of the Karzai government. A veteran of the Northern Alliance, he fought alongside the legendary Ahmed Shah Massoud against the Taliban in the 90s, eventually becoming his intelligence chief, a role he reprised in the Karzai government.

In his speech, Saleh keyed in the pitfalls of negotiating with Taliban. "What has blurred the narrative of the war, is the talk of reconciliation," Saleh told the Jamestown audience. "We could [have reconciled] with Al Qaeda and [the] Taliban on September 14, 15, [or] September 20, 2001. What was the need for these billions and billions of dollars to be spent [on the war]? It’s the same enemy."

And in its desperation to achieve a breakthrough in the talks, the Karazi government overreached. That resulted in what Saleh referred to as the humiliating "bogus Mansour" episode, in which a grocer successfully duped government officials into believing that he was, Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour, a high-ranking Taliban leader willing to come to the negotiating table.

Saleh says his agency had vetted and rejected the man back in 2008 after he was unable to verify his identity, and that the Karzai government's zeal to reach a historic deal with the Taliban akin to the Good Friday Agreement or Dayton Accords—demonstrates its unrealistic hopes for a breakthrough at this juncture.
Brokering a deal with the Taliban, in his view, serves as an excuse to draw down the United States' troop presence in the country without assessing whether any of the on-the-ground facts have changed. "A deal may bring deceptive stability, but it won't bring a long lasting stability where Afghans or foreigners will have confidence to invest, [to] convert Afghanistan into a viable economy," he said.

He questioned those skeptical of the Taliban's strength. "Will they be able to threaten our key and national interest by possessing AK-47s? Remember, when they helped Al Qaeda do 9/11, they had the same weapons." His solution? "DDR" the Taliban. "Demobilize them, disarm them, take their headquarters out of the Pakistani Intelligence basements... Push the Taliban to play according to the script of democracy—and if they win...allow them a chance to govern." He's confident, though, that "they will die in democracy, they will die in a country where law is ruling, not guns, not IEDs, not the spread of fear and intimidation."

Saleh also has a pretty good idea of where to change the narrative of the war: Pakistan. Since 9/11, he says, Pakistan has provided only "retail" and not "wholesale" cooperation. Time after time, the United States has been duped into trusting the country and its intelligence services. Saleh even claimed that Pakistani officials have privately admitted to him that their country has yet to change its ways despite their frequent promises to do so. "Now the United States believes that by giving more money and resources to Pakistan, you can convert their behavior from bad to good…but it is rewarding bad behavior which [continues] that bad behavior."

Until then, government officials and security forces must be more independent, and demonstrate their accountability to Afghans, Saleh argued. Afghans and their government must be prepared for the day when an exhausted United States and NATO decide to leave their country.

"We hear the speeches of major western politicians saying, 'failure is not an option.' Now it seems as if failure is an option. And my key message, coming to Washington, is this: it is a winnable war. The nature of our enemy has not changed."

He added: "People like me, who see the future of Afghanistan hanging on a cliff, we are preparing for plan B."

http://motherjones.com/mojo/2010/12/amrullah-saleh-karzai-afghanistan-reconcililation

[Khidr]

For those of you don't know, "Plan B" has essentially become code word amongst the American Politicians and promiment Tajiks (and Hazaras and Uzbeks) for a military and political breakway from Karzai regime and resistence by the Tajiks and other ethnicities, in the advent of a Karzai alliance with Taliban or a Karzai regime falling.

Plan B is essentially for all intents and purposes, a "defacto partition."

[Azmal]

It's no surprise that Amrullah Saleh, the former head of Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security, was jettisoned by Hamid Karzai back in June (or resigned, depending on the telling), ostensibly for failing to thwart a bomb attack. As Saleh made clear during a speech at a Jamestown Foundation conference on Thursday, he believes Karzai's signature strategy for ending the war, reconciliation with the Taliban, will lead to disaster. And he said the Afghan leader's drive to pursue this strategy shows just how detached his administration is from the reality on the ground.

Western officials had long viewed Saleh, an ethnic Tajik, as one of the most intelligent, trustworthy, and effective members of the Karzai government. A veteran of the Northern Alliance, he fought alongside the legendary Ahmed Shah Massoud against the Taliban in the 90s, eventually becoming his intelligence chief, a role he reprised in the Karzai government.

In his speech, Saleh keyed in the pitfalls of negotiating with Taliban. "What has blurred the narrative of the war, is the talk of reconciliation," Saleh told the Jamestown audience. "We could [have reconciled] with Al Qaeda and [the] Taliban on September 14, 15, [or] September 20, 2001. What was the need for these billions and billions of dollars to be spent [on the war]? It’s the same enemy."

And in its desperation to achieve a breakthrough in the talks, the Karazi government overreached. That resulted in what Saleh referred to as the humiliating "bogus Mansour" episode, in which a grocer successfully duped government officials into believing that he was, Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour, a high-ranking Taliban leader willing to come to the negotiating table.

Saleh says his agency had vetted and rejected the man back in 2008 after he was unable to verify his identity, and that the Karzai government's zeal to reach a historic deal with the Taliban akin to the Good Friday Agreement or Dayton Accords—demonstrates its unrealistic hopes for a breakthrough at this juncture.
Brokering a deal with the Taliban, in his view, serves as an excuse to draw down the United States' troop presence in the country without assessing whether any of the on-the-ground facts have changed. "A deal may bring deceptive stability, but it won't bring a long lasting stability where Afghans or foreigners will have confidence to invest, [to] convert Afghanistan into a viable economy," he said.

He questioned those skeptical of the Taliban's strength. "Will they be able to threaten our key and national interest by possessing AK-47s? Remember, when they helped Al Qaeda do 9/11, they had the same weapons." His solution? "DDR" the Taliban. "Demobilize them, disarm them, take their headquarters out of the Pakistani Intelligence basements... Push the Taliban to play according to the script of democracy—and if they win...allow them a chance to govern." He's confident, though, that "they will die in democracy, they will die in a country where law is ruling, not guns, not IEDs, not the spread of fear and intimidation."

Saleh also has a pretty good idea of where to change the narrative of the war: Pakistan. Since 9/11, he says, Pakistan has provided only "retail" and not "wholesale" cooperation. Time after time, the United States has been duped into trusting the country and its intelligence services. Saleh even claimed that Pakistani officials have privately admitted to him that their country has yet to change its ways despite their frequent promises to do so. "Now the United States believes that by giving more money and resources to Pakistan, you can convert their behavior from bad to good…but it is rewarding bad behavior which [continues] that bad behavior."

Until then, government officials and security forces must be more independent, and demonstrate their accountability to Afghans, Saleh argued. Afghans and their government must be prepared for the day when an exhausted United States and NATO decide to leave their country.

"We hear the speeches of major western politicians saying, 'failure is not an option.' Now it seems as if failure is an option. And my key message, coming to Washington, is this: it is a winnable war. The nature of our enemy has not changed."

He added: "People like me, who see the future of Afghanistan hanging on a cliff, we are preparing for plan B."

http://motherjones.com/mojo/2010/12/...econcililation

Intelligent, trustworthy, and effective? what was his achievement as head of intelligent agency for 7 years? Why he was not able to penetrate Taliban and ISI? Why he could not blow bombs in Pakistan just as ISI were/are doing at well in Afghanistan? He is right on Pakistani continue backing and support of Taliban…other then that he is a total failure…he is not even worth to head a brothel let alone head of intelligent agency of Afghanistan…A country where almost all the intelligent agencies of world are at work. Afghansitan need a able and strong intelligent agency that will strike terror at hearts of Pakistani and Iranis...but then that is not part of the game...afghan state is deliberately kept weak...westerns have different objectives in region.

[Khidr]

Intelligent, trustworthy, and effective? what was his achievement as head of intelligent agency for 7 years? Why he was not able to penetrate Taliban and ISI? Why he could not blow bombs in Pakistan just as ISI were/are doing at well in Afghanistan? He is right on Pakistani continue backing and support of Taliban…other then that he is a total failure…he is not even worth to head a brothel let alone head of intelligent agency of Afghanistan…A country where almost all the intelligent agencies of world are at work. Afghansitan need a able and strong intelligent agency that will strike terror at hearts of Pakistani and Iranis...but then that is not part of the game...afghan state is deliberately kept weak...westerns have different objectives in region.

My opinion on Saleh as an administrator is the complete opposite of yours. One man cannot pentrate a whole network.

There were/are fundamental mistakes about how this war was/is fought, and now in hindsight this war never winnable within the context of creating a democractic 'United Afghan State' becuase Pakistan always had more influence amongst the Pashtuns than did the exiled sons of former Pashtun aristocracts like Karzai and Ghani. Akhundi Iran was also never going to allow a Pro U.S 'United Afghan State'.

The issue now has become how to salvage this war?

The Tajiks, and Hazaras as well as the Uzbeks and perhaps more importantly the American have come to the view that it rests with a "Plan B".
Give the Taliban, areas where they have support and influence (South and East), and arm and support the areas wherer they are loathed (North and West).

Pakistan might also just accept this deal privately. They get their 'strategic depth' albeit it's half as small as what they would have liked. Pakistan will focus it's energy in keeping Taliban areas of Afghanistan a hotbed of anti-india and Wahabism and making sure it doesnt become a hotbed of Pashtun Nationalism.

Iran won't be happy but will still have some leverage with it's 'Persian and Shia' card in the northern Afghanistan. American will also be content to encapsulate if not eliminate the 'terror threat' to Taliban Afghanistan.

The Tajiks and others will resist the Taliban and accept an indepdent Northern and Western Afghanistan and go about their business. The losers will be Afghan Nationalists (which I formally considered myself to be) and Pashtun Loya Afghanistan nationalists like you.

In the long run, this de-facto partition might have two effects.

The progression of the north and west ecnomically might force the Pashtuns to raise against Taliban and coupled with a mutual fondness between Tajiks, Pashtuns, and Hazaras etc, we might see a 'Berlin Wall' style reunification and a the creation of a more politically and socially equal Afghanistan.

Or with time, the two region will culturally and economically grow apart to the extent where the Tajiks and others will see any reunification with Pashtuns as a return to the 'dark old days of Pashtun supremacy' or too much of an economic burden.

[Toramana]

Khidr, I am sorry but you are wrong on one point i.e., there is almost no chance for the so-called Plan A to succeed because those that have deviced it in the first place don't want it to. It is not that the leadership on one side i.e., Tajak, Uzbak, etc. is more capable or is of a higher calibre whose efforts at consolidating the state are being undermined by the inefficiency of Karzai. Neither Karzai is the lone player/actor in the whole game/drama/event.

We are all pawns. Pashtuns may be bit more pawns because it is they that have been selected to act/appear as the villionous cause of the things that are eventually to happen. Some sings are pretty apparent now e.g., the Ghazni development. Others may unfold not so later.

Pashtun leaders have lately become very skeptical of the intentions of those that claim to be fighting the war on terror. One leader said there are larger plans in place that are being materialiised by sheding Pashtun blood. When you blame an entity of nurturing terror but at the same time are keeping it awashed with money, that gives you a hint what might be the motives behind the "whole show".

Karzai today is a lone person trying to keep things togethor and retain the historical legacy. The way he is blamed for all the bad things happening in Afghanistan indicates how would the future analyst/historian depict his role in all that is to come. It is really unfortunate of him...

Google search for Robert D. Kaplan. You might find one of his 2001 (Oct ) article. It is worthy to read.

[Toramana]

Khidr, I am also doubtful, it would be such a smooth sailing for the north. There are other players in the arena/issues to be decided and factors to come into play in the north. Also south is not economically dependent in any way on the north---nor in future it would be. There are better prospects for it in the south-towards the Arabian Sea. Pakistan is also not in a good shape. Neither, its "energized" form can be a factor of stability in the eyes of those who have broader plans.

[Khidr]

Toramana,

Did you mean Plan B? When you typed Plan A.

I didn’t say the leadership amongst the Tajiks is more capable than Karzai at leading a stable state, and hence that’s why this failed.

This failed, and this war failed because Pakistan and Iran, as well as China and Russia were never going to accept this settlement. It also failed because the exiled son of Pashtun aristocrats’ could not win over the hearts and minds of the ordinary Pashtun people. It failed because Afghan Millat’s Pashtun centric ideology, or Karzai Pashtun aristocratic nostalgia idealogy was not as appealing to the Pashtun mass compared to the Taliban’s simple message.

I disagree on two points with you. I believe that it was in Americas and Europe’s interest from the outset to have a stable U.S aligned Pashtun lead but broad based Afghanistan. This was the ideal solution.


Second point I disagree with is that, Plan B is more of a pragmatic plan. In fact it’s not much of a plan but more of a ‘allowing the natural situation to take place’ and then reacting to it. Within 2015, I believe that the Taliban is going to take over South and East Afghanistan. America will seek to encapsulate them in their region. America will stay in the North and West and will fund a non-Pashtun lead anti-Taliban movement.

I'm not saying it will be all 'rosy and wonderful' in the north. I'm saying it will be better off (relatively speaking) than it would be under Taliban rule or the Pashtun South which will be under Taliban rule. The problem is not neccessarily the Taliban. It's education. It will take time, a generation or two. The North has started this education process already in the last 10 years.

What is your view of the situation Toramana in 5 years time? I would like to know your view.

[Toramana]

Khidr I will comment tommorrow. But the flaw I see in your analysis is, you are looking at it in a narrow framework....

[Orzala]

This so-called "Plan B", what it's essentially doing is causing a rift between Afghanistan. A political, economical and ethnic rift between two sides. It is another way of saying "divide and conquer" - a famous tactic used by previous empires to allow for easy access e.g. British empire on India. Of course, in modern day we don't classify any individual country and it's influence over a certain region of the world, an "empire".

Time after time, the United States has been duped into trusting the country and its intelligence services.

He's personifying America into this naive, trusting-of-others little child. Er...yeah, I don't think so. America has the power from every angle (militarily, politically etc) to mold and bend Pakistan which ever way they want. As much power as Pakistan has right now, they owe it all to the U.S. and it is dependent on them, so I don't know what all this bs about "U.S. has been duped into trusting the country" is based on.

Isn't history repeating itself? U.S. promising one side we'll help you financially to discard that sector of Afghanistan and then in no time, your part will be educationally superior and be able to move forward in the world. Similarly, the British did just that when Pakistan, Bangladesh etc were all part of India. They encouraged the latter a separation from India would dissolve all issues especially religious when in fact, it has done the opposite. British having played a big role in the game and substantially benefiting from it, withdrew without a scratch and Pakistan and India still have their feud. Only, there's no specific reason for the feud, other than "just for the sake of it".

Afghanistan is in its current situation not only because of the South and East. All I'm seeing is an opinionated, biased view from a Tajik who thinks he's the man just because he "fought" alongside Massoud. One thing this article has succeeded in is the generalised assumption that Pashtuns (especially from the South and East) are heavily influenced by Pakistanis. It's agreeable that the Taliban is in part controlled by Pakistan, it comes as no surprise since they are the weapon providers. But to make such a big generalisation that all Pashtuns in the South and East are influenced, is undeniably an arrogant, narrow-minded opinion.

"Will they be able to threaten our key and national interest by possessing AK-47s? Remember, when they helped Al Qaeda do 9/11, they had the same weapons."

Lol, there is no way their AK-47s could have impacted on the most well organised "terrorist" attack, even in the slightest. Taliban did not, I repeat, did not, help carry out the 9/11 attacks. Their only mistake was shielding Osama when he sought their protection.

"Now the United States believes that by giving more money and resources to Pakistan, you can convert their behavior from bad to good…but it is rewarding bad behavior which [continues] that bad behavior."

Now that paragraph reeks of crap. In fact, this whole article including his speech is packed with nothing but fallacious assumptions and far-fetched solutions driven solely by internal ethnic problems in the country.

[r3alist]

But to make such a big generalisation that all Pashtuns in the South and East are influenced, is undeniably an arrogant, narrow-minded opinion.

why is it such a popular opinion?

[Khidr]

Khidr you support plan B?

I think “Plan B” provides the only solution acceptable to my people, it’s the only logical way for the North and West “Afghanistan” to continue to build on the modest progress of the last 10 years, and it’s the only logical way to address the thousand and one other social, economic challenges the north faces.
To answer your question, Yes I support “Plan B”.

[Khidr]

Just judging by this forum alone, clearly there is an arduous debate amongst the Pashtuns in regards to Secularism or Talibanisn and which best reconciles with Loy-Afghanistanism or Pashtunism, etc.

Plan B, will allow the Pashtuns to address this issue within the bounds of their own domain. The North and West have no interest in engaging in this debate.


A young university student from my city, when I went to Afghanistan told me: All we want now, and we are prepared to have foreign troops roaming our streets if that’s the cost, is peace and education. Within a generation, we will be in a better place to address the questions of how can we reconcile our identity and history with our politics.