Tweet
Saving Afghanistan
It can be done, but only if the international community truly invests in democracy.
BY ABDULLAH ABDULLAH | JANUARY 8, 2013 The Foreign Policy
In the year 2000, well before the tragic Sept. 11 attacks on the United States and the subsequent liberation of Afghanistan, a secret meeting took place in northern Afghanistan, one of the few areas not conquered by the Taliban. A man named Hamid Karzai, as part of a delegation representing the former king of Afghanistan, flew in to meet Ahmad Shah Massoud, leader of the anti-Taliban United Front, and me to discuss the future of the country.
Our conversation might have seemed presumptuous, focused as it was on outlining a post-Taliban government. We discussed plans to exert pressure on the government of Pakistan to halt its support for the Taliban, who were now despised by the Afghan people, achieve military gains in the resistance against the insurgency, create an interim Afghan administration, convene a constitutional loya jirga to approve a constitution, and lastly to call for elections based on a simple idea: One person equals one vote.
Following 9/11 and the global response, these ideas became the structure for the future Afghan government. But today, despite incredible amounts of blood and treasure and unprecedented support from the United States and the international community, Afghanistan is perceived as on the brink of collapse, with the shadow of the 2014 withdrawal date casting a pall on everything from soldier morale to the economy.
Despite the overwhelming list of challenges, however, from corruption to an economy dependent on foreign aid, Afghanistan can still experience a successful political transition in 2014. For this to happen, all the stakeholders involved must stop thinking strictly in terms of military means.
Afghanistan arrived at this point through a tragic combination of errors, some internal and some external. The initial mistake was to entrust President Karzai with the sacred duty of securing the fate of our embattled nation. His lack of faith in his fellow countrymen is perhaps best exemplified by his request that the CIA, even before he was officially inaugurated as president, provide bodyguards to protect him not from al Qaeda but from the Afghans who helped install him in power. Despite high hopes, he has rarely pursued local support for his policies and alienated many U.S. and international partners with his xenophobic pronouncements, thus tainting any opportunity for genuine leadership.
Karzai's lack of trust led directly to the ill-conceived policy of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, best described as Iraqi-style de-Baathification but in practice targeted against those who had fought as U.S. allies against the Taliban. The end result was a power vacuum that pitted a government with limited resources and capability against a nascent but determined and foreign-supported insurgency. Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's fateful decision to continue to view elements of the Taliban, and Islamic extremism more broadly, as a strategic asset for use in Afghanistan set the stage for the current conflict and fed the insecurity, while the United States became more focused on Iraq, Iran's nuclear program, and the rise of China.
Yet other obstacles to success in Afghanistan are much harder to quantify. The tolerance of the Afghan government and foreigners alike toward high-brow corruption has today become a significant threat to a stable Afghanistan, along with the Taliban. It would be a tragic mistake for the international community to conclude that democracy doesn't work in Afghanistan, while the only thing that doesn't work is democracy as Karzai's government understands it. The Afghan government has done little to ensure that the institutions of democracy, from our parliament to our courts and civil society, are supported and nurtured. Instead, it has confused the Afghan people by being passive toward corruption and pursuing an inconsistent and ambivalent policy regarding reconciliation with the armed insurgency. As the current Afghan government has repeatedly made clear, a red line of reconciliation with the Taliban must be their acceptance of the Constitution -- and Karzai needs to illustrate his own commitment to this same standard. No wonder Afghans feel no connection to this government and understand democracy to be code language for anarchy.
Because of these countless psychological and structural missteps, influential, democratically minded Afghans -- and those who support them -- must focus more sharply on a political transition, without which any "military transition" will ultimately be meaningless. And for a successful political transition, Afghanistan needs every country involved in its rebuilding effort to send a clear message to today's Afghan leadership demanding a democratic transition of power based on the principles of free and fair elections. Instead of abandoning democracy because it hasn't worked under a kleptocracy, Afghanistan and the international community must clean it up.
Can this be done in just over a year? Yes. The time until the 2014 elections must be used to implement procedures that support democracy. Our international partners, in particular the United States, should ensure the positioning of foreign observers to keep a clean tally of the votes. Karzai and the Afghan parliament should approve new voter registration procedures to ensure that every voter's voice -- new and old -- is heard. Our parliament needs to mandate the vetting of all election officials who will oversee election centers, rather than accepting them as a result of presidential decree, as they are now. There needs to be an independent body to resolve all electoral disputes -- an independent Electoral Complaints Commission whose members are selected transparently and with meaningful consultations among Afghan political opposition groups, parliament, civil society, and others.
Karzai must clearly illustrate his willingness both to step down when his constitutionally limited time is up and to promise not to interfere in the election process, addressing the top two concerns of the Kabul political elite. Taking into account our recent presidential and parliamentary elections in 2009 and 2010, state resources should not be used to influence the outcome of the elections.
The political transition, based entirely on credible and transparent elections, is of paramount importance because it will restore the Afghan people's faith and sense of ownership in their government. Despite all the fraud and mismanagement in previous elections, it is, remarkably, not yet lost. And if the government obtains this mandate from the people, it can act with confidence on issues from dealing with the Taliban to stabilizing the economy and receiving long-term assistance from the West and the international community that will ensure Afghanistan's security, stability, and prosperity. By playing a constructive role in facilitating necessary electoral reforms and overseeing a credible and legitimate transfer of power in 2014, Karzai can still take advantage of this unique opportunity and moment in Afghan history to be remembered as a reformist.
The structure of Afghanistan's political process, which was discussed in that meeting in 2000, further implemented in the 2001 Bonn agreement, and painfully built over the past decade, is still the right one. But work remains on that central point -- ensuring that every person gets the opportunity to choose his or her government. With a push from the international community, and in particular, the United States, to help Afghanistan conduct free and fair elections, Afghanistan can be saved -- and move into the next decade from a position of strength. Together with our international partners, the Afghan nation has come a long way in our transition toward democracy and stability. We must march on forward.
The open question of Afghanistan
By Walter Pincus, Tuesday, January 8, 3:52 AM The Washington Post
President Obama this week has a chance to explain to President Hamid Karzai, and hopefully to the American people, what will be our future role in Afghanistan.
Most speculation has focused on how rapidly the remaining 60,000-plus U.S. combat troops will be withdrawn and how many will be permanently assigned there after 2014. But as the U.S. financial belt is being tightened, people want to know the financial cost, for how long and what will be accomplished.
The fiscal 2013 Defense Authorization Act contains $4.7 billion for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), an amount that the U.S. government can’t continue to expend. The House-Senate conferees on the bill, realizing that Afghan support must be reduced, called for an independent study of what size the ANSF should be to make certain that Afghanistan will not again serve as a training camp for terrorists. The Afghans cannot support the security forces that the United States and its allies have created. That means Washington will have to pay or get others to join in future funding of Kabul’s forces.
“There are no public U.S. plans that show how the Obama administration will deal with either the civil or military aspects of this transition between now and the end of 2014, or in the years that follow,” Anthony H. Cordesman, who holds the Arleigh A. Burke chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, wrote last week. A former Pentagon official who has closely followed the 10- year war in Afghanistan, Cordesman questioned recent Pentagon statements of continuing successes, saying his reading of official reports shows “there has been no meaningful military progress since the end of 2010.”
He also wrote, “The State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have never issued a remotely credible report on the progress and impact of the civilian surge or any aspect of the civil aid program.”
The real issue, Cordesman said, “is the future size of the civil-military effort, not the military effort alone. Any debate or analysis of the future U.S. role in Afghanistan that does not tie the two together is little more than intellectual and media rubbish.”
High on the Obama-Karzai agenda is a status-of-forces or similar agreement that would authorize a U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan after 2014. Discussions have been underway since November. One has to only look back at Iraq to see the pitfalls that may arise before the two sides can reach such an agreement. Not the least is getting an Afghan-U.S. guarantee over which country will exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel and under what circumstances.
Karzai, who is set to give up the presidency next year, has his own wish list that seems to include a long-term U.S. presence, but under Afghan terms. He has a list that “he has enumerated for months in public speeches, including accusations that the United States has fomented corruption in Afghanistan and continues to violate the country’s sovereignty,” according to The Washington Post’s Kabul correspondent Kevin Sieff.
One of Karzai’s favorite subjects is the U.S. approval of contracts “with [Afghan] warlords who use the money for their own gains,” according to his spokesman, Aimal Faizi. While one of the U.S. complaints about the Afghan government is its corruption, Karzai has repeatedly said that corruption is “imposed on us, and it is meant to weaken our system.”
A glance at the contracts awarded or offered in the first week of January shows how deeply committed the U.S. operation is in Afghanistan.
Construction contracts alone awarded last week totaled $41.3 million to build various facilities for elements of the ANSF and other government agencies. The largest was for $14.2 million to build a national fire training academy near Kabul that would be “for a population of 350 personnel to include students, instructors, mentors, administration and support staff,” according to the award notice.
Also awarded were contracts to construct a $3.4 million Afghan Border Police headquarters in Farah province; a $3.3 million Class B fire station for the Afghan National Police (ANP) in Ghor province; a $4.3 million expansion of Afghan army facilities in Helmand province; a $5.6 million supply facility for the ANP in Baghlan province; a $6.8 million expansion of facilities for the Afghan army and air force combined wing in Kandahar province; and $3.8 million to expand facilities at Camp Zafar in Herat province, which I wrote about last week.
New contracts also were in the offing. For example, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is seeking a contractor to upgrade the Afghan army’s Khair Khot garrison in Paktika province. The work, to involve 25 structures, would include “a new compound for a Transient Kandak [Afghan battalion of about 600], an Operations Coordination Center, additional barracks and latrines for existing units already fielded, two literacy training classrooms and utility upgrades,” according to the government notice.
Remember, this was just the first week in January, and the United States is planning to be in Afghanistan 51 more weeks this year. It would be much better for Obama and Karzai to end their meeting with a specific list of what exactly will be involved rather than empty words saying they will continue to support each other in the fight against terrorists.
A 'Zero Option' for Afghanistan
Yes, President Karzai, we might pull out completely.
Foreign Policy BY DAVID W. BARNO JANUARY 7, 2013
Afghan President Hamid Karzai's visit this week to Washington marks one of the final big decision points in America's 11-year Afghanistan war. This week's meetings are likely to determine the final U.S. footprint in Afghanistan after 2014, when all international combat operations are slated to end. And that residual number of U.S. forces could well be zero.
Recent reports suggest that the White House is looking at troop options ranging from 3,000 to as many as 15,000 stay-behind troops. Many think that the final figure will be well under 10,000. These numbers are much diminished from proposals seriously considered even 12 to 24 months ago of a long-term presence in the range of 20,000 to 35,000 troops. The realities of shrinking budgets and crumpled public support for the war have dramatically trimmed those expectations. In recent weeks, vigorous debate has been under way inside the administration in advance of Karzai's visit to sort out a minimalist approach that will protect long-term U.S. interests in the region, but do so with the absolute leanest outlay of dollars and troops.
Karzai comes to this week's discussions convinced that the United States desperately needs long-term military bases in Afghanistan. He sees an America without other viable options to maintain its regional influence, cajole Pakistan, threaten Iran, or launch raids against nearby terrorists. Because of this, Karzai thinks that he holds all the cards in the upcoming negotiations. He is absolutely convinced that the United States has no workable strategic choice but to station substantial U.S. troops in Afghanistan after 2014.
But Karzai has it wrong. There is strong sentiment in the United States to look at all the options. Here are five reasons why:
Iraq. The outcome of America's war in Iraq sets a strong precedent for a similar "zero" U.S. military posture in Central Asia. Iraq has not become an Iranian puppet state nor descended into chaos since the United States withdrew all its military forces at the end of 2011. The United States maintains a robust diplomatic presence there -- and presumably conducts intelligence activities -- to protect its interests. Iraqi political decisions are often at odds with U.S. preferences; few think that a U.S. troop presence would change that reality. Iraq's failure to grant remaining U.S. soldiers legal immunity from Iraqi law doomed any possibility of a residual force there; the same could happen in Afghanistan, and withdrawal could be seen as an equally viable outcome by many Americans.
Budgetary pressure. With a debt crisis and crumbling infrastructure at home, enthusiasm on Capitol Hill for spending taxpayer dollars on foreign adventures is at an all-time low. The recent action to avert the fiscal cliff has delayed, but not fixed, the substantial imbalance between U.S. spending and revenue. A perpetual flow of billions of aid dollars to Afghanistan after 2014 -- for U.S. troops or for Afghans -- will be a much tougher sell two years from now than it is today. And it is very tough today.
War weariness. By 2014, the United States will have been at war in Afghanistan for over 12 years. The connection between Afghanistan and the 9/11 attacks has frayed deeply since Osama bin Laden's death at the hands of U.S. forces in 2011. With over 2,000 Americans killed and another 17,000 wounded in over a decade of inconclusive fighting, most Americans are looking for an exit from a seemingly interminable war. Maintaining congressional and popular support for an unending deployment of thousands of U.S. troops after 12 years at war will be supremely difficult, even more so if casualties continue.
Stand-off capabilities. The United States has powerful remote intelligence, surveillance, and strike capabilities that could only be dreamed of in the 1990s. These capabilities increasingly can be employed from "stand-off" distances, with a few flying from as far as the United States. Some of these capabilities require regional basing, but Afghanistan is not the only country that can provide low-visibility basing options. Drones have changed the face of warfare, and used in concert with U.S. intelligence into remote areas, they are increasingly lethal to terrorists.
U.S. intelligence networks. Eleven years of extensive quiet intelligence efforts partnered with Afghans (and Pakistanis) have created a deep web of friendly contacts that will be maintained long after 2014. In some ways, the post-2014 environment in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area could evolve into a prolonged "intelligence war," with hundreds of U.S. operatives and billions of covert dollars invested in preventing further terrorist attacks on the United States. Given its vital importance, this undertaking will endure -- regardless of the size of the residual U.S. military presence.
U.S. President Barack Obama will have to weigh the substantial risks inherent in a "Zero Option" for Afghanistan. Absent the stabilizing influence of some numbers of U.S. troops, Afghanistan could slip back into chaos, experiencing a new version of the devastating civil war that rent the country in the 1990s. The ability to see and strike terrorist groups that aim to attack the United States or its allies from within the region would be degraded. Al Qaeda could surge into growing ungoverned spaces and perhaps re-establish a more prominent foothold. U.S. influence on a nuclear-armed Pakistan would undoubtedly lessen if U.S. troops were no longer stationed next door. And the potential for the United States to put pressure on Iran from U.S. forces posted near its eastern border would vanish. By any measure, it is a suboptimal posture for the United States in the region, but not necessarily an untenable one.
Obama must consider all these risks as he sits down with Karzai to hammer out this last chapter of the war. Karzai would be wise to avoid overplaying his hand. Even though the Zero Option is not the best choice to protect American long-term regional interests, it certainly remains on the table. Overreach on Karzai's part could easily sour prospects for any sort of enduring U.S. military presence.
For Americans, the Afghanistan war is entering its final phase. Obama knows that this war will end on his watch. His legacy as president will inevitably be shaped by its outcome. Whether U.S. troops ultimately stay or leave Afghanistan after 2014 may now come down to just one week of tough bargaining. Each nation has a great deal at stake.
Opposition Urges Karzai to Consider National Interest on US Trip
TOLOnews.com By Sharif Amiry Monday, 07 January 2013
President Hamid Karzai should prioritize the country's interests in his negotiations with US officials, Afghan politicians urged Monday as the president flew off to Washington for a three-day visit.
President Karzai is expected to meet his American counterpart and other US officials to discuss bilateral issues, particularly the Afghan-US security pact that will determine the American troops' stay in Afghanistan post-2014.
"We expect president Karzai to consider the national interests and the current security challenges of the country. He should also solicit guarantees from the US that Afghanistan will not be abandoned to engage in civil war once again," said Mawlawi Jalaluddin Shinwari, a member of the Right and Justice Party.
The politicians also insisted on the continuation of war against terror after 2014, urging the US government to support the democratic process and civil society in the country.
"The US should support the political, democratic and civil society process of Afghanistan. The international community should continue its war on terror after 2014 too," Afghanistan's National Front Spokesman Sayed Aqa Fazel Sancharaki said.
As concerns over the uncertain future of the country grows rapidly, the Afghan government relies most on its strategic agreements with the US and other Nato allies to ensure continued funding of the Afghan national security forces.
As Pentagon chief, Hagel likely to favor sizable Afghan drawdown
Reuters By Phil Stewart 07/01/2013
WASHINGTON - A decorated Vietnam veteran acutely aware of the limits of military power, Chuck Hagel is likely to favor a sizable drawdown in Afghanistan, more frugal spending at the Pentagon and extreme caution when contemplating the use of force in places like Iran or Syria.
Obama's decision to nominate Hagel - a Republican former senator who split with his party to oppose the Iraq war - as U.S. defense secretary came despite a public lobbying campaign against his candidacy in recent weeks by a host of critics, some of whom seized upon past remarks to argue he is anti-Israel.
Hagel's supporters deny that, but are bracing for a tough confirmation battle in the Senate. Obama, as he announced the nomination, called Hagel the kind of leader U.S. forces deserve and pointed to his sacrifices in the Vietnam War, where he earned two Purple Hearts - the decoration for troops wounded in battle.
"Chuck knows that war is not an abstraction," Obama said. "He understands that sending young Americans to fight and bleed in the dirt and mud, that's something we only do when it's absolutely necessary."
Hagel, who would be the first Vietnam veteran to take the job, would succeed Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, 74, who is retiring from public life after a more than four-decade career in government that included leading the CIA during the covert raid to kill al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in 2011.
The blunt, 66-year-old Hagel will need to take over where Panetta leaves off, orchestrating a drawdown in U.S. forces in Afghanistan intended to bring the combat mission to a close by the end 2014. Hagel and Panetta were due to dine together on Monday night to discuss the transition.
The Afghan drawdown's pace is an open question, as is the size of the residual force the United States will leave behind. Obama is again showing his readiness to veto the military brass, considering a lower range of options - keeping between 3,000 and 9,000 troops in Afghanistan - than his top commander in Afghanistan proposed, one U.S. official told Reuters.
Hagel has not yet commented on the matter, but Obama would likely not choose a Pentagon chief who fundamentally disagreed with him on that or other key issues.
Hagel, who fought alongside his own brother and suffered shrapnel wounds in Vietnam and burns to his face, has made no secret of his reservations about what the military can accomplish in Afghanistan.
"We can't impose our will. The Russians found that out in Afghanistan. We've been involved in two very costly wars that have taught us a lesson once again," Hagel told PBS's "Tavis Smiley" show last year.
Unsurprisingly, he also is extremely cautious about what could be done in Syria. "I don't think America wants to be in the lead on this," he told Foreign Policy magazine in May.
'THE GUY AT THE BOTTOM'
Hagel's first-hand experience in war may win respect inside the Pentagon. He volunteered for the Vietnam War as an infantryman. He would become be the first defense secretary who started and ended his military career with an enlisted rank, as opposed to serving as an officer - an important distinction in wartime.
The enlisted ranks are "the ones who have the least say about where, when, and why we go to war, but bear the harshest consequences when we do," Matt Pottinger, a veteran of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and a former journalist, wrote in a piece on the "The Daily Beast" website applauding Hagel as a candidate to become defense chief.
Obama on Monday quoted Hagel saying: "My frame of reference ... is geared towards the guy at the bottom who's doing the fighting and the dying."
Hagel's comments on Middle East issues, including on Israel, are likely to complicate his Senate confirmation. House of Representatives Majority Leader Eric Cantor, a Virginia Republican, said in a statement on Monday he is "profoundly concerned and disappointed" by Hagel's nomination.
Critics including Abraham Foxman of the Anti-Defamation League, a group devoted to fighting anti-Semitism, have raised questions about Hagel's past comments, including one during a 2006 interview in which he was quoted as saying: "the Jewish lobby intimidates a lot of people up here." Hagel also has faced criticism for urging direct talks with Iran.
Many foreign policy heavyweights have come to Hagel's defense, including former national security advisers Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who served Republican and Democratic presidents respectively, and former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq Ryan Crocker.
Questions remain about Hagel's approach to the defense budget.
Panetta has said the U.S. military would be hollowed out if $487 billion in planned spending reductions over the next decade are doubled - something that would happen if Obama and Congress fail to agree by the end of February on a way to avert automatic cuts due to kick in.
But Hagel said in an interview last year with the Financial Times: "I think the military needs to be pared down. I don't think the military has really looked at themselves strategically, critically in a long, long time."
His position in favor of deficit reduction raises questions about possible cuts or schedule delays to big weapons systems like Lockheed Martin Corp's F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, according to Jim McAleese, a defense consultant.
McAleese also named as being at risk of cuts or delays the Army's planned Ground Combat Vehicle, the V-22 Osprey built by Boeing Co and Bell Helicopter, a unit of Textron Inc , and the Navy's early work on developing a new ballistic missile submarine. McAleese said final decisions would be up to Congress, where such programs enjoy strong support. (Additional reporting by Andrea Shalal-Esa; Editing by Warren Strobel and Will Dunham)
As Karzai Visits U.S., What Are The Prospects For Afghan Peace?
NPR By Sean Carberry January 07, 2013
As Afghan President Hamid Karzai comes to Washington to meet with President Obama and other U.S. officials this week, there is renewed discussion in Afghanistan about the possibility of a negotiated end to the country's war.
Recent talks hosted by France have rekindled hopes for some sort of reconciliation between the Taliban and Karzai's government. But given the decades of war in Afghanistan, many think the prospect of a peace deal remains nothing but talk.
The on-and-off peace efforts have spent most of the last year off due to a set of seemingly irreconcilable differences.
U.S. Calls For Direct Afghan Talks
Taliban leaders have long rejected peace talks with the Karzai government, saying they will only negotiate with the U.S. The U.S., for its part, says the two Afghan parties should negotiate directly.
But at least the mood has changed a bit since an informal meeting last month outside Paris.
For the first time, envoys from the Taliban sat at the same table with members of the Karzai-appointed Afghan High Peace Council as well as other Afghan politicians and members of parliament, including Nilofar Ibrahimi.
"It's the first time the Taliban accepted two women to join the peace talks. This is something very positive, and this is a very strong move towards peace," Ibrahimi tells NPR.
Ibrahimi says the Taliban delegates seemed ready to make some concessions on the question of women's rights once there is a peace settlement.
"The Taliban agreed that women will have the right to work, to study and to do business, but according to Islamic law," says Ibrahimi.
That's progress in Ibrahimi's view, though she's still skeptical about the Taliban's intentions.
"I cannot say that I'm definitely optimistic about this meeting. There might be something that is still hidden behind the curtains," she says.
Mawlawi Qalamuddin, a former Taliban official and a member of the Afghan High Peace Council, says the talks in France were symbolically significant.
"The most important part of the talks in France was the participation of the Taliban," he says. "For the two years the Peace Council has been in existence, no one from the Taliban has come to share their views with us."
Kate Clark, a senior analyst with the Afghanistan Analysts Network in Kabul, says, "I think peace is possible here."
She says that one of the main challenges is that there are so many players — the U.S., the other NATO counties, Pakistan, the Taliban, the Afghan opposition and the Karzai government. And each has its own interests and needs to come away with some sort of victory they can take back to their respective constituencies.
"It's messy. It's really messy and, I think, to get beyond that requires a level of political seriousness that we have yet to see amongst the big players," Clark says. "Up until now, they've mainly been serious about waging war."
Skepticism In Kabul
That also explains why the attitude on the Afghan street is subdued — people hunger for peace, but they seem to think that one party or the other won't agree on a deal.
Sayed Shekeib, a 19-year-old student, says he doesn't trust the Taliban.
Ahmad, a 43-year-old shopkeeper, says only the U.S. can make peace happen. He doesn't think the Karzai government is looking out for the interests of the Afghan people.
Wahid Mujdah, a former Taliban official who now lives in Kabul, agrees.
"The Afghan government [has] no idea about this peace, no plan [or] agenda about the peace process," Mujdah says.
He and others within Afghanistan say a recent plan drafted by the government is a half-hearted effort to exert control over the peace process. Mujdah says Taliban leaders have told him they still will not negotiate with Karzai.
"We want to reach an agreement with the Americans on the future of Afghanistan," says Mujdah.
Which circles back to another apparent dead end since the U.S. says peace talks must be Afghan-led.
So, while in France the parties agreed that there must be peace in Afghanistan, they still can't agree on a road map to get there.
NPR's Sultan Faizy contributed to this report
Over 200 Afghan policemen poisoned in Balkh province
Press TV January 9, 2013
A total of 250 Afghan policemen have been poisoned in Afghanistan's northern province of Balkh, Press TV reports.
Local officials said the incident took place in a police station in Marmul district on Tuesday night.
Nobody has yet claimed responsibility for the poisoning whose cause is still unclear.
The incident is considered the latest in similar poisoning incidents in the war-torn country.
On June 25, 2012, some 76 Afghan policemen were poisoned in a police academy in Lashkargah city in Afghanistan's southern province of Helmand.
Apparently, the police officers felt headaches nauseous after eating breakfast.
Meanwhile earlier in the same month, at least 116 students, mostly girls, were poisoned at the Hazrat Imam Zada Yahya high school in the northern province of Sar-e-Pol.
The school girls showed symptoms of exposure to toxic gas, including headache and nausea.
Also on September 26, a total of 16 schoolgirls were poisoned in Um-ul-Benin high school in the capital Kabul.
President Hamid Karzai has blamed the enemies of Afghanistan for the poisoning incidents.
Afghan President Begins U.S. Visit
January 9, 2013 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Afghan President Hamid Karzai has begun a four-day visit to the United States.
Karzai is expected to meet with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, and U.S. senators.
After arriving on January 8, Karzai met with Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security Asadullah Khalid, who is being treated in Washington for wounds he received in a suicide bombing last month.
On January 11, Karzai and U.S. President Barack Obama will negotiate a bilateral security agreement.
The White House says that during the visit, Obama will not announce a decision on how many troops will stay in Afghanistan after 2014.
U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser For Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes told reporters the two leaders will "consult about those issues" before Obama makes a decision "in the coming months."
Rhodes also said the White House does not rule out the possibility that no troops will remain post-2014, when Afghanistan is scheduled to take full responsibility for its security.
Negotiations on a bilateral security agreement are set to feature in talks between Karzai and Obama Friday.
Based on reporting by AFP and Reuters
Afghan policy debate fuelled White House, Pentagon mistrust - book
Reuters By David Alexander 07/01/2013
WASHINGTON - President Barack Obama's first year in office was marked by creeping mistrust between the White House and the Pentagon over Afghan war policy, with repeated requests for more troops fuelling the suspicions, retired General Stanley McChrystal said in a new book.
McChrystal, who became the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan during those months, said Obama was elected at a time when General David McKiernan, then head of international forces, was seeking 30,000 more troops to stave off a Taliban resurgence, a request that had been on hold since the previous summer.
"It created an unwelcome dynamic," McChrystal wrote in his new memoir, "My Share of the Task." "In the eighth year of the war in Afghanistan, a new president found himself facing a time-sensitive decision."
"The next 10 months saw the emergence of an unfortunate deficit of trust between the White House and the Department of Defense, largely arising from the decision-making process on Afghanistan," he wrote. "To me it appeared unintentional on both sides. But over time, the effects were costly."
The rising mistrust ultimately played a role in McChrystal's resignation. In June 2010 the general stepped down after Rolling Stone magazine ran an article entitled "The Runaway General," in which it quoted members of McChrystal's staff disparaging top White House officials and allies. McChrystal was summoned back to Washington, where he resigned.
An investigation by the Department of Defense Inspector General concluded that not all of the events described in the Rolling Stone article had occurred as reported and there was insufficient evidence to conclude any Defense Department standards had been violated. Rolling Stone stood by its story.
McChrystal, while expressing surprise about the "tone and direction" of the article, said he accepted responsibility for it and never had any question about the necessary response.
"I knew only one decision was right for the moment and for the mission. I didn't try to figure out what others might do, no hero's or mentor's example came to mind. I called no one for advice," wrote McChrystal, who now teaches leadership at Yale University and heads a leadership consulting group.
STRUGGLING FOR A STRATEGY
The memoir, which is being released on Monday, offers McChrystal's first assessment of the events that led to his resignation. It depicts a U.S. military in Afghanistan struggling to find a strategy for success at a time of Taliban resurgence and an inexperienced White House sceptical of the war and sensitive to criticism.
The general portrays himself as well-meaning but slow to understand the administration's political sensitivities and undercut by his failure to grasp the dynamics of the situation. He wrote that he wanted to operate as independently as possible of political or even policy pressures.
"I found ... the demands of the job made this difficult," McChrystal said. "The process of formulating, negotiating, articulating and then prosecuting even a largely military campaign involved politics at multiple levels that were impossible to ignore."
His memoir hits the shelves at a new time of transition in the war whose strategy he helped to devise, with Afghan President Hamid Karzai due to visit Washington this week for talks with Obama.
The two countries are trying to hammer out a deal on the nature of any U.S. troop presence after 2014, when most combat forces are due to leave and hand over security to the Afghan army and police.
The administration is currently studying a residual force of between 3,000 and 9,000 troops to conduct counterterrorism operations and training once most combat troops are withdrawn, a U.S. official said.
That is lower than the preliminary range of 6,000 to 15,000 troops that officials said was initially put forward by Marine Corps General John Allen, the head of international forces. Some defense analysts have warned that those troop numbers are likely to be too small to fulfil the mission.
The current debate over troop numbers echoes the one that McChrystal describes in his book after Obama took office in 2009. The president, who had promised during the election to refocus on Afghanistan and send two additional brigades, found himself facing a request for 30,000 U.S. troops.
The president initially agreed to send 17,000 troops, but the Pentagon soon had to ask for 4,000 more, who were needed for support, making it look as if officials hadn't done their homework.
DAMAGE DONE
Obama ultimately approved the additional troops after announcing a new strategic direction for the war that called for U.S. forces to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and to pursue a counterinsurgency-style strategy in Afghanistan. But the damage had been done.
"The rising mistrust was disappointing," McChrystal wrote.
After the general was tapped to take over international forces in Afghanistan in May, he conducted a strategic reassessment assisted by civilian defense analysts that concluded at least 40,000 additional troops would be needed to carry out a counterinsurgency strategy.
Several weeks after briefing Defense Secretary Robert Gates on the strategy, McChrystal said he learned it had been leaked to the media, creating pressures on the White House and Pentagon that were not helpful for the decision-making process.
"I didn't anticipate insinuations that I, or my staff, had been the source of the leak, which we were not," McChrystal wrote. "Nor did I fully appreciate that morning that many observers and some policy makers felt the leaking had begun six weeks earlier, when the civilian advisers who had participated in our strategic assessment returned to the United States and began to say more forces were needed."
As a result of the leaks, "some in the White House felt as though the military had limited the president's options before he had a chance to weigh our professional advice," McChrystal wrote. "This was never my intent, nor that of my staff."
A few weeks later, in early October in London, McChrystal was asked whether a more limited counterterrorism approach was viable for Afghanistan.
McChrystal said he answered "that, in my estimation, a more holistic effort than a counterterrorism, capture-and-kill campaign was required to leave Afghanistan stable."
Although Vice President Joe Biden's name was not mentioned, McChrystal said his response was taken as "a rebuttal of other policy options for Afghanistan and as criticism of the vice president's views."
"It wasn't intended as such," he wrote.
(Reporting By David Alexander; editing by Christopher Wilson)
McChrystal says counterinsurgency worked, but Afghanistan still needs a US security lifeline
Associated Press Tuesday, January 8, 2013
NEW YORK - Retired Gen. Stanley McChrystal said Monday he backs the White House’s drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan slated for 2014, but added that the U.S. owes Afghans some sort of enduring security presence to support them.
“We have an emotional responsibility,” McChrystal said of Afghanistan in an interview with The Associated Press. He commanded forces there before resigning over a controversial magazine article.
“We created expectations after 2001 in people” that the U.S. would be there to keep the country from sliding back into the chaos of the Taliban years, McChrystal said.
His comments come ahead of a visit by Afghan President Hamid Karzai to the White House, as the two nations try to craft a long-term plan for Afghanistan that will include a U.S. military presence whose size and scope have not yet been decided. The Afghan war commander, Gen. John Allen, has offered White House planners a range of troop numbers to choose from, from 6,000 troops, who would be devoted mostly to hunting al-Qaida, to more than 15,000, enough to continue much of the U.S. training mission and also back Afghan troops in the field with intelligence and logistical support.
McChrystal said Afghans don’t want an occupying army, but they fear the U.S. will withdraw completely.
“Like a teenager, you really don’t want your parents hanging around you, but...you like to know if things go bad, they’re going to help,” he said. McChrystal added that the Afghans are not children, but they need to know they can trust America.
The general gave interviews upon the release of his memoir, “My Share of the Task,” published by Portfolio/Penguin, an imprint of Penguin Group USA. The book outlines his time from commanding the top military counterterrorism unit, the Joint Special Operations Command, to the contentious process of crafting the Afghan war strategy, and ends with his abrupt resignation over an article in The Rolling Stone.
McChrystal took full responsibility for the piece, by embedded reporter Michael Hastings, which anonymously quoted members of McChrystal’s staff disparaging the White House over war policy. He would not confirm whether the article’s quotes were accurate, saying only that he “cheerfully” offered President Barack Obama his resignation, as the article had created a perception of a rift that would hurt the war mission.
But his eyes watered at the memory of telling his wife, Annie, that his 34-year Army career was at an end.
“Annie said, Good. We’ve always been happy, we’ll always be happy, and we have been, every day since,” he said. McChrystal now teaches at Yale University, and runs his own consulting group.
First lady Michelle Obama later asked McChrystal to work on Joining Forces, the White House initiative for military troops and their families. He said he’d spoken to the president at several Joining Forces event, but had never again discussed the resignation with him.
Part of the friction between McChrystal’s staff and the White House was over McChrystal’s request for an extra 40,000 troops, which Obama chose over a proposal by Vice President Joe Biden to limit the mission to a small number of counterterrorism forces and trainers.
The retired general insisted the strategy known as counterinsurgency worked, saying the Afghans are much better able to stand on their own.
“If you had tried to bring big American forces in and do search and destroy, or do just raids, it would have been pointless. The Afghan people needed to buy into this,” he said. “They needed to believe we were there to protect them...and we weren’t just using Afghanistan as a place to fight our enemies.”
He called the looming drawdown of U.S. forces “inevitable,” and said that while Afghan troops still needed to “mature rapidly,” being forced to work on their own would help.
“You are never ready to do something by yourself until you actually do it, and then you are surprised you can,” he said.
__
Dozier can be followed on Twitter (at)kimberlydozier.
Karzai visits wounded Afghan spy chief in US hospital
By Sadaf Shinwari - January 9 2013, 11:27 am Khaama Press
Afghan president Hamid Karzai met with the Afghan intelligence — national directorate of security (NDS) chief Asadullah Khalid upon his arrival to United States of America.
According to a statement released by Afghan presidential palace, president Hamid Karzai was briefed regarding the health condition of wounded Afghan spy chief Asadullah Khalid by US doctors.
The source further added president Hamid Karzai praised US doctors for providing medical care to wounded Afghan spy chief and said the health condition of Asadullah Khalid was satisfactory.
Afghan president Hamid Karzai also met with the US soldiers who were wounded in Afghanistan.
Asadullah Khalid was wounded when the bomber struck at a guesthouse used by the National Directorate of Security (NDS) in a heavily guarded area of the capital. The intelligence agency said he had survived a “terrorist attack”.
Khalid was rushed into surgery at an NDS hospital after the attack. He was visited by President Hamid Karzai, signalling his importance in the fight against the Taliban as Nato forces prepare to withdraw in 2014.
He was later admitted to a US hospital for further treatment. The attacker was purportedly carrying a peace message on behalf of the Taliban when he detonated himself.
On Friday Karzai holds his first face-to-face talks with President Obama since last year’s Nato summit in Chicago, shortly after the pair had signed a long-term strategic partnership.
White House: No US Troops an Option For Afghanistan
Dan Robinson VOA News January 8, 2013
WHITE HOUSE — Three days before Afghanistan's president, Hamid Karzai, meets with President Barack Obama in Washington, White House officials said Tuesday that the United States is considering all options, including potentially leaving no troops in Afghanistan beyond 2014 when foreign combat forces are to leave.
The United States and Afghanistan are negotiating details of a bilateral security agreement, including the scope of a potential U.S. troop presence, after 2014.
Recent media reports have quoted unnamed U.S. officials as saying President Obama received a recommendation from military commanders to maintain between 6,000 and 20,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan after 2014.
But the reports say the White House is considering a smaller contingent, with as few as 3,000 troops, to train Afghan forces and help prevent al-Qaida from using the country again as a haven.
Senior Obama administration officials say the question of specific U.S. troop levels is less important than achieving key goals.
Deputy National Security Adviser for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes said, "The way the president approaches this is not aiming to keep a certain number of troops within Afghanistan. The objective of the bilateral security agreement negotiations is not to accomplish a number of U.S. troops in a country. It is to accomplish the two goals of denying a safe haven to al-Qaida, and training and equipping Afghan national security forces."
Rhodes was asked by reporters whether President Obama would not rule out a force level of no U.S. troops in Afghanistan in favor of conducting counterterrorism operations through other means. Rhodes replied, "Yes, we wouldn't rule out any option." He added that Friday's talks between the U.S. and Afghan presidents would not finalize any troop number decision. Rhodes said Mr. Obama will consider all aspects of the situation, including recommendations from U.S. and NATO commander Marine Corps General John Allen.
White House press secretary Jay Carney said, "As we have said in the past, the president is in the process of reviewing proposals and when he is ready to announce a decision, he will do that."
After the withdrawal of a 30,000-member surge force last year, 68,000 U.S. troops remain in Afghanistan. Plans call for continuing gradual reductions toward a milestone when Afghan forces assume the full security lead this year.
Deputy Assistant to the President and Coordinator for South Asia Doug Lute avoided discussion of any potential U.S. troop numbers mentioned in recent media reports.
"If you assume that we make more progress against al-Qaida, then potentially the C.T. [i.e., counterterrorism] mission two years from now is less than it might otherwise be. If you assume that the Afghan capacity continues on a positive glide path and we reach our goals in terms of the development of the army and the police, then you can imagine that they require less support," he said.
Lute said U.S., coalition and Afghan forces have made a lot of progress against al-Qaida. But he added, "the job is not done," and said the training of Afghan forces is incomplete.
Recently, the Taliban issued a statement threatening to continue fighting the Afghan government if U.S. forces remain in the country after 2014.
President Karzai arrived in Washington on Tuesday and will participate in several activities, including talks with U.S. officials and a visit to wounded U.S. soldiers.
Friday's talks between President Obama and President Karzai will include U.S. and Afghan delegations, and will be followed by a working lunch and a joint news conference.
Khalili Denies Allegations of Land Grabbing
TOLOnews.com By Rafi Sediqi Monday, 07 January 2013
The second vice president denied Saturday that he is involved in land grabbing and said that government officials and politicians should not be accused without proper evidence.
Vice President Khalili was accused of land grabbing by a senator recently. In response to the accusation, Khaliil sent a letter of protest to President Karzai, criticizing the accusation.
"Freedom of expression is everyone's right, but it should not be used to lower the prestige of other people, and government officials should not be accused without evidence," Khalili said in the letter, adding that allegations against him should be investigated.
MP Shokria Paikan supported Khalili's position.
"Investigations are underway to find those involved in land grabbing, but no one has the right to accuse a government official or anyone else of land grabbing without sufficient evidence," Paikan said.
Several Afghan lawmakers also accused government officials more broadly of involvement in land grabbing, and urged the Attorney General's Office to make public the names of those involved.
"Unfortunately, some government officials and lawmakers are involved in land grabbing. A commission is working to prepare and release a list of those officials involved in land grabbing," MP Ghulam Hussain Naseri said.
Land grabs have turned into a major issue for the Afghan government as thousands of state-owned lands are believed to have been usurped by powerful figures. These include high-ranking government officials and warlords.
'All Aid' Should be Spent Through the Government: Finance Ministry
TOLOnews.com By Abdul Wali Arian Monday, 07 January 2013
President Hamid Karzai is expected to ask US officials during his three-day visit to Washington to channel more aid through the Afghan government to increase aid effectiveness.
The President is leading a delegation of high-level Afghan officials to Washington to discuss issues related to security, the Afghan economy and the post-2014 situation.
"We want most of the aid -- in fact, all of it -- to be spent through the government of Afghanistan, [because] this is very effective," said Wahid Tawhidi, spokesman of the ministry of finance,.
The demand comes following three weeks of intensive debate in the parliament over the impeachment of 11 ministers who have spent less than 50% of their annual budgets. A lack of capacity, corruption, security challenges and managerial shortcomings are the prime reasons for expenditure inefficiencies.
The international community, specifically the United States, has long criticized the Afghan government over mismanagement and corruption. The recent Tokyo summit in which the international community pledged $16 billion in aid to Afghanistan has also called for strict monitoring of aid expenditure and tough accountability.
The Afghan government has argued over the years that aid expenditure by foreign government and aid agencies has created a parallel structure that has undermined the people's trust in the government and has caused much of the aid to be spent in areas outside the Afghan National Development Strategy.
$450,000 Stolen From the Afghan National Bank
TOLOnews.com By Karim Amini Monday, 07 January 2013
About half a million dollars was stolen from three branches of the Afghan National Bank in Kabul, Kunduz and Badakhshan.
At least $200,000 of the total was stolen from the Kabul branch, the remaining from the other two provinces, reports suggest.
Authorities have arrested 10 people in connection with the heists, ministry of interior spokesman Sediq Sediqi said.
Afghan National Bank officials refused to comment when approached by TOLOnews, but some reports suggest that bank employees might have been involved, including an employee in Kabul, whose mother is said to have served as an accomplice.
It is unclear if the three heists were coordinated by the same group of robbers.
www.afghanistannewscenter.com
It can be done, but only if the international community truly invests in democracy.
BY ABDULLAH ABDULLAH | JANUARY 8, 2013 The Foreign Policy
In the year 2000, well before the tragic Sept. 11 attacks on the United States and the subsequent liberation of Afghanistan, a secret meeting took place in northern Afghanistan, one of the few areas not conquered by the Taliban. A man named Hamid Karzai, as part of a delegation representing the former king of Afghanistan, flew in to meet Ahmad Shah Massoud, leader of the anti-Taliban United Front, and me to discuss the future of the country.
Our conversation might have seemed presumptuous, focused as it was on outlining a post-Taliban government. We discussed plans to exert pressure on the government of Pakistan to halt its support for the Taliban, who were now despised by the Afghan people, achieve military gains in the resistance against the insurgency, create an interim Afghan administration, convene a constitutional loya jirga to approve a constitution, and lastly to call for elections based on a simple idea: One person equals one vote.
Following 9/11 and the global response, these ideas became the structure for the future Afghan government. But today, despite incredible amounts of blood and treasure and unprecedented support from the United States and the international community, Afghanistan is perceived as on the brink of collapse, with the shadow of the 2014 withdrawal date casting a pall on everything from soldier morale to the economy.
Despite the overwhelming list of challenges, however, from corruption to an economy dependent on foreign aid, Afghanistan can still experience a successful political transition in 2014. For this to happen, all the stakeholders involved must stop thinking strictly in terms of military means.
Afghanistan arrived at this point through a tragic combination of errors, some internal and some external. The initial mistake was to entrust President Karzai with the sacred duty of securing the fate of our embattled nation. His lack of faith in his fellow countrymen is perhaps best exemplified by his request that the CIA, even before he was officially inaugurated as president, provide bodyguards to protect him not from al Qaeda but from the Afghans who helped install him in power. Despite high hopes, he has rarely pursued local support for his policies and alienated many U.S. and international partners with his xenophobic pronouncements, thus tainting any opportunity for genuine leadership.
Karzai's lack of trust led directly to the ill-conceived policy of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, best described as Iraqi-style de-Baathification but in practice targeted against those who had fought as U.S. allies against the Taliban. The end result was a power vacuum that pitted a government with limited resources and capability against a nascent but determined and foreign-supported insurgency. Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's fateful decision to continue to view elements of the Taliban, and Islamic extremism more broadly, as a strategic asset for use in Afghanistan set the stage for the current conflict and fed the insecurity, while the United States became more focused on Iraq, Iran's nuclear program, and the rise of China.
Yet other obstacles to success in Afghanistan are much harder to quantify. The tolerance of the Afghan government and foreigners alike toward high-brow corruption has today become a significant threat to a stable Afghanistan, along with the Taliban. It would be a tragic mistake for the international community to conclude that democracy doesn't work in Afghanistan, while the only thing that doesn't work is democracy as Karzai's government understands it. The Afghan government has done little to ensure that the institutions of democracy, from our parliament to our courts and civil society, are supported and nurtured. Instead, it has confused the Afghan people by being passive toward corruption and pursuing an inconsistent and ambivalent policy regarding reconciliation with the armed insurgency. As the current Afghan government has repeatedly made clear, a red line of reconciliation with the Taliban must be their acceptance of the Constitution -- and Karzai needs to illustrate his own commitment to this same standard. No wonder Afghans feel no connection to this government and understand democracy to be code language for anarchy.
Because of these countless psychological and structural missteps, influential, democratically minded Afghans -- and those who support them -- must focus more sharply on a political transition, without which any "military transition" will ultimately be meaningless. And for a successful political transition, Afghanistan needs every country involved in its rebuilding effort to send a clear message to today's Afghan leadership demanding a democratic transition of power based on the principles of free and fair elections. Instead of abandoning democracy because it hasn't worked under a kleptocracy, Afghanistan and the international community must clean it up.
Can this be done in just over a year? Yes. The time until the 2014 elections must be used to implement procedures that support democracy. Our international partners, in particular the United States, should ensure the positioning of foreign observers to keep a clean tally of the votes. Karzai and the Afghan parliament should approve new voter registration procedures to ensure that every voter's voice -- new and old -- is heard. Our parliament needs to mandate the vetting of all election officials who will oversee election centers, rather than accepting them as a result of presidential decree, as they are now. There needs to be an independent body to resolve all electoral disputes -- an independent Electoral Complaints Commission whose members are selected transparently and with meaningful consultations among Afghan political opposition groups, parliament, civil society, and others.
Karzai must clearly illustrate his willingness both to step down when his constitutionally limited time is up and to promise not to interfere in the election process, addressing the top two concerns of the Kabul political elite. Taking into account our recent presidential and parliamentary elections in 2009 and 2010, state resources should not be used to influence the outcome of the elections.
The political transition, based entirely on credible and transparent elections, is of paramount importance because it will restore the Afghan people's faith and sense of ownership in their government. Despite all the fraud and mismanagement in previous elections, it is, remarkably, not yet lost. And if the government obtains this mandate from the people, it can act with confidence on issues from dealing with the Taliban to stabilizing the economy and receiving long-term assistance from the West and the international community that will ensure Afghanistan's security, stability, and prosperity. By playing a constructive role in facilitating necessary electoral reforms and overseeing a credible and legitimate transfer of power in 2014, Karzai can still take advantage of this unique opportunity and moment in Afghan history to be remembered as a reformist.
The structure of Afghanistan's political process, which was discussed in that meeting in 2000, further implemented in the 2001 Bonn agreement, and painfully built over the past decade, is still the right one. But work remains on that central point -- ensuring that every person gets the opportunity to choose his or her government. With a push from the international community, and in particular, the United States, to help Afghanistan conduct free and fair elections, Afghanistan can be saved -- and move into the next decade from a position of strength. Together with our international partners, the Afghan nation has come a long way in our transition toward democracy and stability. We must march on forward.
The open question of Afghanistan
By Walter Pincus, Tuesday, January 8, 3:52 AM The Washington Post
President Obama this week has a chance to explain to President Hamid Karzai, and hopefully to the American people, what will be our future role in Afghanistan.
Most speculation has focused on how rapidly the remaining 60,000-plus U.S. combat troops will be withdrawn and how many will be permanently assigned there after 2014. But as the U.S. financial belt is being tightened, people want to know the financial cost, for how long and what will be accomplished.
The fiscal 2013 Defense Authorization Act contains $4.7 billion for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), an amount that the U.S. government can’t continue to expend. The House-Senate conferees on the bill, realizing that Afghan support must be reduced, called for an independent study of what size the ANSF should be to make certain that Afghanistan will not again serve as a training camp for terrorists. The Afghans cannot support the security forces that the United States and its allies have created. That means Washington will have to pay or get others to join in future funding of Kabul’s forces.
“There are no public U.S. plans that show how the Obama administration will deal with either the civil or military aspects of this transition between now and the end of 2014, or in the years that follow,” Anthony H. Cordesman, who holds the Arleigh A. Burke chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, wrote last week. A former Pentagon official who has closely followed the 10- year war in Afghanistan, Cordesman questioned recent Pentagon statements of continuing successes, saying his reading of official reports shows “there has been no meaningful military progress since the end of 2010.”
He also wrote, “The State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have never issued a remotely credible report on the progress and impact of the civilian surge or any aspect of the civil aid program.”
The real issue, Cordesman said, “is the future size of the civil-military effort, not the military effort alone. Any debate or analysis of the future U.S. role in Afghanistan that does not tie the two together is little more than intellectual and media rubbish.”
High on the Obama-Karzai agenda is a status-of-forces or similar agreement that would authorize a U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan after 2014. Discussions have been underway since November. One has to only look back at Iraq to see the pitfalls that may arise before the two sides can reach such an agreement. Not the least is getting an Afghan-U.S. guarantee over which country will exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel and under what circumstances.
Karzai, who is set to give up the presidency next year, has his own wish list that seems to include a long-term U.S. presence, but under Afghan terms. He has a list that “he has enumerated for months in public speeches, including accusations that the United States has fomented corruption in Afghanistan and continues to violate the country’s sovereignty,” according to The Washington Post’s Kabul correspondent Kevin Sieff.
One of Karzai’s favorite subjects is the U.S. approval of contracts “with [Afghan] warlords who use the money for their own gains,” according to his spokesman, Aimal Faizi. While one of the U.S. complaints about the Afghan government is its corruption, Karzai has repeatedly said that corruption is “imposed on us, and it is meant to weaken our system.”
A glance at the contracts awarded or offered in the first week of January shows how deeply committed the U.S. operation is in Afghanistan.
Construction contracts alone awarded last week totaled $41.3 million to build various facilities for elements of the ANSF and other government agencies. The largest was for $14.2 million to build a national fire training academy near Kabul that would be “for a population of 350 personnel to include students, instructors, mentors, administration and support staff,” according to the award notice.
Also awarded were contracts to construct a $3.4 million Afghan Border Police headquarters in Farah province; a $3.3 million Class B fire station for the Afghan National Police (ANP) in Ghor province; a $4.3 million expansion of Afghan army facilities in Helmand province; a $5.6 million supply facility for the ANP in Baghlan province; a $6.8 million expansion of facilities for the Afghan army and air force combined wing in Kandahar province; and $3.8 million to expand facilities at Camp Zafar in Herat province, which I wrote about last week.
New contracts also were in the offing. For example, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is seeking a contractor to upgrade the Afghan army’s Khair Khot garrison in Paktika province. The work, to involve 25 structures, would include “a new compound for a Transient Kandak [Afghan battalion of about 600], an Operations Coordination Center, additional barracks and latrines for existing units already fielded, two literacy training classrooms and utility upgrades,” according to the government notice.
Remember, this was just the first week in January, and the United States is planning to be in Afghanistan 51 more weeks this year. It would be much better for Obama and Karzai to end their meeting with a specific list of what exactly will be involved rather than empty words saying they will continue to support each other in the fight against terrorists.
A 'Zero Option' for Afghanistan
Yes, President Karzai, we might pull out completely.
Foreign Policy BY DAVID W. BARNO JANUARY 7, 2013
Afghan President Hamid Karzai's visit this week to Washington marks one of the final big decision points in America's 11-year Afghanistan war. This week's meetings are likely to determine the final U.S. footprint in Afghanistan after 2014, when all international combat operations are slated to end. And that residual number of U.S. forces could well be zero.
Recent reports suggest that the White House is looking at troop options ranging from 3,000 to as many as 15,000 stay-behind troops. Many think that the final figure will be well under 10,000. These numbers are much diminished from proposals seriously considered even 12 to 24 months ago of a long-term presence in the range of 20,000 to 35,000 troops. The realities of shrinking budgets and crumpled public support for the war have dramatically trimmed those expectations. In recent weeks, vigorous debate has been under way inside the administration in advance of Karzai's visit to sort out a minimalist approach that will protect long-term U.S. interests in the region, but do so with the absolute leanest outlay of dollars and troops.
Karzai comes to this week's discussions convinced that the United States desperately needs long-term military bases in Afghanistan. He sees an America without other viable options to maintain its regional influence, cajole Pakistan, threaten Iran, or launch raids against nearby terrorists. Because of this, Karzai thinks that he holds all the cards in the upcoming negotiations. He is absolutely convinced that the United States has no workable strategic choice but to station substantial U.S. troops in Afghanistan after 2014.
But Karzai has it wrong. There is strong sentiment in the United States to look at all the options. Here are five reasons why:
Iraq. The outcome of America's war in Iraq sets a strong precedent for a similar "zero" U.S. military posture in Central Asia. Iraq has not become an Iranian puppet state nor descended into chaos since the United States withdrew all its military forces at the end of 2011. The United States maintains a robust diplomatic presence there -- and presumably conducts intelligence activities -- to protect its interests. Iraqi political decisions are often at odds with U.S. preferences; few think that a U.S. troop presence would change that reality. Iraq's failure to grant remaining U.S. soldiers legal immunity from Iraqi law doomed any possibility of a residual force there; the same could happen in Afghanistan, and withdrawal could be seen as an equally viable outcome by many Americans.
Budgetary pressure. With a debt crisis and crumbling infrastructure at home, enthusiasm on Capitol Hill for spending taxpayer dollars on foreign adventures is at an all-time low. The recent action to avert the fiscal cliff has delayed, but not fixed, the substantial imbalance between U.S. spending and revenue. A perpetual flow of billions of aid dollars to Afghanistan after 2014 -- for U.S. troops or for Afghans -- will be a much tougher sell two years from now than it is today. And it is very tough today.
War weariness. By 2014, the United States will have been at war in Afghanistan for over 12 years. The connection between Afghanistan and the 9/11 attacks has frayed deeply since Osama bin Laden's death at the hands of U.S. forces in 2011. With over 2,000 Americans killed and another 17,000 wounded in over a decade of inconclusive fighting, most Americans are looking for an exit from a seemingly interminable war. Maintaining congressional and popular support for an unending deployment of thousands of U.S. troops after 12 years at war will be supremely difficult, even more so if casualties continue.
Stand-off capabilities. The United States has powerful remote intelligence, surveillance, and strike capabilities that could only be dreamed of in the 1990s. These capabilities increasingly can be employed from "stand-off" distances, with a few flying from as far as the United States. Some of these capabilities require regional basing, but Afghanistan is not the only country that can provide low-visibility basing options. Drones have changed the face of warfare, and used in concert with U.S. intelligence into remote areas, they are increasingly lethal to terrorists.
U.S. intelligence networks. Eleven years of extensive quiet intelligence efforts partnered with Afghans (and Pakistanis) have created a deep web of friendly contacts that will be maintained long after 2014. In some ways, the post-2014 environment in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area could evolve into a prolonged "intelligence war," with hundreds of U.S. operatives and billions of covert dollars invested in preventing further terrorist attacks on the United States. Given its vital importance, this undertaking will endure -- regardless of the size of the residual U.S. military presence.
U.S. President Barack Obama will have to weigh the substantial risks inherent in a "Zero Option" for Afghanistan. Absent the stabilizing influence of some numbers of U.S. troops, Afghanistan could slip back into chaos, experiencing a new version of the devastating civil war that rent the country in the 1990s. The ability to see and strike terrorist groups that aim to attack the United States or its allies from within the region would be degraded. Al Qaeda could surge into growing ungoverned spaces and perhaps re-establish a more prominent foothold. U.S. influence on a nuclear-armed Pakistan would undoubtedly lessen if U.S. troops were no longer stationed next door. And the potential for the United States to put pressure on Iran from U.S. forces posted near its eastern border would vanish. By any measure, it is a suboptimal posture for the United States in the region, but not necessarily an untenable one.
Obama must consider all these risks as he sits down with Karzai to hammer out this last chapter of the war. Karzai would be wise to avoid overplaying his hand. Even though the Zero Option is not the best choice to protect American long-term regional interests, it certainly remains on the table. Overreach on Karzai's part could easily sour prospects for any sort of enduring U.S. military presence.
For Americans, the Afghanistan war is entering its final phase. Obama knows that this war will end on his watch. His legacy as president will inevitably be shaped by its outcome. Whether U.S. troops ultimately stay or leave Afghanistan after 2014 may now come down to just one week of tough bargaining. Each nation has a great deal at stake.
Opposition Urges Karzai to Consider National Interest on US Trip
TOLOnews.com By Sharif Amiry Monday, 07 January 2013
President Hamid Karzai should prioritize the country's interests in his negotiations with US officials, Afghan politicians urged Monday as the president flew off to Washington for a three-day visit.
President Karzai is expected to meet his American counterpart and other US officials to discuss bilateral issues, particularly the Afghan-US security pact that will determine the American troops' stay in Afghanistan post-2014.
"We expect president Karzai to consider the national interests and the current security challenges of the country. He should also solicit guarantees from the US that Afghanistan will not be abandoned to engage in civil war once again," said Mawlawi Jalaluddin Shinwari, a member of the Right and Justice Party.
The politicians also insisted on the continuation of war against terror after 2014, urging the US government to support the democratic process and civil society in the country.
"The US should support the political, democratic and civil society process of Afghanistan. The international community should continue its war on terror after 2014 too," Afghanistan's National Front Spokesman Sayed Aqa Fazel Sancharaki said.
As concerns over the uncertain future of the country grows rapidly, the Afghan government relies most on its strategic agreements with the US and other Nato allies to ensure continued funding of the Afghan national security forces.
As Pentagon chief, Hagel likely to favor sizable Afghan drawdown
Reuters By Phil Stewart 07/01/2013
WASHINGTON - A decorated Vietnam veteran acutely aware of the limits of military power, Chuck Hagel is likely to favor a sizable drawdown in Afghanistan, more frugal spending at the Pentagon and extreme caution when contemplating the use of force in places like Iran or Syria.
Obama's decision to nominate Hagel - a Republican former senator who split with his party to oppose the Iraq war - as U.S. defense secretary came despite a public lobbying campaign against his candidacy in recent weeks by a host of critics, some of whom seized upon past remarks to argue he is anti-Israel.
Hagel's supporters deny that, but are bracing for a tough confirmation battle in the Senate. Obama, as he announced the nomination, called Hagel the kind of leader U.S. forces deserve and pointed to his sacrifices in the Vietnam War, where he earned two Purple Hearts - the decoration for troops wounded in battle.
"Chuck knows that war is not an abstraction," Obama said. "He understands that sending young Americans to fight and bleed in the dirt and mud, that's something we only do when it's absolutely necessary."
Hagel, who would be the first Vietnam veteran to take the job, would succeed Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, 74, who is retiring from public life after a more than four-decade career in government that included leading the CIA during the covert raid to kill al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in 2011.
The blunt, 66-year-old Hagel will need to take over where Panetta leaves off, orchestrating a drawdown in U.S. forces in Afghanistan intended to bring the combat mission to a close by the end 2014. Hagel and Panetta were due to dine together on Monday night to discuss the transition.
The Afghan drawdown's pace is an open question, as is the size of the residual force the United States will leave behind. Obama is again showing his readiness to veto the military brass, considering a lower range of options - keeping between 3,000 and 9,000 troops in Afghanistan - than his top commander in Afghanistan proposed, one U.S. official told Reuters.
Hagel has not yet commented on the matter, but Obama would likely not choose a Pentagon chief who fundamentally disagreed with him on that or other key issues.
Hagel, who fought alongside his own brother and suffered shrapnel wounds in Vietnam and burns to his face, has made no secret of his reservations about what the military can accomplish in Afghanistan.
"We can't impose our will. The Russians found that out in Afghanistan. We've been involved in two very costly wars that have taught us a lesson once again," Hagel told PBS's "Tavis Smiley" show last year.
Unsurprisingly, he also is extremely cautious about what could be done in Syria. "I don't think America wants to be in the lead on this," he told Foreign Policy magazine in May.
'THE GUY AT THE BOTTOM'
Hagel's first-hand experience in war may win respect inside the Pentagon. He volunteered for the Vietnam War as an infantryman. He would become be the first defense secretary who started and ended his military career with an enlisted rank, as opposed to serving as an officer - an important distinction in wartime.
The enlisted ranks are "the ones who have the least say about where, when, and why we go to war, but bear the harshest consequences when we do," Matt Pottinger, a veteran of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and a former journalist, wrote in a piece on the "The Daily Beast" website applauding Hagel as a candidate to become defense chief.
Obama on Monday quoted Hagel saying: "My frame of reference ... is geared towards the guy at the bottom who's doing the fighting and the dying."
Hagel's comments on Middle East issues, including on Israel, are likely to complicate his Senate confirmation. House of Representatives Majority Leader Eric Cantor, a Virginia Republican, said in a statement on Monday he is "profoundly concerned and disappointed" by Hagel's nomination.
Critics including Abraham Foxman of the Anti-Defamation League, a group devoted to fighting anti-Semitism, have raised questions about Hagel's past comments, including one during a 2006 interview in which he was quoted as saying: "the Jewish lobby intimidates a lot of people up here." Hagel also has faced criticism for urging direct talks with Iran.
Many foreign policy heavyweights have come to Hagel's defense, including former national security advisers Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who served Republican and Democratic presidents respectively, and former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq Ryan Crocker.
Questions remain about Hagel's approach to the defense budget.
Panetta has said the U.S. military would be hollowed out if $487 billion in planned spending reductions over the next decade are doubled - something that would happen if Obama and Congress fail to agree by the end of February on a way to avert automatic cuts due to kick in.
But Hagel said in an interview last year with the Financial Times: "I think the military needs to be pared down. I don't think the military has really looked at themselves strategically, critically in a long, long time."
His position in favor of deficit reduction raises questions about possible cuts or schedule delays to big weapons systems like Lockheed Martin Corp's F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, according to Jim McAleese, a defense consultant.
McAleese also named as being at risk of cuts or delays the Army's planned Ground Combat Vehicle, the V-22 Osprey built by Boeing Co and Bell Helicopter, a unit of Textron Inc , and the Navy's early work on developing a new ballistic missile submarine. McAleese said final decisions would be up to Congress, where such programs enjoy strong support. (Additional reporting by Andrea Shalal-Esa; Editing by Warren Strobel and Will Dunham)
As Karzai Visits U.S., What Are The Prospects For Afghan Peace?
NPR By Sean Carberry January 07, 2013
As Afghan President Hamid Karzai comes to Washington to meet with President Obama and other U.S. officials this week, there is renewed discussion in Afghanistan about the possibility of a negotiated end to the country's war.
Recent talks hosted by France have rekindled hopes for some sort of reconciliation between the Taliban and Karzai's government. But given the decades of war in Afghanistan, many think the prospect of a peace deal remains nothing but talk.
The on-and-off peace efforts have spent most of the last year off due to a set of seemingly irreconcilable differences.
U.S. Calls For Direct Afghan Talks
Taliban leaders have long rejected peace talks with the Karzai government, saying they will only negotiate with the U.S. The U.S., for its part, says the two Afghan parties should negotiate directly.
But at least the mood has changed a bit since an informal meeting last month outside Paris.
For the first time, envoys from the Taliban sat at the same table with members of the Karzai-appointed Afghan High Peace Council as well as other Afghan politicians and members of parliament, including Nilofar Ibrahimi.
"It's the first time the Taliban accepted two women to join the peace talks. This is something very positive, and this is a very strong move towards peace," Ibrahimi tells NPR.
Ibrahimi says the Taliban delegates seemed ready to make some concessions on the question of women's rights once there is a peace settlement.
"The Taliban agreed that women will have the right to work, to study and to do business, but according to Islamic law," says Ibrahimi.
That's progress in Ibrahimi's view, though she's still skeptical about the Taliban's intentions.
"I cannot say that I'm definitely optimistic about this meeting. There might be something that is still hidden behind the curtains," she says.
Mawlawi Qalamuddin, a former Taliban official and a member of the Afghan High Peace Council, says the talks in France were symbolically significant.
"The most important part of the talks in France was the participation of the Taliban," he says. "For the two years the Peace Council has been in existence, no one from the Taliban has come to share their views with us."
Kate Clark, a senior analyst with the Afghanistan Analysts Network in Kabul, says, "I think peace is possible here."
She says that one of the main challenges is that there are so many players — the U.S., the other NATO counties, Pakistan, the Taliban, the Afghan opposition and the Karzai government. And each has its own interests and needs to come away with some sort of victory they can take back to their respective constituencies.
"It's messy. It's really messy and, I think, to get beyond that requires a level of political seriousness that we have yet to see amongst the big players," Clark says. "Up until now, they've mainly been serious about waging war."
Skepticism In Kabul
That also explains why the attitude on the Afghan street is subdued — people hunger for peace, but they seem to think that one party or the other won't agree on a deal.
Sayed Shekeib, a 19-year-old student, says he doesn't trust the Taliban.
Ahmad, a 43-year-old shopkeeper, says only the U.S. can make peace happen. He doesn't think the Karzai government is looking out for the interests of the Afghan people.
Wahid Mujdah, a former Taliban official who now lives in Kabul, agrees.
"The Afghan government [has] no idea about this peace, no plan [or] agenda about the peace process," Mujdah says.
He and others within Afghanistan say a recent plan drafted by the government is a half-hearted effort to exert control over the peace process. Mujdah says Taliban leaders have told him they still will not negotiate with Karzai.
"We want to reach an agreement with the Americans on the future of Afghanistan," says Mujdah.
Which circles back to another apparent dead end since the U.S. says peace talks must be Afghan-led.
So, while in France the parties agreed that there must be peace in Afghanistan, they still can't agree on a road map to get there.
NPR's Sultan Faizy contributed to this report
Over 200 Afghan policemen poisoned in Balkh province
Press TV January 9, 2013
A total of 250 Afghan policemen have been poisoned in Afghanistan's northern province of Balkh, Press TV reports.
Local officials said the incident took place in a police station in Marmul district on Tuesday night.
Nobody has yet claimed responsibility for the poisoning whose cause is still unclear.
The incident is considered the latest in similar poisoning incidents in the war-torn country.
On June 25, 2012, some 76 Afghan policemen were poisoned in a police academy in Lashkargah city in Afghanistan's southern province of Helmand.
Apparently, the police officers felt headaches nauseous after eating breakfast.
Meanwhile earlier in the same month, at least 116 students, mostly girls, were poisoned at the Hazrat Imam Zada Yahya high school in the northern province of Sar-e-Pol.
The school girls showed symptoms of exposure to toxic gas, including headache and nausea.
Also on September 26, a total of 16 schoolgirls were poisoned in Um-ul-Benin high school in the capital Kabul.
President Hamid Karzai has blamed the enemies of Afghanistan for the poisoning incidents.
Afghan President Begins U.S. Visit
January 9, 2013 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Afghan President Hamid Karzai has begun a four-day visit to the United States.
Karzai is expected to meet with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, and U.S. senators.
After arriving on January 8, Karzai met with Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security Asadullah Khalid, who is being treated in Washington for wounds he received in a suicide bombing last month.
On January 11, Karzai and U.S. President Barack Obama will negotiate a bilateral security agreement.
The White House says that during the visit, Obama will not announce a decision on how many troops will stay in Afghanistan after 2014.
U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser For Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes told reporters the two leaders will "consult about those issues" before Obama makes a decision "in the coming months."
Rhodes also said the White House does not rule out the possibility that no troops will remain post-2014, when Afghanistan is scheduled to take full responsibility for its security.
Negotiations on a bilateral security agreement are set to feature in talks between Karzai and Obama Friday.
Based on reporting by AFP and Reuters
Afghan policy debate fuelled White House, Pentagon mistrust - book
Reuters By David Alexander 07/01/2013
WASHINGTON - President Barack Obama's first year in office was marked by creeping mistrust between the White House and the Pentagon over Afghan war policy, with repeated requests for more troops fuelling the suspicions, retired General Stanley McChrystal said in a new book.
McChrystal, who became the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan during those months, said Obama was elected at a time when General David McKiernan, then head of international forces, was seeking 30,000 more troops to stave off a Taliban resurgence, a request that had been on hold since the previous summer.
"It created an unwelcome dynamic," McChrystal wrote in his new memoir, "My Share of the Task." "In the eighth year of the war in Afghanistan, a new president found himself facing a time-sensitive decision."
"The next 10 months saw the emergence of an unfortunate deficit of trust between the White House and the Department of Defense, largely arising from the decision-making process on Afghanistan," he wrote. "To me it appeared unintentional on both sides. But over time, the effects were costly."
The rising mistrust ultimately played a role in McChrystal's resignation. In June 2010 the general stepped down after Rolling Stone magazine ran an article entitled "The Runaway General," in which it quoted members of McChrystal's staff disparaging top White House officials and allies. McChrystal was summoned back to Washington, where he resigned.
An investigation by the Department of Defense Inspector General concluded that not all of the events described in the Rolling Stone article had occurred as reported and there was insufficient evidence to conclude any Defense Department standards had been violated. Rolling Stone stood by its story.
McChrystal, while expressing surprise about the "tone and direction" of the article, said he accepted responsibility for it and never had any question about the necessary response.
"I knew only one decision was right for the moment and for the mission. I didn't try to figure out what others might do, no hero's or mentor's example came to mind. I called no one for advice," wrote McChrystal, who now teaches leadership at Yale University and heads a leadership consulting group.
STRUGGLING FOR A STRATEGY
The memoir, which is being released on Monday, offers McChrystal's first assessment of the events that led to his resignation. It depicts a U.S. military in Afghanistan struggling to find a strategy for success at a time of Taliban resurgence and an inexperienced White House sceptical of the war and sensitive to criticism.
The general portrays himself as well-meaning but slow to understand the administration's political sensitivities and undercut by his failure to grasp the dynamics of the situation. He wrote that he wanted to operate as independently as possible of political or even policy pressures.
"I found ... the demands of the job made this difficult," McChrystal said. "The process of formulating, negotiating, articulating and then prosecuting even a largely military campaign involved politics at multiple levels that were impossible to ignore."
His memoir hits the shelves at a new time of transition in the war whose strategy he helped to devise, with Afghan President Hamid Karzai due to visit Washington this week for talks with Obama.
The two countries are trying to hammer out a deal on the nature of any U.S. troop presence after 2014, when most combat forces are due to leave and hand over security to the Afghan army and police.
The administration is currently studying a residual force of between 3,000 and 9,000 troops to conduct counterterrorism operations and training once most combat troops are withdrawn, a U.S. official said.
That is lower than the preliminary range of 6,000 to 15,000 troops that officials said was initially put forward by Marine Corps General John Allen, the head of international forces. Some defense analysts have warned that those troop numbers are likely to be too small to fulfil the mission.
The current debate over troop numbers echoes the one that McChrystal describes in his book after Obama took office in 2009. The president, who had promised during the election to refocus on Afghanistan and send two additional brigades, found himself facing a request for 30,000 U.S. troops.
The president initially agreed to send 17,000 troops, but the Pentagon soon had to ask for 4,000 more, who were needed for support, making it look as if officials hadn't done their homework.
DAMAGE DONE
Obama ultimately approved the additional troops after announcing a new strategic direction for the war that called for U.S. forces to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and to pursue a counterinsurgency-style strategy in Afghanistan. But the damage had been done.
"The rising mistrust was disappointing," McChrystal wrote.
After the general was tapped to take over international forces in Afghanistan in May, he conducted a strategic reassessment assisted by civilian defense analysts that concluded at least 40,000 additional troops would be needed to carry out a counterinsurgency strategy.
Several weeks after briefing Defense Secretary Robert Gates on the strategy, McChrystal said he learned it had been leaked to the media, creating pressures on the White House and Pentagon that were not helpful for the decision-making process.
"I didn't anticipate insinuations that I, or my staff, had been the source of the leak, which we were not," McChrystal wrote. "Nor did I fully appreciate that morning that many observers and some policy makers felt the leaking had begun six weeks earlier, when the civilian advisers who had participated in our strategic assessment returned to the United States and began to say more forces were needed."
As a result of the leaks, "some in the White House felt as though the military had limited the president's options before he had a chance to weigh our professional advice," McChrystal wrote. "This was never my intent, nor that of my staff."
A few weeks later, in early October in London, McChrystal was asked whether a more limited counterterrorism approach was viable for Afghanistan.
McChrystal said he answered "that, in my estimation, a more holistic effort than a counterterrorism, capture-and-kill campaign was required to leave Afghanistan stable."
Although Vice President Joe Biden's name was not mentioned, McChrystal said his response was taken as "a rebuttal of other policy options for Afghanistan and as criticism of the vice president's views."
"It wasn't intended as such," he wrote.
(Reporting By David Alexander; editing by Christopher Wilson)
McChrystal says counterinsurgency worked, but Afghanistan still needs a US security lifeline
Associated Press Tuesday, January 8, 2013
NEW YORK - Retired Gen. Stanley McChrystal said Monday he backs the White House’s drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan slated for 2014, but added that the U.S. owes Afghans some sort of enduring security presence to support them.
“We have an emotional responsibility,” McChrystal said of Afghanistan in an interview with The Associated Press. He commanded forces there before resigning over a controversial magazine article.
“We created expectations after 2001 in people” that the U.S. would be there to keep the country from sliding back into the chaos of the Taliban years, McChrystal said.
His comments come ahead of a visit by Afghan President Hamid Karzai to the White House, as the two nations try to craft a long-term plan for Afghanistan that will include a U.S. military presence whose size and scope have not yet been decided. The Afghan war commander, Gen. John Allen, has offered White House planners a range of troop numbers to choose from, from 6,000 troops, who would be devoted mostly to hunting al-Qaida, to more than 15,000, enough to continue much of the U.S. training mission and also back Afghan troops in the field with intelligence and logistical support.
McChrystal said Afghans don’t want an occupying army, but they fear the U.S. will withdraw completely.
“Like a teenager, you really don’t want your parents hanging around you, but...you like to know if things go bad, they’re going to help,” he said. McChrystal added that the Afghans are not children, but they need to know they can trust America.
The general gave interviews upon the release of his memoir, “My Share of the Task,” published by Portfolio/Penguin, an imprint of Penguin Group USA. The book outlines his time from commanding the top military counterterrorism unit, the Joint Special Operations Command, to the contentious process of crafting the Afghan war strategy, and ends with his abrupt resignation over an article in The Rolling Stone.
McChrystal took full responsibility for the piece, by embedded reporter Michael Hastings, which anonymously quoted members of McChrystal’s staff disparaging the White House over war policy. He would not confirm whether the article’s quotes were accurate, saying only that he “cheerfully” offered President Barack Obama his resignation, as the article had created a perception of a rift that would hurt the war mission.
But his eyes watered at the memory of telling his wife, Annie, that his 34-year Army career was at an end.
“Annie said, Good. We’ve always been happy, we’ll always be happy, and we have been, every day since,” he said. McChrystal now teaches at Yale University, and runs his own consulting group.
First lady Michelle Obama later asked McChrystal to work on Joining Forces, the White House initiative for military troops and their families. He said he’d spoken to the president at several Joining Forces event, but had never again discussed the resignation with him.
Part of the friction between McChrystal’s staff and the White House was over McChrystal’s request for an extra 40,000 troops, which Obama chose over a proposal by Vice President Joe Biden to limit the mission to a small number of counterterrorism forces and trainers.
The retired general insisted the strategy known as counterinsurgency worked, saying the Afghans are much better able to stand on their own.
“If you had tried to bring big American forces in and do search and destroy, or do just raids, it would have been pointless. The Afghan people needed to buy into this,” he said. “They needed to believe we were there to protect them...and we weren’t just using Afghanistan as a place to fight our enemies.”
He called the looming drawdown of U.S. forces “inevitable,” and said that while Afghan troops still needed to “mature rapidly,” being forced to work on their own would help.
“You are never ready to do something by yourself until you actually do it, and then you are surprised you can,” he said.
__
Dozier can be followed on Twitter (at)kimberlydozier.
Karzai visits wounded Afghan spy chief in US hospital
By Sadaf Shinwari - January 9 2013, 11:27 am Khaama Press
Afghan president Hamid Karzai met with the Afghan intelligence — national directorate of security (NDS) chief Asadullah Khalid upon his arrival to United States of America.
According to a statement released by Afghan presidential palace, president Hamid Karzai was briefed regarding the health condition of wounded Afghan spy chief Asadullah Khalid by US doctors.
The source further added president Hamid Karzai praised US doctors for providing medical care to wounded Afghan spy chief and said the health condition of Asadullah Khalid was satisfactory.
Afghan president Hamid Karzai also met with the US soldiers who were wounded in Afghanistan.
Asadullah Khalid was wounded when the bomber struck at a guesthouse used by the National Directorate of Security (NDS) in a heavily guarded area of the capital. The intelligence agency said he had survived a “terrorist attack”.
Khalid was rushed into surgery at an NDS hospital after the attack. He was visited by President Hamid Karzai, signalling his importance in the fight against the Taliban as Nato forces prepare to withdraw in 2014.
He was later admitted to a US hospital for further treatment. The attacker was purportedly carrying a peace message on behalf of the Taliban when he detonated himself.
On Friday Karzai holds his first face-to-face talks with President Obama since last year’s Nato summit in Chicago, shortly after the pair had signed a long-term strategic partnership.
White House: No US Troops an Option For Afghanistan
Dan Robinson VOA News January 8, 2013
WHITE HOUSE — Three days before Afghanistan's president, Hamid Karzai, meets with President Barack Obama in Washington, White House officials said Tuesday that the United States is considering all options, including potentially leaving no troops in Afghanistan beyond 2014 when foreign combat forces are to leave.
The United States and Afghanistan are negotiating details of a bilateral security agreement, including the scope of a potential U.S. troop presence, after 2014.
Recent media reports have quoted unnamed U.S. officials as saying President Obama received a recommendation from military commanders to maintain between 6,000 and 20,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan after 2014.
But the reports say the White House is considering a smaller contingent, with as few as 3,000 troops, to train Afghan forces and help prevent al-Qaida from using the country again as a haven.
Senior Obama administration officials say the question of specific U.S. troop levels is less important than achieving key goals.
Deputy National Security Adviser for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes said, "The way the president approaches this is not aiming to keep a certain number of troops within Afghanistan. The objective of the bilateral security agreement negotiations is not to accomplish a number of U.S. troops in a country. It is to accomplish the two goals of denying a safe haven to al-Qaida, and training and equipping Afghan national security forces."
Rhodes was asked by reporters whether President Obama would not rule out a force level of no U.S. troops in Afghanistan in favor of conducting counterterrorism operations through other means. Rhodes replied, "Yes, we wouldn't rule out any option." He added that Friday's talks between the U.S. and Afghan presidents would not finalize any troop number decision. Rhodes said Mr. Obama will consider all aspects of the situation, including recommendations from U.S. and NATO commander Marine Corps General John Allen.
White House press secretary Jay Carney said, "As we have said in the past, the president is in the process of reviewing proposals and when he is ready to announce a decision, he will do that."
After the withdrawal of a 30,000-member surge force last year, 68,000 U.S. troops remain in Afghanistan. Plans call for continuing gradual reductions toward a milestone when Afghan forces assume the full security lead this year.
Deputy Assistant to the President and Coordinator for South Asia Doug Lute avoided discussion of any potential U.S. troop numbers mentioned in recent media reports.
"If you assume that we make more progress against al-Qaida, then potentially the C.T. [i.e., counterterrorism] mission two years from now is less than it might otherwise be. If you assume that the Afghan capacity continues on a positive glide path and we reach our goals in terms of the development of the army and the police, then you can imagine that they require less support," he said.
Lute said U.S., coalition and Afghan forces have made a lot of progress against al-Qaida. But he added, "the job is not done," and said the training of Afghan forces is incomplete.
Recently, the Taliban issued a statement threatening to continue fighting the Afghan government if U.S. forces remain in the country after 2014.
President Karzai arrived in Washington on Tuesday and will participate in several activities, including talks with U.S. officials and a visit to wounded U.S. soldiers.
Friday's talks between President Obama and President Karzai will include U.S. and Afghan delegations, and will be followed by a working lunch and a joint news conference.
Khalili Denies Allegations of Land Grabbing
TOLOnews.com By Rafi Sediqi Monday, 07 January 2013
The second vice president denied Saturday that he is involved in land grabbing and said that government officials and politicians should not be accused without proper evidence.
Vice President Khalili was accused of land grabbing by a senator recently. In response to the accusation, Khaliil sent a letter of protest to President Karzai, criticizing the accusation.
"Freedom of expression is everyone's right, but it should not be used to lower the prestige of other people, and government officials should not be accused without evidence," Khalili said in the letter, adding that allegations against him should be investigated.
MP Shokria Paikan supported Khalili's position.
"Investigations are underway to find those involved in land grabbing, but no one has the right to accuse a government official or anyone else of land grabbing without sufficient evidence," Paikan said.
Several Afghan lawmakers also accused government officials more broadly of involvement in land grabbing, and urged the Attorney General's Office to make public the names of those involved.
"Unfortunately, some government officials and lawmakers are involved in land grabbing. A commission is working to prepare and release a list of those officials involved in land grabbing," MP Ghulam Hussain Naseri said.
Land grabs have turned into a major issue for the Afghan government as thousands of state-owned lands are believed to have been usurped by powerful figures. These include high-ranking government officials and warlords.
'All Aid' Should be Spent Through the Government: Finance Ministry
TOLOnews.com By Abdul Wali Arian Monday, 07 January 2013
President Hamid Karzai is expected to ask US officials during his three-day visit to Washington to channel more aid through the Afghan government to increase aid effectiveness.
The President is leading a delegation of high-level Afghan officials to Washington to discuss issues related to security, the Afghan economy and the post-2014 situation.
"We want most of the aid -- in fact, all of it -- to be spent through the government of Afghanistan, [because] this is very effective," said Wahid Tawhidi, spokesman of the ministry of finance,.
The demand comes following three weeks of intensive debate in the parliament over the impeachment of 11 ministers who have spent less than 50% of their annual budgets. A lack of capacity, corruption, security challenges and managerial shortcomings are the prime reasons for expenditure inefficiencies.
The international community, specifically the United States, has long criticized the Afghan government over mismanagement and corruption. The recent Tokyo summit in which the international community pledged $16 billion in aid to Afghanistan has also called for strict monitoring of aid expenditure and tough accountability.
The Afghan government has argued over the years that aid expenditure by foreign government and aid agencies has created a parallel structure that has undermined the people's trust in the government and has caused much of the aid to be spent in areas outside the Afghan National Development Strategy.
$450,000 Stolen From the Afghan National Bank
TOLOnews.com By Karim Amini Monday, 07 January 2013
About half a million dollars was stolen from three branches of the Afghan National Bank in Kabul, Kunduz and Badakhshan.
At least $200,000 of the total was stolen from the Kabul branch, the remaining from the other two provinces, reports suggest.
Authorities have arrested 10 people in connection with the heists, ministry of interior spokesman Sediq Sediqi said.
Afghan National Bank officials refused to comment when approached by TOLOnews, but some reports suggest that bank employees might have been involved, including an employee in Kabul, whose mother is said to have served as an accomplice.
It is unclear if the three heists were coordinated by the same group of robbers.
www.afghanistannewscenter.com