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News Analysis: Islamabad's Afghan Taliban release major boost to peace process
by Muhammad Tahir
ISLAMABAD, Nov. 17 (Xinhua) -- In response to the request of the Afghan Peace Council, Pakistan has freed 13 Afghan Taliban fighters, including a former senior military commander, with both sides now hoping that this gesture would push forward the much- awaited reconciliation process in the war-torn neighboring country.
Islamabad agreed to free the Afghan Taliban detainees during talks with a visiting delegation of the Afghan Peace Council led by its chairman Salahuddin Rabbani earlier this week.
According to an Afghan diplomat who was privy to the Pakistan- Afghan talks in Islamabad, nine of the Afghan Taliban fighters were released at the end of Rabbani's visit while four were freed ahead of the visit as a sign of goodwill on the part of Pakistan.
Pakistan's move was quickly welcomed by the Afghan government and the United States.
Kabul said Islamabad is also considering releasing Taliban second-in-command, Mulla Abdul Ghani Baradar, who was arrested in the Pakistani city of Karachi in February 2010. An Afghan official said that Mulla Baradar was among the four important Taliban leaders, whose release was sought by the Afghan Peace Council.
The Afghan Taliban also welcomed Pakistan's decision to set free their comrades-in-arms. But Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid has urged Pakistan to release all Taliban fighters now in Pakistani jails.
"This is a good step and we welcome it. But we demand that other prisoners in Pakistan should also be released," Mujahid said in a statement.
Mujahid said that the release of the Taliban detainees will definitely boost the trust between the two neighboring countries and their people.
But according to an Afghan official who requested anonymity, all the 13 freed Taliban were not handed over to the Afghan government although they will be allowed to rejoin their families and settle anywhere in Pakistan, Afghanistan and any third country.
The official said that the freed Taliban detainees will neither be stopped nor arrested under the "safe passage" mechanism as agreed by Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States in April this year provided they will express their willingness to participate in the peace process.
The mechanism was put in place after Kabul complained that some Taliban leaders who expressed their willingness to join in the peace talks were either arrested or killed.
Pakistan has also hinted to free more Afghan Taliban detainees after closely reviewing the impact on the Afghan peace process of the release of the prisoners, Pakistani and Afghan officials said.
The Afghan government had sought the release of nearly 40 Taliban prisoners whose names were included in a list that it handed over to Pakistani authorities.
The Afghan government had been asking Islamabad to free the Taliban fighters to boost the reconciliation efforts and to avoid another civil war after the 2014 withdrawal of U.S.-led NATO forces.
Afghanistan had seen the worst bloodshed in its history as the result of factional fighting in capital Kabul after the 1989 withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the country.
Pakistan is also aware of the possibility of such a situation that could cause a huge influx of Afghan refugees in their country like what happened in l989.
Islamabad had earlier agreed on the "safe passage" mechanism for Afghan Taliban leaders who have indicated their willingness to join in peace talks with the government.
In fact, it was under this mechanism that some Taliban leaders detained in Pakistan were allowed to travel to Qatar for talks with the United States.
All these steps reflect a positive change in Pakistan's policy and are considered to be a major boost to the peace negotiations between the Kabul government and the Taliban which the U.S. has encouraged.
Pakistan Takes Step, Not Leap, Toward Afghan Peace
By Frud Bezhan November 16, 2012 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
In a move intended to encourage the Taliban to join stalled peace negotiations with the Afghan government, Pakistan this week released at least eight jailed members of that militant group.
The releases, granted by Islamabad after repeated requests, is seen by some as a sign that Pakistan is finally prepared to play a constructive role in jump-starting reconciliation efforts that have yielded little since they began several years ago. Skeptics -- including the Afghan government -- say that while it is a positive step, Islamabad must do much more to prove its commitment to the Kabul-led peace process.
The Afghan government and its Western allies have stepped up efforts to find a political solution to the ongoing battle against Taliban militants. There are fears that the country could descend into civil war or face another Taliban takeover if militants are not brought into a serious peace process before 2014, when the majority of U.S. and NATO-led ISAF troops will leave.
Releases Welcomed
Islamabad is seen as a crucial player in the process. Pakistan's ties to the Taliban date back to the 1990s, when it provided arms, training, and intelligence to the militants. Islamabad was one of only three countries to recognize the Taliban government after it took power in Afghanistan in 1996. After the regime's fall in 2001, following the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, many Taliban leaders took shelter inside Pakistan.
Pakistan's release of the prisoners, who were reportedly freed late on November 15, has been met with widespread praise -- from the Afghan government to the Taliban to U.S. officials in Kabul.
According to media reports, among the released prisoners are three prominent Taliban: Mullah Nuruddin Turbai, a former justice minister; Allahdad Tabib, former deputy minister of communications; and Mullah Jahangirwal, a special adviser to Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Also reportedly released were former Baghlan Province Governor Abdul Salam; former Konduz Province Governor Mowlawi Muhammad; two former government officials, Haji Qutub and Mowlawi Matiullah; and a former senior commander and deputy minister, Sayed Saduddin Agha.
Michael Kugelman, South Asia associate at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, says that although Pakistan's action is a positive step, the release is only "a single goodwill measure and nothing else."
Kugelman says Pakistan needs to develop a clear policy before it can be said that it has changed course and is willing to play a positive, constructive role in ending the war in neighboring Afghanistan.
"If there's one thing we can say about the Pakistani government, it is that it really doesn't have a clearly defined or strategic policy in terms of how it wants to proceed toward an Afghanistan endgame," Kugelman says. "On the one hand, there's been a lot of talk about having a key role at the negotiating table, but on the other hand there have been mixed messages coming from Islamabad for a number of months and years. It's still unclear what Pakistan wants from all of this."
Taliban Cracks?
Kugelman adds that the Taliban itself is sharply divided on the issue of peace talks. The Taliban, which he describes as a "very diffuse and complex" group, disagrees on how it should proceed with the peace process, with some hard-line Taliban protesting vehemently against participating in negotiations of any kind.
David H. Young, a Washington-based conflict-resolution expert and adjunct fellow at the American Security Project, says Pakistan is unlikely to abandon its policy of maintaining strategic influence in Afghanistan via the Taliban.
Young, who was a civilian adviser to the U.S. Army in eastern Afghanistan, says the prisoner deal is in keeping with Pakistani interests but is unlikely to help the peace process.
Referring to Pakistani intelligence's long-rumored support for the Taliban, Young says that if the country really wants to encourage reconciliation in Afghanistan it should stop the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) from financing and arming the Afghan Taliban. Another step, Young says, would be for Islamabad to release Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban's former deputy leader who was arrested in Pakistan's southern city of Karachi in February 2010.
Baradar was reportedly at the top of the 40-man wish list of prisoners Kabul wanted Pakistani authorities to release. Young says the fact that Islamabad has neither released nor transferred Baradar for the past two years indicates how reluctant it is to hand over the one figure who is likely to facilitate reconciliation efforts. Baradar was reportedly arrested for facilitating secret talks between Kabul and the Taliban leadership.
Young predicts that Pakistan will drag out the peace process until the Taliban is in a stronger bargaining position, namely after 2014 when international troops leave. For now, he says, small gestures like the release of Taliban prisoners strike a good balance for Pakistan between securing its own interests in Afghanistan, where it seeks a more Islamist government in Kabul, and appearing agreeable to facilitating the peace process.
Mixed Signals
Assuming that Pakistan wants to play an active role in the peace talks, Young says the country will only accept a political settlement in Afghanistan that gives it strategic influence in Kabul and minimizes the role of archrival India.
"[A policy] that involves high-level Taliban involvement in the government, guaranteed number of officials in the various ministries, and something that enables them to save face and say that we have overthrown the [Afghan President] Karzai government or instilled a more fair and stable government," Young says. "A government that is more reflective, in part, of Taliban values in order to keep Pakistan's buffer in southwest and southeast Afghanistan."
The release of the Taliban prisoners in Pakistan came after Salahuddin Rabbani, leader of the Afghan High Peace Council, the presidentially appointed body tasked with negotiating with the Taliban, held talks with senior Pakistani government officials.
Afghanistan's ambassador to Pakistan, Omar Daudzai, has welcomed the release of Taliban prisoners and announced on November 16 that Islamabad has agreed in principle to release even more.
The Taliban has likewise hailed the freeing of its members.
"We consider this as a good step and welcome it," Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid was quoted as saying. "We wish to have more prisoners released. This will undoubtedly increase trust between two countries and people."
The release of Taliban prisoners comes after a string of setbacks. In March, the Taliban said they were suspending talks with the United States only weeks after they opened a political office in the Gulf state of Qatar. Kabul objected to the Qatar talks on the basis that they were not Afghan-led.
The Taliban said in a statement that the U.S. approach was "erratic and shaky" and accused Washington of going against their word.
Afghan newspapers widely cover Afghan-U.S. security talks
KABUL, Nov. 17 (Xinhua) -- Afghan newspapers have given wide coverage to the negotiations between the U.S. and Afghanistan on a security pact.
The daily Mandegar, in a story headlined "new chapter in relations of two strategic allies", reported Saturday that negotiations on security agreement between the U.S. and Afghanistan began on Thursday morning in Kabul and lasted for several hours.
"Talks on security agreement will open a new chapter in bilateral relations between the U.S. and Afghanistan," Mandegar quoted Afghan ambassador to Washington and head of Afghan negotiating team, Eklil Hakimi, as saying.
According to the newspaper, Hakimi said that the talks with the U.S. would involve the number and status of U.S. troops to remain in Afghanistan and cooperation in defense between the two countries after the pullout of the NATO-led forces from the war- battered country by the end of 2014.
U.S. President Barack Obama signed the strategic partnership agreement with his Afghan counterpart Hamid Karzai in Kabul on May 2, 2012, granting stay for some U.S. troops after 2014.
According to a fact sheet provided by the White House, the Strategic Partnership Agreement "provides for the possibility of U. S. forces in Afghanistan after 2014, for the purposes of training Afghan Forces and targeting the remnants of al-Qaeda."
The White House said the U.S. side "do not seek permanent military bases in Afghanistan," but the agreement "commits Afghanistan to provide U.S. personnel access to and use of Afghan facilities through 2014 and beyond."
James Warlick, Deputy Special Representative of U.S. on Afghanistan and Pakistan, led the U.S. negotiating team in the talks which may last for several months.
"The documents will provide legal authorities for U.S. armed forces and our civilian components to continue presence in Afghanistan with the full approval of the government of Afghanistan," Warlick told a joint press briefing with Hakimi in Kabul on Thursday.
The controversial security agreement, if signed, would guarantee the presence of U.S. military at least for several years in Afghanistan.
"Ambassador Warlick said the talks on the new security pact focused on respect for the sovereignty of both countries," the daily Outlook writes.
The U.S. diplomat, according to the newspaper, said bilateral security cooperation would guarantee peace and stability in Afghanistan.
The heads of both teams had assured the neighboring countries of Afghanistan that inking security agreement would not risk the security of any third country.
Insider attacks on US troops down, says Afghanistan commander nominee
USA TODAY By Jim Michaels November 15. 2012
WASHINGTON - The number of attacks by Afghan security forces against their coalition partners – so called insider attacks -- have declined in recent months, the general nominated to assume command in Afghanistan testified Thursday.
Marine Gen. Joseph Dunford cautioned, however, that it may be too early to conclude that the decline is the result of new training and other precautions taken to protect troops and reverse the trend.
Insider attacks have killed 53 coalition troops and a sharp spike in the incidents this year raised alarms that the trend would drive a wedge between Afghan and coalition forces as the local forces are assuming a greater security role.
The insider attacks have emerged as one of the most dangerous threats to the coalition mission in Afghanistan. The attacks come as the Taliban has been weakened on the battlefield – militants have been pushed out of towns and villages and into remote areas.
"It's hard to overstate the damage these kinds of attacks do to the morale of our troops and to our broader mission of supporting the growth and professionalization of Afghan forces," said Sen. John McCain, a ranking member of the Armed Services Committee.
Dunford appeared before the committee at a hearing on his nomination to assume command of coalition forces in Afghanistan.
The current commander in Afghanistan, Marine Gen. John Allen, was originally scheduled to be at the hearing as well so the committee could consider his nomination to become supreme allied commander Europe.
His nomination has been put no hold while the Pentagon's Inspector General reviews emails he sent to a woman in Tampa.
Dunford said the command in Afghanistan has strengthened vetting of new recruits, boosted the number of counterintelligence agents and enhanced security for coalition forces operating in remote locations.
The Pentagon has said some of the insider attacks are the result of Taliban infiltration, but others are isolated disputes.
"Insider attacks have declined substantially providing an early indication that countermeasures are working, but it will take time to see the full effect of these countermeasures," Dunford said in a written response to questions from the committee.
The hearing also provided senators with an opportunity to present divergent views on the pace of the drawdown in Afghanistan. The White House has said it will withdraw most conventional combat forces by the end of 2014.
U.S. and Afghan officials are working on an agreement to leave a residual force behind after 2014. The residual force would likely be capable of continuing to train and support Afghan forces and conduct counter-terrorism missions.
The pace of reductions between now and 2015, however, has not yet been determined. McCain and other critics said they worry aggressive cuts in U.S. forces will jeopardize security gains and embolden the Taliban.
"This path would constitute a rush to failure, place unnecessary risks on our forces, and I could not support it in any respect," McCain said.
McCain recommended delaying "the further withdrawal of U.S. forces until 2014, so as to give our commanders maximum flexibility and combat power to achieve our goals."
Sen. Carl Levin, chairman of the committee, pointed out that President Obama referred to the drawdown occurring at a "steady pace."
The United States has about 68,000 troops in Afghanistan now.
Dunford, currently serving as the assistant Marine Corps commandant, said he has not been included in the discussions about the drawdown of forces.
But Dunford said the United States and international allies need to express a strong commitment to Afghanistan beyond 2015. Worries that the United States and the international community may not stick around encourages factions to protect their own interests at the expense of a unified government.
Levin said a former warlord recently called for militias to rearm, indicating a lack of confidence in Afghan security forces.
Dunford said the conclusion of a long-term security agreement between Afghanistan and the United States would help allay fears and restore confidence.
"I think what's necessary right now is that we have a clear and compelling narrative of commitment from our country," Dunford said.
Needed: A sound exit strategy in Afghanistan
With US withdrawal, turmoil is bound to reemerge in Afghanistan and the entire region will again bear the consequences
Gulf News By Jaswant Singh, Special to Gulf News November 16, 2012
In his victory speech to a rapturous crowd in Chicago, following his re-election, President Barack Obama affirmed that America’s “decade-long conflict” in Afghanistan will now end. The line was greeted with prolonged applause — and understandably so. In fact, this ill-advised war — launched on the basis of a United Nations Security Council resolution — has been grinding on for 11 years, making it the longest in American history.
At the beginning, the war was aimed at eliminating Al Qaida, vanquishing the Taliban, and transforming Afghanistan into something resembling a western-style nation-state. With none of these goals fully achieved, America’s intervention — like every other intervention in Afghanistan’s history — is ending unsatisfactorily.
As the curtain drops, two developments will greatly influence the withdrawal process and the ultimate outcome. The first is the management of the transition to Afghan control, which depends on an orderly withdrawal of American and Nato forces by 2014. The second is the election, also to be held in 2014, of a new Afghan president — a process that needs to permit the US and its Nato allies to claim plausibly that they are handing the country over to a legitimate government.
For Afghanistan, ravaged by war without respite since the “Saur Revolution” of 1978, the endgame will be even more nerve-wracking. As the US military leaves, it will enter another period of political and strategic uncertainty, after almost a half-century of disorder and civil war.
A previous period of such uncertainty was the spur to the creation of the Taliban, which proceeded to disrupt Afghanistan’s (and Pakistan’s) already-fragile social order. Today, almost three generations of Afghans have lived from birth to adulthood without having known stability and peace. And, as a visiting American scholar/diplomat recently told me in a confidential conversation: “In the US, too, at least a generation of American children, from birth till the age of 15, have seen their country almost continuously at war.”
That is an arresting thought. It is against this bitter backdrop that a new Afghan president will be elected and the withdrawal of forces carried out. Will these two developments bring about a stable peace, or will Afghanistan succumb to instability once more? And what consequences are in store for the US, following this war without victory or defeat?
Last May, Obama declared that the US had “turned the tide of war” in Afghanistan, an eerie echo of Richard Nixon’s rhetoric as he withdrew US forces from Vietnam. And, like Vietnam, will the US — exhausted and nearly bankrupted by the effort — see all of its supposed gains evaporate soon after it leaves? After all, Al Qaida, albeit weakened, remains capable of regenerating inside Afghanistan, where the Taliban remain dominant in the country’s east and south, as well as in neighbouring North Waziristan in Pakistan.
Just how weakened America is in the region matters. As the US strategist, Daniel Twining, has observed: “Over the coming four years, US leadership will be essential” for “the consolidation of a wide-ranging strategic partnership with India,” as well as for efforts “to prevent Pakistan’s many pathologies from spilling over in ways that undermine fundamental US (and Indian) interests.”
So where does this leave Afghanistan’s neighbours? Deeply concerned. The primary aim is restoration of peace and, if not stability, an acceptable political equilibrium. Even if India did not incur the same costs as the US over the past decade — the hundreds of billions of dollars spent, and the many young people killed or injured — India has paid the price that regional uncertainty always imposes: Lost trade, lost growth, refugees and violence.
In the face of these costs, the overblown and sometimes clearly dishonest claims about the war are an obscenity. This strategically myopic and militarily ill-conceived war was unwinnable from the beginning. As a result, Afghanistan will remain what it was — a violent and ungovernable tribal melange. Indeed, across the region, apprehension is growing that when foreign troops leave, Afghanistan will again descend into civil war, ultimately bringing the Taliban back to power.
That is why “bringing the troops home early” has become the prime objective of western politicians who are engaged in the region. The West needs to get out before the bloodletting starts again in earnest.
My fear is that we have not seen the last of Al Qaida or the Taliban. As a neighbouring country, India would face disturbing consequences if they returned to power in Afghanistan, as would Iran, which would not sit idly by if sectarian strife intensified and the Shiites became targets of a resurgent Taliban.
Other neighbours would also pay a price should the Taliban’s seemingly invariable return turn bloody, however immune they believe they are. China, which has invested billions of dollars in developing Afghanistan’s natural resources — investments protected, ironically, by the US — would be certain to experience greater unrest in Xinjiang Province, home to millions of disaffected Muslims.
But the country that will be most affected is Pakistan, which faces challenges to its territorial and political integrity. The territorial challenge is, no doubt, a mushrooming anxiety; an innocuous remark by an American envoy about the Durand Line, which marks the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, drew sharp retorts from both countries.
Afghanistan’s history of occupation by foreign troops and their eventual withdrawal has been repeated so many times that one wearies of repeating the tale. Yet, this history is the litmus test. With the US withdrawal, turmoil is bound to reemerge and the entire region will again bear the consequences.
— Project Syndicate, 2012
Jaswant Singh, a former Indian finance minister, foreign minister, and defence minister, is the author of Jinnah: India – Partition – Independence.
Relentless Afghan conflict leaves traumatized generation
Reuters By Daniel Magnowski and Mirwais Harooni Nov 16, 2012
KABUL - On a low bed in a quiet, all-female hospital ward, a depressed Afghan teenager huddles silently under blankets, her mother close by. In a nearby room are men suffering from schizophrenia, delusions of persecution and power, anxiety and panic disorders.
Among them are some of the unseen victims of the war in Afghanistan: a generation of people mentally damaged by their exposure to incessant conflict.
The accumulation of psychological problems could begin to undermine national reconstruction and development, say health workers at the country's only facility for treating mental illness.
Ghazia Sadid, a 26-year-old mother, endured depression for years after a family member was killed in a bomb attack, and she fled her home in fear of more violence.
"I still hear the sounds of explosions. I still remember the fighting, but since I have come here my behaviour has changed," she said, speaking at the Kabul Mental Health Hospital, a green-walled building on the outskirts of the city.
"I was totally lost and my life was over. After two years of treatment, now I love my children," she said. "I loved them then too, but in my imagination I had done something wrong."
The concept of mental illness is alien to many in Afghanistan, where the public health system, like much of the country's infrastructure, has been wrecked by decades of war.
Frequently, people suffering psychological disorders are thought by their families to be under the influence of malign spirits, or showing symptoms of a physical ailment.
The Kabul hospital, which has 60 beds for in-patients and another 40 in a separate facility for drug addicts, is run by the government in partnership with U.S.-based nonprofit group the International Medical Corps. It gets funding from the European Union.
Psychologists working there say children who have known nothing but fighting since the U.S.-led overthrow of the Taliban government more than a decade ago are especially vulnerable.
"The generation born after 2001 when the international community entered Afghanistan might be 10, 11 year olds now, and I've been seeing 11 year olds and 10 year olds nowadays who are presenting with so many mental health problems: nightmares, depression, anxiety, incontinence," said Mohammad Zaman Rajabi, clinical psychology advisor at the hospital.
Men, women and children come for treatment with drugs, counselling, group therapy and cognitive behavioural therapy.
TRAUMATIZED GENERATION
"If, in a family, there are problems every day it's obvious that the family members are not well and cannot serve each other properly," said Taiba Alkazai, a psychologist at the hospital.
"In the same way, if there is fighting in a country then its people won't be happy."
The fear of suicide bomb attacks, roadside bombs, and the overall level of violence in Afghanistan - of which civilians bear the brunt, with the number killed rising in 2011 for the fifth straight year to more than 3,000, according to the United Nations - can lead to anxiety, panic and obsession.
"The physical aspects of war (last) for a limited time, but the psychological aspects of the war extend for many years. Day by day the mental health problems caused by the war are increasing," said consultant psychiatrist Said Najib Jawed.
Just as socially damaging is the risk of a generation for whom violence has become the norm.
"One of the examples I always give is that when you talk to an Afghan boy, you can easily get into a physical fight because they just wait for it, they don't know any other ways of dealing with a problem than fighting," Rajabi said.
"All these things will lead to a generation of people who are not very healthy mentally, and this will affect everything in the country: education, relationships, families, generally the development of the country." (Editing by Robert Birsel)
Boxing for Peace in Afghanistan
Der Spiegel By Maik Grossekathöfer 16/11/2012
Kabul - As a child, Hamid Rahimi fled the war in his native Afghanistan to Hamburg. After struggling to fit in, he developed a pair of angry fists that eventually landed him in juvenile prison. But he learned to control his temper and now wants to use his skills for good -- and for peace in his homeland.
They sent bomb-sniffing dogs through the building, unscrewed light bulbs and disassembled loudspeakers to search for explosives. On this evening in late October, some 1,200 Afghan soldiers are guarding the Loya Jirga Hall in Kabul. Pickup trucks armed with machine guns block the access roads in front of the building, which is normally used for meetings of the Loya Jirga, or council of elders, and where battles are normally fought with words instead of fists. Anyone who managed to get a ticket for the fight -- and could afford one, at between $60 (47) and $200 (157) apiece -- has to pass through four security checks and walk through three metal detectors. It takes almost an hour for a ticket holder to get to his seat.
On this morning, a Taliban fighter has shot and killed two British soldiers near the city of Gereshk, 600 kilometers (375 miles) southwest of Kabul, and now Hamid Rahimi is putting on his boxing gloves. He is standing in a heated tent next to the building, wearing a hooded vest and shorts. Someone holds a phone up to his ear. It's Afghan President Hamid Karzai, calling to apologize for not coming in person. He says that he'll watch the fight on TV with his son, and he wishes the boxer the best of luck. Rahimi stretches his hip and spits into a corner.
Rahimi, 29, was born in Kabul as the youngest son of an agricultural engineer and a teacher. He fled the country before the 1991 war, and now lives in Hamburg as a German citizen. He has fought 21 matches as a professional boxer, winning 20 -- nine with knockouts. He is celebrated as a hero in Afghanistan, and he holds the country's highest state honor.
His trainer pats his shoulder, indicating that it's time to go.
Some 3,000 people are waiting for Rahimi in the building. A crowd perhaps four times as large is pushing against iron gates and barriers outside, hoping in vain to get in. A leather armchair in the first row is reserved for the interior minister, the chief of police is present, the head of the intelligence service is sitting on a sofa at the front of the audience, generals and warlords are in attendance, and there are men from the Uzbek, Hazara and Pashtun tribes. No women.
An imam opens the event by reciting a few verses from the Koran. "We pray for our friend Hamid Rahimi," he says. "May he be strong and then, Insha'Allah, God willing, may he win." The audience answers: "Allahu akbar," or "God is great."
Round 1
This is the first professional boxing match in the history of Afghanistan, that eternal battlefield in the Hindu Kush. Two TV stations are broadcasting the fight live to all 34 provinces. The fight is for the World Boxing Organization's intercontinental middleweight championship, for boxers weighing up to 72.58 kilograms (160 lbs.).
Artificial fog is pumped into the building, and the moderator can hardly contain himself when he says: "Here he comes, and he's boxing for peace. Haaaamid Raaahimiiiii!"
His opponent, Said Mbelwa from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, looking brawny and fierce, is already waiting in the ring. Mbelwa has the red corner.
The timekeeper strikes the gong with a carpenter's hammer.
In the first round, Rahimi jabs with his left hand and punches with his right. Mbelwa is agile and his evasive maneuvers are effective.
"Hamid!" the fans shout. "Hamid, Hamid!"
The world has become deaf to good news from Afghanistan, and Rahimi's dream is to change that. Two years ago, he came up with the idea of stepping into the ring in Kabul and turned it into a project called "Fight 4 Peace." He believes that boxing has the power to unify a nation.
He negotiated with the government and met with tribal leaders. The World Boxing Organization (WBO) became involved, because boxing, as it states in its official resolution, is a "peaceful and true sport." But to be perfectly honest, boxing isn't nearly that romantic.
'Only Guests in Germany '
At first Rahimi wanted to fight an American, but officials at the fortress-like headquarters of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) didn't think it was such a good idea. Rahimi reached a deal with a boxer from the Dominican Republic, but that opponent later backed out. That left Said Mbelwa. "He has balls," says Rahimi. "He's not afraid to come here."
It's five days before the fight, and Rahimi is in the best shape of his life. To prepare for the fight, he fought in 130 rounds of sparring matches, instead of the usual 70. He is now running on the treadmill, to be followed by some shadow boxing on the terrace of the Kabul Star Hotel. His trainer is satisfied.
Rahimi is staying in a suite on the sixth floor, accompanied by his mother, Fatima, and his manager, Christof Hawerkamp. His brother, Wahid, who studied communication design and is constantly filming with his video camera, has also come to see the match.
A portrait of Rahimi's father is on the dresser, and a black ribbon with the words "We miss you" hangs above the frame. Aminullah Rahimi left Kabul a year before his family because he was afraid that he would be murdered if he stayed there. He had wanted to go to New York, but he only made it as far as Hamburg. He died in July at 87.
After training, Rahimi sits in the steam sauna. "My father always said we were only guests in Germany. It was clear to him that we would return. Bearded fanatics aren't the only ones living in Afghanistan. Young people here need other heroes. They shouldn't hang posters of mujahideen over their beds, but of athletes instead." It's time for his midday nap, and after that he plans to take a little trip.
Trauma of War in Childhood
Macroyan 1 is a development of grey, concrete buildings built by the Soviets in the eastern part of Kabul. Undergarments are hanging out to dry in front of the window, and a boy is driving a herd of goats. Rahimi stands with his mother in front of building 18, looking up at apartment 15 on the third floor, where they lived 21 years ago in a three-room apartment with a kitchen and a bathroom.
A small market behind the building sells roasted peanuts, women's clothing and ice cream. "This is where it happened," says Rahimi. "I can still smell death and burning flesh here."
He was five years old and had just gone to get an ice cream with his best friend Samir when the bomb exploded. Body parts and blood were everywhere. A piece of shrapnel hit Samir in the heart. Rahimi also remembers the time when missiles were exploding night after night, and how they used to squeeze into the bathtub together, hoping the tiles would protect them. His mother read from the Koran, and the children sang "Cheri, Cheri Lady" to distract themselves.
One day a shell landed next to Hamid's kindergarten, smashing the windows. There was smoke, fire, debris and blood everywhere. This time the attack was too much for Hamid to take. He caught a high fever and lost his ability to speak, stuttering like a diesel engine. He would break out in sweats and wet the bed. Sometimes his entire body became rigid.
Doctors treated him at the hospital for five months. He still chokes up when he tells the story today.
A few months later, he fled from Kabul with his mother and three siblings. The journey to join the father in Hamburg lasted 18 months, passing through Moscow and Prague.
Idolized by Children
There are four more days until the fight. Hawerkamp, his manager, uses the ISAF intranet to find judges for the bout. They need a referee, and Hawerkamp is struggling with the technicians, who don't speak English. He also needs the Tanzanian national anthem, and so far all he has as a flagpole is a broomstick.
"What we're doing here," he says, "is like walking on eggshells."
Rahimi is driven through the streets of Kabul in an open car. He's wearing a traditional robe and holding up the Afghan flag as he hands out autographed cards. He goes to the zoo and the city park, and he hikes up to the old city wall, where people live in huts with no running water and rarely have electricity.
With his brother filming, the pictures are the same everywhere they go: Children and adolescents crowd around him, touch him and want to be photographed with him. "Long live the champion!" they shout, as more and more children join the crowd. "Just look at their faces!" Rahimi shouts. "Look how happy they are!" His schedule is completely full. He has interviews at the Tolo TV, Yak TV and Khurshid studios, and President Karzai has invited him to prayers at his palace. It's the first day after the Feast of Sacrifice, celebrated at the height of the Hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca.
Back at his hotel, Rahimi is told about a suicide bombing in Maymana, in Faryab Province, which claimed 41 lives. He sits down at his laptop and posts a photo of a child crying on his Facebook page. "Let's stick together," he writes. "Only together we can bring peace."
The Amani School, in Kabul's diplomatic district, has a football pitch and biology and chemistry labs. Rahimi pays a visit to a third-grade class consisting of 30 boys with jet-black hair, dressed in blue shirts and gray trousers. He stands at the blackboard and tells the boys the story of how he became a boxer.
Part 2: From Prison to the Boxing Ring
When he was in school in Hamburg, he could hardly utter a sentence without stumbling over his words. He was an easy target for bullies, and he suffered greatly as a result. He felt like an outcast, and when three boys deliberately shot a wet football at his face, he let loose with his fists.
"Suddenly the others were nice to me," says Rahimi. He got into more and more fights, and along the way he cultivated his fighting stances and started a gang called the Real Street Boys. "I broke four noses in a week," he tells the boys. At 17, he punched a Turkish boy in the groin, was convicted of aggravated assault and sent to the Hahnöfersand Juvenile Prison.
In prison, he hated his fists and kept hitting the cell walls until they bled. He was ashamed to face his father and mother.
Then he saw a fight with Dariusz Michalczewski on TV. "He used his fists, too, but he was rich, and he was famous in Germany and in his home country, Poland. He made his parents happy." One of his sisters brought him the boxer's biography. Rahimi read it and began training. He drew the outline of a person on his prison mattress, using it to practice uppercuts and jabs.
His father was against his becoming a boxer. He wanted him to learn something worthwhile, like his daughters -- one is an attorney, the other a fashion designer. Rahimi had his debut as a professional boxer in November 2006. One of his first sponsors was an Afghan from Hamburg who trades in rice. He shot promotional videos with Rahimi and aired them on television at home, which is how the boxer became known in his native Afghanistan.
He stands in front of the children in the Amani School and says: "Since I've been boxing, I've never had a fight on the street again. I have my aggression under control."
Tense Meeting with the Ambassador
The sun has set, the streets are empty and Rahimi pays a visit to Sima Samar, a physician and human rights activist who will receive the so-called Alternative Nobel Prize in December. She is the best friend and former schoolmate of Rahimi's mother.
Samar, wearing a fleece jacket and tennis socks, is sitting in front of a plate of apples, bananas and grapes, as she talks about the European Union as an arms dealer and the Afghan government's lack of vision. Rahimi talks about Don King, the American boxing promoter, who sends his greetings to Kabul. He talks about an "historic opportunity" and an "initial spark for Afghanistan."
Samar smiles. "I won't watch the fight," she says. "It doesn't convince me. It's good that Hamid is getting the young generation to think about other things. But boxing has to do with aggression. I don't know if that's compatible with peace." Rahimi peels an apple.
Hawerkamp is in a good mood the next day. He is having a referee flown in from Berlin, and he found some potential judges: five Afghan amateur boxers. They are sitting in room 214 at the hotel, going over the rules. Hawerkamp explains to them that blows below the belt are forbidden, and that they also have to judge the defensive moves. Rahimi's trainer, sitting in a corner, says: "They'll all be judging in our favor. Mbelwa will have to knock out Hamid if he wants to win."
It's the day before the fight, and the German ambassador, Rüdiger König, wants to meet with him. Rahimi is nervous, because he plans to give the man a piece of his mind. "I presented my project to him a year ago. I asked for his support. I didn't even receive a rejection." Now he wants to know why.
The ambassador's trip to the hotel is short: 350 meters, just around the corner. He arrives with three armor-plated Mercedes limousines. His stone-faced bodyguards, armed with pistols and wearing bulletproof vests and sunglasses, don't say a word. "They scare me," says Rahimi. "They're pit bulls. If you give them your hand they'll bite into it. That's not how to make friends in Afghanistan."
He sits down with the ambassador in the hotel restaurant, and he talks and talks, gesticulating with his arms and bending over the table. The ambassador nods politely in response to the boxer's tirade, while his press spokeswoman stares silently into her coffee cup. She doesn't speak until the afternoon, and then it's only to say that no part of the conversation can be quoted.
"They've got to be kidding," says Rahimi. "They come here, wanting to teach the Afghans democracy and freedom of the press, and then this."
'We Showed the World'
It's around 7 p.m. on the evening of the fight. Mbelwa is furiously attacking his opponent, but his left straight-arm punch isn't working, and neither is his hook. After 17 seconds, Rahimi hits him on the right shoulder and Mbelwa crumples defenselessly, holding his arm.
The referee stops the fight, sends Rahimi into the neutral corner and calls the ringside doctor. Rahimi sinks to his knees and waves his fists in front of his face, waiting. Then the referee announces that Rahimi has won the fight, by virtue of a technical knockout.
The fans jump up from their seats, hopping, screaming, clapping and kissing each other. They push their way forward to the ring and climb up into it. Hawerkamp shouts in panic, and then police officers turn up with shields and batons, pushing back the crowd.
The fans hoist Rahimi to their shoulders in the ring. He is holding up the Afghan flag. Then he speaks into the microphone, as his words are broadcast to the entire country: "This title doesn't belong to me. I won it for you. It belongs to all of Afghanistan. We showed the world that it's worth it to fight against war and terrorism."
Back to Germany
Soon afterwards, Rahimi is in the shower while the crowd outside continues to howl like drunkards. "That was so cool. I didn't want to leave," he says. He dries himself off and puts on a shirt and tie. "We made history today, and my father was looking down at me. Now I can die happy." His brother is standing next to him, filming the scene with tears in his eyes.
Back at the hotel, the first thing Rahimi does is read the new messages on his Facebook page. Then he orders room service and calls his sisters in Hamburg.
After that, Rahimi and his team go out to a bar where a can of Heineken costs $10. But he isn't as fired up as the rest of them, drinking only Diet Coke. He's tired and it's close to 1 a.m. The tension has left his body. "Not everyone here is a terrorist or a drug dealer," he says. "The young people want respect. I will fight for that as long as I can breathe."
The next morning, there is a breaking news report on television and on the radio that a roadside bomb planted by the Taliban in Musa Qala, in Helmand Province, has killed seven women and three children.
Forty-eight hours later Hamid Rahimi, 29, Kabul-born and Hamburg-raised, boards his return flight to Germany.
Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan
Afghanistan: The Taliban Pile Onto Petraeus
As if the disgraced former CIA chief didn’t have enough to feel bad about, the Taliban are gloating over his fall. Sami Yousafzai reports.
The Daily Beast By Sami Yousafzai Nov 16, 2012
The Taliban are beside themselves with glee at the very public humiliation of Gen. David Petraeus. As the leading architect of the U.S. military surge in Afghanistan, he made thousands of mortal enemies among the insurgents, and their old grudges only intensified when he retired from the Army last year and became director of the CIA– the chief operators of the drone war inside the guerrillas’ formerly safe havens across the Pakistani border.
Now the general’s Afghan foes consider themselves both avenged and vindicated by the disclosure of his illicit affair with a married woman, his biographer Paula Broadwell. “The American general’s sex disgrace is a slap not only to the character of the U.S. but also to the faces of [Afghan President Hamid] Karzai and all others who are pro-Western,” says a former cabinet minister from the toppled Taliban regime, now active as a regional leader in the insurgency. “The bloodshed addict General Petraeus was not only after the blood of unfortunate Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan. He was also taking the chastity of married women.”
The general’s infidelities seem to have begun only after he left Afghanistan, but that doesn’t stop his Afghan detractors from speaking as if he desecrated their homeland with his extramarital affair. “We are Pashtun,” says Mullah Juma Khan Akhund, a Taliban commander in Helmand and Kandahar provinces, “Committing such an immoral crime has a traditional punishment, and it disrespects our people and our land. We used to tell everyone that these invaders are here not to help Afghans but to disrespect and kill them. General Petraeus’s affair gives living proof of that.”
But Juma Khan is so delighted at the general’s disgrace that it’s hard for him to stay angry. Laughing, he continues: “General, my son” – to address someone as “my son” in Kandahar is to challenge him to a fight – “you can’t win this war. And now, even before your final defeat, you’re hiding your face in shame because of your immoral sexual relationship.” Breaking off his sermon to the absent general, he turns philosophical: “I heard on the radio that he was the most successful general in Afghanistan. But how could someone who is disloyal to his wife be loyal to his nation?”
“Petraeus and his married mistress should be handed over to the Afghans to be stoned,” says Juma Khan. “They have offended our culture, our religion, and our land.”
The moral disapproval of Petraeus isn’t confined to Afghans in the tradition-bound countryside. “The U.S. ought to keep its drones focused on its own generals, and not on al Qaeda and the Taliban,” says a young student at Kabul University. His shock – if not his indignation – is shared by Mustafa Ahmadzai, an arts major at the same university. “Sex is part of American political and military life,” allows Ahmadzai. “But in a country like Afghanistan? No way. Before leaving for Afghanistan, I’m sure U.S. forces are strongly advised to leave their sexual organs behind in the U.S.A.”
Everyone seems to agree that the general should pay for his indiscretion. “Petraeus and his married mistress should be handed over to the Afghans to be stoned,” says Juma Khan. “They have offended our culture, our religion, and our land.” Zair Gul Zadran, a Haqqani Network commander in Khost province, says he’s surprised that anyone would get in trouble for an extramarital fling in the United States. “Our understanding was that sex is a common matter in American society. But if he committed the offense in our country, there is a traditional penalty: he should sacrifice dozens of sheep in contrition for his impropriety.”
Other Afghans view the general’s sin with a mixture of respect for tradition and unapologetic curiosity.
“By our customs he has insulted our land and our society,” says a tribal elder named Zamrak Zadran. “The way to make it right is for him to get cleaned up and hand himself over to a Pashtun jirga [assembly of elders].” Nevertheless, he says, “It’s interesting how the writing of the general’s life story was combined with voluptuary behavior. Now his biography will be overshadowed by the fact that he became a sexy story. I would love to read the details of the lady’s private nights.”
One thing particularly seems to bother many of the insurgents. Before Petraeus left Afghanistan, Karzai decorated him with the Afghan government’s highest honor, the Ghazi Wazir Mohammad Akbar Khan medal, named for a hero in the war against the Soviets. He should get it back from the profligate and immoral General Petraeus,” says the former Taliban cabinet minister.
On Thursday the Taliban website Al Emara posted a Pashto-language editorial headlined “Libertine Friend.” Under a photo of Karzai awarding Petraeus the medal, the editorial castigated the Afghan president for his association with the now fallen general. “Just imagine the ghosts of those heroes whose names Karzai has insulted by awarding their medals to this dirty general. Those ghosts would grab Karzai and ask him: ‘Why did you reward such a dirty general?’ What answer could Karzai give?”
Sami Yousafzai is Newsweek's correspondent in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where he has covered militancy, al Qaeda, and the Taliban for the magazine since 9/11. He was born in Afghanistan but moved to Pakistan with his family after the Russian invasion in 1979. He began his career as a sports journalist but switched to war reporting in 1997.
For inquiries, please contact The Daily Beast at editorial@thedailybeast.com.
Petraeus: More myth than man
Analysis: The savior of Iraq, the hero of Afghanistan — what is the reality behind the hype?
Global Post By Jean MacKenzie November 16, 2012
BUZZARDS BAY, Mass. - The rhetoric surrounding David Petraeus’ fall from grace has been nothing short of epic. The tawdry affair of the general and the biographer has assumed the proportions of a Shakespearean tragedy, complete with a tragically flawed hero and an evil temptress.
The media has been gushing, even fawning, in its description of Petraeus’ accomplishments, and his disgrace is being portrayed as a national disaster.
The reality is much more mundane, as is the man at the center of all the fuss. His fall from grace is a personal tragedy, and he and his family will have to deal with that. Petraeus was a fine officer with a keen mind and an impressive work ethic. But he is not the miracle-worker that is now being painted.
Even in disgrace, Petraeus is indispensable. The just-resigned CIA director was called to testify Friday at congressional hearings about the September attacks on the US Consulate in Benghazi, Libya.
Much of his reputation rests on his performance during the war in Iraq. When Petraeus arrived in Baghdad, in February 2007, the country was one of the most violent places on earth. He oversaw the surge, which cut down on the killing and provided time and political cover for the United States to withdraw.
It did not, however, pacify the country. Iraq today is witnessing increasing levels of violence, much of which goes unremarked by the American public, since US troops are no longer in harm’s way there.
“Under General Petraeus’ stewardship, the overall violence in Iraq was reduced,” said Joshua Foust, a fellow at the American Security Project who has written extensively on Iraq and Afghanistan. “Even if this dip was temporary, it gave the United States space to withdraw.”
In Afghanistan, where Petraeus took over from Gen. Stanley McChrystal in July 2010 and handed over command to Gen. John Allen a year later, his legacy will be much more problematic.
“Petraeus was very successful in creating the illusion of success,” said Alex Strick van Linschoten, a writer and researcher who has produced several books on Afghanistan. “He was very successful at playing the media, even when the facts did not add up.”
All too often, Petraeus’ claims did not correspond to reality.
In December 2010, the CIA released a National Intelligence Estimate with a very downbeat evaluation of the war in Afghanistan. The Taliban was making significant gains, said the report, and large swaths of the country were in danger of falling to the enemy.
Meanwhile, Petraeus was touting the “fragile and reversible” gains that were being made.
“Well, most of them were reversed,” says Foust.
During Petraeus’ tenure, violence in Afghanistan actually increased. He more than doubled the number of “night raids,” the kill/capture missions that he claimed were decimating the Taliban’s command structure. But these missions caused untold hardship for Afghans, who were frequently caught in the crossfire, and spurred Afghan President Hamid Karzai to all but declare war on NATO.
“Petraeus was fond of metrics,” Foust said. “He would release the body counts, and claim that these kill/capture missions were the most successful tactic in the war. In reality, a distressingly high percentage of those captured were released within days.”
That number topped 80 percent, according to researcher Gareth Porter.
But NATO in Afghanistan, with Petraeus at its head, would seldom admit mistakes.
In one widely publicized incident, Petraeus continued to insist that an airstrike that killed 17 people had targeted the right person, even after it had been demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the supposed target was still alive and well, and that those killed had been election workers on a campaign trip.
In PBS’ “Frontline” program, correspondent Stephen Grey asked the general pointblank: “Can I just ask you how that operation came into being, what made you think this was the man that you were targeting?”
Petraeus answered firmly, staring straight into the camera: “Well, we didn’t think in this case, with respect, we knew. We had days and days of what’s called ‘the unblinking eye,’ confirmed by other forms of intelligence, that informed us that this — there’s no question about who this individual was.”
According to Foust, who recently wrote a piece for The Atlantic magazine called “Myopia: How Counter-Terrorism Has Blinded Our Intelligence Community,” this is a common affliction among spies.
“People at a sufficiently high level of the intelligence community become so focused on their internal channels that they discount anything that is outside of it,” he said. “Even when that information may be more reliable.”
For Strick, it is even simpler.
“Petraeus was caught red-handed getting it wrong and still would not back down,” said Strick. “He was intent on allowing the operation to have the appearance of success, in order to give the United States the opportunity to leave Afghanistan while saving face.”
This, says Strick, is one of the reasons for the schadenfreude that many old Afghans hands are feeling.
“Some are rubbing their hands in glee at Petraeus’ downfall,” he said. “It is the difference between his purported self-discipline and the messiness, the sloppiness of real life.”
There certainly has been quite a bit of breast-beating among those in the media who contributed to creating the “King David” myth. Spencer Ackerman, a national security and defense blogger for Wired magazine, recently posted a piece on the magazine’s website titled “How I Was Drawn into the Cult of David Petraeus.”
He details how the mythmaking machine operated, the stroking of sympathetic journalists, the exclusion of those more critical.
“A lot of the journalism around Petraeus gave him a pass, and I wrote too much of it,” he said. “Writing critically about a public figure you come to admire is a journalistic challenge.”
Jon Lee Anderson, writing in The New Yorker, was even more direct: “[Petraeus’] lionization by admiring and opportunistic politicians and fawning journalists and biographers has been craven and boundless,” he writes. “In Afghanistan there was no Petraeus miracle. In spite of an Iraq-style surge and a much-vaunted counterinsurgency strategy overseen by Petraeus, the Taliban have proven unbeatable.”
Perhaps Petraeus is not yet finished. As history has shown, sexual peccadilloes are no barrier to high office — think of Bill Clinton, John F. Kennedy, Dwight D. Eisenhower and even Thomas Jefferson.
Once he has finished putting his life back together, King David could reassemble his mythmaking machine and rise again.
www.afghanistannewscenter.com
by Muhammad Tahir
ISLAMABAD, Nov. 17 (Xinhua) -- In response to the request of the Afghan Peace Council, Pakistan has freed 13 Afghan Taliban fighters, including a former senior military commander, with both sides now hoping that this gesture would push forward the much- awaited reconciliation process in the war-torn neighboring country.
Islamabad agreed to free the Afghan Taliban detainees during talks with a visiting delegation of the Afghan Peace Council led by its chairman Salahuddin Rabbani earlier this week.
According to an Afghan diplomat who was privy to the Pakistan- Afghan talks in Islamabad, nine of the Afghan Taliban fighters were released at the end of Rabbani's visit while four were freed ahead of the visit as a sign of goodwill on the part of Pakistan.
Pakistan's move was quickly welcomed by the Afghan government and the United States.
Kabul said Islamabad is also considering releasing Taliban second-in-command, Mulla Abdul Ghani Baradar, who was arrested in the Pakistani city of Karachi in February 2010. An Afghan official said that Mulla Baradar was among the four important Taliban leaders, whose release was sought by the Afghan Peace Council.
The Afghan Taliban also welcomed Pakistan's decision to set free their comrades-in-arms. But Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid has urged Pakistan to release all Taliban fighters now in Pakistani jails.
"This is a good step and we welcome it. But we demand that other prisoners in Pakistan should also be released," Mujahid said in a statement.
Mujahid said that the release of the Taliban detainees will definitely boost the trust between the two neighboring countries and their people.
But according to an Afghan official who requested anonymity, all the 13 freed Taliban were not handed over to the Afghan government although they will be allowed to rejoin their families and settle anywhere in Pakistan, Afghanistan and any third country.
The official said that the freed Taliban detainees will neither be stopped nor arrested under the "safe passage" mechanism as agreed by Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States in April this year provided they will express their willingness to participate in the peace process.
The mechanism was put in place after Kabul complained that some Taliban leaders who expressed their willingness to join in the peace talks were either arrested or killed.
Pakistan has also hinted to free more Afghan Taliban detainees after closely reviewing the impact on the Afghan peace process of the release of the prisoners, Pakistani and Afghan officials said.
The Afghan government had sought the release of nearly 40 Taliban prisoners whose names were included in a list that it handed over to Pakistani authorities.
The Afghan government had been asking Islamabad to free the Taliban fighters to boost the reconciliation efforts and to avoid another civil war after the 2014 withdrawal of U.S.-led NATO forces.
Afghanistan had seen the worst bloodshed in its history as the result of factional fighting in capital Kabul after the 1989 withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the country.
Pakistan is also aware of the possibility of such a situation that could cause a huge influx of Afghan refugees in their country like what happened in l989.
Islamabad had earlier agreed on the "safe passage" mechanism for Afghan Taliban leaders who have indicated their willingness to join in peace talks with the government.
In fact, it was under this mechanism that some Taliban leaders detained in Pakistan were allowed to travel to Qatar for talks with the United States.
All these steps reflect a positive change in Pakistan's policy and are considered to be a major boost to the peace negotiations between the Kabul government and the Taliban which the U.S. has encouraged.
Pakistan Takes Step, Not Leap, Toward Afghan Peace
By Frud Bezhan November 16, 2012 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
In a move intended to encourage the Taliban to join stalled peace negotiations with the Afghan government, Pakistan this week released at least eight jailed members of that militant group.
The releases, granted by Islamabad after repeated requests, is seen by some as a sign that Pakistan is finally prepared to play a constructive role in jump-starting reconciliation efforts that have yielded little since they began several years ago. Skeptics -- including the Afghan government -- say that while it is a positive step, Islamabad must do much more to prove its commitment to the Kabul-led peace process.
The Afghan government and its Western allies have stepped up efforts to find a political solution to the ongoing battle against Taliban militants. There are fears that the country could descend into civil war or face another Taliban takeover if militants are not brought into a serious peace process before 2014, when the majority of U.S. and NATO-led ISAF troops will leave.
Releases Welcomed
Islamabad is seen as a crucial player in the process. Pakistan's ties to the Taliban date back to the 1990s, when it provided arms, training, and intelligence to the militants. Islamabad was one of only three countries to recognize the Taliban government after it took power in Afghanistan in 1996. After the regime's fall in 2001, following the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, many Taliban leaders took shelter inside Pakistan.
Pakistan's release of the prisoners, who were reportedly freed late on November 15, has been met with widespread praise -- from the Afghan government to the Taliban to U.S. officials in Kabul.
According to media reports, among the released prisoners are three prominent Taliban: Mullah Nuruddin Turbai, a former justice minister; Allahdad Tabib, former deputy minister of communications; and Mullah Jahangirwal, a special adviser to Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Also reportedly released were former Baghlan Province Governor Abdul Salam; former Konduz Province Governor Mowlawi Muhammad; two former government officials, Haji Qutub and Mowlawi Matiullah; and a former senior commander and deputy minister, Sayed Saduddin Agha.
Michael Kugelman, South Asia associate at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, says that although Pakistan's action is a positive step, the release is only "a single goodwill measure and nothing else."
Kugelman says Pakistan needs to develop a clear policy before it can be said that it has changed course and is willing to play a positive, constructive role in ending the war in neighboring Afghanistan.
"If there's one thing we can say about the Pakistani government, it is that it really doesn't have a clearly defined or strategic policy in terms of how it wants to proceed toward an Afghanistan endgame," Kugelman says. "On the one hand, there's been a lot of talk about having a key role at the negotiating table, but on the other hand there have been mixed messages coming from Islamabad for a number of months and years. It's still unclear what Pakistan wants from all of this."
Taliban Cracks?
Kugelman adds that the Taliban itself is sharply divided on the issue of peace talks. The Taliban, which he describes as a "very diffuse and complex" group, disagrees on how it should proceed with the peace process, with some hard-line Taliban protesting vehemently against participating in negotiations of any kind.
David H. Young, a Washington-based conflict-resolution expert and adjunct fellow at the American Security Project, says Pakistan is unlikely to abandon its policy of maintaining strategic influence in Afghanistan via the Taliban.
Young, who was a civilian adviser to the U.S. Army in eastern Afghanistan, says the prisoner deal is in keeping with Pakistani interests but is unlikely to help the peace process.
Referring to Pakistani intelligence's long-rumored support for the Taliban, Young says that if the country really wants to encourage reconciliation in Afghanistan it should stop the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) from financing and arming the Afghan Taliban. Another step, Young says, would be for Islamabad to release Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban's former deputy leader who was arrested in Pakistan's southern city of Karachi in February 2010.
Baradar was reportedly at the top of the 40-man wish list of prisoners Kabul wanted Pakistani authorities to release. Young says the fact that Islamabad has neither released nor transferred Baradar for the past two years indicates how reluctant it is to hand over the one figure who is likely to facilitate reconciliation efforts. Baradar was reportedly arrested for facilitating secret talks between Kabul and the Taliban leadership.
Young predicts that Pakistan will drag out the peace process until the Taliban is in a stronger bargaining position, namely after 2014 when international troops leave. For now, he says, small gestures like the release of Taliban prisoners strike a good balance for Pakistan between securing its own interests in Afghanistan, where it seeks a more Islamist government in Kabul, and appearing agreeable to facilitating the peace process.
Mixed Signals
Assuming that Pakistan wants to play an active role in the peace talks, Young says the country will only accept a political settlement in Afghanistan that gives it strategic influence in Kabul and minimizes the role of archrival India.
"[A policy] that involves high-level Taliban involvement in the government, guaranteed number of officials in the various ministries, and something that enables them to save face and say that we have overthrown the [Afghan President] Karzai government or instilled a more fair and stable government," Young says. "A government that is more reflective, in part, of Taliban values in order to keep Pakistan's buffer in southwest and southeast Afghanistan."
The release of the Taliban prisoners in Pakistan came after Salahuddin Rabbani, leader of the Afghan High Peace Council, the presidentially appointed body tasked with negotiating with the Taliban, held talks with senior Pakistani government officials.
Afghanistan's ambassador to Pakistan, Omar Daudzai, has welcomed the release of Taliban prisoners and announced on November 16 that Islamabad has agreed in principle to release even more.
The Taliban has likewise hailed the freeing of its members.
"We consider this as a good step and welcome it," Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid was quoted as saying. "We wish to have more prisoners released. This will undoubtedly increase trust between two countries and people."
The release of Taliban prisoners comes after a string of setbacks. In March, the Taliban said they were suspending talks with the United States only weeks after they opened a political office in the Gulf state of Qatar. Kabul objected to the Qatar talks on the basis that they were not Afghan-led.
The Taliban said in a statement that the U.S. approach was "erratic and shaky" and accused Washington of going against their word.
Afghan newspapers widely cover Afghan-U.S. security talks
KABUL, Nov. 17 (Xinhua) -- Afghan newspapers have given wide coverage to the negotiations between the U.S. and Afghanistan on a security pact.
The daily Mandegar, in a story headlined "new chapter in relations of two strategic allies", reported Saturday that negotiations on security agreement between the U.S. and Afghanistan began on Thursday morning in Kabul and lasted for several hours.
"Talks on security agreement will open a new chapter in bilateral relations between the U.S. and Afghanistan," Mandegar quoted Afghan ambassador to Washington and head of Afghan negotiating team, Eklil Hakimi, as saying.
According to the newspaper, Hakimi said that the talks with the U.S. would involve the number and status of U.S. troops to remain in Afghanistan and cooperation in defense between the two countries after the pullout of the NATO-led forces from the war- battered country by the end of 2014.
U.S. President Barack Obama signed the strategic partnership agreement with his Afghan counterpart Hamid Karzai in Kabul on May 2, 2012, granting stay for some U.S. troops after 2014.
According to a fact sheet provided by the White House, the Strategic Partnership Agreement "provides for the possibility of U. S. forces in Afghanistan after 2014, for the purposes of training Afghan Forces and targeting the remnants of al-Qaeda."
The White House said the U.S. side "do not seek permanent military bases in Afghanistan," but the agreement "commits Afghanistan to provide U.S. personnel access to and use of Afghan facilities through 2014 and beyond."
James Warlick, Deputy Special Representative of U.S. on Afghanistan and Pakistan, led the U.S. negotiating team in the talks which may last for several months.
"The documents will provide legal authorities for U.S. armed forces and our civilian components to continue presence in Afghanistan with the full approval of the government of Afghanistan," Warlick told a joint press briefing with Hakimi in Kabul on Thursday.
The controversial security agreement, if signed, would guarantee the presence of U.S. military at least for several years in Afghanistan.
"Ambassador Warlick said the talks on the new security pact focused on respect for the sovereignty of both countries," the daily Outlook writes.
The U.S. diplomat, according to the newspaper, said bilateral security cooperation would guarantee peace and stability in Afghanistan.
The heads of both teams had assured the neighboring countries of Afghanistan that inking security agreement would not risk the security of any third country.
Insider attacks on US troops down, says Afghanistan commander nominee
USA TODAY By Jim Michaels November 15. 2012
WASHINGTON - The number of attacks by Afghan security forces against their coalition partners – so called insider attacks -- have declined in recent months, the general nominated to assume command in Afghanistan testified Thursday.
Marine Gen. Joseph Dunford cautioned, however, that it may be too early to conclude that the decline is the result of new training and other precautions taken to protect troops and reverse the trend.
Insider attacks have killed 53 coalition troops and a sharp spike in the incidents this year raised alarms that the trend would drive a wedge between Afghan and coalition forces as the local forces are assuming a greater security role.
The insider attacks have emerged as one of the most dangerous threats to the coalition mission in Afghanistan. The attacks come as the Taliban has been weakened on the battlefield – militants have been pushed out of towns and villages and into remote areas.
"It's hard to overstate the damage these kinds of attacks do to the morale of our troops and to our broader mission of supporting the growth and professionalization of Afghan forces," said Sen. John McCain, a ranking member of the Armed Services Committee.
Dunford appeared before the committee at a hearing on his nomination to assume command of coalition forces in Afghanistan.
The current commander in Afghanistan, Marine Gen. John Allen, was originally scheduled to be at the hearing as well so the committee could consider his nomination to become supreme allied commander Europe.
His nomination has been put no hold while the Pentagon's Inspector General reviews emails he sent to a woman in Tampa.
Dunford said the command in Afghanistan has strengthened vetting of new recruits, boosted the number of counterintelligence agents and enhanced security for coalition forces operating in remote locations.
The Pentagon has said some of the insider attacks are the result of Taliban infiltration, but others are isolated disputes.
"Insider attacks have declined substantially providing an early indication that countermeasures are working, but it will take time to see the full effect of these countermeasures," Dunford said in a written response to questions from the committee.
The hearing also provided senators with an opportunity to present divergent views on the pace of the drawdown in Afghanistan. The White House has said it will withdraw most conventional combat forces by the end of 2014.
U.S. and Afghan officials are working on an agreement to leave a residual force behind after 2014. The residual force would likely be capable of continuing to train and support Afghan forces and conduct counter-terrorism missions.
The pace of reductions between now and 2015, however, has not yet been determined. McCain and other critics said they worry aggressive cuts in U.S. forces will jeopardize security gains and embolden the Taliban.
"This path would constitute a rush to failure, place unnecessary risks on our forces, and I could not support it in any respect," McCain said.
McCain recommended delaying "the further withdrawal of U.S. forces until 2014, so as to give our commanders maximum flexibility and combat power to achieve our goals."
Sen. Carl Levin, chairman of the committee, pointed out that President Obama referred to the drawdown occurring at a "steady pace."
The United States has about 68,000 troops in Afghanistan now.
Dunford, currently serving as the assistant Marine Corps commandant, said he has not been included in the discussions about the drawdown of forces.
But Dunford said the United States and international allies need to express a strong commitment to Afghanistan beyond 2015. Worries that the United States and the international community may not stick around encourages factions to protect their own interests at the expense of a unified government.
Levin said a former warlord recently called for militias to rearm, indicating a lack of confidence in Afghan security forces.
Dunford said the conclusion of a long-term security agreement between Afghanistan and the United States would help allay fears and restore confidence.
"I think what's necessary right now is that we have a clear and compelling narrative of commitment from our country," Dunford said.
Needed: A sound exit strategy in Afghanistan
With US withdrawal, turmoil is bound to reemerge in Afghanistan and the entire region will again bear the consequences
Gulf News By Jaswant Singh, Special to Gulf News November 16, 2012
In his victory speech to a rapturous crowd in Chicago, following his re-election, President Barack Obama affirmed that America’s “decade-long conflict” in Afghanistan will now end. The line was greeted with prolonged applause — and understandably so. In fact, this ill-advised war — launched on the basis of a United Nations Security Council resolution — has been grinding on for 11 years, making it the longest in American history.
At the beginning, the war was aimed at eliminating Al Qaida, vanquishing the Taliban, and transforming Afghanistan into something resembling a western-style nation-state. With none of these goals fully achieved, America’s intervention — like every other intervention in Afghanistan’s history — is ending unsatisfactorily.
As the curtain drops, two developments will greatly influence the withdrawal process and the ultimate outcome. The first is the management of the transition to Afghan control, which depends on an orderly withdrawal of American and Nato forces by 2014. The second is the election, also to be held in 2014, of a new Afghan president — a process that needs to permit the US and its Nato allies to claim plausibly that they are handing the country over to a legitimate government.
For Afghanistan, ravaged by war without respite since the “Saur Revolution” of 1978, the endgame will be even more nerve-wracking. As the US military leaves, it will enter another period of political and strategic uncertainty, after almost a half-century of disorder and civil war.
A previous period of such uncertainty was the spur to the creation of the Taliban, which proceeded to disrupt Afghanistan’s (and Pakistan’s) already-fragile social order. Today, almost three generations of Afghans have lived from birth to adulthood without having known stability and peace. And, as a visiting American scholar/diplomat recently told me in a confidential conversation: “In the US, too, at least a generation of American children, from birth till the age of 15, have seen their country almost continuously at war.”
That is an arresting thought. It is against this bitter backdrop that a new Afghan president will be elected and the withdrawal of forces carried out. Will these two developments bring about a stable peace, or will Afghanistan succumb to instability once more? And what consequences are in store for the US, following this war without victory or defeat?
Last May, Obama declared that the US had “turned the tide of war” in Afghanistan, an eerie echo of Richard Nixon’s rhetoric as he withdrew US forces from Vietnam. And, like Vietnam, will the US — exhausted and nearly bankrupted by the effort — see all of its supposed gains evaporate soon after it leaves? After all, Al Qaida, albeit weakened, remains capable of regenerating inside Afghanistan, where the Taliban remain dominant in the country’s east and south, as well as in neighbouring North Waziristan in Pakistan.
Just how weakened America is in the region matters. As the US strategist, Daniel Twining, has observed: “Over the coming four years, US leadership will be essential” for “the consolidation of a wide-ranging strategic partnership with India,” as well as for efforts “to prevent Pakistan’s many pathologies from spilling over in ways that undermine fundamental US (and Indian) interests.”
So where does this leave Afghanistan’s neighbours? Deeply concerned. The primary aim is restoration of peace and, if not stability, an acceptable political equilibrium. Even if India did not incur the same costs as the US over the past decade — the hundreds of billions of dollars spent, and the many young people killed or injured — India has paid the price that regional uncertainty always imposes: Lost trade, lost growth, refugees and violence.
In the face of these costs, the overblown and sometimes clearly dishonest claims about the war are an obscenity. This strategically myopic and militarily ill-conceived war was unwinnable from the beginning. As a result, Afghanistan will remain what it was — a violent and ungovernable tribal melange. Indeed, across the region, apprehension is growing that when foreign troops leave, Afghanistan will again descend into civil war, ultimately bringing the Taliban back to power.
That is why “bringing the troops home early” has become the prime objective of western politicians who are engaged in the region. The West needs to get out before the bloodletting starts again in earnest.
My fear is that we have not seen the last of Al Qaida or the Taliban. As a neighbouring country, India would face disturbing consequences if they returned to power in Afghanistan, as would Iran, which would not sit idly by if sectarian strife intensified and the Shiites became targets of a resurgent Taliban.
Other neighbours would also pay a price should the Taliban’s seemingly invariable return turn bloody, however immune they believe they are. China, which has invested billions of dollars in developing Afghanistan’s natural resources — investments protected, ironically, by the US — would be certain to experience greater unrest in Xinjiang Province, home to millions of disaffected Muslims.
But the country that will be most affected is Pakistan, which faces challenges to its territorial and political integrity. The territorial challenge is, no doubt, a mushrooming anxiety; an innocuous remark by an American envoy about the Durand Line, which marks the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, drew sharp retorts from both countries.
Afghanistan’s history of occupation by foreign troops and their eventual withdrawal has been repeated so many times that one wearies of repeating the tale. Yet, this history is the litmus test. With the US withdrawal, turmoil is bound to reemerge and the entire region will again bear the consequences.
— Project Syndicate, 2012
Jaswant Singh, a former Indian finance minister, foreign minister, and defence minister, is the author of Jinnah: India – Partition – Independence.
Relentless Afghan conflict leaves traumatized generation
Reuters By Daniel Magnowski and Mirwais Harooni Nov 16, 2012
KABUL - On a low bed in a quiet, all-female hospital ward, a depressed Afghan teenager huddles silently under blankets, her mother close by. In a nearby room are men suffering from schizophrenia, delusions of persecution and power, anxiety and panic disorders.
Among them are some of the unseen victims of the war in Afghanistan: a generation of people mentally damaged by their exposure to incessant conflict.
The accumulation of psychological problems could begin to undermine national reconstruction and development, say health workers at the country's only facility for treating mental illness.
Ghazia Sadid, a 26-year-old mother, endured depression for years after a family member was killed in a bomb attack, and she fled her home in fear of more violence.
"I still hear the sounds of explosions. I still remember the fighting, but since I have come here my behaviour has changed," she said, speaking at the Kabul Mental Health Hospital, a green-walled building on the outskirts of the city.
"I was totally lost and my life was over. After two years of treatment, now I love my children," she said. "I loved them then too, but in my imagination I had done something wrong."
The concept of mental illness is alien to many in Afghanistan, where the public health system, like much of the country's infrastructure, has been wrecked by decades of war.
Frequently, people suffering psychological disorders are thought by their families to be under the influence of malign spirits, or showing symptoms of a physical ailment.
The Kabul hospital, which has 60 beds for in-patients and another 40 in a separate facility for drug addicts, is run by the government in partnership with U.S.-based nonprofit group the International Medical Corps. It gets funding from the European Union.
Psychologists working there say children who have known nothing but fighting since the U.S.-led overthrow of the Taliban government more than a decade ago are especially vulnerable.
"The generation born after 2001 when the international community entered Afghanistan might be 10, 11 year olds now, and I've been seeing 11 year olds and 10 year olds nowadays who are presenting with so many mental health problems: nightmares, depression, anxiety, incontinence," said Mohammad Zaman Rajabi, clinical psychology advisor at the hospital.
Men, women and children come for treatment with drugs, counselling, group therapy and cognitive behavioural therapy.
TRAUMATIZED GENERATION
"If, in a family, there are problems every day it's obvious that the family members are not well and cannot serve each other properly," said Taiba Alkazai, a psychologist at the hospital.
"In the same way, if there is fighting in a country then its people won't be happy."
The fear of suicide bomb attacks, roadside bombs, and the overall level of violence in Afghanistan - of which civilians bear the brunt, with the number killed rising in 2011 for the fifth straight year to more than 3,000, according to the United Nations - can lead to anxiety, panic and obsession.
"The physical aspects of war (last) for a limited time, but the psychological aspects of the war extend for many years. Day by day the mental health problems caused by the war are increasing," said consultant psychiatrist Said Najib Jawed.
Just as socially damaging is the risk of a generation for whom violence has become the norm.
"One of the examples I always give is that when you talk to an Afghan boy, you can easily get into a physical fight because they just wait for it, they don't know any other ways of dealing with a problem than fighting," Rajabi said.
"All these things will lead to a generation of people who are not very healthy mentally, and this will affect everything in the country: education, relationships, families, generally the development of the country." (Editing by Robert Birsel)
Boxing for Peace in Afghanistan
Der Spiegel By Maik Grossekathöfer 16/11/2012
Kabul - As a child, Hamid Rahimi fled the war in his native Afghanistan to Hamburg. After struggling to fit in, he developed a pair of angry fists that eventually landed him in juvenile prison. But he learned to control his temper and now wants to use his skills for good -- and for peace in his homeland.
They sent bomb-sniffing dogs through the building, unscrewed light bulbs and disassembled loudspeakers to search for explosives. On this evening in late October, some 1,200 Afghan soldiers are guarding the Loya Jirga Hall in Kabul. Pickup trucks armed with machine guns block the access roads in front of the building, which is normally used for meetings of the Loya Jirga, or council of elders, and where battles are normally fought with words instead of fists. Anyone who managed to get a ticket for the fight -- and could afford one, at between $60 (47) and $200 (157) apiece -- has to pass through four security checks and walk through three metal detectors. It takes almost an hour for a ticket holder to get to his seat.
On this morning, a Taliban fighter has shot and killed two British soldiers near the city of Gereshk, 600 kilometers (375 miles) southwest of Kabul, and now Hamid Rahimi is putting on his boxing gloves. He is standing in a heated tent next to the building, wearing a hooded vest and shorts. Someone holds a phone up to his ear. It's Afghan President Hamid Karzai, calling to apologize for not coming in person. He says that he'll watch the fight on TV with his son, and he wishes the boxer the best of luck. Rahimi stretches his hip and spits into a corner.
Rahimi, 29, was born in Kabul as the youngest son of an agricultural engineer and a teacher. He fled the country before the 1991 war, and now lives in Hamburg as a German citizen. He has fought 21 matches as a professional boxer, winning 20 -- nine with knockouts. He is celebrated as a hero in Afghanistan, and he holds the country's highest state honor.
His trainer pats his shoulder, indicating that it's time to go.
Some 3,000 people are waiting for Rahimi in the building. A crowd perhaps four times as large is pushing against iron gates and barriers outside, hoping in vain to get in. A leather armchair in the first row is reserved for the interior minister, the chief of police is present, the head of the intelligence service is sitting on a sofa at the front of the audience, generals and warlords are in attendance, and there are men from the Uzbek, Hazara and Pashtun tribes. No women.
An imam opens the event by reciting a few verses from the Koran. "We pray for our friend Hamid Rahimi," he says. "May he be strong and then, Insha'Allah, God willing, may he win." The audience answers: "Allahu akbar," or "God is great."
Round 1
This is the first professional boxing match in the history of Afghanistan, that eternal battlefield in the Hindu Kush. Two TV stations are broadcasting the fight live to all 34 provinces. The fight is for the World Boxing Organization's intercontinental middleweight championship, for boxers weighing up to 72.58 kilograms (160 lbs.).
Artificial fog is pumped into the building, and the moderator can hardly contain himself when he says: "Here he comes, and he's boxing for peace. Haaaamid Raaahimiiiii!"
His opponent, Said Mbelwa from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, looking brawny and fierce, is already waiting in the ring. Mbelwa has the red corner.
The timekeeper strikes the gong with a carpenter's hammer.
In the first round, Rahimi jabs with his left hand and punches with his right. Mbelwa is agile and his evasive maneuvers are effective.
"Hamid!" the fans shout. "Hamid, Hamid!"
The world has become deaf to good news from Afghanistan, and Rahimi's dream is to change that. Two years ago, he came up with the idea of stepping into the ring in Kabul and turned it into a project called "Fight 4 Peace." He believes that boxing has the power to unify a nation.
He negotiated with the government and met with tribal leaders. The World Boxing Organization (WBO) became involved, because boxing, as it states in its official resolution, is a "peaceful and true sport." But to be perfectly honest, boxing isn't nearly that romantic.
'Only Guests in Germany '
At first Rahimi wanted to fight an American, but officials at the fortress-like headquarters of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) didn't think it was such a good idea. Rahimi reached a deal with a boxer from the Dominican Republic, but that opponent later backed out. That left Said Mbelwa. "He has balls," says Rahimi. "He's not afraid to come here."
It's five days before the fight, and Rahimi is in the best shape of his life. To prepare for the fight, he fought in 130 rounds of sparring matches, instead of the usual 70. He is now running on the treadmill, to be followed by some shadow boxing on the terrace of the Kabul Star Hotel. His trainer is satisfied.
Rahimi is staying in a suite on the sixth floor, accompanied by his mother, Fatima, and his manager, Christof Hawerkamp. His brother, Wahid, who studied communication design and is constantly filming with his video camera, has also come to see the match.
A portrait of Rahimi's father is on the dresser, and a black ribbon with the words "We miss you" hangs above the frame. Aminullah Rahimi left Kabul a year before his family because he was afraid that he would be murdered if he stayed there. He had wanted to go to New York, but he only made it as far as Hamburg. He died in July at 87.
After training, Rahimi sits in the steam sauna. "My father always said we were only guests in Germany. It was clear to him that we would return. Bearded fanatics aren't the only ones living in Afghanistan. Young people here need other heroes. They shouldn't hang posters of mujahideen over their beds, but of athletes instead." It's time for his midday nap, and after that he plans to take a little trip.
Trauma of War in Childhood
Macroyan 1 is a development of grey, concrete buildings built by the Soviets in the eastern part of Kabul. Undergarments are hanging out to dry in front of the window, and a boy is driving a herd of goats. Rahimi stands with his mother in front of building 18, looking up at apartment 15 on the third floor, where they lived 21 years ago in a three-room apartment with a kitchen and a bathroom.
A small market behind the building sells roasted peanuts, women's clothing and ice cream. "This is where it happened," says Rahimi. "I can still smell death and burning flesh here."
He was five years old and had just gone to get an ice cream with his best friend Samir when the bomb exploded. Body parts and blood were everywhere. A piece of shrapnel hit Samir in the heart. Rahimi also remembers the time when missiles were exploding night after night, and how they used to squeeze into the bathtub together, hoping the tiles would protect them. His mother read from the Koran, and the children sang "Cheri, Cheri Lady" to distract themselves.
One day a shell landed next to Hamid's kindergarten, smashing the windows. There was smoke, fire, debris and blood everywhere. This time the attack was too much for Hamid to take. He caught a high fever and lost his ability to speak, stuttering like a diesel engine. He would break out in sweats and wet the bed. Sometimes his entire body became rigid.
Doctors treated him at the hospital for five months. He still chokes up when he tells the story today.
A few months later, he fled from Kabul with his mother and three siblings. The journey to join the father in Hamburg lasted 18 months, passing through Moscow and Prague.
Idolized by Children
There are four more days until the fight. Hawerkamp, his manager, uses the ISAF intranet to find judges for the bout. They need a referee, and Hawerkamp is struggling with the technicians, who don't speak English. He also needs the Tanzanian national anthem, and so far all he has as a flagpole is a broomstick.
"What we're doing here," he says, "is like walking on eggshells."
Rahimi is driven through the streets of Kabul in an open car. He's wearing a traditional robe and holding up the Afghan flag as he hands out autographed cards. He goes to the zoo and the city park, and he hikes up to the old city wall, where people live in huts with no running water and rarely have electricity.
With his brother filming, the pictures are the same everywhere they go: Children and adolescents crowd around him, touch him and want to be photographed with him. "Long live the champion!" they shout, as more and more children join the crowd. "Just look at their faces!" Rahimi shouts. "Look how happy they are!" His schedule is completely full. He has interviews at the Tolo TV, Yak TV and Khurshid studios, and President Karzai has invited him to prayers at his palace. It's the first day after the Feast of Sacrifice, celebrated at the height of the Hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca.
Back at his hotel, Rahimi is told about a suicide bombing in Maymana, in Faryab Province, which claimed 41 lives. He sits down at his laptop and posts a photo of a child crying on his Facebook page. "Let's stick together," he writes. "Only together we can bring peace."
The Amani School, in Kabul's diplomatic district, has a football pitch and biology and chemistry labs. Rahimi pays a visit to a third-grade class consisting of 30 boys with jet-black hair, dressed in blue shirts and gray trousers. He stands at the blackboard and tells the boys the story of how he became a boxer.
Part 2: From Prison to the Boxing Ring
When he was in school in Hamburg, he could hardly utter a sentence without stumbling over his words. He was an easy target for bullies, and he suffered greatly as a result. He felt like an outcast, and when three boys deliberately shot a wet football at his face, he let loose with his fists.
"Suddenly the others were nice to me," says Rahimi. He got into more and more fights, and along the way he cultivated his fighting stances and started a gang called the Real Street Boys. "I broke four noses in a week," he tells the boys. At 17, he punched a Turkish boy in the groin, was convicted of aggravated assault and sent to the Hahnöfersand Juvenile Prison.
In prison, he hated his fists and kept hitting the cell walls until they bled. He was ashamed to face his father and mother.
Then he saw a fight with Dariusz Michalczewski on TV. "He used his fists, too, but he was rich, and he was famous in Germany and in his home country, Poland. He made his parents happy." One of his sisters brought him the boxer's biography. Rahimi read it and began training. He drew the outline of a person on his prison mattress, using it to practice uppercuts and jabs.
His father was against his becoming a boxer. He wanted him to learn something worthwhile, like his daughters -- one is an attorney, the other a fashion designer. Rahimi had his debut as a professional boxer in November 2006. One of his first sponsors was an Afghan from Hamburg who trades in rice. He shot promotional videos with Rahimi and aired them on television at home, which is how the boxer became known in his native Afghanistan.
He stands in front of the children in the Amani School and says: "Since I've been boxing, I've never had a fight on the street again. I have my aggression under control."
Tense Meeting with the Ambassador
The sun has set, the streets are empty and Rahimi pays a visit to Sima Samar, a physician and human rights activist who will receive the so-called Alternative Nobel Prize in December. She is the best friend and former schoolmate of Rahimi's mother.
Samar, wearing a fleece jacket and tennis socks, is sitting in front of a plate of apples, bananas and grapes, as she talks about the European Union as an arms dealer and the Afghan government's lack of vision. Rahimi talks about Don King, the American boxing promoter, who sends his greetings to Kabul. He talks about an "historic opportunity" and an "initial spark for Afghanistan."
Samar smiles. "I won't watch the fight," she says. "It doesn't convince me. It's good that Hamid is getting the young generation to think about other things. But boxing has to do with aggression. I don't know if that's compatible with peace." Rahimi peels an apple.
Hawerkamp is in a good mood the next day. He is having a referee flown in from Berlin, and he found some potential judges: five Afghan amateur boxers. They are sitting in room 214 at the hotel, going over the rules. Hawerkamp explains to them that blows below the belt are forbidden, and that they also have to judge the defensive moves. Rahimi's trainer, sitting in a corner, says: "They'll all be judging in our favor. Mbelwa will have to knock out Hamid if he wants to win."
It's the day before the fight, and the German ambassador, Rüdiger König, wants to meet with him. Rahimi is nervous, because he plans to give the man a piece of his mind. "I presented my project to him a year ago. I asked for his support. I didn't even receive a rejection." Now he wants to know why.
The ambassador's trip to the hotel is short: 350 meters, just around the corner. He arrives with three armor-plated Mercedes limousines. His stone-faced bodyguards, armed with pistols and wearing bulletproof vests and sunglasses, don't say a word. "They scare me," says Rahimi. "They're pit bulls. If you give them your hand they'll bite into it. That's not how to make friends in Afghanistan."
He sits down with the ambassador in the hotel restaurant, and he talks and talks, gesticulating with his arms and bending over the table. The ambassador nods politely in response to the boxer's tirade, while his press spokeswoman stares silently into her coffee cup. She doesn't speak until the afternoon, and then it's only to say that no part of the conversation can be quoted.
"They've got to be kidding," says Rahimi. "They come here, wanting to teach the Afghans democracy and freedom of the press, and then this."
'We Showed the World'
It's around 7 p.m. on the evening of the fight. Mbelwa is furiously attacking his opponent, but his left straight-arm punch isn't working, and neither is his hook. After 17 seconds, Rahimi hits him on the right shoulder and Mbelwa crumples defenselessly, holding his arm.
The referee stops the fight, sends Rahimi into the neutral corner and calls the ringside doctor. Rahimi sinks to his knees and waves his fists in front of his face, waiting. Then the referee announces that Rahimi has won the fight, by virtue of a technical knockout.
The fans jump up from their seats, hopping, screaming, clapping and kissing each other. They push their way forward to the ring and climb up into it. Hawerkamp shouts in panic, and then police officers turn up with shields and batons, pushing back the crowd.
The fans hoist Rahimi to their shoulders in the ring. He is holding up the Afghan flag. Then he speaks into the microphone, as his words are broadcast to the entire country: "This title doesn't belong to me. I won it for you. It belongs to all of Afghanistan. We showed the world that it's worth it to fight against war and terrorism."
Back to Germany
Soon afterwards, Rahimi is in the shower while the crowd outside continues to howl like drunkards. "That was so cool. I didn't want to leave," he says. He dries himself off and puts on a shirt and tie. "We made history today, and my father was looking down at me. Now I can die happy." His brother is standing next to him, filming the scene with tears in his eyes.
Back at the hotel, the first thing Rahimi does is read the new messages on his Facebook page. Then he orders room service and calls his sisters in Hamburg.
After that, Rahimi and his team go out to a bar where a can of Heineken costs $10. But he isn't as fired up as the rest of them, drinking only Diet Coke. He's tired and it's close to 1 a.m. The tension has left his body. "Not everyone here is a terrorist or a drug dealer," he says. "The young people want respect. I will fight for that as long as I can breathe."
The next morning, there is a breaking news report on television and on the radio that a roadside bomb planted by the Taliban in Musa Qala, in Helmand Province, has killed seven women and three children.
Forty-eight hours later Hamid Rahimi, 29, Kabul-born and Hamburg-raised, boards his return flight to Germany.
Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan
Afghanistan: The Taliban Pile Onto Petraeus
As if the disgraced former CIA chief didn’t have enough to feel bad about, the Taliban are gloating over his fall. Sami Yousafzai reports.
The Daily Beast By Sami Yousafzai Nov 16, 2012
The Taliban are beside themselves with glee at the very public humiliation of Gen. David Petraeus. As the leading architect of the U.S. military surge in Afghanistan, he made thousands of mortal enemies among the insurgents, and their old grudges only intensified when he retired from the Army last year and became director of the CIA– the chief operators of the drone war inside the guerrillas’ formerly safe havens across the Pakistani border.
Now the general’s Afghan foes consider themselves both avenged and vindicated by the disclosure of his illicit affair with a married woman, his biographer Paula Broadwell. “The American general’s sex disgrace is a slap not only to the character of the U.S. but also to the faces of [Afghan President Hamid] Karzai and all others who are pro-Western,” says a former cabinet minister from the toppled Taliban regime, now active as a regional leader in the insurgency. “The bloodshed addict General Petraeus was not only after the blood of unfortunate Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan. He was also taking the chastity of married women.”
The general’s infidelities seem to have begun only after he left Afghanistan, but that doesn’t stop his Afghan detractors from speaking as if he desecrated their homeland with his extramarital affair. “We are Pashtun,” says Mullah Juma Khan Akhund, a Taliban commander in Helmand and Kandahar provinces, “Committing such an immoral crime has a traditional punishment, and it disrespects our people and our land. We used to tell everyone that these invaders are here not to help Afghans but to disrespect and kill them. General Petraeus’s affair gives living proof of that.”
But Juma Khan is so delighted at the general’s disgrace that it’s hard for him to stay angry. Laughing, he continues: “General, my son” – to address someone as “my son” in Kandahar is to challenge him to a fight – “you can’t win this war. And now, even before your final defeat, you’re hiding your face in shame because of your immoral sexual relationship.” Breaking off his sermon to the absent general, he turns philosophical: “I heard on the radio that he was the most successful general in Afghanistan. But how could someone who is disloyal to his wife be loyal to his nation?”
“Petraeus and his married mistress should be handed over to the Afghans to be stoned,” says Juma Khan. “They have offended our culture, our religion, and our land.”
The moral disapproval of Petraeus isn’t confined to Afghans in the tradition-bound countryside. “The U.S. ought to keep its drones focused on its own generals, and not on al Qaeda and the Taliban,” says a young student at Kabul University. His shock – if not his indignation – is shared by Mustafa Ahmadzai, an arts major at the same university. “Sex is part of American political and military life,” allows Ahmadzai. “But in a country like Afghanistan? No way. Before leaving for Afghanistan, I’m sure U.S. forces are strongly advised to leave their sexual organs behind in the U.S.A.”
Everyone seems to agree that the general should pay for his indiscretion. “Petraeus and his married mistress should be handed over to the Afghans to be stoned,” says Juma Khan. “They have offended our culture, our religion, and our land.” Zair Gul Zadran, a Haqqani Network commander in Khost province, says he’s surprised that anyone would get in trouble for an extramarital fling in the United States. “Our understanding was that sex is a common matter in American society. But if he committed the offense in our country, there is a traditional penalty: he should sacrifice dozens of sheep in contrition for his impropriety.”
Other Afghans view the general’s sin with a mixture of respect for tradition and unapologetic curiosity.
“By our customs he has insulted our land and our society,” says a tribal elder named Zamrak Zadran. “The way to make it right is for him to get cleaned up and hand himself over to a Pashtun jirga [assembly of elders].” Nevertheless, he says, “It’s interesting how the writing of the general’s life story was combined with voluptuary behavior. Now his biography will be overshadowed by the fact that he became a sexy story. I would love to read the details of the lady’s private nights.”
One thing particularly seems to bother many of the insurgents. Before Petraeus left Afghanistan, Karzai decorated him with the Afghan government’s highest honor, the Ghazi Wazir Mohammad Akbar Khan medal, named for a hero in the war against the Soviets. He should get it back from the profligate and immoral General Petraeus,” says the former Taliban cabinet minister.
On Thursday the Taliban website Al Emara posted a Pashto-language editorial headlined “Libertine Friend.” Under a photo of Karzai awarding Petraeus the medal, the editorial castigated the Afghan president for his association with the now fallen general. “Just imagine the ghosts of those heroes whose names Karzai has insulted by awarding their medals to this dirty general. Those ghosts would grab Karzai and ask him: ‘Why did you reward such a dirty general?’ What answer could Karzai give?”
Sami Yousafzai is Newsweek's correspondent in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where he has covered militancy, al Qaeda, and the Taliban for the magazine since 9/11. He was born in Afghanistan but moved to Pakistan with his family after the Russian invasion in 1979. He began his career as a sports journalist but switched to war reporting in 1997.
For inquiries, please contact The Daily Beast at editorial@thedailybeast.com.
Petraeus: More myth than man
Analysis: The savior of Iraq, the hero of Afghanistan — what is the reality behind the hype?
Global Post By Jean MacKenzie November 16, 2012
BUZZARDS BAY, Mass. - The rhetoric surrounding David Petraeus’ fall from grace has been nothing short of epic. The tawdry affair of the general and the biographer has assumed the proportions of a Shakespearean tragedy, complete with a tragically flawed hero and an evil temptress.
The media has been gushing, even fawning, in its description of Petraeus’ accomplishments, and his disgrace is being portrayed as a national disaster.
The reality is much more mundane, as is the man at the center of all the fuss. His fall from grace is a personal tragedy, and he and his family will have to deal with that. Petraeus was a fine officer with a keen mind and an impressive work ethic. But he is not the miracle-worker that is now being painted.
Even in disgrace, Petraeus is indispensable. The just-resigned CIA director was called to testify Friday at congressional hearings about the September attacks on the US Consulate in Benghazi, Libya.
Much of his reputation rests on his performance during the war in Iraq. When Petraeus arrived in Baghdad, in February 2007, the country was one of the most violent places on earth. He oversaw the surge, which cut down on the killing and provided time and political cover for the United States to withdraw.
It did not, however, pacify the country. Iraq today is witnessing increasing levels of violence, much of which goes unremarked by the American public, since US troops are no longer in harm’s way there.
“Under General Petraeus’ stewardship, the overall violence in Iraq was reduced,” said Joshua Foust, a fellow at the American Security Project who has written extensively on Iraq and Afghanistan. “Even if this dip was temporary, it gave the United States space to withdraw.”
In Afghanistan, where Petraeus took over from Gen. Stanley McChrystal in July 2010 and handed over command to Gen. John Allen a year later, his legacy will be much more problematic.
“Petraeus was very successful in creating the illusion of success,” said Alex Strick van Linschoten, a writer and researcher who has produced several books on Afghanistan. “He was very successful at playing the media, even when the facts did not add up.”
All too often, Petraeus’ claims did not correspond to reality.
In December 2010, the CIA released a National Intelligence Estimate with a very downbeat evaluation of the war in Afghanistan. The Taliban was making significant gains, said the report, and large swaths of the country were in danger of falling to the enemy.
Meanwhile, Petraeus was touting the “fragile and reversible” gains that were being made.
“Well, most of them were reversed,” says Foust.
During Petraeus’ tenure, violence in Afghanistan actually increased. He more than doubled the number of “night raids,” the kill/capture missions that he claimed were decimating the Taliban’s command structure. But these missions caused untold hardship for Afghans, who were frequently caught in the crossfire, and spurred Afghan President Hamid Karzai to all but declare war on NATO.
“Petraeus was fond of metrics,” Foust said. “He would release the body counts, and claim that these kill/capture missions were the most successful tactic in the war. In reality, a distressingly high percentage of those captured were released within days.”
That number topped 80 percent, according to researcher Gareth Porter.
But NATO in Afghanistan, with Petraeus at its head, would seldom admit mistakes.
In one widely publicized incident, Petraeus continued to insist that an airstrike that killed 17 people had targeted the right person, even after it had been demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the supposed target was still alive and well, and that those killed had been election workers on a campaign trip.
In PBS’ “Frontline” program, correspondent Stephen Grey asked the general pointblank: “Can I just ask you how that operation came into being, what made you think this was the man that you were targeting?”
Petraeus answered firmly, staring straight into the camera: “Well, we didn’t think in this case, with respect, we knew. We had days and days of what’s called ‘the unblinking eye,’ confirmed by other forms of intelligence, that informed us that this — there’s no question about who this individual was.”
According to Foust, who recently wrote a piece for The Atlantic magazine called “Myopia: How Counter-Terrorism Has Blinded Our Intelligence Community,” this is a common affliction among spies.
“People at a sufficiently high level of the intelligence community become so focused on their internal channels that they discount anything that is outside of it,” he said. “Even when that information may be more reliable.”
For Strick, it is even simpler.
“Petraeus was caught red-handed getting it wrong and still would not back down,” said Strick. “He was intent on allowing the operation to have the appearance of success, in order to give the United States the opportunity to leave Afghanistan while saving face.”
This, says Strick, is one of the reasons for the schadenfreude that many old Afghans hands are feeling.
“Some are rubbing their hands in glee at Petraeus’ downfall,” he said. “It is the difference between his purported self-discipline and the messiness, the sloppiness of real life.”
There certainly has been quite a bit of breast-beating among those in the media who contributed to creating the “King David” myth. Spencer Ackerman, a national security and defense blogger for Wired magazine, recently posted a piece on the magazine’s website titled “How I Was Drawn into the Cult of David Petraeus.”
He details how the mythmaking machine operated, the stroking of sympathetic journalists, the exclusion of those more critical.
“A lot of the journalism around Petraeus gave him a pass, and I wrote too much of it,” he said. “Writing critically about a public figure you come to admire is a journalistic challenge.”
Jon Lee Anderson, writing in The New Yorker, was even more direct: “[Petraeus’] lionization by admiring and opportunistic politicians and fawning journalists and biographers has been craven and boundless,” he writes. “In Afghanistan there was no Petraeus miracle. In spite of an Iraq-style surge and a much-vaunted counterinsurgency strategy overseen by Petraeus, the Taliban have proven unbeatable.”
Perhaps Petraeus is not yet finished. As history has shown, sexual peccadilloes are no barrier to high office — think of Bill Clinton, John F. Kennedy, Dwight D. Eisenhower and even Thomas Jefferson.
Once he has finished putting his life back together, King David could reassemble his mythmaking machine and rise again.
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