[Afghan News] August 1, 2012

[یاسمینه]

Afghan Finance Minister Under Scrutiny
By ALISSA J. RUBIN The New York Times August 1, 2012
KABUL, Afghanistan — Afghanistan’s powerful finance minister came under scrutiny on Wednesday when an Afghan television network broadcast copies of two of his bank account statements that showed sizable payments from businesses and individuals and transfers of money from those accounts to bank accounts in Canada.

It is unclear for now whether the deposits and transfers were legitimate transactions, as Finance Minister Omar Zakhilwal insists, or a red flag signaling malfeasance in one of the most critical ministries in terms of driving the country’s future. The Finance Ministry oversees the Afghan budget, the collection of taxes, customs duties and the allocation of money to other ministries.

The report on Tolo Television, which included an interview with Mr. Zakhilwal, showed copies of his bank statements from Standard Chartered Bank and Alfalah Bank from the years 2007-11 and stated that more than $1 million had been deposited into his accounts in that time and that some of the money had been transferred out of the country. The highlighted transactions included a $200,000 deposit from Safi Landmark, an Afghan company that runs hotels and other businesses here.

Mr. Zakhilwal said that the money in the accounts had been earned through his work as a consultant. “Before I came to Afghanistan, I was a doctor of economics and had a job in Canada. I was a university professor there,” he said in the Tolo interview.

“I had consultancy responsibilities,” he added, noting that he had worked for the World Bank and written chapters for books. Advisers in Afghanistan are paid $1,500 a day, he said.

A Finance Ministry spokesman, Najibullah Manali, dismissed the report as “character assassination,” adding: “If anyone wants to accrue money illegally, he does not do it through banks and bank accounts. There is a very safe hawala system of money transfer in which the money earned through corruption can be transferred with so much safety that no one can catch you.”

“No one resorts to corruption through the proper banking system, which can be tracked and detected,” he said.

The denials did not convince the chief of the high office on oversight, Azizullah Ludin, who has looked at the banking documents reviewed by the television network. He said he would send a team of investigators to the Finance Ministry on Saturday, the first day of the workweek.

“All the bank statements and documents show the transactions took place,” he said. “All those documents seem authentic.”

Mr. Zakhilwal, a fluent English speaker, has long been a favorite of the international community and a public proponent of transparency. His reputation among Afghans is less shining: he was known as a chief fund-raiser for President Hamid Karzai during his 2009 re-election campaign, corralling millions of dollars in donations that were never reported to the election commission, according to news reports.

An official in the attorney general’s office said that there were no criminal investigations of the ministry or of Mr. Zakhilwal.

The disclosure of his bank records comes at a delicate moment for Mr. Karzai’s government, which is trying to show that it is clamping down on corruption. That is in part to satisfy Western donors who want to see real progress in ensuring that the dollars they give are actually spent on projects and programs.

Sangar Rahimi and Jawad Sukhanyar contributed reporting.

A version of this article appeared in print on August 2, 2012, on page A5 of the National edition with the headline: Afghan Finance Minister Under Scrutiny.

NATO should finish job in Afghanistan, Putin says
By Gleb Bryanski
ULYANOVSK, Russia (Reuters) - NATO forces should stay in Afghanistan until they have finished their job to ensure stability, Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Wednesday, criticizing the planned withdrawal of most combat troops by 2014.

Putin reiterated Kremlin concerns that the pull-out of the U.S.-led alliance, due to start next year, will leave the Central Asian region south of Russia vulnerable to militant violence and drug trafficking.

"It is regrettable that many participants in this operation are thinking about how to pull out of there. They took up this burden and should carry it to the end," Putin said at a meeting with paratroopers in the Russian city of Ulyanovsk.

"If there is no order in Afghanistan it will not be calm on our southern borders. The current (Afghan) leadership will have difficulties keeping the situation under control. NATO member states are present there, and are performing this function," he said.

"We need to help them (NATO). We should not be fighting there again. Let them sit there and fight."

The Soviet Union fought a disastrous war in Afghanistan in the 1980s and Russia ruled out sending troops to aid the U.S.-led invasion after the September 11, 2001 attacks.

But Moscow has supported the NATO operation by allowing transit across its territory.

It expanded that support with an agreement that took effect on Wednesday allowing the alliance to use a transit hub in Ulyanovsk to send non-lethal supplies in and out of Afghanistan using the Russian rail network and air transport.

Supply routes are particularly important for the NATO operation in Afghanistan and the planned pull-out.

Removing a major headache for the alliance, Pakistan re-opened NATO transit lines via its territory in July after months of closure over NATO air strike that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers.

Putin said the transit hub agreement, which has drawn criticism from Communists and others saying Russia is allowing an enemy on its territory, in fact benefited Russia - which is otherwise often at loggerheads with the alliance.

"It corresponds to our national interests. On many other issues we have disagreements. We have different approaches, opinions." Putin said, reiterating his description of NATO as a "throwback to the past, to the times of the Cold War".

"We will cooperate with them on other fields, fighting piracy on the sea, international terrorism, organized crime. But we will always follow our national interests," the former KGB spy said.

(Writing by Gabriela Baczynska; Editing by Steve Gutterman and Pravin Char)

Afghanistan: Peace signals from the Taliban
1 August 2012 BBC News
The Taliban have been sending signals that they are ready to sit down with the US. But it seems as if the US is unwilling to act, particularly as the presidential election nears. Writer Ahmed Rashid considers what this means for Afghanistan's future.

In the past three months, there have been numerous public signals by the Taliban that they are willing to resume talks with the Americans. But there has been no such response from Washington as the US elections draw near.

Meanwhile, the Taliban have stepped up attacks on US and Afghan forces, and there has been no respite in the fighting despite the advent of Ramadan.

At the end of June, at an academic conference in Kyoto, Japan, an active member of the Taliban shura (council) held substantial talks with Masoom Stanakzai, a leading member of the Afghan High Peace Council and adviser to President Hamid Karzai.

That was despite Taliban insistence that they would not meet any representative from Mr Karzai.

At the same time, at a conference in Paris, former Taliban officials discussed sensitive issues with other Afghans, such as power-sharing and changing the constitution so the Taliban could be accommodated.

Later interviews with former or active Taliban by prominent academic and ex-UN official Michael Semple, and more interviews by a group from the War Studies department of London University, all pointed to a keen desire by the Taliban to get talks restarted with the US and a surprisingly conciliatory attitude on many issues.

No word

But there has not been a whisper from any member of the Obama administration, either welcoming these positive Taliban statements or even a mention of whether the US is committed to the talks.

The reason, of course, is the US elections on 2 November. Neither President Obama nor Mitt Romney want to say anything conciliatory towards the Taliban that may make them look weak in the eyes of their opposite number.

Although there have been some attempts by the State Department to get talks restarted, they are floundering on the back of the elections and the lack of unity within the Obama administration on the very issue of talking to the Taliban. As a result, it seems that talks could get delayed until after November.

The US and Taliban representatives had met at least seven times in secret talks in Germany and Qatar before talks were stalled in January 2012.

Although the Taliban called them off, the culprit seemed to have been the Americans, who went back on an apparent commitment to free five Taliban leaders from Guantanamo in exchange for a US soldier.

Meanwhile, Taliban attacks against US and Afghan forces over April, May and June - the beginning of the traditional fighting season - have increased by 11% compared with the same period last year.

Taliban revival

Most dangerous is the Taliban revival and re-emergence in Helmand and Kandahar, southern provinces that were supposed to have been swept clean by a massive US Marine offensive over the past two years.

Moreover, there has been no respite in fighting for the traditional month of Ramadan, when Muslims fast from sunrise to sunset. We have seen even more suicide attacks this year instead.

With US relations with Pakistan having also been in free-fall, and with the US continuing to accuse Pakistan of harbouring Taliban leaders and fighters, there was a hardening of the American position in the military, the US Congress and the media.

There is now every chance that rather than pressure for re-opening talks with the Taliban, there will be congressional pressure on President Obama to declare the Jalaluddin Haqqani network a terrorist organisation.

That would have enormously negative consequences in the region. It could implicate Pakistan as a state supporter of terrorism, which could lead to US sanctions, more cross-border raids by US forces into Pakistan and greater anti-Americanism.

It would make it virtually impossible for Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar to restart talks with the US, as long as one of his colleagues was declared outside the pale by Washington. And it would likely lead to more suicide bombers against US forces.

Lives in danger

The Haqqanis also hold numerous Western, Pakistani and Afghan hostages and kidnap-for-ransom victims, including the US army sergeant, Bowe Bergdahl, 25, who has been held prisoner now for over three years. Their lives could be in danger with a terrorist label stamped on the Haqqanis.

The Taliban have no wish for the Americans to leave Afghanistan in 2014 in a continued or even worse state of civil war.

Mr Karzai is anxious for talks with the Taliban, and so is neighbouring Pakistan, although Islamabad has done little to help facilitate negotiations between the Taliban and the Americans or Mr Karzai.

Pakistan could have been much more helpful by putting greater pressure on Mullah Omar and the Haqqanis to reduce their fighting and hold talks.

The Pakistan military, which runs the country's Afghan policy, seems to be paralysed as a result of the continuing domestic crisis and the year-long war of words with the US.

Consequently, the military does not seem to have a coherent policy towards Afghanistan at present, which should involve a turnaround on some of its past practices, such as giving sanctuary to the Taliban.

Meanwhile, as US forces focus on the transition to Afghan forces which we are repeatedly told is going extremely well, Taliban attacks have increased.

Regional countries have also become more hostile to a planned long-term US military presence in Afghanistan of some 20,000 troops after 2014. There are growing fears about a downward plunge for the Afghan economy.

Afghan presidential elections and the uncertainty they carry loom in 2014, and ethnic divisions in the country are widening over the issue of peace talks with the Taliban.

The US and Nato have so far failed to put greater emphasis on these other political challenges, which will affect Afghanistan's future in the months ahead, almost as much as a successful transition to Afghan security forces will do.

The US needs to quickly reopen talks with the Taliban and start helping the Afghan government deal with this extraordinary set of problems.

Ahmed Rashid's book, Taliban, was updated and reissued recently on the 10th anniversary of its publication. His latest book is Pakistan on the Brink: The future of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West.

Afghan militancy, conflicts claim 35 lives in 2 days
By Abdul Haleem
KABUL, Aug. 1 (Xinhua) -- Taliban-linked militancy and conflicts have claimed 35 lives in the conflict-ridden Afghanistan in two days as five police officers lost their lives in the troubled southern region.

The police chief of Shamozai district in Zabul province, 340 km south of Afghan capital Kabul, along with two of his bodyguards were killed as a roadside bomb struck his vehicle Wednesday. "The incident happened at around noon when a mine planted by militants struck the vehicle of Shah Khan, police chief of Shamonzai district, killing him along with two of his bodyguards on the spot at noon time Wednesday,"Deputy Provincial Governor Mohammad Jan Rasoulyar told Xinhua.

He blamed Taliban militants for organizing the attack. However, the outfit has yet to make comment.

Hours earlier, two policemen were killed and one injured in a similar incident in the neighboring Uruzgan province, 370 km south of Kabul, a spokesman with the provincial administration Gulab Khan confirmed.

Anti-government militants' activities in the southern region commonly known as the hotbed of Taliban also claimed the life of a senior police officer in Ghazni province, 125 km south of Kabul, Tuesday night. "Unknown men planted a remote-controlled bomb near the gate of the house of Nasrullah Andar, deputy police of third precinct in Ghazni city last night and when he was going home from the mosque it exploded killing him on the spot,"spokesman for provincial administration Fazal Rahman Sabawon told Xinhua on Wednesday.

Continued militancy has also claimed the lives of four civilians in Wardak province on Tuesday, an official confirmed Wednesday.

"A total of four civilians were kidnapped by militants Tuesday evening in Mullah Khil area of Jalrez district and their bullet- riddle bodies were found in Salman-e-Fars area of the district Wednesday morning," provincial administration spokesman Shahidullah Shahid told Xinhua.

Meantime, four anti-government militants were killed as NATO aircraft targeted them while they were planting mines on a road in Wardak province, 35 km west of Afghan capital Kabul, Tuesday night, provincial administration said in a statement Wednesday. "Five insurgents were busy in planting mines on a road in Nurkh district, Wardak province Tuesday night when the NATO-led forces' reconnaissance discovered and conducted air raid, killing four on the spot and injuring another," the statement added.

In the counterinsurgency, Afghan police have killed 21 Taliban militants and captured 12 others over the past 24 hours, Interior Ministry said in a statement Wednesday. "Afghan National Police backed by the army and the NATO-led coalition forces have killed 21 Taliban militants and captured 12 others across the country during series of operations over the past 24 hours," the statement said.

Senior Taliban leader captured in S. Afghanistan: ISAF
KABUL, Aug. 1 (Xinhua) -- A senior Taliban leader was captured by a joint Afghan and NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) security force in southern Zabul province Tuesday, the ISAF forces said Wednesday.

"An Afghan and coalition security force arrested a senior Taliban leader in Tarnak wa Jaldak district, Zabul province, during an operation yesterday," the ISAF said in a press release providing daily operational updates to the media.

The senior Taliban leader organized a complex Improvised Explosive Device (IED) network responsible for multiple IED attacks in the region, the release said without disclosing the name of the leader.

"He was also responsible for directing suicide bombings and for planning and executing multiple attacks against Afghan security forces and civilians throughout the district." it said.

Earlier Wednesday, another joint security force conducted an operation to arrest a Taliban leader in Zharay district in southern Kandahar province, the release added.

"During the operation, a group of armed insurgents attacked the Afghan and coalition troops. The security force engaged the insurgents and killing several of them. After the engagement, the security force detained multiple suspected insurgents."

The Afghan and ISAF forces also conducted a counter-narcotics operation in the Shorabak district of Kandahar province Tuesday, according to the press release. "As a result of the operation, the combined force seized 1080 kilograms (2381 pounds) of hashish and detained two suspected narcotics traffickers. The drugs were destroyed on site, "it said

Separately, two suspected Taliban insurgents were detained by the joint forces in Pul-e Khurmi district of the northern Baghlan province Wednesday morning.

"The Afghan and coalition troops discovered a cache of improvised explosive device components and ammunition while searching the compound of a suspected Taliban leader," in the above operation, the ISAF release said.

Violence has been on the rise since Taliban launched an annual spring offensive on May 3.

A total of 50 countries are contributing 130,000-strong forces in Afghanistan with over 90,000 of them American mainly stationed in the east and south, followed by 9,500 from UK mainly based in southern Afghanistan.

The Taliban insurgents, who have been waging an insurgency of more than one decade, have yet to make comments.

Building Communities: Springsteen and Pakistan
THE NEW YORKER NEWS DESK By Ahmed Rashid July 31, 2012
After thirty years of wanting to, I finally attended a Bruce Springsteen concert this summer, at Madison Square Garden. For a journalist born and based in Pakistan who has carried Springsteen’s music everywhere over the years, from war zones to weddings, it was a mind-blowing experience. The music, the energy, the wall of sound, the dancing on the stage, the camaraderie and professionalism of the E Street Band—aspects of Springsteen’s performances that David Remnick captured in his recent Profile—added up to the total fulfillment of a desire to see him live I’d held since first hearing his music, while travelling in Europe some three decades ago. Watching Bruce, I thought that I understood, for the first time, something that is distant to those on the periphery of the world of Western dance halls. Everyone in the audience was standing the whole three and a half hours of the concert, everyone was singing along together, and everyone knew all the words of the songs—even those of his latest album, “Wrecking Ball
,” which had only been out a few weeks. And by “everyone” I mean from teen-agers to grandmothers.

What Springsteen epitomizes is the meaning and power of American culture—and that is community. Through his music and his earthiness Bruce builds a community of people who share every beat of his guitar, who partake ever so briefly in the life of the artist but who share that with millions of other people. I thought about how General Zia ul-Haq, during his awful and brutal dictatorship, from 1977 to 1988, banned any public gathering of five or more people. That, of course, ended any hope of cultural performances. It’s part of his legacy that even today, as Pakistan’s youth culture flourishes with filmmaking, music, drama, and art, there are no proper venues or halls to perform plays, concerts, or dance. Much of the circulation of culture here is done through YouTube and private gatherings. Springsteen himself is hugely popular with millions of Pakistanis working or studying abroad, and young people at home who see his performances on social media. It is a crying shame that a country of a hundred and eighty mi
llion, home to some of the biggest cities in the world, has no large purpose-built modern auditorium where Springsteen-scale performances can take place.

I say this with an acute sense of loss, because in Pakistan and so many other countries of the world a community built through culture has always been a threat to the status quo, to the military dictatorships, and to the wealthy—those who believe their position would be undermined with democracy and freedom of expression. In many Muslim societies there is the added problem of cultural segregation, with men and women often unable to hear or see each other’s dance and music. In Afghanistan, Pakistan’s neighbor, the Taliban have executed women who dared to dance at a family wedding. But such restrictions are not really about Islam—it’s about how those in power wish to prevent the building of a culture and with a certain sense of shared responsibility. Today there is the problem of local Islamic extremists and terrorists who would try to prevent any concert taking place in any major city. The threat alone scares many people away from participatory culture.

Culture is all about strengthening civil society, building a community of people with shared values, strengthening the bonds between generations. Rightly or wrongly, America dominates world culture, but no cultural expression explains its power so well as rock music does. (In contrast, Hollywood movies or HBO TV series are ultimately more about enjoying spectacle and drama in the privacy of your own home and mind than about sharing them with the community.) It is about partaking of a cultural event in the company of others: bringing the maximum number of people into a venue, performing for them, and allowing them to go home with the feeling that they have shared something with other human beings. We want to hug the guy we are standing next to, we want to talk to people we don’t know, we want to keep singing the songs as we leave the theatre, and when the harsh reality of the street hits us we want every taxi driver to turn into an angel while we keep talking to strangers.

This is what Springsteen does for me and for many others. Like no other rock musician—perhaps since the early Bob Dylan—Springsteen builds a wall of friendship and shared longing for American society to come together instead of splintering apart, as it is doing. He temporarily bridges the generation gap, the class divide, and the wealth gap. In other words, his music builds communities of people who want to realize their responsibility to each other. There are several Pakistani pop singers, such as Ali Zafar or Atif Aslam, who could aspire to play such a role if there were the opportunities, the venues, and the support from the state and society.

Remnick makes the point that the liberal left have always confused a musician’s words and music with his politics. Bob Dylan was castigated first for dropping the acoustic guitar for the electric guitar and then for turning away from anti-Vietnam War songs and folk music to rock music. Springsteen, the working-class boy turned billionaire, is often criticized for an allegedly fake concern for people’s welfare. However, what is important for these icons is their music not their overt political stands; I don’t expect Springsteen to sing songs about the war in Afghanistan, but he does touch all important social bases for an American public. I do have the sense from his songs that his heart is in the right place and that he rejects violence—that the community his music builds is one of shared hopes and human values.

As a reporter who has covered wars for thirty-two years—the numerous wars in Afghanistan and Central Asia and the bloody violence in Pakistan— I have always taken Springsteen with me, whether in the shape of early cassette tapes or today’s CDs. I would always play him at night after a day of watching people kill each other, and I would play him loud. Strangely, the thump of rock, the wall of sound, his gruff, aching voice were always immensely soothing. I wanted to go out into the streets and let the warriors battling it out there hear his music.

Photograph by Julian Broad.

French Hand Over Base In Afghanistan
July 31, 2012 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
French troops have handed over their military base near Kabul to the Afghan National Army as part of the pullout of 2,000 French combat soldiers by the end of the year.

The handover of the forward operating base in the restive Surobi district, about 50 kilometers from central Kabul, was marked by a ceremony.

The French flag was lowered and the Afghan one hoisted in its place.

President Francois Hollande announced the pullout in May.

He said he would leave around 1,400 French soldiers behind to help with logistics and the training of Afghan security forces.

Based on reporting by AP and Pajhwok Afghan News

Kunar Rocket Attacks are Attempt to get Afghanistan to Recognise Durand Line
TOLOnews.com Tuesday, 31 July 2012
Rocket attacks from Pakistan on Nuristan and Kunar provinces seek to pressure the Afghan government into recognising the Durand Line, the Afghan National Army's chief of staff, Shir Mohammad Karimi, said on Tuesday. Afghan senators had summoned General Karimi and other Afghan security officials to explain the recent cross-border shelling in the two provinces.

Officials said Pakistan was behind the attacks and blamed the country's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency and the army for the rockets.

General Karimi told lawmakers that the issue had been brought up with Nato and US officials a number of times.

"We asked Nato to put pressure on Pakistan several times," General Karimi said. "But it is still unclear why Nato is not taking the issue seriously. Maybe they fear for their supply trucks or [Pakistan's status as a] nuclear power,"

The Afghan Minister of Interior echoed General Karimi's stance and said that nearly 1,000 rockets had landed in Afghanistan's border regions since the start of this year.

"There is no doubt that the ISI and Pakistan's army are continuing to fire rockets into Kunar province," said Minister of Interior Bismillah Khan Mohammadi. He added that the Afghan security forces awaited orders from President Hamid Karzai and the Afghan parliament to take action against Pakistan.

He added that Pakistan's army had penetrated 2 kilometres into Afghan territory.

"Look at these photos that we have collected with the help of local residents," General Khan said. "The Taliban does not have such heavy artillery; only Pakistan's army has this."

Deputy Head of Operations at the National Directorate of Security, Mohammad Yasin Zia, told the Senate he believes that Pakistan's army is attempting to place Pakistani spies in the houses left vacant by fleeing Afghans.

"These rockets are fired by Pakistan's army 100 per cent; we reject the claims of Pakistani officials of rocket attacks from Afghanistan," Dr Zia added.

At the end of the session Afghan senators voted that Afghan forces should take action against Pakistan.

Taliban cheers reopening of NATO supply line
Associated Press July 31, 2012
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan - As the United States trumpeted its success in persuading Pakistan to end its seven-month blockade of supplies for NATO troops in Afghanistan, another group privately cheered its good fortune: the Taliban.

One of the Afghan war's great ironies is that both NATO and the Taliban rely on the convoys to fuel their operations -- a recipe for seemingly endless conflict.

The insurgents have earned millions of dollars from Afghan security firms that illegally paid them not to attack trucks making the perilous journey from Pakistan to coalition bases throughout Afghanistan -- a practice the U.S. has tried to crack down on but admits likely still occurs.

Militants often target the convoys in Pakistan as well, but there have been far fewer reports of trucking companies paying off the insurgents, possibly because the route there is less vulnerable to attack.

Pakistan's decision to close its border to NATO supplies in November in retaliation for U.S. airstrikes that killed 24 Pakistani troops significantly reduced the flow of cash to militants operating in southern and eastern Afghanistan, where the convoys travel up from Pakistan, said Taliban commanders.

Pakistan reopened the supply route in early July after the U.S. apologized for the deaths of the soldiers. The two countries signed a formal agreement regulating the shipment of troop supplies to and from Afghanistan on Tuesday.

"Stopping these supplies caused us real trouble," a Taliban commander who leads about 60 insurgents in eastern Ghazni province told The Associated Press in an interview. "Earnings dropped down pretty badly. Therefore the rebellion was not as strong as we had planned."

A second Taliban commander who controls several dozen fighters in southern Kandahar province said the money from security companies was a key source of financing for the insurgency, which uses it to pay fighters and buy weapons, ammunition and other supplies.

"We are able to make money in bundles," the commander told the AP by telephone. "Therefore, the NATO supply is very important for us."

Both commanders spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of being targeted by NATO or Afghan forces, and neither would specify exactly how much money they make off the convoys.

The U.S. military estimated last year that $360 million in U.S. tax dollars ended up in the hands of the Taliban, criminals and power brokers with ties to both. More than half the losses flowed through a $2.1 billion contract to truck huge amounts of food, water and fuel to American troops across Afghanistan.

The military said only a small percentage of the $360 million was funneled to the Taliban and other insurgent groups. But even a small percentage would mean millions of dollars, and the militants, who rely on crude weaponry, require relatively little money to operate.

The military investigated one power broker who owned a private security company and was known to supply weapons to the Taliban. The power broker, who was not named, received payments from a trucking contractor doing business with the U.S. Over more than two years, the power broker funneled $8.5 million to the owners of an unlicensed money exchange service used by insurgents.

A congressional report in 2010 called "Warlord, Inc." said trucking contractors pay tens of millions of dollars annually to local warlords across Afghanistan in exchange for guarding their supply convoys, some of which are suspected of paying off the Taliban.

The military instituted a new, roughly $1 billion trucking contract last September with a different set of companies that it claims has reduced the flow of money to insurgents by providing greater visibility of which subcontractors those firms hire, said Maj. Gen. Richard Longo, head of a U.S. anti-corruption task force in Afghanistan.

But it's very difficult to cut off the illegal transfers completely, he said.

"I think it would be naive on my part to suggest that no money is going to the enemy," said Longo. "I think there is still money flowing to criminals, and I think that the nexus between criminals and the insurgency is there."

Rep. John Tierney, the Democrat from Massachusetts who led the Warlord, Inc. report, said the new contract has resulted in some increased contractor oversight and accountability, but "the Department of Defense must take more aggressive steps to keep our military personnel safe and to protect taxpayer dollars from going to our enemies in Afghanistan."

The U.S. pushed Pakistan hard to reopen the NATO supply line through the country because it had been forced to use a longer route that runs into northern Afghanistan through Central Asia and costs an additional $100 million per month.

The Taliban commanders interviewed by the AP said the northern route was less lucrative for them because fewer trucks passed through southern and eastern Afghanistan, and contractors seemed to have less money to direct toward the insurgents. It's unclear if that is a result of the new trucking contract implemented by the military.

But the commanders said they were determined to get their cut as the flow of trucks resumes from Pakistan -- a process that has been slowed by bureaucratic delays, disputes over compensation and concerns about security.

"We charge these trucks as they pass through every area, and they are forced to pay," said the commander operating in Ghazni. "If they don't, the supplies never arrive, or they face the consequence of heavy attacks."

Prior to the November attack, the U.S. and other NATO countries shipped about 30 percent of their nonlethal supplies from Pakistan's southern port city of Karachi through two main crossings on the Afghan border.

The route through Pakistan will become even more critical as the U.S. seeks to withdraw most of its combat troops by the end of 2014, a process that will require tens of thousands of containers carrying equipment and supplies.

"We have had to wait these past seven months for the supply lines to reopen and our income to start again," said the Taliban commander in Ghazni. "Now work is back to normal."

US Diplomats: Afghan, Pakistan Engagement Necessary
VOA News July 31, 2012 Michael Bowman
CAPITOL HILL -- President Barack Obama's nominees for the next U.S. ambassadors to Pakistan and Afghanistan testified Tuesday before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

After holding diplomatic posts in the United Arab Emirates and Afghanistan, Richard Olson hopes to become U.S. ambassador to Pakistan. At his Senate confirmation hearing, Olson said that recent tensions between Washington and Islamabad do not change the fact that a stable and democratic Pakistan is in America’s interest.

"Continued engagement with Pakistan is necessary to pursue the strategic defeat of al-Qaida," he said. "Engagement is necessary to promote peace and stability in Afghanistan, to encourage regional stability, and to support political and economic stability within Pakistan itself. Instability in Pakistan would undermine what we are trying to achieve in the region."

James Cunningham, who President Obama nominated to be America’s top diplomat in Kabul, where he currently serves as deputy ambassador, said significant challenges remain in Afghanistan, but that U.S. efforts are bringing results.

"Today, the pieces of a long-term, enduring support structure for Afghanistan's continuing progress and development are now in place," he said. "This makes clear to Afghans and the region that the security transition does not mean we are abandoning Afghanistan. And the Taliban appear to be taking notice. For the first time in a decade, they are debating and signaling an openness to negotiations."

Olson and Cunningham testified at a time of growing pessimism and frustration among many lawmakers over a perceived lack of progress in Afghanistan and difficult U.S.-Pakistan relations. The Senate committee’s chairman, Democrat John Kerry (D-Mass.), summed it up by saying, “Obviously, there is no shortage of challenge here.”

Other legislators were more blunt. The committee's top Republican, Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), questioned the basis for continued, large-scale U.S. military commitments in Afghanistan.

"The country is important but does not hold that level of strategic value for us -- especially at a time when our nation is confronting a debt crisis, our armed forces have been strained by repeated combat deployments, and we are attempting to place more emphasis on East Asia," said Lugar.

Another Republican committee member, Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), summed up U.S.-Pakistan ties as "pay-for-play" as he enquired about about U.S. strategy.

"Since it is more of a transactional relationship -- not one that is built on goodwill -- how do we leverage the resources that we have to cause Pakistan to act in ways that we would like to see them act?"

Olson responded by saying that Pakistan must be convinced of an enduring U.S. engagement in the region.

"The great fear among many in the region, I certainly heard this from my Afghan friends when I was serving there, and I think it is true in Pakistan, as well - is that the international community will repeat the experience of 1989 to 1992, when, having accomplished the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the international community turned away and disengaged."

Committee Chairman Kerry predicted that Olson and Cunningham will be confirmed to their new diplomatic posts. In a rare moment of levity in an otherwise somber hearing, he noted that envoys who succeed at challenging posts usually are rewarded with even more difficult assignments.

Top Afghan General: Taliban Defeat Would Take Less Than A Year
A top Afghan general tells Magsie Hamilton Little that the Taliban could be defeated in less than a year.
The Daily Beast By Magsie Hamilton Little Jul 31, 2012
It is Friday—holy day—in Kabul. Near the checkpoint barrier a woman begs, her burka hiding her shame, but the only thing she receives is a spattering of dirt cast up by the passing trucks. The barrier lifts. Soldiers in dark green uniforms, rifles slung over their shoulders, wave me through. As I climb out of the car a thousand eyes burn into me, but I am careful not to return anyone’s gaze. Such brazen conduct from a foreign woman would be sure to get me into trouble.

Inside the house, in a marble room with a shiny new lift that wouldn’t look out of place in a Manhattan hotel, a man in a long gown greets me like a long-lost daughter. At six feet tall, he towers a good seven inches above me. I feel my limbs wobble—his reputation is nearly as fearsome as his bushy moustache. He is General Abdurashid Dostum, Afghanistan’s most powerful warlord, head of the Uzbek tribe, unofficial ruler of the north, and, as the government’s chief of staff, commander of an army of over 25,000 men.

It is only when I tell myself I have nothing to fear that I remember the rumors that make your stomach turn and heart pound, such as the one about how, at Dostum’s command, women had been raped and their breasts cut off before they were killed during the siege of Kabul in 1991. Or the one that told how Dostum ordered 2,000 Taliban prisoners to be asphyxiated in metal shipping containers and left to rot in the desert a few years earlier. Or how he treated his prisoners—tying them to the muzzles of cannons before firing them into the air. Naturally, the General has always denied such stories.

I know from experience how genial a host he is, having encountered him on my many previous visits to Afghanistan. A donation of books from my charity to his children’s foundation is a wonderful excuse for a get together to talk politics.

As we sit down to tea, the General is unequivocal about the problems facing Afghanistan in the light of the withdrawal of foreign troops; David Cameron has said he wants to withdraw all combat troops by 2014.

What does the General think of the timing? “Most Afghans believe it is too soon,” he says fearing the country might disintegrate into chaos. I put it to him the comments I have heard from his own soldiers making up part of the Afghan army, who complain that their equipment is inadequate. A common complaint is that the foreign armies are fitted out well (although some back home may beg to differ) whereas the Afghan army has their cast-offs. Their boots are falling apart, their helmets have holes.

Dostum is nodding gravely. “We are not ungrateful,” he insists, “but if you commit to any form of assistance, you must do it properly. You have a duty to do a good job.”

It is not just the poor equipment that leaves the Afghan army feeling despondent for the future security of their country. Many talk of a general lack of respect fueled by events, however accidental or isolated, such as the Koran burnings this February—when US soldiers set alight religious texts—or tales of soldiers urinating on dead bodies. Such occurrences have turned many Afghans against those same foreign forces trying to help them.

“Why come here and insult our culture?” says Dostum. “Such events have only served to create an atmosphere of mistrust and anger. New recruits to the Afghan army have to be watched closely in case they are Taliban spies. Acts of disrespect from US troops only serve to strengthen the position of the Taliban and will have made it harder to work out a peaceful solution.”

***
I had first come to Afghanistan after witnessing the bus bombing in London’s Tavistock Square on 7 July 2005. Having studied Islamic history at university, my rose-tinted world of Persian miniatures and Sufi poetry had been shattered by the first-hand experience of Islamic terrorism. To my mind, there were now big questions to be asked—and I wanted answers. Against the advice of friends and family, I packed my bags and bought a plane ticket to Kabul.

Luckily, the Afghans I met took pity on me. I was, of course, a woman; I was an infidel; and I was alone. My first time I stayed among the locals, venturing into the bazaars unchallenged, often donning a burka. Having expected the worst, I found the Afghans proud and strong, as kind as they were canny, and with a nobility that seemed to me to have been all too often lost in our own society. The generosity I had received from those who owned little more than the clothes they stood up in had moved me beyond words.

I had subsequently returned to Britain armed with an entirely new set of questions about the nature of terrorism, the war, and the cultural and religious divisions between our societies, along with a sense of responsibility. I wanted to do something that would help the Afghans that was peaceful and positive. Education was at the heart of what was needed for the long-term regeneration of Afghanistan. However, over 50 percent of the country’s children didn’t go to school at all and reading materials were a scarcity. So I set up a small charity printing books in Kabul for children with little or no access to schooling.

“Tell your government that the Taliban amount to no more than around 9,000 individuals. We know who they are and where to find them.”

During that initial visit—and in my subsequent trips to the country—I have encountered drug dealers, feudal chiefs and Taliban sympathisers, men of influence whose track records are as murky as the toxic waters of Lake Quargha. In a country where corruption is so endemic it is said to be part of the constitution, I never once batted an eyelid. After all, no one else did.

So does the General believe the Taliban can ever be defeated? “Tell your government,” he roars, letting out a great belly laugh, moustache bristling, “that the Taliban amount to no more than around 9,000 individuals. We know who they are and where to find them. Given the order, I estimate it would take less than a year to destroy their ringleaders. I have said this on many occasions.”

Dostum’s despondency at the current leadership is surprising given that he helped bring President Karzai to power in the first place, backing him in the last elections. “After the troops withdraw, his days will be numbered,” he shrugs. “In Afghanistan we say he is half-Afghan, half-American because he spends so much time in that country and even owns businesses there.”

I hesitate to ask the General his view of what he thinks will happen to the rights of Afghan women in the future, especially given his own alleged track record.

Many women have told me how scared they are of the return to a Taliban-styled government, I say. Women are concerned Karzai will seek peace at any price, and if that means kowtowing to the Taliban on women’s rights, they will do so. “To ensure progress is made on all fronts, Afghan and US leaders must ensure women are actively involved in a settlement that protects the rights accorded to them in recent years.”

His reassurances offer some comfort, but the fact is that Afghanistan remains a very hard place to live as a woman. Despite incremental improvements following the US invasion that brought in new laws protecting women’s rights, oppression is still rife, particularly in the south. It is estimated that 87 percent of women suffer violence at home, and medical care is so poor that one woman dies every half-hour in childbirth.

On the way down in the lift, the sense of apprehension I might previously have felt has all but evaporated as I realize I have survived the meeting unscathed. I ask the General if he has any ideas for a future leader, a Jeffersonian figure who could build the brave new Afghanistan so many of us have been praying for. Is there such a person? Maybe he even plans to stand for office himself, I suggest almost playfully.

He shakes his head firmly. He does not want the job, but it comes as no surprise that he has someone else in mind.

It is no less than I would expect from Afghanistan’s greatest deal-maker. Let’s hope it will be his best deal yet.

Magsie Hamilton Little is the author of The Thing About Islam, which was published by Max Press in February.

For inquiries, please contact The Daily Beast at editorial@thedailybeast.com.

'There Are No Buyers' -- Kabul's Housing Boom Goes Bust Amid Uncertainty
July 31, 2012 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty By Frud Bezhan
KABUL -- Billions of dollars in foreign aid and lucrative reconstruction contracts fueled a housing boom in Kabul for much of the past decade. But the high-rises and pricey mansions that now dot the smoggy skyline belie fears that the Afghan capital is headed for a crash.

The high-end real-estate market -- propped up by wealthy Afghan traders, foreign embassies, and international organizations that jumped in to buy or rent properties -- can hardly be described as robust today.

Kabul realtor Abdul Sami Mirza made a modest fortune selling and renting prime housing in Kabul's affluent Karte-Seh district. But those days are over, he says.

"There are no buyers. They've all disappeared," he says. "The political situation is bad, so people don't have the courage to buy. [Last year] the market was very good. But then the political situation badly affected those looking to buy or sell their homes. Many homeowners are going back overseas and leaving Afghanistan altogether."

The catalyst, Mirza says, is fear.

As tens of thousands of NATO-led coalition forces prepare for a major drawdown in 2014, uncertainty about future security and the country's heavy reliance on foreign aid have sparked an exodus. Demand and housing prices have plummeted by as much as 50 percent in wealthy neighborhoods occupied by Afghan businessman and foreign workers.

Just 12 months ago, Mirza provides as an example, he rented out a large house in Karte-Seh on around 240 square meters of land for around $21,000 a month. But when the lease expired and the British nongovernmental organization that used it as a guesthouse and office left the country, he was stuck with an unrentable property. Even though he has slashed the rental price to $9,000 a month, Mirza laments, he has still been unable to find a tenant.

'No Money In The City'

Abdul Hamid, an Afghan businessman, says he moved from his home in southern Ghazni Province to Kabul five years ago in the middle of the housing boom. Hamid, who says he went on to build dozens of houses, reveals that he is now heavily in debt and will leave the country as soon as he sells his remaining properties.

"Every night, we contemplate whether to stay in Afghanistan. I'm selling my properties because of the economy. Every day people are taking losses on their investments," Hamid says. "There are no jobs, and there's no money in the city. In the past, people trusted the housing market, but not anymore. People are tight-fisted with their money and think about what will happen tomorrow."

It's not for lack of demand. In fact, demand for low- and middle-income properties has never been higher in Kabul.

The lack of affordable housing revealed itself as a pressing social problem in recent years when Kabul's population exploded as rural Afghans headed to the capital in search of work. Inflated rental and buying costs meant that many ordinary people in Kabul, whose population rose from 1 million a decade ago to more than 5 million today, were left with few options to keep a roof over their heads.

Thousands erected illegal dwellings on government land. Others constructed mud houses resting precariously on slopes outside Kabul. The most disadvantaged sought shelter in slums and makeshift camps, where they have little access to water or electricity.

They never benefited from the city's previous housing construction efforts, seeing them as catering to the wealthy. And even as they see lucrative properties being vacated, landlords are still looking to maintain prices at levels that are well beyond the average Afghans' reach.

Dependant On Outsiders

Thomas Ruttig, co-director of the Afghanistan Analysts Network, an independent research organization in Kabul, says foreign aid and the forming of a "military and contracting economy" lured many Afghan expatriates and wealthy entrepreneurs back to the country.

That environment lifted many sectors, including housing, to unnatural highs and led to an unbalanced economy, Ruttig explains.

Afghanistan's weak position made it nearly entirely dependant on outsiders. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that foreign aid accounted for 97 percent of Afghanistan's entire gross domestic product (GDP) in 2010.

How U.S.-Iran Tensions Are Tied To Afghanistan
NPR By Sean Carberry July 31, 2012
To the United States, Iran is a pariah state. To Afghanistan, Iran is a powerful neighbor that could help promote development and stability, and that puts U.S. foreign policy in conflict. On one hand, Washington is looking for every opportunity to contain Tehran. But, if Iran chooses to help achieve the American goal of peace and stability in Afghanistan, the U.S. might have to turn a blind eye.

RENEE MONTAGNE, HOST:

In the eyes of the U.S., Iran is a pariah state. To Afghanistan, Iran is a powerful neighbor, which can be both good and bad. Iran and the U.S. do have some shared interests in Afghanistan, but the tension between the Washington and Tehran makes Afghan officials uneasy.

NPR's Sean Carberry traveled to Herat Province, along the Afghan border with Iran, and filed this report on a complicated relationship.

(SOUNDBITE OF TRAFFIC)

SEAN CARBERRY, BYLINE: Herat Province, which borders Iran, is one of the more stable and vibrant provinces in Afghanistan. The pine tree-lined streets of Herat City are packed with shops like the one owned by Seif Huddein.

SEIF HUDDEIN: (Foreign language spoken)

CARBERRY: The 26-year old has run this store for two years. He sells kitchenware, toys and other trinkets. Like many people in western Afghanistan, he spent time in exile in Iran. He says that Iran has done a few things to help Afghanistan since the Taliban fell.

HUDDEIN: (Through Translator) Sixty percent of the electricity in Herat comes from Iran, and Iran paved 120 kilometers of road from the border to Herat City. The people are happy about the good works Iran has done here, but the people know that Iran is not a good country. The owner of the shop next door agrees.

ABDUL MALIK: (Speaking foreign language)

CARBERRY: Abdul Malik says the Iranian government looks down on Afghans and treats them badly, especially the two million refugees still in Iran.

ABDUL-QAIUM SAJJADI: (Speaking foreign language)

CARBERRY: Abdul-Qaium Sajjadi is a member of the Afghan parliament. He alleges Iran is dumping cheap goods into Afghanistan in an effort to undermine local manufacturers and the economy. He says this is in stark contrast to Iran's public statements of support for Afghanistan. Sajjadi and others say Iran is playing a variety of games that contradict its official line.

KATE CLARK: They certainly continue to fund senior members of the government.

CARBERRY: Kate Clark is the senior analyst with the Afghan Analysts Network, a think tank in Kabul.

CLARK: The president's former chief of staff came back with millions of dollars stuffed into plastic bags, and when asked about it, President Karzai said well, why not.

CARBERRY: U.S. and Afghan officials say Tehran also tried to buy votes in the Afghan parliament recently, against the strategic partnership agreement between Kabul and the U.S. In a snub that's a source of pride among many Afghans, most lawmakers pocketed the cash and still voted for the agreement. Kate Clark says Iran has even sought to buy influence with the Taliban.

CLARK: There shouldn't be good relations between Taliban and the Iranians. The Taliban are militant Sunnis. The Iranian government is militant Shia, but there is a shared interest in enmity with the Americans.

CARBERRY: U.S. officials assert that Iran's top policy objectives in Afghanistan are to drive out the U.S. and ensure there's a pro-Iranian regime here. But one official who spoke anonymously says Iran fails to recognize that most Afghans, even the sizeable Shia community, don't like the Iranian regime. Still, the Afghan government continues to strike a conciliatory tone.

JANAN MOSAZAI: We have no alternative, but to be supportive, cooperative, and neighbors to one another.

CARBERRY: Janan Mosazai is the spokesman for Afghanistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

MOSAZAI: What we have accomplished over the past ten years, so far, is this balance. And we have managed to do that with understanding from both sides, both on the Iranian side and from the American side.

CARBERRY: Mosazai says Kabul sees the potential for large-scale investment from Iran, in the construction, mining, agriculture, and other sectors, all of which are critical for Afghanistan's future. The U.S. recognizes that Afghanistan does need humanitarian and economic support from Iran, but the tension between Washington and Tehran could cause more problems for Kabul, says Kate Clark.

CLARK: The bad Iranian-American relationship actually makes Afghanistan vulnerable, if that relationship gets so bad that Iran feels it has to use asymmetric warfare to get back at America.

SAJJADI: (Speaking foreign language)

CARBERRY: Lawmaker Abdul-Qaium Sajjadi and other officials fear Iran might take punitive action, such as expelling the Afghan refugees. So Kabul continues to ask Tehran and Washington to take their fight outside. Sean Carberry, NPR News, Kabul.

Tehran Builds on Outreach to Taliban
Wall Street Journal By MARIA ABI-HABIB July 31, 2012
KABUL - Iran has allowed the Taliban to open an office in eastern Iran and discussed providing them with surface-to-air missiles, ramping up the potential for cooperation with the insurgents, according to senior Afghan and Western officials.

Iran's shift came after the U.S. and Afghanistan sealed a long-term partnership agreement in May, and in an effort to expand its options for retaliation should its nuclear facilities be attacked, the officials said.

Iran, a Shiite theocracy, wasn't friendly with the Sunni Taliban government ousted by the U.S. in 2001 and hasn't permitted an official Taliban presence in the country until now. But these days both sides "see America as the bigger enemy" a Western official in Kabul said.

"Iran is willing to put aside ideology and put aside deeply held religious valuesfor their ultimate goal: accelerating the departure of U.S. forces from Afghanistan," the official said.

The Iranian Embassy in Kabul and consulate in Herat, in western Afghanistan near the border with Iran, didn't respond to requests for comment.

A member of the Taliban's leadership council, the Quetta Shura, set up an office in the eastern Iranian city of Zahedan in late May, according to a senior Western diplomat in Kabul and a senior Afghan official. Zahedan sits near the borders with Pakistan and Afghanistan and on an easy transit route from the Pakistani city of Quetta, where the Taliban leadership is based.

The office is intended to allow Iran to coordinate with the Taliban against the U.S., the officials said.

In intercepted communications in early July, members of the Quds Force, a special unit of Iran's Revolutionary Guard, discussed plans to send surface-to-air missiles to insurgents in Afghanistan, according to the Western official. There is no information that Iran has delivered such missiles to the insurgents, Western officials said.

A U.S. decision to supply such missiles to the mujahedeen in the 1980s proved a game changer during the Soviet occupation, precipitating a Soviet withdrawal.

The U.S. has committed to withdraw most of its troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, but will maintain bases, mostly for special forces, after that.

The possible introduction of surface-to-air missiles should be seen as Iran's contingency planning if its nuclear facilities are attacked by Israel or America, coalition officials say. The Obama administration has described such a strike as an option if Iran proceeds with nuclear weapons production; Iran says its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes.

The dozens of U.S. bases in Afghanistan are on Iran's doorstep, and would be the most effective way for Iran to strike back if it is attacked first, officials say.

"Something significant would have to changea strike against the home nation," for Iran to introduce surface-to-air missiles, a senior coalition military official in Kabul said. "Then, red lines will be crossed and things will probably change."

The official said the Iranians continue to provide "low-level lethal support" and training in Iran to the insurgency, but hold back from supplying "signature weapons" such as the explosively-formed penetrator, or EFP, mines that were widely used by pro-Iranian insurgents against U.S. troops in Iraq. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul declined to comment.

The increase in Iranian support for the Taliban comes after Tehran failed in its campaign to scuttle the U.S.-Afghan agreement in May, which establishes long-term U.S. military presence here post-2014.

Iran's ambassador to Kabul at the time urged Afghan lawmakers to vote against the agreement, and threatened economic reprisals such as the expulsion of millions of Afghans working in Iran if they didn't. The warning caused a public uproar in Afghanistan. Both houses of parliament proceeded to ratify the pact, and the Iranian ambassador was recalled in a low point in relations between the two countries under Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

In June, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad escalated the issue, warning Mr. Karzai during a meeting at a regional conference in Beijing that Afghan civilians living around U.S. bases should be removed "for their own safety," according to senior Afghan officials familiar with the conversation.

Afghanistan's intelligence service in July said Iran was sending infiltrators into the country among the hundreds of Afghan refugees it deports every month, according to a Western military official who read the classified report. That coincides with what Western and Afghan officials say is increased Iranian surveillance of coalition military bases and U.S. government infrastructure in Afghanistan.

"Iran is the only neighboring country opposed to the Strategic Partnership Agreement," said a senior Afghan official close to Mr. Karzai. "Afghanistan is determined to have friendly and deep brotherly relations with Iran and this is our policy." —Yaroslav Trofimov and Ziaulhaq Sultani contributed to this article.

Write to Maria Abi-Habib at maria.habib@dowjones.com

Senators quiz Obama's nominees to top posts in Afghanistan and Pakistan
Richard Olson and James Cunningham, both currently serving in Kabul, defend US diplomatic policy and its financial costs
Guardian.co.uk By Chitrangada Choudhury Tuesday 31 July 2012
Barack Obama's nominee for US ambassador to Pakistan, Richard Olson, has pledged to prioritise action against the militant Haqqani network in his new role.

Olson, speaking at a Senate foreign relations committee hearing on Tuesday, acknowledged "relationship issues" between America and Pakistan, but said drone strikes would continue.

The remarks come on the eve of a visit to Washington by Pakistan's intelligence chief, who is likely to reiterate the demand that America end drone strikes on Pakistani soil in his meetings with the CIA.

The committee also heard James Cunningham, the president's nominee for the ambassador's post in Kabul, who will be the seventh US ambassador to Afghanistan in the past decade. Both diplomats currently serve in the US embassy in Kabul, and their new appointments require confirmation by the Senate.

During their testimonies, Cunningham and Olson stressed the progress America had made over the past years with both countries on counter-terrorism and the joint efforts that had put America close to "shutting down" al-Qaida. But committee members remained skeptical about the sustainability of the relationships and questioned the value of committing billions of taxpayer dollars in aid to the two countries amid increasing financial distress and budget deficits at home.

Senator Robert Menendez, Democrat from New Jersey, said that "the Afghan government was undoubtedly significantly corrupt" and America could not continue to commit $90bn or more without at least an expectation of greater transparency and efficiency. "We cannot provide open-ended support, when we face such enormous challenges at home" he said. "We have a responsibility because we went in there, but the Afghans also have a responsibility."

Robert Casey, Democrat from Pennsylvania, asked Olson what he would do as ambassador to get Pakistan to crack down on raw material supplies used in IEDs – which remain the leading killer of US troops. Bob Corker, Republican from Tennessee, wanted to know how Pakistan would "behave the way we want them to behave on things that are important to us", while accepting that "cutting off all aid to the country was not a good way to stay engaged."

The positions in Islamabad and Kabul are arguably the most complex foreign assignments for American diplomats, even as the sub-continent braces itself for an American troop withdrawal leading up to 2014. After over a decade of military presence and billions of dollars in aid, the area continues to suffer high casualties and political turmoil, with America's relationship with the two countries – in particular Pakistan – evoking mutual mistrust and frustration.

In response to a query by Corker as to which of the two assignments was more difficult, Cunningham said that it was impossible to rank them: "Both are challenging positions in challenging times."

Pir Zubair Shah, a fellow at the Council for Foreign Relations and a journalist from Waziristan – the epicenter of US drone strikes – said the US-Pakistan relationship in particular, was currently at its worst and unlikely to improve anytime soon, "given the inherent contradictions in the strategic goals of the two countries".

Shah said: "Pakistan will not ditch the Haqqani network, especially when the US has publicly announced that it will leave, and the endgame is so near. And if they do not close such sanctuaries, US drone strikes in turn will continue, which brings us back to square one.."

Why China Should Do More In Afghanistan
While nations like Japan pour money into development aid, Beijing has largely stayed on the sidelines.
The Diplomat By Jeffrey W. Hornung August 01, 2012
The drawdown of International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan after 2014 means the burden of maintaining and governing a modern state will fall on Kabul, complete with all the associated economic and political challenges. Never mind there are serious doubts the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) can meet the expected security challenges. Importantly, Kabul does not have the necessary funds to do all this. If there is any hope for sustained stability post-2014, Afghanistan is going to require foreign assistance.

Japan recently hosted the Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan where the focus was on securing $16 billion from international donors to ensure Afghanistan’s sustainable development for the remainder of the transition process and beyond. This was Japan’s second time hosting an international conference on Afghanistan assistance. It also remains the second largest donor to Afghanistan, after the United States.

Given that many think Japan is a declining power, it is difficult not to ask why Japan is so involved in Afghanistan.

Come to think of it, given all the talk about China’s rise, why has there not been a Beijing Conference?

The answer is leadership.

There is plenty of empirical chum to feed the Japan-is-a-declining-power thesis. Its economy grew at tepid rates over the past twenty years, allowing China to surpass it as the world’s second largest a few years back. Add to this a ballooning debt-to-GDP ratio (that ranks second globally) and a rapidly aging and shrinking population that places enormous stress on Japan’s social security system and tax base. The March 2011 disasters, which by some estimates cost of over $300 billion, pressured an already strained economy. With a political establishment unable to make the tough decisions to avoid economic ruin, it is hard not to believe Japan’s best days are behind it.

Yet, Tokyo remains deeply engaged in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development. It has hosted two international donor conferences to raise money for Afghanistan’s future. More importantly, since 2001, Japan has pledged billions in unilateral assistance directed toward governance, security, and reconstruction of which $4.051 billion has already provided. Japan’s aid has gone to support the training of the National Police; demobilizing former soldiers; reintegrating insurgents into society; providing education and medicine; and improving infrastructure, agriculture, and other basic needs.

Although Afghanistan’s instability arguably never has or will affect Japan’s security, it remains committed to Afghanistan’s future. Tokyo’s engagement is motivated by its desire to help Afghanistan overcome decades of suffering and assist in its reconstruction so as to prevent it from becoming a hotbed of terrorism. Tokyo chose to be involved, not out of fear or the promise of lucrative contracts, but out of the recognition that it needs to shoulder responsibility as a member of the international community.

Contrast this with China. China’s double-digit growth has fueled the country’s rapid development, military modernization, and programs that symbolize its re-entry onto the world stage, such as the Beijing Olympics. Yet, while economic growth promotes Beijing’s ambitious agenda, it has not translated into large sums of assistance to multilateral organizations or developing countries. Instead, China appears mercantilist, focusing on acquiring wealth and securing resources. Nowhere is this more apparent than Afghanistan. China’s primary form of assistance has been investment in energy and mineral resources. Symbolic of such investment is the deal to develop the Aynak cooper mine.

Compare this with Chinese assistance to Afghanistan’s development. Although it supports the anti-terrorist activities of ISAF and ANSF, it has not provided any direct military assistance nor contributed to the $4.1 billion fund established at the Chicago NATO summit to sustain the ANSF after 2014. Nor has Beijing provided any significant economic assistance. Between 2002 and 2011, Beijing contributed around $230 million to Afghanistan’s reconstruction. Last month, Chinese President Hu Jintao announced a further “selfless” $23 million for 2012. This is pocket change for a nearly $6 trillion economy that is rising to be the world’s next big power.

In some ways, China’s lack of engagement is understandable. After all, it has a record of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. It also has no record of deploying its military abroad to support the stability of another country. Yet, Afghanistan’s fate has a direct impact on China, which is why its halfhearted engagement is actually more surprising than understandable.

After ISAF leaves, there is a possibility Afghanistan could fall into a civil war. If the situation in Afghanistan worsens, China will become a victim. China’s main interest in Central Asia is regional security because it seeks to prevent the destabilization of Xinjiang Province, its largely Muslim region where Uighur separatists actively work to cede from China. As long as the Taliban operates in Afghanistan, there is possibility that they will provide a sanctuary for Xinjiang separatists, or worse, overt support. At the same time, heavy Chinese investments into Afghanistan mean that Beijing has a stake in ensuring stability because instability will pose significant risks to these investments. Together, there is no doubt that Beijing has a direct interest in a stable and prosperous Afghanistan.

It is well understood that without international help, there is little hope for a secure and stable Afghanistan. To avoid collapse, the international community has assumed a large role in promoting Afghanistan’s development and assisting the funding and training of ANSF. Although Japan faces minimal threats from the situation in Afghanistan, it is one of Afghanistan’s strongest supporters. As a neighbor with a direct interest in the security situation, China can no longer remain a free-riding observer to Afghanistan’s future. China has a lot to learn from Japan. Japan’s involvement in Afghanistan speaks to its willingness to lead in the international arena. What is more, it demonstrates what rich states can do for poorer ones, even when not directly threatened.

China is already a great power in many ways, but until it shifts its focus from “what’s in it for me,” to “what’s in it for them,” it will remain a country that few others will want to follow.

Jeffrey W. Hornung is an Associate Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, HI and an Adjunct Fellow with the Office of the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this article are solely his.

New Boldness From Militants Poses Risk to U.S.-Pakistan Ties
New York Times By DECLAN WALSH and ERIC SCHMITT July 30, 2012
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan - Grinning for the camera, the suicide bomber fondly patted his truckload of explosives. “We will defeat these crusader pigs as they have invaded our land,” he declared as he revved the engine.

The camera followed the truck to an American base in southern Afghanistan, where it exploded with a tangerine dust-framed fireball that punched a hole in the perimeter wall. Other suicide bombers leapt from a second vehicle and swarmed through the breach. The crackle and boom of violence filled the air.

The video, documenting a June 1 assault on Camp Salerno near the border with Pakistan, was released in the past week as a publicity blitz by the group behind the attack: the Haqqani network, a Taliban affiliate whose leaders shelter in Pakistan.

Even as the United States begins a large-scale troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Salerno attack, acknowledged at the time only in terse official statements, and others like it have cemented the Haqqani network’s standing as the most ominous threat to the fragile American-Pakistani relationship, officials from both countries say.

The two countries are just getting back on track, after months of grueling negotiations that finally reopened NATO supply routes through Pakistan. Pakistan’s spy chief, Lt. Gen. Zahir ul-Islam, is scheduled to arrive in Washington this week for talks with the Central Intelligence Agency, in an early sign of a new reconciliation.

But the relationship still has a tinderbox quality, riven by differences over C.I.A. drone strikes in Pakistan’s tribal belt, the Afghan war and, most contentiously, the Haqqani network. The arguments are well worn: American officials say the Pakistani military’s Inter-Services Intelligence spy agency is covertly aiding the insurgents; Pakistani officials deny the accusation and contend the Obama administration is deflecting attention from its own failings in Afghanistan.

But a new boldness from the Haqqanis that aims at mass American casualties, combined with simmering political tension, has reduced the room for ambiguity between the two countries. Inside the administration, it is a commonly held view that the United States is “one major attack” away from unilateral action against Pakistan — diplomatically or perhaps even militarily, one senior official said.

“If 50 U.S. troops were blown to smithereens by the Haqqanis, or they penetrated the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and killed several diplomats — that would be the game changer,” he said.

American officials recently considered what that could mean. Days after the Salerno attack, the White House held a series of interagency meetings to weigh its options in the event of a major success by the Haqqanis against American troops.

Salerno had come uncomfortably close. Although just two Americans were killed, the attackers had penetrated the defenses of a major base to within yards of a dining hall used by hundreds of soldiers.

The meetings yielded a list of about 30 possible responses, according to a senior official who was briefed on the deliberations — everything from withdrawing the Islamabad ambassador, to a flurry of intensified drone attacks on Haqqani targets in Pakistan’s tribal belt, to American or Afghan commando raids on Haqqani hide-outs in the same area.

“We looked at the A to Z of how to get the Pakistanis’ attention,” the official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity, as did other American and Pakistani officials interviewed about the issue.

Yet there were no easy answers. Officials concluded that most options ran the risk of setting off a wider conflict with Pakistan’s nuclear-armed military. “It came down to the fact that there wasn’t much we could do,” the official said. Other senior officials confirmed the broad details of his account; many noted that most contingency plans are never transformed into actions.

At the heart of the conundrum is the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, or ISI, and its new chief, General Islam.

He is a largely unknown quantity in Washington, and much of this week’s trip is likely to focus on relationship building with American officials, including the director of the C.I.A., David H. Petraeus. But the tone has already been set by Congress: in the past month, both the House and the Senate have passed bills that urge Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to designate the Haqqani network a “foreign terrorist organization.”

“The Haqqani network is engaged in a reign of terror,” said Representative Mike Rogers, a Michigan Republican who is chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. “Now is the time for action, not simply paperwork and talk.”

The Haqqanis’ formidable reputation comes from a series of “swarm” attacks that have struck at American efforts to ensure a smooth and public transition of power to President Hamid Karzai by the end of 2014. Since 2008, Haqqani suicide attackers have struck the Indian Embassy, five-star hotels and restaurants and, last September, the headquarters of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force and the American Embassy.

The headlines created by such violence are disproportionate to their military significance: Haqqani operations account for one-tenth of the attacks on ISAF troops, and perhaps 15 percent of casualties, senior American officials estimate. Other countries do not even consider the Haqqanis to be the most dangerous group sheltering in Pakistan, a mantle usually awarded to the more ideologically driven Lashkar-e-Taiba, which was behind the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India.

Yet their success is rooted in the sanctuary enjoyed by Haqqani leadership in North Waziristan, where, at the very least, they are unmolested by the Pakistani military.

That relationship stretches to the anti-Soviet resistance of the 1980s, when the ISI funneled C.I.A. money and weapons to Haqqani fighters. The Pakistani agency continued to send funds during the 1990s, according to a new report by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.

Today, the ISI admits that it maintains regular contact with the Haqqanis, but denies providing operational support. “Doesn’t the C.I.A. have contacts with the people it is fighting?” said a senior ISI official. “In intelligence work, you need to ingress to find out what the other side is doing.”

American and other Western officials, citing intelligence reports, say the ISI and the Haqqanis do more than just talk. Pakistani intelligence allows Haqqani operatives to run legitimate businesses in Pakistan, facilitates their travel to Persian Gulf states, and has continued to donate money. Senior Haqqani figures own houses in the capital, Islamabad, where their relatives live unmolested.

A Pakistani expert on organized crime, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said Said Jan ’Abd al-Salam, a Haqqani supporter listed as a terrorist financier by the American government, lived in Islamabad’s upmarket F7 neighborhood for periods of 2008 and 2009. A Western diplomat said he had seen credible reports that the group’s leader, Sirajuddin Haqqani, dined openly in a city center restaurant this year.

But, officials and some analysts caution, such links do not amount to ISI support for attacks on Americans. They may point to something more subtle: a containment policy that is devised to prevent Haqqani violence inside Pakistan, all the while providing a strategic card to help influence the future of Afghanistan.

“We think the Haqqani network has an ongoing relationship with the ISI,” a senior Obama administration official said. “But I am not convinced there is a command-and-control relationship between the ISI and those attacks.”

One difficulty in determining the truth is the fragmentary nature of Western intelligence: a mosaic of satellite images, intercepted phone calls and human intelligence. “It’s like on the other side of that door there’s a party going on,” said the senior administration official, pointing to his office door. “You’re trying to find out what’s going on by peeping through the keyhole, or holding a glass to the door. But you only get pieces.”

In many ways, the Haqqanis are their own masters. Although they pledge allegiance to the Afghan Taliban, they enjoy financial autonomy thanks to a tribal crime empire based on extortion, kidnapping and smuggling. They draw operational support from other groups sheltering in Waziristan, including Al Qaeda.

In that sense, several officials said, the ISI may be serving the Haqqani agenda more than the other way around. “Their interests are not always aligned,” said an American intelligence official who tracks the Haqqanis closely.

American efforts to kill Haqqani leaders with C.I.A. drone strikes in Waziristan and Afghanistan have met with little success, two senior officials said, partly because Sirajuddin Haqqani surrounds himself with civilians — often women and children — at his base in the town of Miram Shah.

The United States has long pressured Pakistan to attack the Haqqanis in North Waziristan, but the military says its forces are overstretched. “It’s not that we are unwilling to go against them; we just don’t have the resources,” the ISI official said.

But after the Salerno attack in June, the army chief, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, privately told American officials he would launch a three-phase military operation against the Haqqanis over the coming 12 months.

Most American officials, however, say they are not counting on that promise. One remarked with a sardonic touch, “This is the most delayed campaign in the history of modern warfare.”

Declan Walsh reported from Islamabad, and Eric Schmitt from Washington. Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud contributed reporting.

Unregulated Pharmacies Prompt Health Fears in Afghan Province
Authorities have little control over chemists’ shops in Uruzgan, undermining faith in the health sector.
IWPR By Ajmal Wesal 31 Jul 12
Afghanistan - Khair Mohammad may not be a qualified doctor, but he offers a wide range of treatments to whoever will pay. On a blanket laid out beside a road in Afghanistan’s Uruzgan province, the self-appointed pharmacist sells cures for everything from acne and depression to liver complaints.

Many of Mohammad’s customers in the provincial capital of Tarin Kowt are poor or illiterate. They do not have prescriptions from a doctor, and Mohammad, who cannot read or write, does not ask for them.

“We bring these medicines from Kandahar to Tarin Kowt,” he said. “The good thing is that no one demands money from us for selling them, or from selling them from this spot.”

Mohammad’s pills enable him to make a living in a particularly isolated and impoverished province in central Afghanistan, where drugs and health professionals are often in short supply. (See Healthcare Crisis in Central Afghan District.)

But he is part of a largely unregulated pharmaceutical trade which some people fear is carries high risks. Sources in Uruzgan say anyone can sell medication, regardless of their level of medical training, or whether the drugs have expired.

Afghanistan imports medicines from countries including Iran, China, Pakistan and India. Regulation is slack, the country’s borders are notoriously porous, and some import companies are unlicensed. This creates ideal conditions for counterfeit or low-quality drugs to enter the market.

Dr Sayed Agha Miakhel, head of Uruzgan’s provincial public health department, said there was little he could do to rein in the free-wheeling pharmaceutical trade.

His officials inspect the town’s 52 formal pharmacies every six months looking for low-quality or expired medication, but when it comes to enforcement they have few options.

In 2009, Miakhel’s department closed down four pharmacies for operating without licences, but they quickly reopened thanks to support from influential local figures.

“I could not take on these four [pharmacists] because they are all backed by local commanders, lawmakers and senators,” he said. “For this reason, controlling pharmacies and medical check-up centres in this city is pointless.”

Alongside the pharmacies, some 20 to 30 street vendors like Mohammad sell medication around Tarin Kowt.

The lack of regulation has undermined public confidence in the health sector. Residents of Chura, Dehrawud, Charchino and Chanartu districts, as well as Tarin Kowt, say they know of people killed by low-quality or expired medicines.

They include Qasem, a 33-year-old who repairs radios at an electrical store in Tarin Kowt, who lost his baby daughter Samina in December 2011.

The causes of Samina’s death are unclear. The infant appeared to be feeling faint, which her relatives believe may have been caused by a coal or gas heater. After they took her to the provincial hospital she was given an injection. According to Qasem, her condition then declined rapidly.

“As soon as the doctor injected her, I noticed that she became increasingly faint hour by hour, so that her eyes were closing,” he recalled.

It is unclear what the syringe contained, but Samina’s relatives claim that one doctor subsequently looked at the packaging, hit his forehead and exclaimed that the medication had expired.

Samina’s family also said that she was prescribed drugs for malaria and typhoid worth about four US dollars, but alleged that when they collected them from the pharmacy, they too had expired.

“While I was planning to take Samina to another doctor the next day, she stopped breathing and died,” Qasem said.

Qasem raised his daughter’s death with the pharmacist who sold the medicines, who denied any responsibility. At the provincial hospital, doctors denied injecting drugs that had passed their expiry date, and said Samina could have died from complications relating to malaria.

Whatever caused the child’s death, officials acknowledge that public health in Uruzgan leaves much to be desired.

In the absence of state support, much of the health work in the province is conducted by the non-governmental group Afghan Health and Development Services, Miakhel said.

“The truth is that public health ministry has forgotten Uruzgan because it is a mountainous, underdeveloped province,” he said. “They have not supported it. Without money, people can do nothing.”

The health and sanitation problems even appear to have reached the provincial public health department.

In a room opposite Miakhel’s office, which apparently belonged to another senior colleague, the table tops were thick with dust, while dirty plates could be seen on a table in the corner.

A visiting reporter had to cover his nose due to the overwhelmingly pungent smell that wafted from the room into the corridor.

Ajmal Wesal is an IWPR-trained journalist in Uruzgan province, Afghanistan.

This report was produced as part of the Afghan Critical Mass Media Reporting in Uruzgan and Nangarhar project, and is also published on the Afghan Centre for Investigative Journalism website which IWPR has set up locally.


www.afghanistannewscenter.com