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Taliban claim responsibility for downing helicopter in Afghanistan
By the CNN Wire Staff April 20, 2012
(CNN) -- The Taliban claimed responsibility Friday for downing a Black Hawk helicopter in southern Afghanistan.
"Yesterday (Thursday) evening Taliban fighters shot down a helicopter and killed all its passengers in Khanashen Dewalak area near Garmsir, southern Helmand province," a Taliban spokesman wrote to CNN.
The helicopter's four crew members, all of them American, are believed to be dead, a U.S. military official said.
The copter was flying in bad weather, the official said Thursday. "We cannot yet rule out enemy action," the official said.
Fatal helicopter crashes involving members of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force are not unprecedented in Afghanistan, with some of the aircraft brought down by enemy fire while others crashed for mechanical reasons.
The single deadliest loss for U.S. troops since the Afghan war began in late 2001 happened in August when 30 U.S. service members died as a helicopter carrying them went down while they were reinforcing other troops, officials said. Seven Afghan troops died in that same crash.
A U.S. military official said then that insurgents were believed to have shot down the CH-47 Chinook. The Taliban claimed that militants downed the helicopter with a rocket-propelled grenade.
Last month, 12 people died when a helicopter crashed in Afghanistan's capital of Kabul. There was no reported "insurgent activity in the area" at the time, said Capt. David Yaryar, a spokesman for the NATO-led force.
NATO head calls on China, Russia to help fund Afghan forces
Sebastian Moffett and Justyna Pawlak, Reuters April 20, 2012
BRUSSELS (Reuters) - The head of NATO called on China and Russia on Thursday to help fund Afghan security after 2014, as the alliance tries to rally contributions from a wider range of sources before most foreign combat troops pull out of Afghanistan.
NATO estimates that the annual cost of maintaining Afghan security forces will be some $4 billion (2.5 billion pounds), and the United States is hoping for contributions worth 1 billion euros ($1.3 billion) from other NATO allies and partners. But so far only Britain has publicly pledged an actual amount of cash, $110 million a year.
"We would welcome financial contributions from Russia, China and other countries to ensure a strong sustainable Afghan security force beyond 2014," Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen told a news conference in Brussels, where NATO foreign and defence ministers were meeting to prepare for a summit next month in Chicago.
The United States and NATO, keen to douse fears Afghanistan could face renewed civil war when foreign troops pull out, want to use the summit to demonstrate a long-term commitment to Afghan stability that will endure well after 2014.
China has significant economic stakes in Afghanistan and is also a close ally of neighbouring Pakistan, making it potentially a strong partner in helping to foster stability.
With the world's biggest foreign exchange reserves, it is also better placed than many western countries struggling with economic downturn to help pay for stability in Afghanistan.
Analysts have suggested, however, that China would be wary of becoming too sucked in to problems in Afghanistan, and would not want to be seen to taking sides if this were to make it a target for Islamist militants.
"The Chinese officials I have asked about financing Afghan security forces have been sceptical, saying they'd rather provide support on the civilian and economic side," said Andrew Small at The German Marshall Fund of the United States.
On Thursday, NATO ministers met Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and tried to narrow differences with Russia over Syria, Afghanistan and missile defence - all areas where NATO allies would like Russian support to promote stability.
Lavrov did not respond at the meeting to Rasmussen's request for financial help, according to a western diplomat familiar with the talks.
But Russia's cooperation with western troops in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is expected to expand soon. Currently Russia allows ISAF to use a rail route through Russian territory to transport equipment.
Rasmussen said Russia had offered the use of a new transit route, which will allow ISAF to send supplies in and out of Afghanistan using both the Russian rail network and air transport. The route is expected to pass through the town of Ulyanovsk, said two officials, one in Russia and one in Brussels.
The United States and its allies have been building up alternative routes in and out of Afghanistan, reducing its dependence on Pakistan, which suspended supply routes after a NATO cross-border air attack in November killed 24 Pakistani soldiers.
However, despite the progress on expanding supply routes through Russia, President-elect Vladimir Putin is likely to turn down an invitation from NATO to attend the Chicago summit.
"I have talked with President-elect Putin, and we agreed that due to a very busy domestic political calendar in Russia, just a few weeks after his inauguration as a new president of Russia, it's not possible and not practical also to have a NATO-Russia Summit meeting in Chicago," Rasmussen said.
Russian diplomats have said Putin was unlikely to attend in the absence of an agreement bridging deep differences over U.S. and NATO plans for a European anti-missile shield.
Lavrov repeated complaints over the missile defence system, which Russia says risks tipping the balance of nuclear power between itself and the United States in NATO'S favour. NATO says the shield is meant to protect against a potential Iranian threat and not against Russia.
"We need clear guarantees that it is not targeted against us," Lavrov said.
(Additional reporting By Arshad Mohammed; Editing by Myra MacDonald)
Russia concerned over US plans to keep Afghan bases
By Indo Asian News Service | IANS India Private Limited
Brussels, April 20 (IANS/RIA Novosti) Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has expressed concern over US plans to keep its military contingent in Afghanistan after the pullout of international troops in 2014.
Lavrov also said Moscow was worried about the drug and terrorism situation in Afghanistan after the pullout.
"We do not understand such (US) plans to maintain a presence, we have questions and we would like to get answers," Lavrov said following a foreign ministerial meeting of the Russia-NATO Council in Brussels.
He said the international contingent stayed in Afghanistan under a UN Security Council mandate.
"So long as the Afghan side is unable to provide security in the country, any artificial deadlines for troops' withdrawal do not seem quite correct. But when the UN Security Council mandate expires, there will be no reason for a foreign presence in Afghanistan and the region," he said.
The Russian minister expressed concern about the persisting threat of terrorism and drug trafficking from Afghanistan.
"Unfortunately, despite all the international efforts, the threat of terrorism and drug trafficking from Afghanistan persists," he said.
Russia "is concerned how things are going to develop after the International Security Assistance Force is pulled out of Afghanistan".
According to Russia's federal drug control watchdog, heroin production in Afghanistan rose 40-fold in the past decade, and opium poppy plantations cover 130,000 hectares in the Central Asian country.
According to the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Taliban makes $150 million from drug production annually and total drug profits amounted to $4 billion.
--IANS/RIA Novosti
Ending the politicisation of Afghan security forces
Well-equipped security forces have been derailed by politics and a lack of incentives, says author.
Aljazeera By Amrullah Saleh, Amrullah Saleh, a former Afghan intelligence chief, is an opposition leader. 19 Apr 2012
Kabul, Afghanistan - A decadent leadership and a disciplined force - can it be?
The aftermath of every deadly Taliban attack brings voices that condemn the Taliban and praise the Afghan security forces. And some muster up the courage to criticise the political leadership and the government of the country.
Have the Afghan national security forces reached a level of competency where we can trust their skills and abilities? To understand the answer to this, we need to look at three areas: the relationship between the political leadership and the security forces, the capabilities of the forces, and the role these forces will play in the future.
The upper and middle echelons of Afghan forces are filled by people who have not risen to their promotions in a democratic system. They are not "secu-crats": Most of them have been placed in their posts through political consultations and personal connections. This directly affects the loyalty and inspiration of the officers at different levels.
When the president ventures out to pay a visit to a unit of the national police, national army, or intelligence, his personal security detail, called the President Protection Service (PPS), disarms everyone in advance. It sends the message that the only loyal unit to the president and the system is the PPS, comprised of 750 people who guard and protect him.
By infiltrating the ranks of Afghan army and police, the Taliban have brought about unfortunate incidents. But the president’s mistrust of Afghan forces goes back much earlier.
In the early years of the new government, mistrust was at such a high level that for up to six years, an American company named DynCorp was responsible for the president’s security. Now, foreign mentors operate in the PPS who, in addition to coordinating with NATO forces, ensure discipline in the ranks and file of the unit. Their influence is clear on the behaviour of the president’s bodyguards, who often act insensitively to Afghan cultural values.
In the army units, too, prejudiced views stemming from ethnic sensitivities exist as many officers turn to seeking ethnic, political, or personal sanctuaries for protection against political meddling.
The political relations with the Afghan police are more complex than the Afghan army. The police were far from international attention until 2007, when most of the aid was going to the army. For this reason, and many others, the influence of political figures in the police is greater, and continues to increase.
Before Zarar Ahmad Muqbel’s sacking as minister of interior, Karzai had lost faith in him and his abilities. In security meetings, he would invite General Ali Shah Paktiawal, the then-CID at Kabul police department, along with the minister. It was an odd mix that did not even befit the management of partisan or guerrilla forces. On occasions, Paktiawal would reject the words of Muqbel or explain the issue in a completely different way. When police forces understand that their minister and one of his managers are not on the same level, it’s clear that a certain kind of chaos will reign.
Ordinary citizens in the ranks of Afghan forces are, to a remarkable extent, sheltered from the personal and ethnic tension. But some of them are certainly influenced by the mentality of high-ranking officers who have ethnic or regional leanings.
Cost of interference
It is possible that one day young officers, who are devoid of ethnic or regional leanings and graduates of institutes of higher education, will enter the security forces and become a beacon of hope for the Afghan people. But this scenario remains just a possibility, and depends entirely on whether there will be an end to the politicisation of our security institutions.
Interference in the management of the security forces, be it in the upper or lower levels, slows their growth rate, increases their expenses, and strikes a major blow to their morale. The nepotistic appointment of officers in upper and middle echelons of the security force will at best protect narrow interests instead of national ones.
With the intelligence force, the situation is also not much different. In this institution, pockets loyal to President Karzai, his vice presidents, provincial leaders and those protected by Americans are distinctly visible.
This problem had been minimized in previous years, but in Karzai’s second term, which has been characterised by the distribution of state resources to his allies, the intelligence force have also been affected.
Without corruption and decadence at the leadership level, the strengthening of the ranks and the creation a strong incentive for fighting negative trends are not difficult tasks.
Idealism and belief in values are crucial to strengthening the ranks. But when the security forces witness the decay of values at the leadership level, the incentive for sacrifice plummets. The effectiveness of the force declines. And in such situations ethnic and regional divides, personal connections, and mistrust creep in.
Continuing the current situation, in which the leadership lacks vision and is corrupt in certain areas, will corrupt the forces to a tragic extent, or will make the relationship between political leadership and security forces one of deceit, lies, and narrow interest, the results of which will be felt deeply by the Afghan people.
Another sign of this decaying relationship is the negative competition and accusations. These days, government institutions attack each other through the media. It doesn’t take more than a brief observation of the media to see a clear lack of coordination.
Capability of the forces:
In the context of threat assessments for Afghanistan, the majority of the experts believe that Afghan security forces will not be faced with the invasion of foreign armies. And if they do face an invasion, they will never be able to stand their ground due to weak economic base of the country.
Instead, neighbouring countries will try to train and equip forces that will fight for them and thereby destabilise the situation in Afghanistan. These countries will exploit the political turmoil, poverty, ethnic divides, the porous borders, and most importantly the weakness of our national identity to rally our own citizens against the state on different pretexts. This scenario is the foundation for the Afghan security doctrine - how would we deal with this kind of a threat? With what mechanisms, systems, and firepower?
The structure, equipment, and training given to the Afghan security forces have provided them with the capability to move quickly and react swiftly. Threat assessment, target evaluation, coordination and execution of operations all fall within the current capabilities and skills of the forces.
Some of the world’s military and security thinkers, including the late Ahmad Shah Massoud (the anti-Soviet resistance leader), believed that poor countries surrounded by hostile or bad neighbours needed a tripartite formula: a strong motivation, followed by a capable and disciplined leadership, and then by resources.
For poor countries, a resource-only based motivation, resource-based leadership and organisation is not sustainable. These countries will always lack sufficient defence and security resources, and will always try to protect their macro security through alliance with regional or global powers.
The resources at the service of the Afghan forces are sufficient for the total or partial diffusion of defined threats, but here the formula is implemented backwards. The emphasis has been on equipping the forces, not on strengthening their non-materialistic motivation.
Excessive dependence on resources, strengthening organisation and management through resources, and eventually creating incentives through financial resources is the opposite of what has proven effective in history.
The fact that the existing method is dependent on foreign aid - and every day the leadership of security forces complains of shortage or lack of resources - shows the weakness from both a practical and academic lens.
The aid from US and the west to Afghan security forces is uncertain and short-term. This aid is dependent on the donor country’s national interests rather than the national need of Afghanistan. Coincidentally, we share a common enemy with the western world, but this situation will change. Therefore, the insistence of the Afghan military and security leadership on increasing the quantity is flawed. Not only is a foreign aid dependent military and security force hard to trust, but it also creates constant uncertainty as the situation changes with the wiles of the donor.
Role of the forces in political shifts
The number of professionals and non-professionals who occupy leadership positions in Afghan security forces for political and nepotistic reasons is over 90 per cent.
It will not be possible to change this percentage in the next two years before the next elections are held. In the meantime, the retirement of the older officers also are delayed on ethnic or political basis.
Considering this issue, the possibility of interference by security forces in politics in future years is very likely.
Large-scale interference that could lead to a coup d’etat is less likely, first because the security forces are divided in their political views and leanings, and secondly because the leadership at different levels are dependent and conscious of western aid.
But as the previous election showed, certain police and army units, through soft intimidation and influence in various parts of the country, brought local leaders to support the candidates of their choice. The appointments of the past two years point to the possibility of this recurring, in a more organised way.
The dream situation would be that the security forces defend the system in its entirety, which includes the legal opposition. But we have never gotten close to our dreams. The security forces spend 12 times more than Afghanistan’s entire income. When such resources are given to vulnerable institutions, it will surely be tempting to use it for political influence.
Therefore, the solution will put together an oversight commission for monitoring the neutrality of the security forces before any election. Even now, institutions that have the ability to tap phones listen to the conversations of political figures under the pretext of “special operations”. For a dictatorship, that is natural. But we speak of an infant democracy built on the blood of the people - we shouldn’t let the few national resources be used for protecting the narrow interest of a clique.
A large number of officers from our national security forces, especially those deeply rooted in the country and not returnees from exile or foreign institutions, know that involvement of the military in politics has been tragic for Afghanistan. And some in these years, through visits to prosperous countries, have been acquainted with soft demeanor and nationalistic behavior of those countries’ military forces. They have noticed that the dignity of the security forces is in defending national rule, not in defending small political circles.
Possibly, getting acquainted with new methods has influenced the outlook of the Afghan officers. The officers are from this land, this country. But just hoping for a good outlook on their behalf is not sufficient. Hope is not something solid and measurable. We need to create mechanisms so they are not turned into pawns. Not only is the creation of these mechanisms important for the transparency of our politics, but also for the durability, dignity, and honor of the Afghan security forces.
Amrullah Saleh was the head of Afghanistan's intelligence agency from 2004 until 2010. He is currently the leader of an opposite movement.
A version of this article first appeared in Dar/Farsi, on the BBC website.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
Perceptions of Afghan Taliban victory dangerous: Pakistan general
By Qasim Nauman Fri Apr 20, 2012 9:24am EDT
PESHAWAR, Pakistan - (Reuters) - The withdrawal of most combat troops from Afghanistan at the end of 2014 has raised questions from Kabul to Brussels to Washington about the potential chaos that may follow if the Taliban press to take over again.
Few people are as worried about what the pullout could trigger next door in nuclear-armed Pakistan as Lieutenant-General Khalid Rabbani, commander of the frontline corps fighting militants in the northwest of the country.
Sitting in his office in the heavily-fortified headquarters of the XI Corps in Peshawar - one of the Pakistan cities worst hit by suicide bombings - he speaks anxiously about creating the right perceptions as the foreign troop exit approaches.
If the Taliban are seen as the victors in any way, that could be disastrous for Pakistan, emboldening homegrown Taliban militants, who are close to al Qaeda, to step up their campaign to topple the U.S.-backed Islamabad government.
"If they are leaving and giving a notion of success to the Taliban of Afghanistan, this notion of success may have a snowballing effect on to the threat matrix of Afghanistan," Rabbani told Reuters in an interview this week.
"On our side, it may give impetus to the already dying down so-called Tehrik-e-Taliban's (Pakistan Taliban) effort over here."
Rabbani has good reason to worry, even though he and other military officials say security crackdowns have hurt the Pakistani Taliban.
The loose alliance of militant groups - the biggest security threat to the state - has proven resilient, despite repeated offensives from the military, one of the largest in the world.
They have carried out suicide bombings and high-profile attacks, including one on army headquarters, since they were formed in 2007 after a military raid on Islamabad's Red Mosque, which was controlled by its allies.
The Pakistani Taliban have close links with the Afghan Taliban. They move back and forth across the unmarked border, exchange intelligence and shelter each other in a region U.S. President Barack Obama has described as "the most dangerous place in the world".
Those ties worry military commanders like Rabbani, who believe the strengthening of ties between the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban will complicate efforts to contain any spillover of instability in 2014.
One of the most notorious Pakistani Taliban leaders, Afghanistan-based Mullah Fazlullah, has already demonstrated what may be in store if U.S.-led NATO forces fail to stabilize Afghanistan before 2014.
Hundreds of his fighters staged cross-border raids on Pakistani border posts last summer, killing dozens of Pakistani soldiers.
"Our friends on the other side know exactly where they are because we communicate it to them. But they have capacity issues," said Rabbani, referring to Western and Afghan forces.
"I wonder, that if the superpowers and the Western world operating on the other side, they have capacity issues, we certainly have them too."
Critics say Pakistan has created a major security threat along the border by supporting militant groups for decades, an allegation Islamabad denies.
"COUNTERPRODUCTIVE" DRONE STRIKES
Rabbani took command at a time of deep crisis in relations between Washington and Islamabad, a week after a cross-border NATO air attack killed 24 Pakistan soldiers on November 26.
Pakistan's parliament recently concluded a review of ties with the United States, recommending that the government demand an end to American drone strikes in the nation's tribal areas.
Even though analysts say drone strikes which kill high-profile al Qaeda or Taliban militants are not possible without Pakistani intelligence assistance, the campaign fuels anti-American sentiments.
Rabbani acknowledged the strikes can be effective, but said they also kill civilians and are counterproductive.
"You kill five, and you're making 50 more enemies. It's very clear arithmetic. This is the arithmetic that we're trying to make them understand," he said, adding that instead intelligence should be shared so that Pakistan can act.
"They may indicate (a target), we'll pound it with the precision shooting of our F-16s. So it can be done, it has been done at one or two places. Why can't this model be followed, we keep on telling them this is a possible model to be followed."
Washington has repeatedly urged Pakistan to mount a full-scale assault on North Waziristan and go after the Haqqani network, one of the deadliest Afghan insurgent groups.
The U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan said this week that there was "no question" that the Haqqani network had staged coordinated attacks on Kabul and repeated calls for Pakistan to pursue the group.
Pakistan is a recipient of billions of dollars in U.S. aid. It denies that the Haqqanis are based there and says it is too stretched elsewhere fighting the Taliban.
Rabbani said the region near the Afghan border was a major security risk, but repeated the official line that Pakistan will set its own timetable for any operation in the area.
"Something has to be done with North Waziristan. The sooner the better. And we are already looking into it as to how we are going to deal with it," he said.
"We will have our own time and decision to go."
(Writing by Michael Georgy; Editing by Ron Popeski)
Afghanistan's Unfulfilled Marshall Plan
Bloomberg By Katherine Brown Apr 19, 2012
The week began with a reminder that springtime in Afghanistan is fighting season. But it also marks the anniversary of a forgotten episode in U.S.-Afghan relations: Ten years ago Tuesday, President George W. Bush delivered a speech at the Virginia Military Institute in which he likened U.S. aid efforts in Afghanistan to the Marshall Plan.
The Marshall Plan was the post-World War II, extensive aid package designed to build strong, democratic societies in Western Europe and thwart the threat of Communism. The 16 countries that benefited from the aid became some of the U.S.'s strongest allies, and went on to form the European Union and NATO.
The lofty comparison in the April 2002 speech was, to put it mildly, disingenuous. The Marshall Plan, in 2002 dollars, amounted to about $90 billion; Bush at the time was giving Afghanistan less than $1 billion in aid. The original Marshall Plan succeeded partly because the countries had existing infrastructure on which to build; Afghanistan barely had roads.
It may have been just a speech, but U.S. news travels, and it helped to set expectations in Afghanistan that the U.S. was committed to creating a strong, prosperous society that rebuffed extremism.
Not that there hasn't been progress. Afghans are healthier and better educated than ever before; the media is vibrant; and women have gone from being secluded in their homes to representing their fellow citizens in parliament. Innovative aid programs like the U.S. Agency for International Development's mobile money project has worked with the country's flourishing telecommunications industry, which reaches 85 percent of the country, to create a virtual financial infrastructure that has led to greater economic efficiency and transparency. And on Sunday, it was the Afghan National Security Forces that effectively ended a multi-city coordinated attack with minimal civilian casualties.
Still, Afghanistan will not have the grand-scale makeover that President Bush suggested 10 years ago, and our options for helping the Afghan people are becoming increasingly limited.
On Bloomberg View this week, Jeffrey Goldberg asked a rare question: Americans want out of Afghanistan by 2014, but what will we think if large swaths of the country once again come under Taliban control in 2015? And what will be the state of women, the populace most invested in the words of the West?
The argument that our credibility with Afghan citizens matters is not popular these days -- but it does matter, not just for the sake of principle, but for our long-term interests in a volatile part of the world.
(Katherine Brown is a member of the Bloomberg View editorial staff. Follow her on Twitter.)
For more quick commentary from Bloomberg View, go to The Ticker.
Hamidullah Zaker, Afghanistan Commando, Emerges As Hero Of Kabul Battle
04/20/2012 1:17 pm The Huffington Post
KABUL, Afghanistan -- When a half-dozen Taliban militants stormed the Intercontinental Hotel here last June in a bloody overnight siege, a photograph of a team of NATO special operations soldiers, their hands and clothes still bloody as they strode confidently away from the combat zone, became the iconic photograph of the battle.
On Sunday, after yet another drawn-out street battle with Taliban militants, this one in downtown Kabul, a similarly emblematic image was taken of a confident, rugged, and blood-strewn commando emerging from a hazy battleground. Only this time something was different: the hero was Afghan.
For days after the fighting, Afghans in Kabul appeared to bask in the glory of one of their own taking the spotlight; they changed their Facebook profile pictures to that of the unknown commando and printed thousands of flyers to post around the city.
It's the sort of shift -- in both tactical capability and public perception -- that Afghans seem ready to embrace, and American officials eager to see.
"We've been saying for months and months that the Afghan security forces are in the lead, and it's like no one's been listening," said Lt. Col. Jimmie Cummings, a spokesman for the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force.
On Thursday, the hero was identified by the Guardian and the Afghan multimedia project Kabul: A City At Work, as Hamidullah Zaker, a 24-year-old member of the local Crisis Response Unit.
"All the people back home like my job," Zaker told reporters of the growing national sentiment toward the indigenous military in a rare interview. "When I am home they ask for a bit of my uniform, my badges. Even those who are police like to hang out with me and be with me."
Military officials and eyewitnesses uniformly praised the competence and bravery of the Afghan special forces troops in the 18-hour battle, and have been keen to link their capabilities with those of the broader Afghan fighting force.
"The response by the Afghan national security forces were fast and effective, and the attacks failed," said Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in an appearance at a NATO conference in Brussels earlier this week. "Not long ago, this kind of response by Afghans themselves would not have been possible. So the Afghans are proving themselves increasingly ready to take control of their own future."
Zaker's Crisis Response Unit in particular has been instrumental to the defense of Kabul in several other major urban conflicts here, especially in last September's raid on the U.S. Embassy, when it was among the first to arrive on the scene.
But when U.S. and NATO forces draw down their presence in Afghanistan at the end of 2014, it will be left to all Afghan security forces -- a fraction of whom are specially trained operators -- to keep the tenuous peace. Analysts say the general army and police units, which have been plagued by drug use and poor discipline, have a long way to go to reach similar levels of proficiency.
But to American officials at least, the rise of a local hero after Sunday's attacks bodes well for a more enduring role for Afghanistan's own military.
"What the insurgents did on Sunday was basically provide a test see how the Afghan security forces would respond," Cummings said. "In September, we were in the back supporting them. And we were ready to support them this time as well, had ground forces ready to go, but they never called for us. It was a test, and I think they responded very well."
Parliament to Revise Decision Over Embezzlement-Accused Minister
TOLOnews.com Thursday, 19 April 2012
Afghanistan's Parliament said it will revise its decision to appoint a minister if the accusation of the country's anti-corruption watchdog - that one of the recently appointed minister's is corrupt - proves true.
Head of Afghanistan's High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption Azizullah Ludin was summoned by the Upper House on Tuesday to respond to charges of corruption in the Customs office.
Ludin said that one of the nine recently-nominated Ministers had been accused of $70m embezzlement, but despite his efforts, all the nominees won the vote of confidence from Parliament.
"I informed the commission within the parliament, but all of them won vote of confidence," he said.
Ludin declined to say the name of the Minister who was accused.
Parliamentary members reacted to his comment and asked for clarification on the issue.
Speaker of the lower house Abdul Raouf Ibrahimi said that the documents of the ministers had not presented with any problems in the past, but if there was evidence of the corruption watchdog's accusations, the decision should be revised.
In a separate incident, Afghanistan's Attorney General has detained several officials from Hairatan's Border Services Department who were accused of corruption and bribery.
The exact number of arrestees was not officially announced, but a source who spoke on condition of anonymity told TOLOnews that 14 border officials including the head of the Department, an National Directorate of Security representative, a Mostofiat representative, a cashier and head of Human Resources Section were among those arrested by the Attorney General's office.
The High Office of Oversight and Anti Corruption has previously said that more than 3 billion Afghanis were being embezzled through the port.
Hairatan is one of the major transit routes between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan through Balkh Province.
www.afghanistannewscenter.com
By the CNN Wire Staff April 20, 2012
(CNN) -- The Taliban claimed responsibility Friday for downing a Black Hawk helicopter in southern Afghanistan.
"Yesterday (Thursday) evening Taliban fighters shot down a helicopter and killed all its passengers in Khanashen Dewalak area near Garmsir, southern Helmand province," a Taliban spokesman wrote to CNN.
The helicopter's four crew members, all of them American, are believed to be dead, a U.S. military official said.
The copter was flying in bad weather, the official said Thursday. "We cannot yet rule out enemy action," the official said.
Fatal helicopter crashes involving members of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force are not unprecedented in Afghanistan, with some of the aircraft brought down by enemy fire while others crashed for mechanical reasons.
The single deadliest loss for U.S. troops since the Afghan war began in late 2001 happened in August when 30 U.S. service members died as a helicopter carrying them went down while they were reinforcing other troops, officials said. Seven Afghan troops died in that same crash.
A U.S. military official said then that insurgents were believed to have shot down the CH-47 Chinook. The Taliban claimed that militants downed the helicopter with a rocket-propelled grenade.
Last month, 12 people died when a helicopter crashed in Afghanistan's capital of Kabul. There was no reported "insurgent activity in the area" at the time, said Capt. David Yaryar, a spokesman for the NATO-led force.
NATO head calls on China, Russia to help fund Afghan forces
Sebastian Moffett and Justyna Pawlak, Reuters April 20, 2012
BRUSSELS (Reuters) - The head of NATO called on China and Russia on Thursday to help fund Afghan security after 2014, as the alliance tries to rally contributions from a wider range of sources before most foreign combat troops pull out of Afghanistan.
NATO estimates that the annual cost of maintaining Afghan security forces will be some $4 billion (2.5 billion pounds), and the United States is hoping for contributions worth 1 billion euros ($1.3 billion) from other NATO allies and partners. But so far only Britain has publicly pledged an actual amount of cash, $110 million a year.
"We would welcome financial contributions from Russia, China and other countries to ensure a strong sustainable Afghan security force beyond 2014," Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen told a news conference in Brussels, where NATO foreign and defence ministers were meeting to prepare for a summit next month in Chicago.
The United States and NATO, keen to douse fears Afghanistan could face renewed civil war when foreign troops pull out, want to use the summit to demonstrate a long-term commitment to Afghan stability that will endure well after 2014.
China has significant economic stakes in Afghanistan and is also a close ally of neighbouring Pakistan, making it potentially a strong partner in helping to foster stability.
With the world's biggest foreign exchange reserves, it is also better placed than many western countries struggling with economic downturn to help pay for stability in Afghanistan.
Analysts have suggested, however, that China would be wary of becoming too sucked in to problems in Afghanistan, and would not want to be seen to taking sides if this were to make it a target for Islamist militants.
"The Chinese officials I have asked about financing Afghan security forces have been sceptical, saying they'd rather provide support on the civilian and economic side," said Andrew Small at The German Marshall Fund of the United States.
On Thursday, NATO ministers met Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and tried to narrow differences with Russia over Syria, Afghanistan and missile defence - all areas where NATO allies would like Russian support to promote stability.
Lavrov did not respond at the meeting to Rasmussen's request for financial help, according to a western diplomat familiar with the talks.
But Russia's cooperation with western troops in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is expected to expand soon. Currently Russia allows ISAF to use a rail route through Russian territory to transport equipment.
Rasmussen said Russia had offered the use of a new transit route, which will allow ISAF to send supplies in and out of Afghanistan using both the Russian rail network and air transport. The route is expected to pass through the town of Ulyanovsk, said two officials, one in Russia and one in Brussels.
The United States and its allies have been building up alternative routes in and out of Afghanistan, reducing its dependence on Pakistan, which suspended supply routes after a NATO cross-border air attack in November killed 24 Pakistani soldiers.
However, despite the progress on expanding supply routes through Russia, President-elect Vladimir Putin is likely to turn down an invitation from NATO to attend the Chicago summit.
"I have talked with President-elect Putin, and we agreed that due to a very busy domestic political calendar in Russia, just a few weeks after his inauguration as a new president of Russia, it's not possible and not practical also to have a NATO-Russia Summit meeting in Chicago," Rasmussen said.
Russian diplomats have said Putin was unlikely to attend in the absence of an agreement bridging deep differences over U.S. and NATO plans for a European anti-missile shield.
Lavrov repeated complaints over the missile defence system, which Russia says risks tipping the balance of nuclear power between itself and the United States in NATO'S favour. NATO says the shield is meant to protect against a potential Iranian threat and not against Russia.
"We need clear guarantees that it is not targeted against us," Lavrov said.
(Additional reporting By Arshad Mohammed; Editing by Myra MacDonald)
Russia concerned over US plans to keep Afghan bases
By Indo Asian News Service | IANS India Private Limited
Brussels, April 20 (IANS/RIA Novosti) Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has expressed concern over US plans to keep its military contingent in Afghanistan after the pullout of international troops in 2014.
Lavrov also said Moscow was worried about the drug and terrorism situation in Afghanistan after the pullout.
"We do not understand such (US) plans to maintain a presence, we have questions and we would like to get answers," Lavrov said following a foreign ministerial meeting of the Russia-NATO Council in Brussels.
He said the international contingent stayed in Afghanistan under a UN Security Council mandate.
"So long as the Afghan side is unable to provide security in the country, any artificial deadlines for troops' withdrawal do not seem quite correct. But when the UN Security Council mandate expires, there will be no reason for a foreign presence in Afghanistan and the region," he said.
The Russian minister expressed concern about the persisting threat of terrorism and drug trafficking from Afghanistan.
"Unfortunately, despite all the international efforts, the threat of terrorism and drug trafficking from Afghanistan persists," he said.
Russia "is concerned how things are going to develop after the International Security Assistance Force is pulled out of Afghanistan".
According to Russia's federal drug control watchdog, heroin production in Afghanistan rose 40-fold in the past decade, and opium poppy plantations cover 130,000 hectares in the Central Asian country.
According to the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Taliban makes $150 million from drug production annually and total drug profits amounted to $4 billion.
--IANS/RIA Novosti
Ending the politicisation of Afghan security forces
Well-equipped security forces have been derailed by politics and a lack of incentives, says author.
Aljazeera By Amrullah Saleh, Amrullah Saleh, a former Afghan intelligence chief, is an opposition leader. 19 Apr 2012
Kabul, Afghanistan - A decadent leadership and a disciplined force - can it be?
The aftermath of every deadly Taliban attack brings voices that condemn the Taliban and praise the Afghan security forces. And some muster up the courage to criticise the political leadership and the government of the country.
Have the Afghan national security forces reached a level of competency where we can trust their skills and abilities? To understand the answer to this, we need to look at three areas: the relationship between the political leadership and the security forces, the capabilities of the forces, and the role these forces will play in the future.
The upper and middle echelons of Afghan forces are filled by people who have not risen to their promotions in a democratic system. They are not "secu-crats": Most of them have been placed in their posts through political consultations and personal connections. This directly affects the loyalty and inspiration of the officers at different levels.
When the president ventures out to pay a visit to a unit of the national police, national army, or intelligence, his personal security detail, called the President Protection Service (PPS), disarms everyone in advance. It sends the message that the only loyal unit to the president and the system is the PPS, comprised of 750 people who guard and protect him.
By infiltrating the ranks of Afghan army and police, the Taliban have brought about unfortunate incidents. But the president’s mistrust of Afghan forces goes back much earlier.
In the early years of the new government, mistrust was at such a high level that for up to six years, an American company named DynCorp was responsible for the president’s security. Now, foreign mentors operate in the PPS who, in addition to coordinating with NATO forces, ensure discipline in the ranks and file of the unit. Their influence is clear on the behaviour of the president’s bodyguards, who often act insensitively to Afghan cultural values.
In the army units, too, prejudiced views stemming from ethnic sensitivities exist as many officers turn to seeking ethnic, political, or personal sanctuaries for protection against political meddling.
The political relations with the Afghan police are more complex than the Afghan army. The police were far from international attention until 2007, when most of the aid was going to the army. For this reason, and many others, the influence of political figures in the police is greater, and continues to increase.
Before Zarar Ahmad Muqbel’s sacking as minister of interior, Karzai had lost faith in him and his abilities. In security meetings, he would invite General Ali Shah Paktiawal, the then-CID at Kabul police department, along with the minister. It was an odd mix that did not even befit the management of partisan or guerrilla forces. On occasions, Paktiawal would reject the words of Muqbel or explain the issue in a completely different way. When police forces understand that their minister and one of his managers are not on the same level, it’s clear that a certain kind of chaos will reign.
Ordinary citizens in the ranks of Afghan forces are, to a remarkable extent, sheltered from the personal and ethnic tension. But some of them are certainly influenced by the mentality of high-ranking officers who have ethnic or regional leanings.
Cost of interference
It is possible that one day young officers, who are devoid of ethnic or regional leanings and graduates of institutes of higher education, will enter the security forces and become a beacon of hope for the Afghan people. But this scenario remains just a possibility, and depends entirely on whether there will be an end to the politicisation of our security institutions.
Interference in the management of the security forces, be it in the upper or lower levels, slows their growth rate, increases their expenses, and strikes a major blow to their morale. The nepotistic appointment of officers in upper and middle echelons of the security force will at best protect narrow interests instead of national ones.
With the intelligence force, the situation is also not much different. In this institution, pockets loyal to President Karzai, his vice presidents, provincial leaders and those protected by Americans are distinctly visible.
This problem had been minimized in previous years, but in Karzai’s second term, which has been characterised by the distribution of state resources to his allies, the intelligence force have also been affected.
Without corruption and decadence at the leadership level, the strengthening of the ranks and the creation a strong incentive for fighting negative trends are not difficult tasks.
Idealism and belief in values are crucial to strengthening the ranks. But when the security forces witness the decay of values at the leadership level, the incentive for sacrifice plummets. The effectiveness of the force declines. And in such situations ethnic and regional divides, personal connections, and mistrust creep in.
Continuing the current situation, in which the leadership lacks vision and is corrupt in certain areas, will corrupt the forces to a tragic extent, or will make the relationship between political leadership and security forces one of deceit, lies, and narrow interest, the results of which will be felt deeply by the Afghan people.
Another sign of this decaying relationship is the negative competition and accusations. These days, government institutions attack each other through the media. It doesn’t take more than a brief observation of the media to see a clear lack of coordination.
Capability of the forces:
In the context of threat assessments for Afghanistan, the majority of the experts believe that Afghan security forces will not be faced with the invasion of foreign armies. And if they do face an invasion, they will never be able to stand their ground due to weak economic base of the country.
Instead, neighbouring countries will try to train and equip forces that will fight for them and thereby destabilise the situation in Afghanistan. These countries will exploit the political turmoil, poverty, ethnic divides, the porous borders, and most importantly the weakness of our national identity to rally our own citizens against the state on different pretexts. This scenario is the foundation for the Afghan security doctrine - how would we deal with this kind of a threat? With what mechanisms, systems, and firepower?
The structure, equipment, and training given to the Afghan security forces have provided them with the capability to move quickly and react swiftly. Threat assessment, target evaluation, coordination and execution of operations all fall within the current capabilities and skills of the forces.
Some of the world’s military and security thinkers, including the late Ahmad Shah Massoud (the anti-Soviet resistance leader), believed that poor countries surrounded by hostile or bad neighbours needed a tripartite formula: a strong motivation, followed by a capable and disciplined leadership, and then by resources.
For poor countries, a resource-only based motivation, resource-based leadership and organisation is not sustainable. These countries will always lack sufficient defence and security resources, and will always try to protect their macro security through alliance with regional or global powers.
The resources at the service of the Afghan forces are sufficient for the total or partial diffusion of defined threats, but here the formula is implemented backwards. The emphasis has been on equipping the forces, not on strengthening their non-materialistic motivation.
Excessive dependence on resources, strengthening organisation and management through resources, and eventually creating incentives through financial resources is the opposite of what has proven effective in history.
The fact that the existing method is dependent on foreign aid - and every day the leadership of security forces complains of shortage or lack of resources - shows the weakness from both a practical and academic lens.
The aid from US and the west to Afghan security forces is uncertain and short-term. This aid is dependent on the donor country’s national interests rather than the national need of Afghanistan. Coincidentally, we share a common enemy with the western world, but this situation will change. Therefore, the insistence of the Afghan military and security leadership on increasing the quantity is flawed. Not only is a foreign aid dependent military and security force hard to trust, but it also creates constant uncertainty as the situation changes with the wiles of the donor.
Role of the forces in political shifts
The number of professionals and non-professionals who occupy leadership positions in Afghan security forces for political and nepotistic reasons is over 90 per cent.
It will not be possible to change this percentage in the next two years before the next elections are held. In the meantime, the retirement of the older officers also are delayed on ethnic or political basis.
Considering this issue, the possibility of interference by security forces in politics in future years is very likely.
Large-scale interference that could lead to a coup d’etat is less likely, first because the security forces are divided in their political views and leanings, and secondly because the leadership at different levels are dependent and conscious of western aid.
But as the previous election showed, certain police and army units, through soft intimidation and influence in various parts of the country, brought local leaders to support the candidates of their choice. The appointments of the past two years point to the possibility of this recurring, in a more organised way.
The dream situation would be that the security forces defend the system in its entirety, which includes the legal opposition. But we have never gotten close to our dreams. The security forces spend 12 times more than Afghanistan’s entire income. When such resources are given to vulnerable institutions, it will surely be tempting to use it for political influence.
Therefore, the solution will put together an oversight commission for monitoring the neutrality of the security forces before any election. Even now, institutions that have the ability to tap phones listen to the conversations of political figures under the pretext of “special operations”. For a dictatorship, that is natural. But we speak of an infant democracy built on the blood of the people - we shouldn’t let the few national resources be used for protecting the narrow interest of a clique.
A large number of officers from our national security forces, especially those deeply rooted in the country and not returnees from exile or foreign institutions, know that involvement of the military in politics has been tragic for Afghanistan. And some in these years, through visits to prosperous countries, have been acquainted with soft demeanor and nationalistic behavior of those countries’ military forces. They have noticed that the dignity of the security forces is in defending national rule, not in defending small political circles.
Possibly, getting acquainted with new methods has influenced the outlook of the Afghan officers. The officers are from this land, this country. But just hoping for a good outlook on their behalf is not sufficient. Hope is not something solid and measurable. We need to create mechanisms so they are not turned into pawns. Not only is the creation of these mechanisms important for the transparency of our politics, but also for the durability, dignity, and honor of the Afghan security forces.
Amrullah Saleh was the head of Afghanistan's intelligence agency from 2004 until 2010. He is currently the leader of an opposite movement.
A version of this article first appeared in Dar/Farsi, on the BBC website.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
Perceptions of Afghan Taliban victory dangerous: Pakistan general
By Qasim Nauman Fri Apr 20, 2012 9:24am EDT
PESHAWAR, Pakistan - (Reuters) - The withdrawal of most combat troops from Afghanistan at the end of 2014 has raised questions from Kabul to Brussels to Washington about the potential chaos that may follow if the Taliban press to take over again.
Few people are as worried about what the pullout could trigger next door in nuclear-armed Pakistan as Lieutenant-General Khalid Rabbani, commander of the frontline corps fighting militants in the northwest of the country.
Sitting in his office in the heavily-fortified headquarters of the XI Corps in Peshawar - one of the Pakistan cities worst hit by suicide bombings - he speaks anxiously about creating the right perceptions as the foreign troop exit approaches.
If the Taliban are seen as the victors in any way, that could be disastrous for Pakistan, emboldening homegrown Taliban militants, who are close to al Qaeda, to step up their campaign to topple the U.S.-backed Islamabad government.
"If they are leaving and giving a notion of success to the Taliban of Afghanistan, this notion of success may have a snowballing effect on to the threat matrix of Afghanistan," Rabbani told Reuters in an interview this week.
"On our side, it may give impetus to the already dying down so-called Tehrik-e-Taliban's (Pakistan Taliban) effort over here."
Rabbani has good reason to worry, even though he and other military officials say security crackdowns have hurt the Pakistani Taliban.
The loose alliance of militant groups - the biggest security threat to the state - has proven resilient, despite repeated offensives from the military, one of the largest in the world.
They have carried out suicide bombings and high-profile attacks, including one on army headquarters, since they were formed in 2007 after a military raid on Islamabad's Red Mosque, which was controlled by its allies.
The Pakistani Taliban have close links with the Afghan Taliban. They move back and forth across the unmarked border, exchange intelligence and shelter each other in a region U.S. President Barack Obama has described as "the most dangerous place in the world".
Those ties worry military commanders like Rabbani, who believe the strengthening of ties between the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban will complicate efforts to contain any spillover of instability in 2014.
One of the most notorious Pakistani Taliban leaders, Afghanistan-based Mullah Fazlullah, has already demonstrated what may be in store if U.S.-led NATO forces fail to stabilize Afghanistan before 2014.
Hundreds of his fighters staged cross-border raids on Pakistani border posts last summer, killing dozens of Pakistani soldiers.
"Our friends on the other side know exactly where they are because we communicate it to them. But they have capacity issues," said Rabbani, referring to Western and Afghan forces.
"I wonder, that if the superpowers and the Western world operating on the other side, they have capacity issues, we certainly have them too."
Critics say Pakistan has created a major security threat along the border by supporting militant groups for decades, an allegation Islamabad denies.
"COUNTERPRODUCTIVE" DRONE STRIKES
Rabbani took command at a time of deep crisis in relations between Washington and Islamabad, a week after a cross-border NATO air attack killed 24 Pakistan soldiers on November 26.
Pakistan's parliament recently concluded a review of ties with the United States, recommending that the government demand an end to American drone strikes in the nation's tribal areas.
Even though analysts say drone strikes which kill high-profile al Qaeda or Taliban militants are not possible without Pakistani intelligence assistance, the campaign fuels anti-American sentiments.
Rabbani acknowledged the strikes can be effective, but said they also kill civilians and are counterproductive.
"You kill five, and you're making 50 more enemies. It's very clear arithmetic. This is the arithmetic that we're trying to make them understand," he said, adding that instead intelligence should be shared so that Pakistan can act.
"They may indicate (a target), we'll pound it with the precision shooting of our F-16s. So it can be done, it has been done at one or two places. Why can't this model be followed, we keep on telling them this is a possible model to be followed."
Washington has repeatedly urged Pakistan to mount a full-scale assault on North Waziristan and go after the Haqqani network, one of the deadliest Afghan insurgent groups.
The U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan said this week that there was "no question" that the Haqqani network had staged coordinated attacks on Kabul and repeated calls for Pakistan to pursue the group.
Pakistan is a recipient of billions of dollars in U.S. aid. It denies that the Haqqanis are based there and says it is too stretched elsewhere fighting the Taliban.
Rabbani said the region near the Afghan border was a major security risk, but repeated the official line that Pakistan will set its own timetable for any operation in the area.
"Something has to be done with North Waziristan. The sooner the better. And we are already looking into it as to how we are going to deal with it," he said.
"We will have our own time and decision to go."
(Writing by Michael Georgy; Editing by Ron Popeski)
Afghanistan's Unfulfilled Marshall Plan
Bloomberg By Katherine Brown Apr 19, 2012
The week began with a reminder that springtime in Afghanistan is fighting season. But it also marks the anniversary of a forgotten episode in U.S.-Afghan relations: Ten years ago Tuesday, President George W. Bush delivered a speech at the Virginia Military Institute in which he likened U.S. aid efforts in Afghanistan to the Marshall Plan.
The Marshall Plan was the post-World War II, extensive aid package designed to build strong, democratic societies in Western Europe and thwart the threat of Communism. The 16 countries that benefited from the aid became some of the U.S.'s strongest allies, and went on to form the European Union and NATO.
The lofty comparison in the April 2002 speech was, to put it mildly, disingenuous. The Marshall Plan, in 2002 dollars, amounted to about $90 billion; Bush at the time was giving Afghanistan less than $1 billion in aid. The original Marshall Plan succeeded partly because the countries had existing infrastructure on which to build; Afghanistan barely had roads.
It may have been just a speech, but U.S. news travels, and it helped to set expectations in Afghanistan that the U.S. was committed to creating a strong, prosperous society that rebuffed extremism.
Not that there hasn't been progress. Afghans are healthier and better educated than ever before; the media is vibrant; and women have gone from being secluded in their homes to representing their fellow citizens in parliament. Innovative aid programs like the U.S. Agency for International Development's mobile money project has worked with the country's flourishing telecommunications industry, which reaches 85 percent of the country, to create a virtual financial infrastructure that has led to greater economic efficiency and transparency. And on Sunday, it was the Afghan National Security Forces that effectively ended a multi-city coordinated attack with minimal civilian casualties.
Still, Afghanistan will not have the grand-scale makeover that President Bush suggested 10 years ago, and our options for helping the Afghan people are becoming increasingly limited.
On Bloomberg View this week, Jeffrey Goldberg asked a rare question: Americans want out of Afghanistan by 2014, but what will we think if large swaths of the country once again come under Taliban control in 2015? And what will be the state of women, the populace most invested in the words of the West?
The argument that our credibility with Afghan citizens matters is not popular these days -- but it does matter, not just for the sake of principle, but for our long-term interests in a volatile part of the world.
(Katherine Brown is a member of the Bloomberg View editorial staff. Follow her on Twitter.)
For more quick commentary from Bloomberg View, go to The Ticker.
Hamidullah Zaker, Afghanistan Commando, Emerges As Hero Of Kabul Battle
04/20/2012 1:17 pm The Huffington Post
KABUL, Afghanistan -- When a half-dozen Taliban militants stormed the Intercontinental Hotel here last June in a bloody overnight siege, a photograph of a team of NATO special operations soldiers, their hands and clothes still bloody as they strode confidently away from the combat zone, became the iconic photograph of the battle.
On Sunday, after yet another drawn-out street battle with Taliban militants, this one in downtown Kabul, a similarly emblematic image was taken of a confident, rugged, and blood-strewn commando emerging from a hazy battleground. Only this time something was different: the hero was Afghan.
For days after the fighting, Afghans in Kabul appeared to bask in the glory of one of their own taking the spotlight; they changed their Facebook profile pictures to that of the unknown commando and printed thousands of flyers to post around the city.
It's the sort of shift -- in both tactical capability and public perception -- that Afghans seem ready to embrace, and American officials eager to see.
"We've been saying for months and months that the Afghan security forces are in the lead, and it's like no one's been listening," said Lt. Col. Jimmie Cummings, a spokesman for the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force.
On Thursday, the hero was identified by the Guardian and the Afghan multimedia project Kabul: A City At Work, as Hamidullah Zaker, a 24-year-old member of the local Crisis Response Unit.
"All the people back home like my job," Zaker told reporters of the growing national sentiment toward the indigenous military in a rare interview. "When I am home they ask for a bit of my uniform, my badges. Even those who are police like to hang out with me and be with me."
Military officials and eyewitnesses uniformly praised the competence and bravery of the Afghan special forces troops in the 18-hour battle, and have been keen to link their capabilities with those of the broader Afghan fighting force.
"The response by the Afghan national security forces were fast and effective, and the attacks failed," said Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in an appearance at a NATO conference in Brussels earlier this week. "Not long ago, this kind of response by Afghans themselves would not have been possible. So the Afghans are proving themselves increasingly ready to take control of their own future."
Zaker's Crisis Response Unit in particular has been instrumental to the defense of Kabul in several other major urban conflicts here, especially in last September's raid on the U.S. Embassy, when it was among the first to arrive on the scene.
But when U.S. and NATO forces draw down their presence in Afghanistan at the end of 2014, it will be left to all Afghan security forces -- a fraction of whom are specially trained operators -- to keep the tenuous peace. Analysts say the general army and police units, which have been plagued by drug use and poor discipline, have a long way to go to reach similar levels of proficiency.
But to American officials at least, the rise of a local hero after Sunday's attacks bodes well for a more enduring role for Afghanistan's own military.
"What the insurgents did on Sunday was basically provide a test see how the Afghan security forces would respond," Cummings said. "In September, we were in the back supporting them. And we were ready to support them this time as well, had ground forces ready to go, but they never called for us. It was a test, and I think they responded very well."
Parliament to Revise Decision Over Embezzlement-Accused Minister
TOLOnews.com Thursday, 19 April 2012
Afghanistan's Parliament said it will revise its decision to appoint a minister if the accusation of the country's anti-corruption watchdog - that one of the recently appointed minister's is corrupt - proves true.
Head of Afghanistan's High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption Azizullah Ludin was summoned by the Upper House on Tuesday to respond to charges of corruption in the Customs office.
Ludin said that one of the nine recently-nominated Ministers had been accused of $70m embezzlement, but despite his efforts, all the nominees won the vote of confidence from Parliament.
"I informed the commission within the parliament, but all of them won vote of confidence," he said.
Ludin declined to say the name of the Minister who was accused.
Parliamentary members reacted to his comment and asked for clarification on the issue.
Speaker of the lower house Abdul Raouf Ibrahimi said that the documents of the ministers had not presented with any problems in the past, but if there was evidence of the corruption watchdog's accusations, the decision should be revised.
In a separate incident, Afghanistan's Attorney General has detained several officials from Hairatan's Border Services Department who were accused of corruption and bribery.
The exact number of arrestees was not officially announced, but a source who spoke on condition of anonymity told TOLOnews that 14 border officials including the head of the Department, an National Directorate of Security representative, a Mostofiat representative, a cashier and head of Human Resources Section were among those arrested by the Attorney General's office.
The High Office of Oversight and Anti Corruption has previously said that more than 3 billion Afghanis were being embezzled through the port.
Hairatan is one of the major transit routes between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan through Balkh Province.
www.afghanistannewscenter.com