[Afghan News] September 30, 2011

[یاسمینه]

How to get Pakistan to cooperate with the U.S. in Afghanistan
Editor's Note: Michael O’Hanlon specializes in national security and defense policy and is senior author of the Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan Index projects. You can read more from him on the Global Public Square.
By Michael O'Hanlon – Special to CNN
The strong words of former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen that the Haqqani network remains a “veritable arm of the ISI,” Pakistan's main intelligence agency, have plunged U.S.-Pakistan relations to their lowest point since before 9/11. Taken literally, Mullen's words would almost require designation of Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism – and transnational terrorism that targets American citizens at that. The Haqqanis are one of our main problems today in Afghanistan and carried out recent attacks in Kabul, including the September assault on the U.S. embassy. Calling them a "veritable arm of the ISI" strongly suggests that top Pakistani intelligence operatives have controlled the group and used it for their own purposes.

Mullen’s words went too far, as best we can tell. While ISI operatives undoubtedly have had contacts with the Haqqani network, and while Pakistan’s army has let the Haqqani clan operate within its North Waziristan region for too long with impunity, that is not the same thing as Pakistan deliberately using the group to kill Americans and key Afghans like former President Rabbani. Nuances are important because Mullen’s diagnosis, taken literally, would seem inconsistent with any pretense that the United States and Pakistan share common goals in Afghanistan or can work together in pursuit of common objectives. If this is indeed the situation, it is hard to see the U.S. Congress approving future aid packages for Pakistan. It is also hard to believe that Pakistan would continue to allow American forces to use its territory for logistics support of the Afghanistan mission or keep tolerating our drone attacks against the Haqqanis and al Qaeda.

So in addition to avoiding such sweeping language - as others in the U.S. government have wisely done in refusing to repeat Mullen’s contentions - we need to look for ways to repair U.S.-Pakistan cooperation in regard to Afghanistan as well. In fact, while Afghanistan is unlikely to go down as a shining success for American foreign policy, we can still achieve the minimal goals set out by both the Bush and Obama administrations of preventing major terrorist sanctuaries from reestablishing themselves on Afghan soil in the future. The NATO-led military campaign is gradually weakening the overall strength of the insurgency. In addition, and equally importantly, it is providing the outlines of an exit strategy by training and equipping an Afghan army that increasingly displays a toughness on the battlefield as well as a political commitment to the Afghan state.

We can aspire, over the coming three years, to a successful transition from a NATO-led operation to an Afghan-led and NATO-supported effort. This is, in fact, the current military plan and under the able leadership of Ambassador Ryan Crocker, General John Allen and key international figures like U.N. official Steffan di Mistura. It seems feasible. The end state will not be victory per se, but perhaps something like Colombia in 2000 or for that matter Pakistan today - a country with a big violence problem and some uncontrolled spaces, yet a strong enough state to contain the violence and gradually curtail it.

But there are two big “ifs” in this prediction. The first is achieving a political transition in Afghanistan in 2014 when President Karzai must step down from power according to the country’s constitution to go along with the military transition that same year. Each of these changes is hard; achieving them both at once will be truly challenging. Among other things, this effort requires that outside actors help Afghans strengthen their own political parties and their system of checks and balances so that Karzai does not remain, as he largely is today, the only political figure in the country with real nationwide power and some degree of national stature ( however limited Karzai's national standing may be). The United States has been too reluctant to help in this until Crocker’s appointment, and, in fact, was part of the reason that Karzai was able to consume virtually all of the political oxygen in Afghanistan over this last decade. We need to change course.

The second big challenge is, naturally, Pakistan. As long as Islamabad views itself as the ultimate power broker in Afghanistan and keeps alive insurgent groups like the Haqqanis either as a hedge against NATO failing to achieve its task or (more ominously) as a way of using proxies to dominate Afghanistan in the future itself, it will be very hard to ensure that the insurgency weakens with time. Figuring out a way to give Islamabad adequate incentives to rethink its tolerance for these groups, which remains excessive, even if Mullen overstated the problem somewhat , is a central challenge of American policy. Of course any such effort must be coordinated with Afghanistan, but Kabul need not be given veto rights, as we have our own legitimate national interests in scaling back the violence and achieving greater stability. Put differently, Afghan leaders too need to know that they cannot feud with Pakistan unnecessarily and indefinitely if the price of that feud is to be paid partly in American blood.

So the following kinds of ideas should be put on the table in negotiations involving the three countries:

– Afghanistan and Pakistan should pursue an accord to accept the Durand line, the de facto border between their two countries, indefinitely. Ironically, it is Kabul that refuses to do so now. If no permanent agreement on a permanent border is yet within reach, a 50-year or 100-year postponement of the issue might be wise.

– Afghanistan should be willing to ask India to shut down its consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar. Pakistan sees these as likely outposts for Indian intelligence operatives. Its fears are probably unwarranted, but the consulates are not worth the resulting strain on the relationship and can be closed as part of a deal.-

– Kabul should at least listen to Islamabad’s interests and advice in choosing governors for its eastern provinces and districts in the future. Indeed, if a peace deal with elements of the Taliban or Haqqani network ever becomes feasible, some reconciled insurgent leaders might even share in such positions, under certain conditions about disarmament and about accepting the Afghan constitution as well as the continued presence of foreign troops on Afghan soil for the foreseeable future.

– For its part, Islamabad needs to reign in the insurgent groups on its territory and constrain their use of sanctuaries on its soil. The demand here should not be the occasional symbolic arrest or two. The effort needs to be systematic enough that overall violence levels in the east of Afghanistan diminish substantially in 2012 - that is the ultimate barometer of Pakistan’s seriousness, and Islamabad should be held to it.

If this sort of deal can be struck, American economic and budgetary help for Pakistan might not only be sustained, but eventually increased. It might, for example, include aid for Pakistan’s beleaguered energy sector and extend as well to a future free-trade accord. Alas, that is the positive vision for the relationship and there is another and currently more likely outcome as well. That negative result would be mutually tragic for all involved - greater instability in Afghanistan, a likely end to Pakistani help with NATO logistics and intelligence operations, greater sanctuaries for extremists along both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border and a full break in U.S.-Pakistan cooperation. All of us should be aware of these stakes and should focus intently on avoiding such a terrible possible outcome before it is too late. To paraphrase Churchill, the U.S.-Pakistan partnership today is the worst possible relationship we could have with that country, except for half the other possibilities, and we cannot simply throw up our hands in frustration.

The views expressed in this article are solely those of Michael O'Hanlon.

Karzai trapped in no-man's land
By M K Bhadrakumar Asia Times Online
Afghan President Hamid Karzai has made his first political move a week after the assassination of the head of the Afghan High Peace Council and former president, Burhanuddin Rabbani.

Following a meeting in Kabul that included tribal elders, legislative chairmen, cabinet ministers, former mujahideen commanders and his two vice presidents, Karzai's office issued a statement on Wednesday admitting that a question mark should be on the Taliban's capacity to take independent decisions, implying they were merely a Pakistani proxy.

The statement suggested that Karzai no more regards the Taliban as his errant "brothers", which used to be his preferred epithet to describe the insurgents. "During our three-year efforts for peace, the Taliban has martyred our religious ulema, tribal elders, women, children, old and young. By killing Rabbani, they showed they are not able to take decisions. Now, the question is [whether we should seek] peace with whom, which people?”

Karzai's retraction
It is a belated confession by Karzai, necessitated by the force of circumstances, as he gropes for a way forward. Conceivably, it need not be taken as the final word. Karzai is grandstanding. Rabbani's departure has left Karzai stranded in a no-man's land where he stands all by himself - derided by the Taliban, disowned by the United States and despised by the many fuming detractors within the erstwhile Northern Alliance (NA) groups whom he sidelined and kept out of office.

Karzai has been one of the first and consistent advocates of peace talks with the Taliban. His speech at the London conference in January 2010 bears eloquent testimony to Karzai's deep-rooted conviction that Taliban are a part of the Afghan nation and should be allowed to participate in mainstream Afghan life. Many countries were not convinced that was the case but still went along since it was Karzai's Afghan initiative (backed robustly, of course by Richard Holbrooke, the late US special representative for AfPak).

By Karzai's own admission, Rabbani's assassination puts a question mark on his power of judgment. Which is an unfair self-indictment because he was fundamentally right in his judgment that the war was not getting anywhere and only through a political settlement with the Taliban can it be brought to an end.

His bete noir, Abdullah Abdullah, the former Afghan foreign minister and presidential candidate, has seized the moment and was in an incendiary mood this week. He said Taliban have "not demonstrated even one sign of interest in seriously coming to the table to discuss a political settlement ... They think that using this strategy will allow them to gain power in Afghanistan."

Abdullah is riding the wave of indignation among Rabbani's followers. He knows it makes good politics to do some more Karzai-bashing when Washington is listening: "Day by day, the government is losing people's support an trust. Government bodies like the police and military have not been developed, and there is no rule of law. So, this encourages the Taliban to continue terrorist attacks and bring harm to the people of Afghanistan."

But what is the alternative that Abdullah would suggest? Karzai had sensed all along that there was widespread opposition to his peace plan among the non-Pashtun groups belonging to the erstwhile Northern Alliance, which Abdullah was tapping into for mounting a political challenge to his presidency. Karzai was wary about Abdullah's channels to influential quarters in Washington.

Karzai's trump cards were two. One, he had Rabbani with him. Karzai counted on him as a political bridge to the non-Pashtun constituencies as well as to the mujahideen. With Rabbani gone, he has a problem connecting with the anti-Taliban constituency in Afghanistan, leave alone bringing them on board a broad-based settlement.

The president's other trump cards have been his two vice presidents, who are powerful satraps in the non-Pashtun political domain. One is Mohammed Fahim, the strongman from Panjshir who inherited Ahmed Shah Massoud's war machine and the other is Karim Khalili, leader of the Hazara Shi'ites. Both have everything to lose in a Taliban takeover in Afghanistan.

Karzai has also been indulging in a delicate exercise in the past few years building bridges with the Pashtun tribes and carving out a base in the southern regions. He depended heavily on the ruthless skills of his half-brother Wali Karzai on this front, but his assassination in July of Kandahar's mayor has thrown Karzai's stratagem into shambles.

If the peace process had progressed, a new political dynamic would have emerged that strengthened Karzai, but with Wali and Rabbani removed from the scene, he is forced to gravitate toward the non-Pashtun camp, although it isn't his natural constituency.

Peering into a bottomless pit
Ideally, this is a moment when the Americans should raise his comfort level. On the contrary, they are looking away and are consumed by their own problems. The latest United Nations Report on secretary general Ban Ki-Moon's desk says Afghanistan is witnessing "considerable political volatility and disconcerting levels of insecurity".

Former commander of US forces in Afghanistan David Petraeus' claims regarding the encouraging results of the US's surge seem an obfuscation of the harsh ground reality. The UN report says there has been a 40% increase in the monthly average number of "security incidents" in the first eight months of 2011 as compared to the same period last year.

More important, it says the southeastern region which was the theatre for Petraeus' surge remains the "focus of military activity" accounting for two-thirds of all violent incidents, and that even where the US handed over responsibility for security to the Afghan forces, a "resilient insurgency" is challenging the efficacy of the transition.

On top of this, the US is barely coping with Pakistan's blunt refusal to act against the Haqqani network. The standoff can turn into a confrontation any day from now if the US decides to put the Haqqanis on the list of terrorists.

Chairman of the US Senate Intelligence Committee Dianne Feinstein has written to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that on the basis of the testimony given by the outgoing chairman of the joint chiefs of staff committee Mike Mullen, the Haqqani group "meets the standards for designation" as a terrorist organization. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has agreed with Mullen's testimony.

In such a scenario, logically, the US would have to consider at some stage declaring Pakistan as a state sponsoring terrorism, putting at risk the entire future of the "war on terror".

Put plainly, the US-Pakistan relationship is peering into a bottomless pit. Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani was not far off the mark in his remark that the US's Afghan policy shows "confusion and policy disarray".

At such a juncture, where is the time or inclination for the Barack Obama administration to come to Karzai's rescue? On the other hand, Washington is resorting to blame game accusing Karzai's government for ineptitude and corruption and as responsible for all that is going wrong.

The biggest danger in Karzai's gravitation to the NA camp is that it would exacerbate ethnic polarization in Afghanistan. The strengthening of the NA hold on the power structure in Kabul at this juncture virtually forecloses any scope for reconciliation with the Taliban.

As the US drawdown accelerates through the coming months, Karzai will face the dilemma of having to depend more and more on the military muscle of the NA groups. That would be a recipe for another round of civil war.

Regional politics is bound to play a decisive role in what lies ahead. Karzai understands that Pakistan is central to any peace process with the Taliban. He already met Gilani last Thursday when the Pakistani prime minister traveled to Kabul. Gilani is expected in Kabul again in early October.

Pakistan can be expected to do all it can to kickstart another round of peace process. Its interest lies in preventing Karzai becoming a prisoner of the anti-Taliban NA groups, which is to say to prevent a return of the NA's dominance of the Kabul government. But in the present political climate in Kabul, the task of finding another consensus candidate to replace Rabbani will not be easy.

Meanwhile, Karzai is heading for New Delhi next week, his first visit abroad after Rabbani's assassination. It is a scheduled visit apparently for delivering a memorial lecture in New Delhi on regional politics, but Karzai would seek India's support with the expectation that it might give him leverage vis-a-vis Pakistan in the coming period and it has a degree of influence with the NA groups. India, however, would prefer to stand on the sidelines and it remains wary of another civil war in Afghanistan.

India's warnings of the shape of things to come are indeed coming true but this is hardly the moment for self-gratification. Delhi is exasperated with the inconsistencies and disarray in the US's policies. The aggravation of the US-Pakistan rift may appear to work to India's advantage but on the contrary, there is a sense of disquiet in Delhi over the talk of possible military strikes against Pakistan.

The point is, the result of any such US incursions into Pakistan cannot be far different from what happened in Cambodia following the US invasion in April 1970 - namely, a radicalization of the entire region. Just as the Cambodian incursion couldn't salvage the Vietnam War, in the present case, too, staving off defeat in Afghanistan is going to be very difficult for the US.

All the same, Indian commentators have almost in unison pointed out that Rabbani's assassination shows there has been hardly any change in the Taliban's mindset, which militates against the idea of any from of power sharing with other Afghan groups.

Having said that, New Delhi is also keen to build on the current atmosphere of cordiality with Pakistan and encourage Islamabad to draw a line under cross-border terrorist activities. The standoff with the US, ironically, may make Islamabad more receptive to Indian concerns. Karzai will receive renewed assurances of Indian support during his visit next week, but on balance India will not allow itself to be sucked into the Afghan endgame.

Fatal mistake
The point is, Karzai's predicament is also the manifestation of a much bigger crisis that is enveloping Afghanistan. The Afghan body polity is virtually crumbling and the US neither has the energy nor the resources and the will to fortify the Afghan state when such support is needed more than ever in the past decade.

The meltdown leading to a civil war can be rapid if the ethnic rift widens in the coming period. The signs are not good in this regard. Rabbani's assassination has torn asunder the fragile crust that was forming on the ethnic divides in the country. Karzai's dependence on the "warlords" of the NA will set the clock back in Afghan politics. Parliament is already at a standstill. There is great political uncertainty. Abdullah was echoing a widely held perception among the Afghan politicians when he said that Rabbani's is not going to be the last political assassination.

But overarching all this is the disintegration of the US's alliance with Pakistan. The US needs to grasp that it has no alternative but to concede Pakistan's legitimate interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan is not going to blink since it has high stakes on the Afghan chessboard and Washington is nobody to dictate how to frame its interests.

Any US incursion into Pakistan is sure to bring forth a furious backlash that will dwarf the Beirut Barracks Bombing in October 1983, which killed 241 American servicemen. And that will be the end of the Obama presidency. Make no mistake about it.

The only course available for the US is to rein in the irreconcilable NA elements (many of whom were foolishly propped up by the US as the "anti-thesis" to Karzai and have no standing of their own) and allow Karzai and his Pakistani interlocutors to kickstart another effort within the framework of the Afghan-Pakistan peace process.

It should allow Karzai to select his own nominee to replace Rabbani with whom he can work closely - and whom Pakistan is comfortable with. That should be the first necessary step in the coming days. A vacuum should not be allowed to develop.

Equally, there should be a change of heart on the part of the US and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies; they should not interfere with the intra-Afghan peace process. Despite whatever inadequacies he may have, Karzai is still the most credible figure to lead the Kabul set up in the peace process.

Again, he deserves to be given more space to do the sort of Afghan-style networking that he is good at, and create his own coalition and establish his credibility with the Taliban. This is simply not the time to apply Western norms of politics. Simply put, there has been far too much US interference.

The US and NATO's attempt to establish a parallel track of their own has been at the root of the discord between Washington and Islamabad. If and when the veil lifts on Rabbani's assassination, it is more than probable that his recent proximity with the US turned out to be the ultimate fatal mistake on the part of this extraordinary politician, which cost him his life.

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.

Afghans Drop Three-Way Peace Bid
By DION NISSENBAUM And MARIA ABI-HABIB The Wall Street Journal SEPTEMBER 30, 2011
KABUL—Afghanistan plans to suspend an effort to work with Pakistan and the U.S. to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table, Afghan officials said, taking a tougher line with Pakistan after last week's assassination of Kabul's top peace negotiator.

Senior U.S., Pakistani and Afghan officials had been set to meet in Kabul on Oct. 8 to discuss ways to get insurgents into peace talks and end the 10-year-old conflict. Afghanistan has now decided to cancel the meeting, deputy national-security adviser Shaida Mohammad Abdali said on Thursday.

Afghanistan also dropped plans for Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani to attend a meeting in Kabul at the end of October of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Joint Commission for Reconciliation and Peace in Afghanistan, a three-month-old bilateral initiative intended to galvanize the peace process.

Pakistani officials couldn't be reached to comment on the shift by Afghanistan.

Officials at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul declined to comment on Afghanistan's moves. The U.S. still plans to send Marc Grossman, the State Department's special representative for the region, to Kabul for talks next week that were meant to include the trilateral meeting, said Gavin Sundwall, a spokesman for the U.S. Embassy.

The decision to scuttle the meeting could complicate U.S.-led efforts to cultivate a regional dialogue that would make it easier to withdraw most coalition forces as planned by late 2014.

Kabul hasn't abandoned its push for a negotiated end to the war, though it faced a significant setback with the assassination on Sept. 20 of the man who led those efforts, former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani.

Afghan leaders have been trying to compel Pakistan to openly facilitate talks between Afghanistan and Taliban leaders. Officials in President Hamid Karzai's government say they are convinced Pakistan is intent on disrupting its attempts to engage the Taliban without interference from Islamabad.

Pakistani officials have publicly supported peace efforts, while asserting that Pakistan has a right to take part.

Though Afghan officials have criticized Pakistan before, the cancellations signal a change in strategy. "From now on Afghanistan will follow 'trust but verify' approach toward Pakistan, in particular with regard to our peace effort," said Mr. Abdali, suggesting that Kabul would, as a policy, not readily accept Pakistan's offers of help.

Afghan and U.S. relations with Islamabad have deteriorated in recent weeks following the Sept. 13 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and the assassination of Mr. Rabbani a week later.

Last week, departing U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen accused Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency, or ISI, of sponsoring the Haqqani network, the militant group blamed by the U.S. for the embassy attack.

Afghan officials have accused the ISI of organizing the plot that allowed a purported Taliban emissary to kill Mr. Rabbani. Mr. Rabbani was the head of the Afghan government's High Peace Council, which was responsible for attempts to broker a peace deal with the Taliban's top leaders, who are believed to be based in Quetta, Pakistan.

"This was a turning point," Mr. Abdali said of the assassination. "Definitely it goes back to the same place: Pakistan. The phone calls go all the way from here to Quetta." Mr. Abdali said the plot to kill Mr. Rabbani was too complicated to have been carried out by insurgents alone.

Pakistani officials have rejected the charges. "ISI isn't exporting any kind of terrorism to Afghanistan or aiding the Haqqani network," ISI chief Lt. Gen. Shuja Pasha told a meeting of politicians and military leaders on Thursday, according to politicians who attended.

—Matthew Rosenberg and Owais Tohid contributed to this article.

Afghanistan’s Leaders Sour on Pakistan and Peace Talks
New York Times By ALISSA J. RUBIN September 29, 2011
KABUL, Afghanistan - Afghanistan’s president and other senior leaders announced Thursday that they were rethinking the country’s relationship with Pakistan and its negotiations with the Taliban because talks had yielded so little.

As a result, the leaders said, they planned to work closely with the United States, Europe and India to plan the country’s future.

The shift in Afghanistan’s policies emerged in a statement released by the presidential palace on Thursday after a meeting the night before of senior government officials, including the two vice presidents, the national security adviser and several former military commanders who are close advisers to President Hamid Karzai and who fought to push the Russians out of the country in the 1980s.

“Despite making repeated attempts in the past three years, including sending several letters to the Taliban to open negotiations in order to bring peace and stability to the country, our leaders, scholars, influential figures, elders, women and children, old and young are being martyred,” the statement said, referring to a string of assassinations this year, most recently the killing of Burhanuddin Rabbani, the chairman of the peace council.

While the peace talks have yielded little, they had provided Afghanistan and the United States with the hope that there could be a negotiated end to the 10-year-old war. The statement did not rule out the possibility of future talks, but suggested that there was little prospect that they would continue.

With regard to Pakistan, the tone was similarly frustrated.

“Despite three years of talks, coming and going, good intentions and efforts, made by Afghanistan for peace and the initiation of good relations with Pakistan, the Pakistani government has not taken any measures for closing down its terrorist safe havens nor prevented the training and equipping of terrorists on its soil,” the statement said.

One measure of Afghan frustration was the statement’s specific mention of the prospect of a strategic partnership with India, in addition to the United States and Europe. Pakistan considers India its archenemy, and by mentioning it, Afghanistan appeared to be positioning itself in opposition to Pakistan, despite their longtime relationship.

Over the past several months, Afghanistan appeared to have had a reconciliation with Pakistan, and the two countries had been meeting regularly, bilaterally and also with American representatives present. The Wall Street Journal reported Thursday that Afghanistan was planning to suspend the trilateral talks indefinitely.

It remained unclear how far Afghanistan wished to go in pushing away Pakistan and what approach it would prefer. “The question is peace with whom?” the statement said.

Pakistan intelligence chief warns on US ties
Financial Times By Matthew Green and Farhan Bokhari September 29, 2011
Islamabad - Pakistan’s intelligence chief has told the country’s politicians that relations with the US must not be allowed to break down over allegations that his agency is backing attacks by insurgents on Nato forces in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s military and political leadership is seeking to defuse growing tensions with Washington over accusations that the army’s Inter-Services Intelligence is supporting attacks by the Haqqani network of Afghan militants on US troops.

General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the head of the ISI, told an all-party gathering of politicians in Islamabad on Thursday that any attempt by the US to attack suspected militant hide-outs on Pakistani soil would be unacceptable.

Pakistan’s military, which dictates the country’s Afghan policy, reiterated its position that it has no imminent plans to launch any operation in the enclave of North Waziristan, which US officials believe is a Haqqani haven.

But Gen Pasha also said it was important that relations with the US did not reach “a point of no return” and that diplomatic channels should be used to resolve the dispute with Washington, according to television reports of proceedings at the closed-door meeting.

Yusuf Raza Gilani, Pakistan’s prime minister, who called the meeting to formulate a response to the US allegations, warned Washington against placing pressure on Pakistan. But he added: “The doors are still open from our side for talks and discussion.”

The mix of defiance and conciliation by civilian and military leaders reflected the dilemma faced by Pakistan, which has been embarrassed by the US allegations but which cannot afford a complete rupture with Washington.

“The escalating crisis has unfortunately brought us to a point where people on both sides have dug in their heels,” said a Pakistani foreign ministry official. “There are discussions which are ongoing to avoid a bigger crisis.”

The two countries’ fraught alliance hit its latest rocky patch last week when Admiral Mike Mullen, the outgoing head of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, described the Haqqani network of Taliban-affiliated insurgents as a “veritable arm” of the ISI.

Adm Mullen said the ISI had supported recent attacks by Haqqani militants on the US embassy in Kabul and a truck bombing that wounded dozens of US soldiers, among many other operations. Pakistan’s army denies the allegations, although many independent analysts believe the military has long supported – or at least tolerated – the Haqqani network, seeing it as a tool to project influence into Afghanistan and undermine Indian interests in Kabul.

Adm Mullen’s remarks triggered an outpouring of anti-American sentiment in Pakistan, where many people lay the blame for the emergence of a fierce domestic insurgency on the US invasion of Afghanistan following the September 11 terror attacks on the US. Pakistan’s boisterous talk shows have been seized with feverish speculation that the US might be planning an imminent military strike on suspected militant hide-outs near the Afghan border.

Both sides have since sought to tread a delicate diplomatic line to avoid a greater rift without retreating from their core positions.

On Wednesday, the White House appeared to moderate the US stance, with a spokesman saying that Adm Mullen’s description of the Haqqani network as a “veritable arm” of the ISI “is not the language I would use”.

However, the spokesman said the administration remained united in its view that “links exist” between the Haqqanis and the ISI.

The anger triggered by Adm Mullen’s remarks has laid bare the complexities the US faces in dealing with Pakistan, where overt pressure from Washington tends to harden entrenched suspicion of US motives in the region, play into the hands of Islamist parties and set back progress towards democracy by reinforcing the central role of the country’s military at times of crisis.

“The US is turning Pakistan into a scapegoat for its failures in Afghanistan. People feel we’ve been serving American interests for too long – it’s time Pakistan became was more assertive,” said Mahmood Shah, a retired Pakistan army brigadier and commentator.

The risk for Washington is that it could emerge from the showdown looking weaker if Pakistan’s military is able to weather the pressure without taking significant steps against the Haqqanis.

Some US officials want Washington to take a harder line to try to force Pakistan to decisively break with its long-standing policy of supporting proxies in Afghanistan, while others believe the only way to stabilise the region is to win Pakistan’s help in bringing Taliban factions to the negotiating table.

The US’s room for manoeuvre is limited by a fear that ramping up pressure on Pakistan further – or even launching some form of operation in North Waziristan – could endanger broader counter-terrorism ties, a covert programme of drone strikes on militants and co-operation over nuclear security.

Pakistani parties slam U.S. threats
by Tahir khan
ISLAMABAD, Sept. 30 (Xinhua) -- Political and religious parties in Pakistan have condemned U.S. threats of launching unilateral military action in the country and backed the armed forces to take steps to defend the country.

The All Parties Conference (APC) was convened by Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani after top American military leaders accused Pakistan's main spy agency of having links with the Afghan armed groups.

"The APC rejected the recent assertions and baseless allegations made against Pakistan. Such assertions are without substance and derogatory to a partnership approach," a unanimous resolution adopted by over 50 political leaders late Thursday night.

The resolution also called for initiating dialogue with the Pakistani militants with a view to negotiate peace with own people in the tribal areas and a proper mechanism for this be put in place.

The conference was briefed by Foreign Minister, Hina Rabbani Khar and Director General Intelligence Agency, the ISI, Lt. Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha on the security environment of the country and the regional situation.

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Akhtar Shamim Wayeen and Army Chief General Parvez Kayani also attended the conference.

"The Pakistani nation affirms its full solidarity and support for the armed forces of Pakistan in defeating any threat to national security," the resolution said.

The resolution said Pakistan desires to establish and maintain friendly and cordial relations with all countries of the world on the basis of sovereign equality, mutual interest and respect.

All Parties Conference recognized that there has to be a new direction and policy with a focus on peace and reconciliation. "Give peace a chance" must be the guiding central principle henceforth," the resolution said.

It said Pakistan shall continue to endeavor to promote stability and peace at the regional and global planes, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

The U.S. Defense Secretary, Leon Panetta and senior top military officials claimed that Pakistan's spy agency is using the Taliban-linked Haqqani-network to export "terrorism" into Afghanistan and that Pakistani agency the Inter-Services Intelligence or ISI provided logistic support to the Afghan militants for the Sept. 13 attack in the heart of Kabul on U.S. embassy and the Sept. 11 truck bomb attack on the U.S. base in Maidan Wardak province.

Pakistan angrily rejected U.S. claims as unfortunate and also dismissed the threats of unilateral action as contrary to the spirit of bilateral cooperation in the war on terror.

The U.S. leaders insist that the Haqqani network is operating from Pakistan's North Waziristan tribal region and is using the lawless region as a launching pad for cross border attacks into Afghanistan. The U.S. routinely uses unmanned aircraft to target the hideouts of the suspected militants in Waziristan region, bordering Afghanistan.

The Afghan Taliban says it supports Haqqani, not Pakistan
CNN By Shaan Khan September 29, 2011
The Afghan Taliban has rejected U.S. allegations that the Haqqani terrorist network is supported by Pakistan, in an email CNN obtained Wednesday.

"Our bases are not in Pakistan nor do we reside outside of our country in insecure conditions," the email sent to Afghan and Pakistani journalists said. "All military and civilian activities in (Afghanistan) are our own initiatives and our own actions."

The response came less than a week after Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen said that the Haqqani network, which has carried out a number of high-profile terror attacks in the Afghan capital Kabul and elsewhere, acted "as a veritable arm of Pakistan's intelligence."

Jalaluddin Haqqani, the founder of the militant group, "only receives orders from their leader, Mullah Omar," according to the Taliban email that also said the U.S. allegations are "baseless."

Meanwhile, Pakistan continued to deny Mullen's charges.

"Very few countries have been ravaged by the monster of terrorism as brutally as Pakistan," Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar said in an address this week to the U.N. General Assembly in New York. "It is Pakistan's firm determination not to allow any space on its territory for militants and terrorists."

Washington's allegations have strained ties between the two countries, which have been in an uneasy alliance in the war against terror since 2001.

The relationship between Pakistani intelligence and the Haqqanis goes back to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan when Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United States supported the mujahedeen resistance. Intelligence officials believe Pakistan still regards the Haqqanis as an important tool in countering Indian influence in Afghanistan and helping shape any future peace process in line with Islamabad's priorities. With an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 fighters, the Haqqanis' close relationship with both the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban makes them an important player in the region.

Major General Athar Abbas, a spokesman for the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence, acknowledged the service has had contacts with the Haqqanis.

"Any intelligence agency would like to maintain contact with whatever opposition group, whatever terrorist organization ... for some positive outcome," he told CNN in a telephone interview this month.

However, those contacts do not mean that the ISI supports or endorses the organization, he added.

Western counterterrorism officials believe that contrary to Pakistan's assertions, the Haqqanis rely on Pakistani territory -- specifically North Waziristan and the Khurram agency -- to organize, resupply and raise funds.

The Haqqanis are widely regarded as one of the most effective militant groups in Afghanistan. Western intelligence officials believe the Haqqanis were involved in the assassination this month of the Chairman of Afghanistan's High Peace Council, Burhanuddin Rabbani, and an attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul in June. Rabbani himself alleged that the group that attacked the hotel had been in phone contact with people in the town of Miranshah in the Pakistani territory of North Waziristan, long regarded as a stronghold of the Haqqani network.

India warns against hurry in troop withdrawal from Afghanistan
The Times of India Sep 30, 2011, 01.12PM IST
UNITED NATIONS: Expressing concern over the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, India today warned against any "hurry" in withdrawing troops from the country, saying such a move should be done keeping in mind the ground realities and not just to meet any deadline.

"For peace, stability and security in Afghanistan, it is imperative that the ongoing transition must be linked to the ground realities rather than rigid timetables. This, the international community in its hurry to withdraw from a combat role in Afghanistan, will ignore at its own peril," India's Permanent Representative to the UN Hardeep Singh Puri said.

Pointing out that extremist groups continue to attack high-security targets and assassinate important political figures such as former president Burhanudin Rabbani, Puri said gains on the security front cannot be consolidated unless the international community is able to firmly deal with safe havens for terrorist groups outside Afghanistan's borders.

He said the "syndicate of terrorism" including al-Qaida, LeT and other extremist groups operating from within and outside Afghan borders must be rooted out for stability in the country.

"For security and stabilisation of Afghanistan, it is important to isolate and root out the syndicate of terrorism which includes elements of the al-Qaida, Taliban, Laskar-e-Taiba and other terrorist and extremist groups operating from within and outside Afghanistan's borders," Puri said.

"These groups are ideologically and operationally fused and their bonds have strengthened over the years," Puri said.

Citing the UN Secretary General's report on Afghanistan, Puri said the average monthly number of security incidents this year is up 39 per cent as compared to the same period in 2010.

While the process of transition of security responsibilities to Afghan National Security Forces has commenced since July, 2011, it is "indeed worrisome that there has been no let up in terrorist violence."

These attacks point to a dangerous "osmosis of ideologies, ambitions, training and operations" among the syndicate of terrorism in the region with suicide terrorism as its main technique and targets not limited to Afghanistan, Puri added.

He reiterated India's commitment to partnering with the government and people of Afghanistan in building a peaceful, stable, democratic and pluralistic nation.

"We support further strengthening of the Afghan National Security Forces. We fully support an Afghan-led inclusive and transparent process of reconciliation."

It must be accompanied by an inclusive political process and intra-Afghan dialogue" which includes renunciation of violence, cutting of ties to terrorist groups and protections of human rights, including the rights of women, Puri said.

India's two billion dollar assistance to Afghanistan spans a plethora of economic and social development activities.

Why the U.S. needs to make nice with Pakistan
By Vali Nasr, The Washington Post Friday, September 30, 4:09 AM
Washington has long dealt with Pakistani malfeasance out of the public eye, on the assumption that private pressure is more productive than public shaming and that stability in U.S.-Pakistani relations is necessary if the United States is to achieve its objectives in Afghanistan and against al-Qaeda. But the revelations last week of Pakistani involvement in the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kabul have led Washington to abandon all talk of alliance and partnership.

Breaking with Pakistan at this juncture is risky. Chances are slim that doing so will change Pakistani behavior. The far more likely outcome is that the stakes will be raised in Afghanistan.

Security gains in southern Afghanistan over the past year were made possible by generous American aid and intense engagement that improved U.S. and Pakistani relations, and the U.S. military was able to leverage that momentum to its advantage. When the Obama administration decided this year on an exit strategy from Afghanistan, officials were assuming that those conditions would hold.

The U.S. raid on Osama bin Laden’s hideout in May changed all that. Convinced of Pakistani duplicity, Washington kept the mission a secret, and that humiliated and angered the Pakistani military. Relations then spiraled downward as Washington demanded more cooperation on fighting terrorism and Pakistan provided less. The embassy attack finally pushed the relationship over the edge.

Yet Pakistan’s cooperation is still critical to U.S. objectives in Afghanistan, and a breach in U.S.-Pakistan relations could put peace and security in Afghanistan beyond reach.

That cooperation looks less likely. Anti-Americanism is on the rise in Pakistan. Even the mood in the military is dark. That leaves the Pakistani army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, very little room to maneuver. Now that Washington has made its private complaints public and is threatening direct military action, the generals in Pakistan will have little choice but to dig in their heels. For now, Pakistani leaders see the political cost of buckling to open American pressure as higher than the price their country will ultimately pay for intransigence.

Pakistan’s military leaders think they can do without American aid in the short run and absorb U.S. diplomatic pressure long enough to realize their own interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan sees Afghanistan through the prism of its regional rivalry with India; it fears that a strong and independent Afghanistan will take India’s side and would then lay claim to Pakistan’s Pashtun areas. For the past two decades, Islamabad has used the Taliban to avoid that outcome. Pakistan’s strategic calculus is too deeply entrenched and the stakes in Afghanistan are too high for Islamabad to change course over the threat of curtailed U.S. aid.

Confrontation with Pakistan presents Washington with a dilemma that will make leaving Afghanistan harder. If the United States truly wishes to change Pakistani behavior for the greater good of the region, then Washington has to be prepared to do what it takes to get that job done. That includes potentially keeping large numbers of U.S. troops in Afghanistan indefinitely to protect that country against the fallout from our policy and to convince Islamabad that it is futile for Pakistan to pursue its own goals in Afghanistan.

But if our goal is to leave Afghanistan in short order, then the prudent course of action is a return to stability in U.S.-Pakistan relations. That would have to start with ending the recent public acrimony but also confronting head-on what Pakistan is after in Afghanistan.

The administration is hoping that by 2014 the combination of a strong Afghan military and a peace deal between the Karzai government and the Taliban will create the conditions for U.S. troops to finally leave Afghanistan. Pakistan, worrying about the sort of government that would next rule Afghanistan, is eager to be part of the planning for what is to follow the U.S. exit. In particular, Islamabad wants control over when and how the Taliban will engage Kabul and Washington. Afghans oppose this, and given Pakistan’s track record, Washington has not included Islamabad in decisions on the future of Afghanistan. But this is ultimately the price for Pakistan’s cooperation.

Still, even if the United States allows Pakistan to play a role in shaping a future Afghanistan, Washington should make any Pakistani role conditional on Islamabad taking concrete measures against groups such as the Haqqani network and the Taliban.

American policy will be most effective if it flows from a clear understanding of our objectives and the resources we are willing to commit to their pursuit. The recent change of policy toward Pakistan does not reflect this.

The writer is a professor of international politics at Tufts University’s Fletcher School and a senior fellow at Brookings Institution. He served as senior adviser to the State Department’s special representative on Afghanistan and Pakistan from 2009 to 2011.

Experts: New Data Speeds Search For Afghanistan Minerals
VOA News September 29, 2011 Jim Randle
A team of U.S. and Afghan officials and experts has just published new geological data that may speed up efforts to turn Afghanistan's vast mineral deposits into prosperity.

Experts have thought for years that Afghanistan has significant mineral deposits, including gold, copper, iron, rare earths and gems.

A new joint U.S.-Afghan project gives foreign investors and mining companies data that is more complete and more accurate.

The U.S. Geological Survey and its counterparts in the Afghan government reanalyzed old data, including information from the Soviet era, with more modern tools than were available when the data was collected decades ago.

The USGS also gathered huge amounts of new data from high-tech sensors on satellites and aircraft that peered deeply into most of Afghanistan's rugged and mountainous land. Ground teams examined promising areas in more detail. Team leaders have put all the project's data, thousands of pages of it, on a USGS website in the hope it will encourage companies to bid on projects.

USGS project chief Steve Peters says better information reduces the risk for investors and increases the likelihood that projects will get started.

"We think we have summarized what the potential is and we have provided enough data for private industry and the Ministry of Mines to move forward," said Peters.

Peters says some projects, such as gold mining, require relatively simple infrastructure and could get started in a year or so. Other efforts, like mining iron ore, need roads, power, and other kinds of infrastructure, which could take 10 years or more.

Worries about security could slow developments further.

But Afghanistan's ambassador to the United States, Eklil Hakimi, says the lure of profits will encourage companies to hurry up.

"As you know, people who want to make money, they do not want to wait," said Hakimi.

The Ambassador says the sooner companies get started, the sooner money and jobs can flow into Afghanistan's troubled economy.

"That is the ultimate goal, to make sure that this wealth that belongs to the people of Afghanistan, ultimately that they can get the benefit from it," he said.

He said it is crucial that a fair share of the profits go to ordinary people not just foreign companies or officials.

An indecent rush to the Afghan exit
Financial Times By Philip Stephens September 29, 2011
Ten years on, America and its allies have alighted on a strategy for Afghanistan. They are dressing up defeat as victory and heading hotfoot for the exit. There is something indecent about the way this has become a forgotten war. Young men and women in uniform are still losing lives and limbs to the Taliban. Casualties among civilians are much higher still. So what became of the grand plan to build a new Afghanistan that would bring democracy to its people and keep us secure at home?

Better not ask. The anniversary of the attacks on America in September 2001 stirred remembrance and reflection. A decade after Kabul fell to the US-backed Northern Alliance, Afghanistan is an all-too-present source of grief and embarrassment.

The other day I listened to an official at the heart of western policymaking give an assessment of the outlook when the bulk of western forces leave in 2014. I left the encounter wondering what on earth the politicians can any longer say to the families of those blown up in the deserts and bazaars of Kandahar and Helmand.

An optimistic scenario – and most of the officials and diplomats I speak to are not at all optimistic – would see the Afghan government just about standing on its own feet. Nato policymakers talk about leaving behind a “viable” state.

Viable is a word that allows them to avoid any inconvenient value judgments about the nature of governance. No one wants any longer to dwell on small things such as democracy or women’s rights.

Staying, though, with the upbeat view, the Taliban would probably regain suzerainty over much of the Pashtun heartland in southern Afghanistan, but a modus vivendi within Kabul would drain intensity from the insurgency. The settlement would also accommodate the country’s regional warlords. The Afghan constitution would be quietly edged aside by tribal politics. The drugs trade and endemic corruption would continue much as before.

In such circumstances, the US and its closest allies would continue to deploy military trainers and special forces and use drone warfare to contain Taliban affiliates such as the Haqqani network. The Haqqani are thought to have been behind the murder of former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was acting as a mediator between Hamid Karzai’s government and the Taliban. Pakistan would remain in one piece, alternately appeasing and confronting extremists.

The Afghanistan of 2014, in other words, would look pretty much like that of 2002 – before what started as a US campaign to destroy al-Qaeda drifted into a full-scale war against the Taliban. On the plus side, the Afghan national army may number about 300,000 against barely a few thousand in 2001. Al-Qaeda, bereft of most of its former leadership, already poses a much diminished threat.

Remember, though, that this is the optimistic case. The risks of something worse are all too apparent. The speed of the west’s departure may confirm the Taliban in the view that time is on their side. Power could haemorrhage from the Afghan government, pushing the country into civil war. Even as it seeks to destabilise Afghanistan, Islamabad could lose control of the insurgency in Pakistan.

This more pessimistic – or is it realistic? – scenario might see the Pashtun territories of both countries succumbing to Taliban rule. That’s a population of 50m people under the control of extremists: and a prospect as threatening to governance in nuclear Pakistan as in Afghanistan.

Policymakers, of course, point to the series of victories over the Taliban since the surge in US troops in 2009. The bombings in Kabul, they say, are a reaction to Nato’s success in the south. But this is tactics not strategy. “What happens after 2014?” I asked a military commander. “We keep our fingers crossed.”

What else can we do, you hear others say. The west has become part of the problem. Ridding Afghanistan of foreigners is the Taliban’s most resonant rallying cry. A constitution designed for monocultural democracy was never going to work in a tribal society. Anyway, as the late Richard Holbrooke once caustically observed: “The enemy are al-Qaeda in Pakistan so why are we fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan?”

If military retreat was always inevitable, there are ways of doing it. Killing a few thousand more Taliban is not going to make the difference. No, the west owes it both to Afghanistan and its own forces to stretch every sinew in pursuit of a political settlement. Hillary Clinton promised as much recently when she pledged a political “surge” to promote reconciliation in Afghanistan and the engagement of neighbours in underwriting peace.

Better late, I suppose, than never. Honourable diplomats and military commanders are labouring mightily to this end. But they get no support from where it matters. My American friends tell me that the only metric that interests Barack Obama is the number of troops he can bring home before the 2012 presidential election.

David Cameron is adamant that Britain’s combat troops will be withdrawn in 2014 even if the Taliban are in the ascendancy. This mocks his assertion that the troops there now are vital to Britain’s security. It must be coincidental that Mr Cameron faces re-election in 2015.

An effort to advance a political strategy demands presidential and prime ministerial weight. It requires a willingness on Washington’s part to abandon preconditions (why insist on public fealty towards a constitution entirely unsuited to Afghan realities) for negotiations between the Kabul government and the Taliban. It means galvanising neighbours – coaxing and cajoling, and using every available lever to get India, Russia, China, and Iran as well as, critically, Pakistan into a regional contact group that would eventually underwrite a settlement. Afghanistan does not belong to the west, but its future is critical to the security of its neighbours.

No one should imagine this would be smooth or that success would be assured. There’s probably not a lot to be salvaged from the conflict in Afghanistan. The leaders prosecuting the war, however, might at least have the decency to make the effort.

Afghan FM sees 2011 as important year for his country
UNITED NATIONS, Sept. 29 (Xinhua) -- Zalmai Rassoul, the Afghan foreign minister, said here Thursday that the year 2011 is of "particular importance" to his country as it works to try and guarantee peace, democracy, and security for the future.

Rassoul's statement came when he was speaking at an open Security Council meeting on the current situation in Afghanistan.

"Firstly, it marks ten years since the end of the rule of the Taliban, culminating in the opening of a new chapter in our modern history; defined by a concerted effort to achieve what has eluded us Afghans for far too long: peace, stability, and prosperity," he said. "Over the past decade, we have come a long way in our joint efforts, and have much to show for our progress: in building our state-institutions, in ensuring our people with essential services; in enabling democracy to take root; and in upholding fundamental rights of all our citizens."

Rassoul explained that Afghanistan is working on improving its economic development prospects.

"In this regard, we are determined to maximize the potential offered by our natural resources to strengthen our economy," he said. "Furthermore, we have prioritized attracting foreign investments and building our infrastructure."

Two upcoming conferences will provide an opportunity for Afghanistan to work on building peace and prosperity.

The first conference, scheduled to take place in Istanbul, Turkey, in early November will aim to build a stronger future for Afghanistan in the context of the "Heart of Asia" region that surrounds it.

"In Istanbul, together with countries making up the Heart of Asia and other international partners, we will focus on defining a vision for regional peace and development," said Rassoul. "We will do this by soliciting concrete commitments to enhance confidence building, security, and political cooperation centered around Afghanistan."

In December, another event, the International Conference on Afghanistan, will be held in Bonn, Germany. The meeting will bring together stakeholders from all over the world to cultivate commitments to help Afghanistan further develop and maintain peace and security, even as foreign military forces are due to withdraw from the country by 2014 and Afghanistan must take over its own security.

"And in Bonn, we will brief the international community on our achievements over the past decade with a specific focus on transition, reconciliation, and regional cooperation," explained Rassoul. "We will also share our vision for the ten years after transition on consolidating our stability, democracy and economic development. Above all, at Bonn, we will call upon the international community for continued assistance beyond 2014."

The challenge of guaranteeing peace and security for Afghanistan is not yet over, said the foreign minister.

"Despite efforts to stabilize our country, Afghans still suffer from an endless campaign of terror carried out by Afghanistan's enemies," said Rassoul.

On Sept. 20, Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, former Afghan president and chairman of the high peace council (HPC), was assassinated by a suicide bomber.

"Professor Rabbani will be remembered for his distinguished service for the cause of peace in Afghanistan," Rassoul said. "But I want to assure the council that, despite this national loss, our reconciliation process will continue. On behalf of the Afghan people and government, I convey gratitude and appreciation for the outpouring of condolences and support received from around the world."

Other recent incidents include attacks in Kabul, the Afghan capital, on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) compound, the U.S. embassy, and the Intercontinental Hotel.

"The continued spate of attacks, which originate from terrorist sanctuaries and safe-havens beyond our borders, has generated an unprecedented level of anger and frustration among a wide spectrum of Afghan society," Rassoul said.

He reiterated Afghanistan's call for an end to sanctuaries for terrorist internationally.

"To help end the conflict, and meet the demands and aspirations of the Afghan people for a durable, dignified, and inclusive peace, we will work to bring back to social, economic, and political life all members of the armed opposition willing to renounce violence, sever ties with terrorist groups, and accept our constitution, including respect for human rights, women's rights in particular, " he said.

Rassoul expressed gratitude to the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) as well as the UN itself and other international partners for their assistance to Afghanistan in its time of need.

Afghanistan Has ‘World-Class’ Mineral Resources, U.S. Agency Says
Bloomberg By Nicole Gaouette Sep 30, 2011
Afghanistan has “world-class mineral resources” including rare-earth elements, gold, iron and copper, the U.S. Geological Survey said today.

Development of those resources may help the Obama administration and allies to build up Afghanistan’s economy, an initiative the U.S. says is essential to stabilizing the country and the region before U.S. forces withdraw in 2014.

“We all recognize that Afghanistan’s political future is linked to its economic future, and, in fact, to the future of the entire region,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Sept. 22.

The USGS used new and existing data to create detailed digital information packages of each mining area. The information will be distributed by the Afghan ministry of mines to companies interested in bidding for the mineral rights. The information “may make bidding and operating in these areas easier” and reduce investment risk, the report said.

“The mineral resources in Afghanistan have the potential to completely transform the nation’s economy,” Regina Dubey, acting director of a U.S. Defense Department task force that funded the study, said in a news release.

A spokesman for the Afghan embassy said the new data may help stimulate foreign investment. ‘Key to Peace’

“The key to peace in Afghanistan lies in our mineral resources because lasting security and stability is dependent on the amount of economic opportunity available to Afghans,” said spokesman Abduljalil Ghafoory. “For a peaceful future, Afghanistan needs to develop a sustainable economy: one that can provide jobs for the people but is not dependent on international assistance; and our extractive industries will have a crucial contribution to this end.”

Clinton made her comments at a meeting with 30 of her international counterparts on a “New Silk Road” initiative during the United Nations General Assembly last week. The initiative aims to encourage investment and create new economic and transit connections within the region. The group will meet in Istanbul, Bonn and Chicago in the coming months to work out details.

Rare-earth-based magnets and materials are used in Research In Motion Ltd. (RIM)’s BlackBerrys, Toyota Motor Corp. (7203)’s Prius cars, and military radar. China, a major producer of rare-earth minerals, has recently scaled back production.

For each “area of interest,” the USGS has listed the main and minor commodities as well as “possible commodities.” All the Areas of Interest were selected because they “could potentially support mineral production in the near future,” the report said.

The report offered no evaluation of the security situation in the selected areas.

Coalition data show drop in violence in Afghanistan; U.N. report says otherwise
Washington Post By Joshua Partlow Friday, September 30, 2011
KABUL - Let the battle of the war stats begin.

The U.S.-led coalition on Thursday released estimates of the violence in Afghanistan that painted a picture of improving security this summer, particularly in areas of the south where NATO has concentrated the bulk of its troops. The number of “enemy-initiated attacks” dropped 17 percent across the country from June to August compared with the same period last year, according to the NATO figures.

The data stand in contrast to a bleaker assessment released by the United Nations this week. The U.N. report said the average monthly number of “security incidents,” such as gun battles and roadside bombings, was 39 percent higher through August this year compared with the same period last year. In those eight months, the coalition noted a 2 percent drop in enemy attacks over last year.

The United Nations also reported that the number of civilians killed and wounded was 15 percent higher in the first half of this year than the same period last year.

The two batches of statistics represent strands of the competing narratives this summer in Afghanistan. The U.S. military has tended to be more optimistic that military progress was turning the tide against the Taliban, while the United Nations, nongovernmental organizations and Afghan officials have been more pessimistic about the state of the decade-long conflict.

The statistics in the two reports were difficult to compare directly because the coalition and the United Nations measure violence differently.

The coalition does not count as “security incidents” some of the things that the United Nations tallies, such as assassinations, arrests and weapons caches found, said German Brig. Gen. Carsten Jacobson, a NATO spokesman.

“Approximately 25 percent of the total U.N. security incidents are event types that ISAF does not include in its definition of security events,” Jacobson told reporters Thursday, referring to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force. The coalition said its data cover about 80 percent of the country and focused on where troops are deployed.

Over the past several years, violence has risen in the summer months and dropped in the winter, when it is more difficult for insurgents to cross Afghanistan’s snowy mountain passes. But the trend in 2011 has been different, coalition officials said. For the first time since 2007, the months from May through August were less violent than the same months the year before, the officials said.

The greatest declines were found in NATO’s regional command southwest, which includes Helmand province, the initial focus of the 30,000 additional troops President Obama dispatched to Afghanistan. In that part of the country, enemy-initiated attacks, which include roadside bombings, gunfire and mortar attacks, dropped 39 percent from June to August this year over last year, a “marked and consistent progress,” said Lt. Col. Bret Van Poppel, who specializes in tracking statistics for the coalition.

By contrast, this category of violence showed a 15 percent increase in eastern Afghanistan this summer over the last, according to the coalition. In that area, along the border with Pakistan, “we see a continued challenge in our security situation,” Van Poppel said.

The coalition did not specify the numbers of attacks. But according to its graphics — to be published online Friday — it counted more than 3,000 enemy attacks across the country in August; there were more than 4,000 in August last year. In August 2008, about 1,000 insurgent attacks occurred.

The U.N. report put the average monthly number of security incidents at 2,108 from January to August.

The Heat of the Afghan Night
'Kill/capture' missions have become excessive—and the politics of intelligence gathering are to blame.
Wall Street Journal By J. EDWARD CONWAY SEPTEMBER 30, 2011
Night raids by U.S. and British special forces are one of the most successful tactics for capturing high-value Taliban targets. However, like drone strikes they have long been unpopular with the Afghan population and government because of civilian casualties. Nevertheless, the use of night raids has continued to increase to the point where the costs now outweigh the benefits.

That's the message of several independent studies, the most recent of which was jointly released by the Open Society Foundations and the Liaison Office earlier this month. But none of these reports explains a critical reason why the use of night raids, otherwise known as kill/capture operations, has expanded beyond the point of diminishing returns: the bureaucratic politics of intelligence analysis.

Raids are the final stage of a process that starts with analysts identifying an insurgent target, making a case for the individual's capture and providing detailed information on the target's location. These analysts are usually asked to find targets based on function, geography or a combination of the two. One analyst might be looking for bomb makers in Jalalabad while another is hunting commanders in the Haqqani network.

Intelligence analysts are responsible both for understanding their target network and for recommending action to degrade that network. In theory, recommendations can be as diverse as building a school or a well in location X or pressuring the local government to prosecute a particular corrupt official. In the past, proposing an individual's capture was reserved for the most extreme cases.

Today, however, "kill/capture" is the most commonly suggested course of action by intelligence analysts. The reason is that such operations are almost always conducted by special forces, and special forces trust the analysts and act on their recommendations, because their past association has proven successful. Conventional forces—the Marines and soldiers who execute more complicated, long-term operations aimed at winning hearts and minds—do not have the same association or trust.

Conventional forces view analysts with a "don't tell me how to do my job" mentality. Over time, that has encouraged analysts to gravitate toward supporting special forces and away from generating more complicated courses of action better aligned with counterinsurgency objectives.

Field officers typically complain that intelligence analysts do not understand what is happening on the ground, and so their more "creative" courses of action are not feasible. While this may often be the case, the blame should fall in part on conventional field officers for not allowing analysts access.

On one of my deployments to Iraq as an analyst back in 2007, I was assigned an insurgent group based out of Basra, in the south of the country. But I was located behind a desk in Baghdad. When I petitioned my boss to go down to Basra, he axed the idea because Basra was "the second most dangerous city in Iraq." The most dangerous, of course, was Baghdad.

The situation in Afghanistan is the same. Despite desperate, sometimes even public calls to reform the relationship between conventional forces and intelligence analysts, little has changed. Instead of conventional forces stepping up communication with analysts, it is the special forces who invite them to small forward operating bases in remote areas and give them increased access to detainees.

This helps improve the accuracy of targeting and reduce civilian casualties during night raids, as the Open Society/Liaison Office report acknowledges. Yet it is not a solution to the underlying problem. Because special forces are in Afghanistan to execute kill/capture operations, their efforts to strengthen the analyst-operator bond result in even more such missions.

Until conventional forces place the same amount of trust in analysts as special forces do, analysts will continue to tailor their targeting to the abilities of special forces. Every report that criticizes night raids also contains an implicit criticism of conventional forces for failing to leverage the thousands of analysts who signed up to deploy to Afghanistan for the same reason as their military brethren: to make a difference.

Mr. Conway is a doctoral candidate at the University of St Andrews in Scotland and a former analyst for the U.S. Department of Defense.

Afghan Police and Army Still Not Ready to Safeguard Civilians
The Huffngton Post By Louis Belanger Spokesperson, Oxfam; Based in NYC 29/09/2011
Police abuses need to be tackled as Afghan conflict reaches tenth year

The Afghan army and especially the police are still not ready to properly safeguard civilians, as 20,000 police have yet to receive training and the force routinely does not investigate civilian deaths at its own hands.

In a report published today, aid agency Oxfam urged Afghanistan's international allies to tackle police abuses and prioritise the reform of the police force in handover plans for Afghanistan.

As western military intervention in Afghanistan approaches its tenth year, Oxfam says that despite some improvements in police training, which has increased from six to eight weeks and now has a human rights component, there are continued reports of members of Afghan police abusing civilians with impunity.

Oxfam said in the absence of training on the use of lethal force, police readily resort to firing into crowds with live ammunition. At least 25 civilians were killed and 159 were injured in the first six months of this year in crowd control incidents. The agency also said that there were continued reports of the sexual abuse and exploitation of young boys by the police and that abuse of prisoners in detention facilities had led to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to suspend transfer of detainees to Afghan custody.

The aid agency said allegations of misconduct by the police were inadequately investigated and there was a lack of understanding about what accountability to civilians actually means. None of the crowd control incidents, despite having resulted in substantial civilians casualties at the hands of the police, have been investigated. For example, some 10 civilians were killed in a crowd control incident in Kandahar in April, but the Afghan Ministry of Interior said that was not being investigated as no one had filed a complaint. Oxfam called on Afghanistan's international allies to ensure that all such incidents and allegations against the police were investigated thoroughly, transparently and without political interference.

Oxfam also called on the international community to ensure that the estimated 20,000 police who are yet to receive any training are urgently trained; and to consider longer term training for police officers. Currently there is no further training for police once they have completed the eight-week course, whereas new UK police recruits receive refresher training over a two-year period.

Asuntha Charles, Country Director of Oxfam in Afghanistan said: "Many Afghans regard the police as a force to be feared - not a force to trust. But trained security forces that are accountable to their own people are vital for establishing lasting security in Afghanistan. For most of this decade, the international community has focused on getting boots on the ground, rather than the quality of the recruits. Many Afghans believe - justifiably so - that Afghan soldiers and police are able to carry out abuse with impunity. The international community has to change this before it's too late and make sure that Afghans have a police force that they can trust to protect them."

Oxfam said given the endemic levels of violence against women in Afghanistan, the international community needed to encourage the Afghan government to make greater efforts to recruit women into the police force. Almost 90 per cent of Afghan women have experienced at least one form of physical, sexual or psychological violence at some point in their lives. But there are just 1,000 women in the security forces - less than half a per cent of the total. This is particularly problematic because many women will only report crimes to other women.

Oxfam also found that the Afghan army is ill-equipped to properly respond to civilian casualties that occur when civilians get caught in the crossfire in combat operations. Afghan forces have little investigatory capacities, no civilian casualty data tracking system and no systems in place to pay compensation to make amends for harm they have inadvertently caused. At the moment, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is responsible for tracking and investigating civilian casualties

Kabul: Streets with no names
By Tahir Qadiry BBC Persian TV 29 September 2011 BBC News
Kabul - There are few formal street names or house numbers in Kabul - so just how does a postman deliver the mail?

For the postmen of Kabul, navigating the maze of the city is a daunting task. It is a city of more than four million people and one in which hundreds of homes and streets are being developed every year.

There are few street names and house numbers, and the Central Post Office has yet to introduce a full postal code system.

So how does a letter find its way to the correct recipient?

At one of Kabul's Post Office distribution centres, I saw more than 30 private and official letters. None had an exact address - just a series of vague directions.

One, which had been sent from America, simply states, "Hamid Jaan, behind Darul-Aman palace".

Another directs the postman to a destination "behind Omar Jan Mosque", while the addressee of another apparently lives close to "Alauddin school".

"The receiver's address is always vague. They write the address as though I am a friend of the receiver," says Ahmad Omid, who has been working with Afghan Post for more than two years.

"Sometimes, it takes hours to deliver a letter."

Ahmad, who crosses the city by bike, says that finding addresses is based on personal knowledge and asking locals for help.

I accompanied Ahmad on his mission to deliver Hamid Jaan's letter from America.

We headed towards Darul-Aman, south of Kabul, a palace that was built 90 years ago during the reign of Amanullah Khan, the former Afghan king. It had been badly damaged during the civil war in the 1970s. Ask for the butcher

On our way, we asked almost everyone we met - from policemen to students - for help finding Hamid Jaan. One would say go straight, others would give us the address of a "Hamid Jaan" they knew of - but not the one we were after.

People in Afghanistan are predominantly known locally by their profession, and the Hamid we wanted turned out to be a butcher.

So, after two hours of cycling in the 32C heat, and asking about a dozen people, we arrived at Hamid Jaan's house. Mission accomplished.

Afghanistan became a member of the Universal Postal Union (UPU) in 1928, but it has taken since then for the country to begin to fully make use of its status.

For example, a number of private companies now work alongside the government postal services in delivering letters and packages.

Mohammad Yasin Rahmati, head of Kabul Post Office, says most of their business is made up of government offices. Fewer people are requiring their services for personal correspondence.

"With the usage of modern technology, like the internet, people send emails," he says.

Afghan Post has also embarked on a postal code and addressing system project, with technical assistance from the UPU, in an attempt to modernise the service.

"It will take some time for [people] to get used to it," says Mr Rahmati.

However, a postcode is only complete if streets have names and houses have numbers.

Businessman Abdul Ali Haidari sells street signs and house numbers to the residents of Afshar District. He had the idea after struggling himself to find places.

"When people came to our place, they would walk around for hours to find somewhere. The Kabul Municipality hasn't put up signs. So I decided to put signs on streets and houses in this place."

The problem is compounded by the fact that Kabul doesn't even have an official street map.

Some people, however, have resorted to drawing up their own.

Laurence Leusar, head of a cultural organisation funded by the French Embassy in Kabul, has relied on information provided by local residents to compile hers.

"It is always difficult to find a place in Kabul, you must rely on the locals for information," she says.

"When I go somewhere that takes half an hour, I allocate one hour to get there. Half an hour to get there and half an hour to search and ask the locals.

"It is fun, this way you get to know many Afghans."

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