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The Lion of the Panjshir
Written by: L. S. Carbonell on September 9, 2011 Lez Get Real lezgetreal.com
Today is the other tenth anniversay, the one too few Americans are aware of. Today is the tenth anniversary of the assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the Lion of the Panjshir, the leader of the Afghan Northern Alliance, the man who should have been president of Afghanistan these past nine years.
Charismatic, highly intelligent, well educated, a gifted linguist who spoke seven languages, Massoud was something of an enigma to many Westerners. He could have taken his education and his engineering degree and lived a comfortable life, instead he became a guerilla warrior. He so loved his Panjshir Valley, he blew up the entrance and cut it off from Afghanistan. He fought the Soviet invasion and their puppet government, but offered sanctuary to the last communist leader, Mohammad Najibullah. A devout Sunni Muslim who carried a book by Sufi mystic Ghazali with him, he fought the Saudi, Taliban and al Qaida interpretations of Islam. He was also, as seen in film from Canadian freelance journalist Arthur Kent, a man with a wickedly dry sense of humor who could joke about a Soviet rocket attack on his camp being an inconvenient break in his lunch.
Massoud’s story has been told by many. His biography in Wikipedia is impressive and lists dozens of sources. The important parts are these – he was the opposite of a stereotypical Afghan warlord, a man who never sought personal power, but simply had the talent to lead people and used that power for the good of his nation and all the Afghan people. He worked well with the Clinton administration, but was not trusted by the Bush/Cheney administration. Massoud was branded a “drug dealer” by them because he tolerated the poppy growers and opium manufacturers. The fact was, Massoud tolerated them because he taxed the hell out of them to keep his army supplied. The CIA respected him even if the Bush/Cheney administration didn’t understand or appreciate him. European leaders, however, not only appreciated him, they courted his involvement. He traveled to Europe in April, 2001, and addressed the European Union Parliament. In addition to his request for humanitarian assistance for the people of Afghanistan, which was not recovering from the ravages of the Soviet invasion and the seemingly endless civil wars, he warned that his intelligence men had uncovered evidence of an imminent “huge scale” attack on the West. Massoud was by that time holding almost a quarter of Afghanistan against the Taliban, working in conjunction with another “warlord” named Abdul Rashid Dostrum.
By all accounts, life in Massoud’s territory was radically different from the rest of Afghanistan. He helped establish democratic governance in the region, encouraged rights for women, kept the territory peaceful, did not not permit any abuses of power or position by his men. He did not have enough reach to keep Kabul as serene as the Panjshir, however. Massoud told the world that the Taliban could be defeated if their support from Pakistan and al Qaida was cut off. They probably could have been.
When the Bush/Cheney administration captured and interrogated Zachariah Moussaoui, the so-called twentieth highjacker, he insisted he had not been trained for the 9-11 attack on America, but for an attack in Europe that had failed to mature. After Massoud’s warning, there were subtle increases in airport security in Europe, increased surveillance of known al Qaida groups, small things done to intimidate al Qaida in Europe without scaring the population. The planned attack on the EU Parliament building in Salzberg was scraped. The United States only asked Massoud to report any information he received about Osama bin Laden.
In August, Massoud conveyed the message that bin Laden was in residence at a farm in Afghanistan.
In mid-August, Massoud received a request for an interview from a pair of Belgian-Moroccan journalists. Massoud met with them ten years ago today. Their camera was packed with explosives. Two men died in the explosion, one of them a bomber. Three were injured, including Massoud. One bomber was captured and later shot “while trying to escape.” Massoud died in a helicopter flying to a military hospital in Tajikistan with his closest aide, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah at his side.
Dr. Abdullah immediately called the CIA and begged them to keep the news of Massoud’s death a secret. On September 10, the world knew that the Lion of the Panjshir was dead. On September 11, over 3,000 Americans died.
Many in the intelligence community believe that Massoud’s death served two purposes. It was bin Laden’s gift to the Taliban for their support – removing their greatest threat, and it may have been the signal to go through with the plans for 9-11. Dr. Abdullah feared that his friend’s death was meant as a signal for some action on the part of the Taliban or al Qaida, he just wasn’t sure what that action might have been. That is why he begged for secrecy.
Ahmad Shah Massoud was just 48 years and 7 days old when he died. He left a wife, Sediqa, a twelve-year-old son, Ahmad, and five daughters, Fatima, Mariam, Ayesha, Zohra and Nasrine, who was just three. His family is living in Iran, where Sediqa wrote a book about her life with the man named by President Hamid Karzai as the greatest hero in Afghan history. Massoud’s brothers continue to be involved in the rebuilding and governance of Afghanistan.
He is buried in his beloved Panjshir, a place he protected because it nurtured his soul. It is the most peaceful region of Afghanistan. There is one small American unit there, but the people have rebuilt the valley, not American contractors, just as they rebuilt it after each war and invasion. Dr. Abdullah ran against Hamid Karzai for the presidency, and has correctly accused the election of being rigged. He worked with Karzai for a while, until their basic incompatibility on the issues of honesty and integrity made Dr. Abdullah leave the government.
Princeton University Professor Michael Barry wrote in Thoughts on Commander Massoud: “Massoud’s personal mysticism led him to fight without hatred, bitterness, or spirit of revenge, regarding armed conflict only as an imposed and necessary evil in order to defend his people’s freedom, certainly not as an end in itself to be enjoyed as bloodlust or intoxication with power. He always provided protection for humanitarian relief in the most difficult and dangerous circumstances, looked for reconciliation with defeated enemies, and invariably treated his war prisoners with humanity and dignity. To this I was witness … Such moral integrity in the midst of warfare ranks Massoud as one of the very few “philosopher kings” in history, that is, men who have been forced to wage war so as to protect their nation and people, but who detested war in itself and sought no personal political gain.”
A video camera packed with explosives robbed the Afghan people of a great leader. The men who set off that bomb also robbed America of nearly 10,000 lives lost on 9-11 and in combat in two wars, cost us tens of thousands of wounded and almost a trillion dollars, and cost Afghanistan and Iraq hundreds of thousands of civilian dead. So very much could have been so very different if Massoud had lived. It is rare in history for one man and one event to have so much impact, but this was the one man and the one event. It is not enough that Afghanistan honors his memory. We should as well. If Ahmad Shah Massoud had been the face of Islam for Americans instead of Osama bin Laden, how much better a nation we would be.
What If Ahmad Shah Masud, Afghanistan's 'Lion Of Panjshir,' Hadn't Been Killed?
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty September 9, 2011 By Farangis Najibullah
Just before Al-Qaeda achieved its defining moment with the terror attacks against the United States in 2001, it was in a gift-giving mood in Afghanistan.
On September 9, the terrorist organization paid back its Afghan hosts by taking out the Taliban regime's most powerful enemy -- Ahmad Shah Masud.
Before his assassination at the hands of two Al-Qaeda operatives posing as television journalists, Masud, an ethnic Tajik, enjoyed a reputation as a warrior, earning him the moniker "The Lion of Panjshir." He was as polarizing as he was charismatic, having earned as many friends as enemies while establishing himself as a successful mujahedin commander during the Soviet invasion and later as the leader of the Northern Alliance, which was taking on the fledgling Taliban.
By 2001, Masud was considered the last bulwark against the Taliban. From Afghanistan's northeastern provinces, including his stronghold in the Panjshir Valley, Masud commanded an estimated 12,000 troops and controlled between 5 to 10 percent of the country.
Masud's assassination ushered in dramatic changes for Afghanistan.
Within two days, Al-Qaeda would carry out the terrorist attacks against the United States, prompting Washington to begin the so-called "war on terror" whose centerpiece was the invasion of Afghanistan and the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Kabul.
Ten years later, peace has yet to come to Afghanistan. Taliban militants are still engaged in fighting against Afghan government forces. Tens of thousands of Western coalition troops remain on Afghan soil.
This week's anniversary of the 9/11 attacks has many pondering how their lives have changed in the last decade. Taking things one step further, one can ask many more questions:
How would the world look today had Masud not been killed?
Would Al-Qaeda have given the green light to its September 11 plans if he had lived?
Would Masud have regained the upper hand against the Taliban on his own?
Might Masud have emerged as the man to lead the country, instead of Hamid Karzai, following the Taliban's overthrow?
Different Opinions
Ahmad Sayeedi, a former Afghan diplomat, considers the possibilities and concludes, "I believe Masud would not have resisted the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan. Like other mujahedin leaders who received assistance from other countries. Masud, too, knew how to deal with foreign powers.
"America is a superpower, and I don’t believe Masud would have fought against the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. He would cooperate with them with understanding. After all, his closest friends -- Yunis Qanooni, Muhammad Fahim, and Abdullah Abdullah -- are today among those who support pro-U.S. policies."
Sayeedi says some of Masud's allies in the Northern Alliance went on to occupy high posts in post-Taliban Afghanistan, but tarnished their reputations by getting involved in corruption, misuse of public office, and criminal activities.
Sayeedi suggests things might have been different had Masud lived.
"I believe Masud would not do the same," he says. "But would he be able to stop his supporters from going off-track? A lot would depend on that."
For many Afghans, Masud, who died at the age of 48, is known as a war hero and military commander, but not as a political leader. Would he, like many of his fellow mujahedin warriors, have involved himself in government and politics?
Siddiqullah Tawhidi, an Afghan journalist and Masud's friend, says he believes Masud's heart was elsewhere.
"Masud would dream of returning to civilian life," Tawhidi says. "But there are many people who would have wanted to see him in the highest post in this country.
"He used to say during interviews that once peace was restored, he would go back to the polytechnic university to complete his studies. And he wanted to work as a civilian engineer. It was his private dream. But I think he would be worthy of the presidency."
Born to the family of a colonel in the town of Bazarak in the Panjshir Valley, Masud grew up in Kabul, where his father had been given a post. After graduating from the French school of Al-Istiqlal in Kabul, Masud went to study at Kabul Polytechnic University. He joined the Muslim Youth League during his student years and subsequently became a guerrilla fighter.
He returned to Kabul in 1992 after the communist regime of President Najibullah was overthrown by mujahedin forces. Masud was appointed defense minister, but infighting would doom the mujahedin government.
Masud withdrew to the northeast in 1996, as the Taliban rapidly advanced toward the capital. Soon, the Panjshir Valley became one of the last remaining pockets of resistance.
The Legend Lives On
Masud's status in post-Taliban Afghanistan was officially cemented in 2002 when President Hamid Karzai named him a "national hero." But his legend lives strongest at the local level, in his birthplace, the Panjshir Valley, and in neighboring areas in the northeast.
There, posters of Masud -- wearing his trademark woolen hat, the pakol -- still hang along the streets and on the walls of teahouses, schools, and shops.
Masud has become a popular name for boys, says Maryam Panjshiri, a women's right activist and resident of Panjshir.
"People here always remember him and pay tribute to him. We don't need an anniversary to remember Masud," she says. Panjshiri believes Masud would have continued to play a crucial role in determining Afghanistan's fate if he hadn't been killed.
"Today, it feels like Afghanistan has no owner," Panjshiri says. "There is no peace in this country. When one part of Afghanistan becomes peaceful, a conflict arises in its other part. All kinds of foreigners interfere in our affairs. I don't think Masud would let that happen if he were alive today."
Opinions about Masud and of his role differ sharply. There are people who still worship him as a one-of-a-kind hero who fought for Afghanistan's freedom. Critics remember difficult days when mujahedin fighters, including Masud's Jamiat-i-Islami, launched rocket attacks on Kabul in the early 1990s, killing scores of civilians.
"For me, he is one of the mujahedin commanders who bombarded my city," says Shukriya Barekzai, an Afghan journalist and politician. "I lived in Kabul in those days and I have bitter memories. Ordinary people were killed. Mothers lost their children. We were exhausted from moving from one place to another trying to escape the fighting and bloodshed.
"I hold all mujahedin commanders and leaders accountable for that, and Masud was one of them."
As for what role Masud would have played today had he not been killed, Barekzai says, "Masud was a skilled military commander, but when the war is over, it is important what a leader can do to maintain lasting peace, to rebuild the war-ravaged country. I don't know what Masud would have done in that direction."
Some in Afghanistan say Masud's legend will always live on, killed as he was in his prime, at the peak of his struggle to save his country from a hard-line force that was dragging its people backward.
"He is a hero frozen in time and will always be remembered as a handsome and charming warrior who fought for peace," says his friend Tawhidi.
Taliban must face 'more pain' to talk: US envoy
By Katherine Haddon AFP News
The Taliban must feel "more pain" for peace talks to progress, the US ambassador to Kabul said, as Afghans marked a decade since the death of an iconic anti-Taliban fighter two days before 9/11.
Veteran diplomat Ryan Crocker indicated that insurgents needed to face increased military pressure while admitting that efforts to talk peace with them had so far failed to produce concrete results.
"The Taliban needs to feel more pain before you get to a real readiness to reconcile," Crocker, who started his job in July, said in an interview with the Wall Street Journal.
His comments came despite the presence of most of the 33,000 US "surge" troops ordered into Afghanistan in late 2009, and underlined shaky progress in finding a political solution to the war.
Early withdrawals of some of the 140,000 foreign troops in the country have already begun, with all combat forces due to leave by the end of 2014.
The remarks were published on the day Afghans marked the 10th anniversary of the death of Ahmad Shah Massoud, a charismatic commander who led the last bastion of resistance against the Taliban and was killed by an Al-Qaeda bomb.
Some experts say the assassination was linked to the September 11 plot as an Al-Qaeda plan to ensure Taliban leader Mullah Omar would continue to support them after the Twin Towers attacks, despite the certainty of US retribution.
Others argue it came at Omar's behest as the Taliban sought to wipe out Massoud's Northern Alliance, without him knowing in advance about Al-Qaeda's plan to stage the 9/11 attacks.
Northern Alliance fighters joined the United States in the October 2001 invasion of Afghanistan to topple the Taliban. But the Islamist militia revived in the years since to drive the ongoing insurgency against US-led troops.
Massoud, known as the "Lion of Panjshir", is still revered in many parts of Afghanistan and the date of his death is a national holiday.
In Kabul, Afghan President Hamid Karzai failed to make a public appearance to mark the anniversary amid even tighter security than usual across the city.
At a landmark city roundabout named after Massoud, around 200 people gathered chanting "Long live Massoud, we follow your way" while carrying black flags in mourning.
Other government officials gave speeches remembering Massoud.
The 10th anniversary of Massoud's death has put the spotlight back on what progress is being made in the Afghanistan war after a decade of hard sacrifice.
The war has cost the United States alone at least $444 billion, while 2,705 foreign troops have died, according to independent website iCasualties.org.
Afghan and Western diplomats are hoping that progress in peace talks can be made in parallel to the military effort to destroy the Taliban, stepped up by a surge of US forces last year who are now being pulled out.
But they now accept efforts to set up serious peace talks are likely to take longer than was originally expected and that reported contacts with Omar's former private secretary in Germany and Qatar have broken down.
Of the tentative peace negotiations with high-level Taliban, Crocker confirmed that Karzai's High Peace Council, set up last year, had had little success in producing firm results.
"They are still just kind of feeling each other out at this stage," Crocker told the paper.
Further highlighting the challenges facing a political solution, a senior general said Thursday that efforts to persuade low-level Taliban fighters to "reintegrate" with pro-government forces were making only "modest" progress.
Major General Phil Jones, the Briton who oversees the foreign force's "reintegration" effort, said about 10 percent of insurgents -- 2,418 out of roughly 25,000 -- had switched sides since the programme launched last July.
"It's clear that the number of formal reintegrees is still relatively modest in comparison to our scale of ambition," Jones told reporters in Washington via video link from Kabul.
Meanwhile, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon again stressed that the UN was ready to assist and advise the Karzai administration over negotiations with insurgents.
"There should always be a political dialogue and there is a consensus in the international community that there needs to be some sort of negotiation," he said in Canberra.
Afghans observe 10th martyrdom anniversary of Ahmad Shah Masoud
KABUL, Sept. 9 (Xinhua) -- The people and the government of Afghanistan observed the 10th death anniversary of late Afghan resistance leader Ahmad Shah Masoud on Friday.
Recognized as national hero, Masoud who fought against the former Soviet Union occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 and resisted Taliban outfit onslaught from 1996 until his death, was assassinated on Sept. 9, 2001.
Two Arab nationals disguised themselves as journalists and committed the first suicide attack in Afghanistan and killed Masoud during an interview in Khaja Bahaudin district in northern Takhar province.
In a ceremony held here to commemorate the late Masoud and pay tribute to his services, Afghan first Vice President Mohammad Qasim Fahim in his speech urged his countrymen to contribute for strengthening peace and reconstruction process of their war- battered Afghanistan.
Without naming Taliban or any particular armed opposition groups, Fahim said that the government is ready for talks, adding, "we are ready for negotiation and through talks and understanding we can take the country towards stability and prosperity."
In his short speech, Ahmad Wali Masoud the brother of late Ahmad Shah Masoud called for formation of a special commission to initiate a probe into the assassination case of Afghan national hero the late Masoud in order to expose those individuals and agencies behind his murder.
Similar ceremonies have also been held in other cities of the country to mark Afghanistan's national hero services and pay tribute to the known and unknown martyrs of the country.
Extra civilians in Afghanistan cost $2 billion
By PAULINE JELINEK - Associated Press
WASHINGTON (AP) — It cost nearly $2 billion over the last two years to send hundreds of extra U.S. civilians to Afghanistan to help with development projects, the economy and training Afghan government officials, a report said Thursday.
Sending just one employee to Afghanistan for one year, excluding infrastructure and security needed to support that person, costs the government between $410,000 and $570,000, according to the joint report by the offices of the State Department inspector general and the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction.
The report was released as senior U.S. and Afghan officials opened a third round of talks at the State Department and White House on an agreement that would govern relations between the countries after U.S. forces pull out. The two sides remain split over terms for U.S. use of bases in Afghanistan after 2014, among other things. Afghanistan is seeking a stronger, more binding agreement than the U.S. has offered, and negotiations have lagged.
The report on the cost of civilian operations said that determining future costs will be a challenge amid U.S. budget uncertainties and because it's not known exactly how many civilians will be needed in Afghanistan as troops are withdrawn.
Civilians from the departments of State, Agriculture and Justice and from other agencies increased to 1,040 in June from 320 in early 2009, the report said. The boost was a key element in efforts to improve the Afghans' ability to govern themselves.
"State and other agencies are likely to experience increased costs related to an expanded civilian presence in Afghanistan, and State faces significant challenges in planning to address these costs," the report said. The military's withdrawal will likely lead to more costs for the State Department as it opens new consulates and assumes some key security activities now done by troops.
At the State Department, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Afghanistan's national security adviser, Rangin Dadfar Spanta, met as part of the effort to produce a strategic partnership document that lays out the scope and scale of long-term cooperation. The department said the framework will reaffirm shared values and a commitment to a stable, independent Afghanistan that is not a haven for extremists.
The agreement, now in draft form, would give the U.S. use of Afghan-run or jointly run bases after 2014, when the formal combat role is set to end. Senior U.S. officials have said its central function is to provide assurance to Afghans that the U.S. will not shut the door on Afghanistan in 2014, while establishing terms for continued U.S. counterterrorism, training and counternarcotics operations.
U.S. officials stress that U.S. military presence will be at Afghanistan's invitation. A State Department notice about the talks said the U.S. would respect Afghan sovereignty and noted that there were no plans for permanent American military bases in Afghanistan or "a presence that would be a threat to any of Afghanistan's neighbors."
Lower-level meetings will continue at the White House on Friday.
State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said that the U.S. hoped for progress but didn't expect to complete the framework at this round of talks. Senior U.S. and Afghan officials have said they hope to complete the deal ahead of an international conference on Afghanistan's future in Bonn, Germany, in December, although there is no deadline for an agreement.
___
Associated Press writer Matthew Lee contributed to this report.
ISAF: Reporter killed in Afghanistan in case of mistaken identity
By the CNN Wire Staff September 9, 2011
(CNN) -- A reporter was killed by a U.S. service member last July in southern Afghanistan in a case of mistaken identity, according to the results of an investigation by NATO's International Security Assistance Force.
Ahmad Omid Khpalwak -- a free-lancer for the BBC and Pajhwok News Agency in Afghanistan -- was killed during an insurgent attack in the Uruzgan province city of Tarin Kowt on July 28. He was 25 and joined the BBC in May 2008 as a stringer, the network said.
"Mr. Khpalwak was shot by an ISAF member who believed he was an insurgent that posed a threat and was about to detonate a suicide vest improvised explosive device," the NATO-led force said in a statement Thursday. ISAF identified the soldiers at the scene as Americans.
"The investigating officer found that the ISAF member involved in this incident complied with the laws of armed conflict and rules of engagement and acted reasonably under the circumstances."
Peter Horrocks, director BBC Global News, said the death is "a tragedy for his family and friends as well as his colleagues at the BBC."
It "further highlights the great dangers facing journalists who put their lives on the line to provide vital news from around the world," he said. "It is essential that journalists are given the best possible protection whilst reporting in dangerous situations so that the world can hear their stories."
Insurgents staged what ISAF said was a "complex attack" on a number of targets, including the provincial governor's compound and the Radio Television Afghanistan compound. The Committee to Protect Journalists said at least 22 people were killed and 37 people were injured.
Gen. John R. Allen, commander of ISAF, appointed an independent investigating officer to examine the circumstances of the death.
The report said two insurgents gained entry to the RTA compound when they used a car bomb to destroy a gate and a section of the wall.
From inside the building they traded fire with uniformed Afghan forces and shot at U.S. soldiers arriving at the scene. The firing from the insurgents eventually stopped amid escalating force by the Americans.
Afghan leadership told the forces that two suicide bombers were in the RTA building and that they "were not aware of any civilians present," ISAF said.
"Upon U.S. soldiers entering the RTA building, the two suicide bombers detonated their explosives, collapsing the front walls of the building and trapping members of the clearing team under heavy brick debris," ISAF said.
As some soldiers aided the injured, some continued clearing building remains and others "remained in overwatch to provide security."
During the clearing operation, a soldier "identified movement of a young adult male in the building through a large hole in a broken wall."
"The room the man was in was immediately adjacent to the room where one of the suicide bombers had detonated his suicide vest IED, and across the hall from the other suicide vest detonation, just minutes before," ISAF said.
The soldier heard a shot he thought was from the man's "exact location." ISAF said "it is probable that the shot he heard was actually fire by a soldier inside the building during the building clearing."
The soldier "assessed the individual he observed to be enemy and fired a single round which did not strike him. In the stress and urgency of the moment, it is highly probable that soldiers in the courtyard outside the building incorrectly perceived that shot as having been fired by the man in the building."
ISAF said several soldiers thought the man was shooting, and called out warnings.
"A soldier was directed to move up to the broken wall where the man was seen. As the soldier approached he observed a young adult male with a beard with something clinched in one of his fists and reaching for something on his person with his other hand."
The soldier assessed the actions as those of a suicide bomber who was working to detonate an IED that "posed a lethal threat."
The soldier shot and killed the man. They later discovered that the man was Khpalwak. No weapon was found on him.
"It appears that all the rounds perceived as coming from his location were instead fired by U.S. soldiers," ISAF said.
The BBC said the "confusion surrounding the circumstances" intensified "the tragedy felt by the journalist's family and colleagues."
"The BBC recognizes that ISAF has provided clarification that he was killed by a U.S. soldier, ending a period of uncertainty," the network said in a statement. "We will be studying the details of the findings and await receipt of the full report."
CNN's Joe Sterling contributed to this report
The Uncontrollable Momentum of War
By RORY STEWART The New York Times September 9, 2011
The initial decision to strike back after the 9/11 attacks is easy to understand. History, however, will ask not why the West invaded Afghanistan, but why did it stay so long?
Why, a decade after 9/11, were there still 140,000 coalition troops on the ground? Why were there so many civilian casualties in May and June 2011 — more than in any preceding recorded month? Why had the United States been in Afghanistan for twice the length of World War II?
The conventional answer to all these questions is that Afghanistan still poses an existential threat to global security. In March 2009, presenting his strategy for a surge in troop numbers, President Obama said, “If the Afghan government falls to the Taliban ... that country will again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can.”
These fears are reinforced by a domino theory that if Afghanistan falls, Pakistan will follow, and the Taliban will get their hands on nuclear weapons.
Every one of these claims is wrong.
First, Afghanistan poses less of a threat to global security than has been imagined. The Taliban are extremely unlikely to be able to seize Kabul, even if there was a very significant reduction in foreign troops. In the unlikely event they succeeded, they are even more unlikely to invite Al Qaeda back: Many Taliban leaders see that connection as their fundamental mistake before 9/11 and believe that if they had not supported Al Qaeda, they would still be in power.
And even with a foothold in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda wouldn’t significantly strengthen its ability to harm the West. The U.S. would respond much more vigorously than it did before 9/11 if Al Qaeda bases were detected in Afghanistan, and the Taliban could offer little protection.
If the question is about regional stability, Egypt is more important than Afghanistan. If the concern is terrorism, Pakistan is more important. And Pakistan’s security won’t be determined by events across the border but by its own internal politics, economic decline and toxic relationship with India. Afghanistan isn’t strategically important enough to justify the West’s current level of military and humanitarian investment — and failure there is inevitable unless we reverse course.
Consider the conventional wisdom that following the fall of Kabul, the West was distracted by Iraq and maintained too light a footprint in Afghanistan, failing to provide sufficient money or troops for the mission. Afghans who initially welcomed a foreign military intervention were alienated by the slow pace of development and the poor governance. This lack of progress created the opening for the Taliban to return. According to this narrative, it was only Obama’s surge of 2009 that, in his words, “for the first time in years ... put in place the strategy and resources” so that by December 2010, the U.S. was “on track to achieve (its) goals.”
An irony is that the “light footprint” of the early years was relatively successful — Al Qaeda members were driven out of the country almost immediately, and very quickly, school attendance improved dramatically, health clinics were rolled out, and mobile telephone usage exploded. Non-state-controlled media outlets were established and elections were held for the first time in decades. These are accomplishments worthy of pride, but sadly, the addition of more troops and resources to the NATO-led mission since 2006 has made the situation worse.
The tens of billions of dollars donated to the government of Afghanistan have undermined its leadership. The fashionable agendas of foreigners on short-term tours and their micromanagement have pushed aside the priorities of Afghan ministers. Many of the reconstruction projects have fueled waste and corruption. What’s more, the increases in foreign troops didn’t improve security: rather the reverse. Helmand is less safe in 2011 with 32,000 foreign troops in the province than it was in 2005, when there were only 300.
When I walked alone across central Afghanistan in the winter of 2001 and 2002, I found Afghan villagers to be hospitable and generous, but also far more conservative, insular and Islamist than foreigners acknowledged. When I returned to the country in 2006, to establish a nonprofit organization, it was clear that their resistance was inflamed by the increasingly heavy presence of Western troops, which allowed the Taliban to gain support by presenting themselves as fighters for Islam and Afghanistan against a foreign occupation.
In June, Obama announced a drawdown of U.S. forces, to be completed in 2014 with the handover of responsibility to Afghan forces. But a political settlement in the next three years is highly improbable because neither the Taliban, nor the Afghan government, nor Afghanistan’s neighbors are showing much commitment to compromise, in part because they still believe they can win.
Many people have pointed out the absurdity of the West’s approach. From 2008 to 2010, I ran the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School. The center’s research fellows collectively had more than a century of experience on the ground in Afghanistan. Research by fellows such as Andrew Wilder, David Mansfield and Michael Semple proved that our aid projects were increasing instability; that we were undermining any chance of political settlement with the Taliban; and that the Taliban-controlled areas were often more secure than the government areas. Their findings explained why our counterinsurgency strategy was empty and the “surge” was counterproductive, but they were often ignored by the military and political establishment, which has remained defiantly optimistic.
Over the last decade of war, many politicians have trusted charismatic, optimistic generals rather than their own instincts and reason. Concerns about the huge costs of the mission ($120 billion per year for the U.S. alone) and exaggerated fears about what would follow if it failed co-opted almost everyone: Afghan businessmen and foreign contractors, writers and academics. All continued to hope that some magic plan would extract us from humiliation.
At the heart of our irrational persistence are the demons of guilt and fear. Leaders are hypnotized by fears about global security; feel guilty about the loss of lives; ashamed at their inability to honor our promises to Afghans; and terrified of admitting defeat.
Failure in Afghanistan has become “not an option.” This is the fatal legacy of 9/11, because with that slogan, failure has become invisible, inconceivable and inevitable.
Rory Stewart is a member of the British Parliament, and the author of “The Places In Between,” about his solo walk across north-central Afghanistan in 2002.
Taliban claim new missiles downing aircraft
By Habiborrahman Ibrahimi Asia Times
KABUL - The Taliban say new missile consignments are allowing them to down increasing numbers of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aircraft. However, military officials and defense experts cast down on the claim, saying some helicopters have made forced landings after suffering technical problems, and any direct hits probably came from existing weapons.
An estimated 20 helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft belonging to both NATO and Afghan forces have either crashed or been forced to make emergency landings in the past six months.
In the deadliest incident of its kind since international forces entered Afghanistan 10 years ago, a Chinook helicopter carrying 30 US soldiers and eight Afghan colleagues crashed in Wardak province on August 6. NATO officials said the aircraft was probably hit by a rocket-propelled grenade, or RPG.
It was only one of several incidents involving helicopters within a matter of days. Helicopters reportedly came down in the southern Paktia province on August 8, in Khost on August 6 and in Kandahar on August 5. On July 25, a Chinook was brought down in the eastern Kunar region. NATO reports indicated that the aircraft were able to land and no one was killed in these incidents.
Taliban spokesman Zabihollah Mojahed told the Institute for War and Peace Reporting that the insurgents were hitting more aircraft because they had got hold of new surface-to-air missiles.
Without specifying the make or model, he indicated that they were portable, shoulder-launched weapons, and were being gradually rolled out to insurgent forces around Afghanistan. So far, they had been delivered to units in about half the country’s provinces.
"This is a very successful weapon, and the mujahideen in all provinces will soon be receiving it," he said.
Mojahed would not say what the country of origin of the new weapons was; he merely laughed and said the United States was making new enemies every day. "We can obtain anything we want, with the help of God," he said.
The Taliban spokesman said the international forces in Afghanistan "rely on their air power, but this will be defeated soon".
A spokesman for NATO's International Security Assistance Force, Brigadier-General Carsten Jacobsen, said three of the force's helicopters had been shot down by the Taliban, while other crashes and emergency landings were caused by technical problems.
In the case of the helicopter crash that killed 38 people in Wardak, Jacobsen said, "It is not clear whether the Taliban have obtained a new weapon, or used old weapons." He said an investigation was still ongoing, but all the indications were that a new weapon was not used in this case.
As well as NATO, the Afghan armed forces have their own fleet of helicopters. Defense Ministry spokesman General Zaher Azimi acknowledged that some had come down, but blamed this on technical breakdowns.
"Such things happen during military operations," he said, "but they don't mean the opposition has acquired new weapons or become stronger."
General Abdul Wahab Wardak, commander-in-chief of the Afghan Air Force, said the insurgents' claim to have sophisticated new weapons was just talk.
"The Taliban use this kind of propaganda to boost the morale of their fighters," he said.
After 30 years of conflict, weapons like Soviet-made machine guns were in plentiful supply, he said, and it was most likely these that were bringing down aircraft as part of bolder, more aggressive tactics employed by the Taliban in anticipation of the withdrawal of foreign troops, scheduled for 2014.
"Afghanistan is a mountainous country and NATO pilots aren't familiar with the topography," the general said. "They also make the mistake of flying at low altitude, so they can be targeted even with ordinary anti-aircraft weapons."
These general was referring to weapons like the antiquated but powerful Soviet-manufactured DShk heavy machine gun, RPG launchers and other arms capable - with a good aim - of hitting a low-flying helicopter, and still widely available.
From 1986, the US government supplied hundreds of Stinger missiles to Afghan mujahideen to allow them to strike at Soviet military helicopters, specifically the low-flying gunships that could pin them down.
After Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the Americans bought back as many of the missile systems as they could. Experts say that even if the shoulder-launched missiles the Taliban claim to have do exist, it is unlikely they are Stingers from the 1980s.
Not everyone dismisses the Taliban's claims of hitting more aircraft.
Nurolhaq Olumi, a politician from Kandahar and one-time general in the Afghan military, believes NATO is losing more helicopters to hostile fire than it is letting on.
"NATO generals are not telling the truth when they say their helicopters are carrying out emergency landings because of technical problems," he said. "The opposition forces really are hitting their aircraft as they fly at low altitudes."
Olumi said that if the Taliban had not yet got hold of new anti-aircraft systems, it was more than likely they would do so, and this would prolong the conflict. He said they would source such weapons in Iran or Pakistan - both countries that he believes "want NATO to fail in Afghanistan".
Habiborrahman Ibrahimi is a freelance reporter in Kabul.
On the Afghan frontline, U.S. soldiers see longer war ahead
By Nikola Solic Fri Sep 9, 2011 6:49am EDT
KUNAR, Afghanistan (Reuters) - U.S. soldiers deployed on the rugged mountains of eastern Afghanistan say the war isn't going away for another ten years, even after Washington pulls troops from a country locked in a deadly Islamist insurgency.
With failing public support for the war, President Barack Obama has announced a plan to gradually draw down the 100,000 troops in Afghanistan and hand over all security responsibilities to Afghan forces by the end of 2014.
But ten years after the September 11, 2011 attacks, which brought U.S. forces to Afghanistan, the country still faces a Taliban insurgency that the world's formidable military has been unable to quell.
For Captain Dan Mizak of the 27th Infantry Regiment from Cumberland, Maryland, deployed in Kunar on the violent border with Pakistan, the war in Afghanistan is far from over.
"I think one way or another the war is probably going to go on for another ten years," Mizak said.
"These people have been at war in this country for years and I think eventually, you know, we're going to leave but I think there's still going to be fighting going on. So, that's the way I feel about that."
Ten years ago, Mizak was an 18-year-old private in the U.S. army and now he's a captain doing the same thing he was trained to do back then, he said. Many others are on their third or fourth tour of duty.
"I don't think it's a traditional war where you can measure it on battles, but certainly I think we're doing something right when we got Bin Laden, and we're chipping away at the al Qaeda network, so I think we're making steps in the right direction to win the war on terrorism."
Months after al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was killed in Pakistan in a raid by U.S. Navy SEALS, violence is still at its worst levels in Afghanistan, with a resurgent Taliban insurgency taking the heaviest toll on both foreign forces and civilians.
ACTIVE FRONT
While the Taliban has been pushed out of some areas of its southern heartland, the insurgency has intensified along Afghanistan's eastern border with Pakistan.
Remote Kunar with its steep mountain valleys, where bin Laden once had his base, has become the more active front of the war against the Taliban.
The area is used by insurgent fighters as an infiltration and smuggling route from Pakistan, which is just over the mountains to the west. The United States had largely pulled out of Kunar a year ago, focusing the war effort on the southern base of the Taliban, but it has since added troops.
"After 9/11, I had an idea that it was going to be a long, hard campaign. These smaller wars, these savage little wars of peace tend to go on for a long time. They're not as quick and clean as America generally likes them to be," said Captain Tim Blair of the 22nd Infantry from Long Island, New York.
The nature of the enemy was such that the war could go on for a long time with varying intensity. If the United States is to be kept safe, then its soldiers had to go out and take the fight to the enemy.
"I've always kind of thought of the Afghanistan operation as kind of one of those bug lights or lamps that you put on your front porch during the summer months to help prevent the bugs from getting into the house," said First Lieutenant Edward Bachar from Freehold, New Jersey.
"You know, and that's the way I think of our efforts here. We take care of the bad guys in their backyard so the people in the United States don't have to worry about it."
U.S. officials said on Thursday there was a "credible but unconfirmed" threat ahead of the 10th anniversary of the September 11 attacks. It involved Washington D.C. and New York, which were targeted in al Qaeda attacks a decade ago.
A counter-terrorism official said intelligence pointed to possible car bomb attacks and added the threat information came from Pakistan's tribal areas which border Afghanistan.
Kevin Henderson, a staff sergeant from Palestine, Texas, said Americans had gone back to thinking they were invulnerable, but that was a mistake.
"And people in the United States and the world alike need to keep their eyes open and realize that this could happen over and over and over again. And it could be a lot worse."
But Joel Valette, a staff sergeant from California, who was in his fourth tour of duty in Afghanistan, said it was time to wind down, now that most of the objectives had been meet.
"I just. I don't agree with us staying here for another ten years. Because to me, it's pretty much useless since what we came here for we already accomplished."
(Writing by Sanjeev Miglani; Editing by Yoko Nishikawa; sanjeev.miglani.reuters.com)
NATO Commander, Pakistan army chief discuss security
ISLAMABAD, Sept. 9 (Xinhua) -- Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan met Pakistan's Army Chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and discussed " ways to improve regional security", said a U.S. spokesman Friday.
Gen. John R. Allen, during his visit in Pakistan on Thursday and Friday, also met with U.S. Embassy staff and received updates on the U.S. security assistance mission to Pakistan, the U.S. embassy spokesman said in a statement.
Gen. Allen's trip also included a visit to the 11th Corps Headquarters in Peshawar for an operational update and discussions about various topics of mutual interest and security near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, the spokesman said.
This is Gen. Allen's first visit to Pakistan as the NATO ISAF Commander.
Official sources said that Pakistan took up with the NATO commander the issue of attacks on its border check posts by Pakistani Taliban from Afghan territory.
The Pakistani army said that Pakistani Taliban who fled to Afghanistan as the result of major military operations were operating from Afghanistan's Kunar and Nuristan provinces.
The army said that nearly 300 Pakistan militants attacked seven Pakistani check posts in the border district of Chitral in the last week of August and killed about 27 Pakistani security men. Pakistan had summoned Afghan envoy to the Foreign Ministry for a formal protest.
Pakistani Taliban carried out several deadliest attacks from Afghan soil in recent weeks, killing border troops and civilians. They also kidnapped a group of Pakistani boys from the Bajaur tribal region who had gone to the mountainous region for picnic during the Muslim festival of Eid this month. Leader of Pakistani Taliban Maulvi Dadullah showed some of the kidnapped boys to a group of Afghan journalists in Kunar on Tuesday.
The army said that Pakistani Taliban have established bases in Afghanistan remote border regions where NATO and Afghan National Army has scant presence.
Sources said Islamabad was upset at the inability to hit bases of Pakistani Taliban on the side of the border, who are challenging Pakistani border check posts and civilians.
Counterfeit Dollars Flooding Afghanistan
September 8, 2011 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
KABUL -- Money-exchange dealers in Kabul say they are concerned by the large amounts of counterfeit foreign money that they say is entering Afghanistan from neighboring countries, RFE/RL's Radio Free Afghanistan reports.
Aminullah Owijdan, head of the Kabul-based Money Exchange Dealers Association, told RFE/RL that there has been a huge influx of fake U.S. dollars on Kabul's streets in recent weeks.
"We suspect that countries like Iran and Pakistan are attempting to discredit [and disrupt] Afghanistan's money markets," he said. "Therefore, we are urging the government and security forces to do more in the border areas to prevent [the fake money's] entry into the country."
Dealers have asked locals to report to the police if they find counterfeit banknotes, which are reportedly softer in texture than the originals.
Saif al-Din, professor of economics at Kabul University, told RFE/RL that the entrance of fake currencies into Afghanistan has damaged the economy and disrupted everyday business transactions.
"If the government and security forces are serious about finally tackling this problem, it has to put certain control mechanisms in place to detect forged money and keep it from entering Afghanistan in the first place," he said.
The Kabul Bank has thus far not commented publicly on the issue.
Pakistan: Taliban Plot To Free Bin Laden's Wives
ASHRAF KHAN 09/ 9/11 The Huffington Post
KARACHI — Pakistan is warning that the Taliban are plotting to secure the freedom of Osama bin Laden's wives and children by kidnapping a high-ranking government official and then offering to exchange him or her for the slain terror chief's family.
U.S. Navy seals killed bin Laden in a May helicopter-borne raid on his house in northwestern Pakistan.
They took the corpse with them, but left at least two of his wives and several children in the house. They were detained by Pakistani authorities.
Pakistan's interior ministry warned of the kidnap purported plot in a letter that was sent to top security officials on Aug 23 – just three days before gunmen seized Shahbaz Taseer, the son of a wealthy provincial governor who was killed by an Islamist militant earlier this year.
Interior Minister Rehman Malik said there was no evidence that the group that had seized Taseer from the streets of the Punjab provincial capital, Lahore, was hoping to exchange him for bin Laden's family members.
An Associated Press reported obtained a copy of the letter, stamped "secret" on Friday.
It said the information that led to the warning was reliable. It doesn't say which Pakistani official the Taliban plan to kidnap, but said the most likely location was one of the country's four provincial capitals.
Pakistan has reportedly released Taliban prisoners before in exchange for kidnapped government officials and army officers.
Taseer's kidnapping was the second high-profile abduction in Lahore in August. On Aug. 15, gunmen seized a 70-year-old American aid expert from his house. The man, Warren Weinstein, is still missing, and police have declined to speculate on who may be holding him.
Meanwhile, Pakistani police said they were preventing foreign journalists and other visitors from getting close to the house of bin Laden ahead of the 10th anniversary of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.
The Danish Ambassador to Pakistan and his wife, and two French journalists, were among several people detained this week in Abbottabad – the Pakistani garrison town that was bin Laden's last hideout.
They were held briefly before being allowed to return to the capital, Islamabad, police in the northern town said.
Ambassador Uffe Wolffhechel said he asked security officers at a checkpoint on the road to the house whether he and his wife could get in viewing range of it and "they said 'we are sorry, no,' and we shook hands and said 'have a nice day'."
He said they were then held for around two hours while officers checked their papers.
The U.S. operation that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in early May triggered embarrassing questions over how the CIA was able to track him down without the knowledge of Pakistan's powerful army and spy agencies. A backlash ensued, with authorities placing foreigners in Pakistan under greater scrutiny.
However, there have been no formal instructions to media organizations prohibiting their travel to Abbottabad.
Abbottabad police officer Karim Khan said the authorities were preventing journalists and foreigners from visiting the compound because it is regarded as evidence in investigations into how bin Laden lived there and how the CIA found him.
An editorial in the Dawn newspaper on Friday criticized the ban on foreigners visiting.
"Let's face it: the Bin Laden compound, as the site where the world's most wanted terrorist was found, killed and his body taken away in a raid of high drama, will continue to attract visitors," it said.
"The arbitrary restrictions imposed on visiting or filming in Abbottabad are thus untenable, and must be lifted to show the world that there is nothing there that Pakistan wants to hide."
In the days after the raid, hundreds of journalists traveled to the army town and were permitted – initially at least – to get as far as the door of the large, high-walled compound where bin Laden and his wives and children had been living for several years.
www.afghanistannewscenter.com
Written by: L. S. Carbonell on September 9, 2011 Lez Get Real lezgetreal.com
Today is the other tenth anniversay, the one too few Americans are aware of. Today is the tenth anniversary of the assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the Lion of the Panjshir, the leader of the Afghan Northern Alliance, the man who should have been president of Afghanistan these past nine years.
Charismatic, highly intelligent, well educated, a gifted linguist who spoke seven languages, Massoud was something of an enigma to many Westerners. He could have taken his education and his engineering degree and lived a comfortable life, instead he became a guerilla warrior. He so loved his Panjshir Valley, he blew up the entrance and cut it off from Afghanistan. He fought the Soviet invasion and their puppet government, but offered sanctuary to the last communist leader, Mohammad Najibullah. A devout Sunni Muslim who carried a book by Sufi mystic Ghazali with him, he fought the Saudi, Taliban and al Qaida interpretations of Islam. He was also, as seen in film from Canadian freelance journalist Arthur Kent, a man with a wickedly dry sense of humor who could joke about a Soviet rocket attack on his camp being an inconvenient break in his lunch.
Massoud’s story has been told by many. His biography in Wikipedia is impressive and lists dozens of sources. The important parts are these – he was the opposite of a stereotypical Afghan warlord, a man who never sought personal power, but simply had the talent to lead people and used that power for the good of his nation and all the Afghan people. He worked well with the Clinton administration, but was not trusted by the Bush/Cheney administration. Massoud was branded a “drug dealer” by them because he tolerated the poppy growers and opium manufacturers. The fact was, Massoud tolerated them because he taxed the hell out of them to keep his army supplied. The CIA respected him even if the Bush/Cheney administration didn’t understand or appreciate him. European leaders, however, not only appreciated him, they courted his involvement. He traveled to Europe in April, 2001, and addressed the European Union Parliament. In addition to his request for humanitarian assistance for the people of Afghanistan, which was not recovering from the ravages of the Soviet invasion and the seemingly endless civil wars, he warned that his intelligence men had uncovered evidence of an imminent “huge scale” attack on the West. Massoud was by that time holding almost a quarter of Afghanistan against the Taliban, working in conjunction with another “warlord” named Abdul Rashid Dostrum.
By all accounts, life in Massoud’s territory was radically different from the rest of Afghanistan. He helped establish democratic governance in the region, encouraged rights for women, kept the territory peaceful, did not not permit any abuses of power or position by his men. He did not have enough reach to keep Kabul as serene as the Panjshir, however. Massoud told the world that the Taliban could be defeated if their support from Pakistan and al Qaida was cut off. They probably could have been.
When the Bush/Cheney administration captured and interrogated Zachariah Moussaoui, the so-called twentieth highjacker, he insisted he had not been trained for the 9-11 attack on America, but for an attack in Europe that had failed to mature. After Massoud’s warning, there were subtle increases in airport security in Europe, increased surveillance of known al Qaida groups, small things done to intimidate al Qaida in Europe without scaring the population. The planned attack on the EU Parliament building in Salzberg was scraped. The United States only asked Massoud to report any information he received about Osama bin Laden.
In August, Massoud conveyed the message that bin Laden was in residence at a farm in Afghanistan.
In mid-August, Massoud received a request for an interview from a pair of Belgian-Moroccan journalists. Massoud met with them ten years ago today. Their camera was packed with explosives. Two men died in the explosion, one of them a bomber. Three were injured, including Massoud. One bomber was captured and later shot “while trying to escape.” Massoud died in a helicopter flying to a military hospital in Tajikistan with his closest aide, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah at his side.
Dr. Abdullah immediately called the CIA and begged them to keep the news of Massoud’s death a secret. On September 10, the world knew that the Lion of the Panjshir was dead. On September 11, over 3,000 Americans died.
Many in the intelligence community believe that Massoud’s death served two purposes. It was bin Laden’s gift to the Taliban for their support – removing their greatest threat, and it may have been the signal to go through with the plans for 9-11. Dr. Abdullah feared that his friend’s death was meant as a signal for some action on the part of the Taliban or al Qaida, he just wasn’t sure what that action might have been. That is why he begged for secrecy.
Ahmad Shah Massoud was just 48 years and 7 days old when he died. He left a wife, Sediqa, a twelve-year-old son, Ahmad, and five daughters, Fatima, Mariam, Ayesha, Zohra and Nasrine, who was just three. His family is living in Iran, where Sediqa wrote a book about her life with the man named by President Hamid Karzai as the greatest hero in Afghan history. Massoud’s brothers continue to be involved in the rebuilding and governance of Afghanistan.
He is buried in his beloved Panjshir, a place he protected because it nurtured his soul. It is the most peaceful region of Afghanistan. There is one small American unit there, but the people have rebuilt the valley, not American contractors, just as they rebuilt it after each war and invasion. Dr. Abdullah ran against Hamid Karzai for the presidency, and has correctly accused the election of being rigged. He worked with Karzai for a while, until their basic incompatibility on the issues of honesty and integrity made Dr. Abdullah leave the government.
Princeton University Professor Michael Barry wrote in Thoughts on Commander Massoud: “Massoud’s personal mysticism led him to fight without hatred, bitterness, or spirit of revenge, regarding armed conflict only as an imposed and necessary evil in order to defend his people’s freedom, certainly not as an end in itself to be enjoyed as bloodlust or intoxication with power. He always provided protection for humanitarian relief in the most difficult and dangerous circumstances, looked for reconciliation with defeated enemies, and invariably treated his war prisoners with humanity and dignity. To this I was witness … Such moral integrity in the midst of warfare ranks Massoud as one of the very few “philosopher kings” in history, that is, men who have been forced to wage war so as to protect their nation and people, but who detested war in itself and sought no personal political gain.”
A video camera packed with explosives robbed the Afghan people of a great leader. The men who set off that bomb also robbed America of nearly 10,000 lives lost on 9-11 and in combat in two wars, cost us tens of thousands of wounded and almost a trillion dollars, and cost Afghanistan and Iraq hundreds of thousands of civilian dead. So very much could have been so very different if Massoud had lived. It is rare in history for one man and one event to have so much impact, but this was the one man and the one event. It is not enough that Afghanistan honors his memory. We should as well. If Ahmad Shah Massoud had been the face of Islam for Americans instead of Osama bin Laden, how much better a nation we would be.
What If Ahmad Shah Masud, Afghanistan's 'Lion Of Panjshir,' Hadn't Been Killed?
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty September 9, 2011 By Farangis Najibullah
Just before Al-Qaeda achieved its defining moment with the terror attacks against the United States in 2001, it was in a gift-giving mood in Afghanistan.
On September 9, the terrorist organization paid back its Afghan hosts by taking out the Taliban regime's most powerful enemy -- Ahmad Shah Masud.
Before his assassination at the hands of two Al-Qaeda operatives posing as television journalists, Masud, an ethnic Tajik, enjoyed a reputation as a warrior, earning him the moniker "The Lion of Panjshir." He was as polarizing as he was charismatic, having earned as many friends as enemies while establishing himself as a successful mujahedin commander during the Soviet invasion and later as the leader of the Northern Alliance, which was taking on the fledgling Taliban.
By 2001, Masud was considered the last bulwark against the Taliban. From Afghanistan's northeastern provinces, including his stronghold in the Panjshir Valley, Masud commanded an estimated 12,000 troops and controlled between 5 to 10 percent of the country.
Masud's assassination ushered in dramatic changes for Afghanistan.
Within two days, Al-Qaeda would carry out the terrorist attacks against the United States, prompting Washington to begin the so-called "war on terror" whose centerpiece was the invasion of Afghanistan and the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Kabul.
Ten years later, peace has yet to come to Afghanistan. Taliban militants are still engaged in fighting against Afghan government forces. Tens of thousands of Western coalition troops remain on Afghan soil.
This week's anniversary of the 9/11 attacks has many pondering how their lives have changed in the last decade. Taking things one step further, one can ask many more questions:
How would the world look today had Masud not been killed?
Would Al-Qaeda have given the green light to its September 11 plans if he had lived?
Would Masud have regained the upper hand against the Taliban on his own?
Might Masud have emerged as the man to lead the country, instead of Hamid Karzai, following the Taliban's overthrow?
Different Opinions
Ahmad Sayeedi, a former Afghan diplomat, considers the possibilities and concludes, "I believe Masud would not have resisted the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan. Like other mujahedin leaders who received assistance from other countries. Masud, too, knew how to deal with foreign powers.
"America is a superpower, and I don’t believe Masud would have fought against the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. He would cooperate with them with understanding. After all, his closest friends -- Yunis Qanooni, Muhammad Fahim, and Abdullah Abdullah -- are today among those who support pro-U.S. policies."
Sayeedi says some of Masud's allies in the Northern Alliance went on to occupy high posts in post-Taliban Afghanistan, but tarnished their reputations by getting involved in corruption, misuse of public office, and criminal activities.
Sayeedi suggests things might have been different had Masud lived.
"I believe Masud would not do the same," he says. "But would he be able to stop his supporters from going off-track? A lot would depend on that."
For many Afghans, Masud, who died at the age of 48, is known as a war hero and military commander, but not as a political leader. Would he, like many of his fellow mujahedin warriors, have involved himself in government and politics?
Siddiqullah Tawhidi, an Afghan journalist and Masud's friend, says he believes Masud's heart was elsewhere.
"Masud would dream of returning to civilian life," Tawhidi says. "But there are many people who would have wanted to see him in the highest post in this country.
"He used to say during interviews that once peace was restored, he would go back to the polytechnic university to complete his studies. And he wanted to work as a civilian engineer. It was his private dream. But I think he would be worthy of the presidency."
Born to the family of a colonel in the town of Bazarak in the Panjshir Valley, Masud grew up in Kabul, where his father had been given a post. After graduating from the French school of Al-Istiqlal in Kabul, Masud went to study at Kabul Polytechnic University. He joined the Muslim Youth League during his student years and subsequently became a guerrilla fighter.
He returned to Kabul in 1992 after the communist regime of President Najibullah was overthrown by mujahedin forces. Masud was appointed defense minister, but infighting would doom the mujahedin government.
Masud withdrew to the northeast in 1996, as the Taliban rapidly advanced toward the capital. Soon, the Panjshir Valley became one of the last remaining pockets of resistance.
The Legend Lives On
Masud's status in post-Taliban Afghanistan was officially cemented in 2002 when President Hamid Karzai named him a "national hero." But his legend lives strongest at the local level, in his birthplace, the Panjshir Valley, and in neighboring areas in the northeast.
There, posters of Masud -- wearing his trademark woolen hat, the pakol -- still hang along the streets and on the walls of teahouses, schools, and shops.
Masud has become a popular name for boys, says Maryam Panjshiri, a women's right activist and resident of Panjshir.
"People here always remember him and pay tribute to him. We don't need an anniversary to remember Masud," she says. Panjshiri believes Masud would have continued to play a crucial role in determining Afghanistan's fate if he hadn't been killed.
"Today, it feels like Afghanistan has no owner," Panjshiri says. "There is no peace in this country. When one part of Afghanistan becomes peaceful, a conflict arises in its other part. All kinds of foreigners interfere in our affairs. I don't think Masud would let that happen if he were alive today."
Opinions about Masud and of his role differ sharply. There are people who still worship him as a one-of-a-kind hero who fought for Afghanistan's freedom. Critics remember difficult days when mujahedin fighters, including Masud's Jamiat-i-Islami, launched rocket attacks on Kabul in the early 1990s, killing scores of civilians.
"For me, he is one of the mujahedin commanders who bombarded my city," says Shukriya Barekzai, an Afghan journalist and politician. "I lived in Kabul in those days and I have bitter memories. Ordinary people were killed. Mothers lost their children. We were exhausted from moving from one place to another trying to escape the fighting and bloodshed.
"I hold all mujahedin commanders and leaders accountable for that, and Masud was one of them."
As for what role Masud would have played today had he not been killed, Barekzai says, "Masud was a skilled military commander, but when the war is over, it is important what a leader can do to maintain lasting peace, to rebuild the war-ravaged country. I don't know what Masud would have done in that direction."
Some in Afghanistan say Masud's legend will always live on, killed as he was in his prime, at the peak of his struggle to save his country from a hard-line force that was dragging its people backward.
"He is a hero frozen in time and will always be remembered as a handsome and charming warrior who fought for peace," says his friend Tawhidi.
Taliban must face 'more pain' to talk: US envoy
By Katherine Haddon AFP News
The Taliban must feel "more pain" for peace talks to progress, the US ambassador to Kabul said, as Afghans marked a decade since the death of an iconic anti-Taliban fighter two days before 9/11.
Veteran diplomat Ryan Crocker indicated that insurgents needed to face increased military pressure while admitting that efforts to talk peace with them had so far failed to produce concrete results.
"The Taliban needs to feel more pain before you get to a real readiness to reconcile," Crocker, who started his job in July, said in an interview with the Wall Street Journal.
His comments came despite the presence of most of the 33,000 US "surge" troops ordered into Afghanistan in late 2009, and underlined shaky progress in finding a political solution to the war.
Early withdrawals of some of the 140,000 foreign troops in the country have already begun, with all combat forces due to leave by the end of 2014.
The remarks were published on the day Afghans marked the 10th anniversary of the death of Ahmad Shah Massoud, a charismatic commander who led the last bastion of resistance against the Taliban and was killed by an Al-Qaeda bomb.
Some experts say the assassination was linked to the September 11 plot as an Al-Qaeda plan to ensure Taliban leader Mullah Omar would continue to support them after the Twin Towers attacks, despite the certainty of US retribution.
Others argue it came at Omar's behest as the Taliban sought to wipe out Massoud's Northern Alliance, without him knowing in advance about Al-Qaeda's plan to stage the 9/11 attacks.
Northern Alliance fighters joined the United States in the October 2001 invasion of Afghanistan to topple the Taliban. But the Islamist militia revived in the years since to drive the ongoing insurgency against US-led troops.
Massoud, known as the "Lion of Panjshir", is still revered in many parts of Afghanistan and the date of his death is a national holiday.
In Kabul, Afghan President Hamid Karzai failed to make a public appearance to mark the anniversary amid even tighter security than usual across the city.
At a landmark city roundabout named after Massoud, around 200 people gathered chanting "Long live Massoud, we follow your way" while carrying black flags in mourning.
Other government officials gave speeches remembering Massoud.
The 10th anniversary of Massoud's death has put the spotlight back on what progress is being made in the Afghanistan war after a decade of hard sacrifice.
The war has cost the United States alone at least $444 billion, while 2,705 foreign troops have died, according to independent website iCasualties.org.
Afghan and Western diplomats are hoping that progress in peace talks can be made in parallel to the military effort to destroy the Taliban, stepped up by a surge of US forces last year who are now being pulled out.
But they now accept efforts to set up serious peace talks are likely to take longer than was originally expected and that reported contacts with Omar's former private secretary in Germany and Qatar have broken down.
Of the tentative peace negotiations with high-level Taliban, Crocker confirmed that Karzai's High Peace Council, set up last year, had had little success in producing firm results.
"They are still just kind of feeling each other out at this stage," Crocker told the paper.
Further highlighting the challenges facing a political solution, a senior general said Thursday that efforts to persuade low-level Taliban fighters to "reintegrate" with pro-government forces were making only "modest" progress.
Major General Phil Jones, the Briton who oversees the foreign force's "reintegration" effort, said about 10 percent of insurgents -- 2,418 out of roughly 25,000 -- had switched sides since the programme launched last July.
"It's clear that the number of formal reintegrees is still relatively modest in comparison to our scale of ambition," Jones told reporters in Washington via video link from Kabul.
Meanwhile, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon again stressed that the UN was ready to assist and advise the Karzai administration over negotiations with insurgents.
"There should always be a political dialogue and there is a consensus in the international community that there needs to be some sort of negotiation," he said in Canberra.
Afghans observe 10th martyrdom anniversary of Ahmad Shah Masoud
KABUL, Sept. 9 (Xinhua) -- The people and the government of Afghanistan observed the 10th death anniversary of late Afghan resistance leader Ahmad Shah Masoud on Friday.
Recognized as national hero, Masoud who fought against the former Soviet Union occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 and resisted Taliban outfit onslaught from 1996 until his death, was assassinated on Sept. 9, 2001.
Two Arab nationals disguised themselves as journalists and committed the first suicide attack in Afghanistan and killed Masoud during an interview in Khaja Bahaudin district in northern Takhar province.
In a ceremony held here to commemorate the late Masoud and pay tribute to his services, Afghan first Vice President Mohammad Qasim Fahim in his speech urged his countrymen to contribute for strengthening peace and reconstruction process of their war- battered Afghanistan.
Without naming Taliban or any particular armed opposition groups, Fahim said that the government is ready for talks, adding, "we are ready for negotiation and through talks and understanding we can take the country towards stability and prosperity."
In his short speech, Ahmad Wali Masoud the brother of late Ahmad Shah Masoud called for formation of a special commission to initiate a probe into the assassination case of Afghan national hero the late Masoud in order to expose those individuals and agencies behind his murder.
Similar ceremonies have also been held in other cities of the country to mark Afghanistan's national hero services and pay tribute to the known and unknown martyrs of the country.
Extra civilians in Afghanistan cost $2 billion
By PAULINE JELINEK - Associated Press
WASHINGTON (AP) — It cost nearly $2 billion over the last two years to send hundreds of extra U.S. civilians to Afghanistan to help with development projects, the economy and training Afghan government officials, a report said Thursday.
Sending just one employee to Afghanistan for one year, excluding infrastructure and security needed to support that person, costs the government between $410,000 and $570,000, according to the joint report by the offices of the State Department inspector general and the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction.
The report was released as senior U.S. and Afghan officials opened a third round of talks at the State Department and White House on an agreement that would govern relations between the countries after U.S. forces pull out. The two sides remain split over terms for U.S. use of bases in Afghanistan after 2014, among other things. Afghanistan is seeking a stronger, more binding agreement than the U.S. has offered, and negotiations have lagged.
The report on the cost of civilian operations said that determining future costs will be a challenge amid U.S. budget uncertainties and because it's not known exactly how many civilians will be needed in Afghanistan as troops are withdrawn.
Civilians from the departments of State, Agriculture and Justice and from other agencies increased to 1,040 in June from 320 in early 2009, the report said. The boost was a key element in efforts to improve the Afghans' ability to govern themselves.
"State and other agencies are likely to experience increased costs related to an expanded civilian presence in Afghanistan, and State faces significant challenges in planning to address these costs," the report said. The military's withdrawal will likely lead to more costs for the State Department as it opens new consulates and assumes some key security activities now done by troops.
At the State Department, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Afghanistan's national security adviser, Rangin Dadfar Spanta, met as part of the effort to produce a strategic partnership document that lays out the scope and scale of long-term cooperation. The department said the framework will reaffirm shared values and a commitment to a stable, independent Afghanistan that is not a haven for extremists.
The agreement, now in draft form, would give the U.S. use of Afghan-run or jointly run bases after 2014, when the formal combat role is set to end. Senior U.S. officials have said its central function is to provide assurance to Afghans that the U.S. will not shut the door on Afghanistan in 2014, while establishing terms for continued U.S. counterterrorism, training and counternarcotics operations.
U.S. officials stress that U.S. military presence will be at Afghanistan's invitation. A State Department notice about the talks said the U.S. would respect Afghan sovereignty and noted that there were no plans for permanent American military bases in Afghanistan or "a presence that would be a threat to any of Afghanistan's neighbors."
Lower-level meetings will continue at the White House on Friday.
State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said that the U.S. hoped for progress but didn't expect to complete the framework at this round of talks. Senior U.S. and Afghan officials have said they hope to complete the deal ahead of an international conference on Afghanistan's future in Bonn, Germany, in December, although there is no deadline for an agreement.
___
Associated Press writer Matthew Lee contributed to this report.
ISAF: Reporter killed in Afghanistan in case of mistaken identity
By the CNN Wire Staff September 9, 2011
(CNN) -- A reporter was killed by a U.S. service member last July in southern Afghanistan in a case of mistaken identity, according to the results of an investigation by NATO's International Security Assistance Force.
Ahmad Omid Khpalwak -- a free-lancer for the BBC and Pajhwok News Agency in Afghanistan -- was killed during an insurgent attack in the Uruzgan province city of Tarin Kowt on July 28. He was 25 and joined the BBC in May 2008 as a stringer, the network said.
"Mr. Khpalwak was shot by an ISAF member who believed he was an insurgent that posed a threat and was about to detonate a suicide vest improvised explosive device," the NATO-led force said in a statement Thursday. ISAF identified the soldiers at the scene as Americans.
"The investigating officer found that the ISAF member involved in this incident complied with the laws of armed conflict and rules of engagement and acted reasonably under the circumstances."
Peter Horrocks, director BBC Global News, said the death is "a tragedy for his family and friends as well as his colleagues at the BBC."
It "further highlights the great dangers facing journalists who put their lives on the line to provide vital news from around the world," he said. "It is essential that journalists are given the best possible protection whilst reporting in dangerous situations so that the world can hear their stories."
Insurgents staged what ISAF said was a "complex attack" on a number of targets, including the provincial governor's compound and the Radio Television Afghanistan compound. The Committee to Protect Journalists said at least 22 people were killed and 37 people were injured.
Gen. John R. Allen, commander of ISAF, appointed an independent investigating officer to examine the circumstances of the death.
The report said two insurgents gained entry to the RTA compound when they used a car bomb to destroy a gate and a section of the wall.
From inside the building they traded fire with uniformed Afghan forces and shot at U.S. soldiers arriving at the scene. The firing from the insurgents eventually stopped amid escalating force by the Americans.
Afghan leadership told the forces that two suicide bombers were in the RTA building and that they "were not aware of any civilians present," ISAF said.
"Upon U.S. soldiers entering the RTA building, the two suicide bombers detonated their explosives, collapsing the front walls of the building and trapping members of the clearing team under heavy brick debris," ISAF said.
As some soldiers aided the injured, some continued clearing building remains and others "remained in overwatch to provide security."
During the clearing operation, a soldier "identified movement of a young adult male in the building through a large hole in a broken wall."
"The room the man was in was immediately adjacent to the room where one of the suicide bombers had detonated his suicide vest IED, and across the hall from the other suicide vest detonation, just minutes before," ISAF said.
The soldier heard a shot he thought was from the man's "exact location." ISAF said "it is probable that the shot he heard was actually fire by a soldier inside the building during the building clearing."
The soldier "assessed the individual he observed to be enemy and fired a single round which did not strike him. In the stress and urgency of the moment, it is highly probable that soldiers in the courtyard outside the building incorrectly perceived that shot as having been fired by the man in the building."
ISAF said several soldiers thought the man was shooting, and called out warnings.
"A soldier was directed to move up to the broken wall where the man was seen. As the soldier approached he observed a young adult male with a beard with something clinched in one of his fists and reaching for something on his person with his other hand."
The soldier assessed the actions as those of a suicide bomber who was working to detonate an IED that "posed a lethal threat."
The soldier shot and killed the man. They later discovered that the man was Khpalwak. No weapon was found on him.
"It appears that all the rounds perceived as coming from his location were instead fired by U.S. soldiers," ISAF said.
The BBC said the "confusion surrounding the circumstances" intensified "the tragedy felt by the journalist's family and colleagues."
"The BBC recognizes that ISAF has provided clarification that he was killed by a U.S. soldier, ending a period of uncertainty," the network said in a statement. "We will be studying the details of the findings and await receipt of the full report."
CNN's Joe Sterling contributed to this report
The Uncontrollable Momentum of War
By RORY STEWART The New York Times September 9, 2011
The initial decision to strike back after the 9/11 attacks is easy to understand. History, however, will ask not why the West invaded Afghanistan, but why did it stay so long?
Why, a decade after 9/11, were there still 140,000 coalition troops on the ground? Why were there so many civilian casualties in May and June 2011 — more than in any preceding recorded month? Why had the United States been in Afghanistan for twice the length of World War II?
The conventional answer to all these questions is that Afghanistan still poses an existential threat to global security. In March 2009, presenting his strategy for a surge in troop numbers, President Obama said, “If the Afghan government falls to the Taliban ... that country will again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can.”
These fears are reinforced by a domino theory that if Afghanistan falls, Pakistan will follow, and the Taliban will get their hands on nuclear weapons.
Every one of these claims is wrong.
First, Afghanistan poses less of a threat to global security than has been imagined. The Taliban are extremely unlikely to be able to seize Kabul, even if there was a very significant reduction in foreign troops. In the unlikely event they succeeded, they are even more unlikely to invite Al Qaeda back: Many Taliban leaders see that connection as their fundamental mistake before 9/11 and believe that if they had not supported Al Qaeda, they would still be in power.
And even with a foothold in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda wouldn’t significantly strengthen its ability to harm the West. The U.S. would respond much more vigorously than it did before 9/11 if Al Qaeda bases were detected in Afghanistan, and the Taliban could offer little protection.
If the question is about regional stability, Egypt is more important than Afghanistan. If the concern is terrorism, Pakistan is more important. And Pakistan’s security won’t be determined by events across the border but by its own internal politics, economic decline and toxic relationship with India. Afghanistan isn’t strategically important enough to justify the West’s current level of military and humanitarian investment — and failure there is inevitable unless we reverse course.
Consider the conventional wisdom that following the fall of Kabul, the West was distracted by Iraq and maintained too light a footprint in Afghanistan, failing to provide sufficient money or troops for the mission. Afghans who initially welcomed a foreign military intervention were alienated by the slow pace of development and the poor governance. This lack of progress created the opening for the Taliban to return. According to this narrative, it was only Obama’s surge of 2009 that, in his words, “for the first time in years ... put in place the strategy and resources” so that by December 2010, the U.S. was “on track to achieve (its) goals.”
An irony is that the “light footprint” of the early years was relatively successful — Al Qaeda members were driven out of the country almost immediately, and very quickly, school attendance improved dramatically, health clinics were rolled out, and mobile telephone usage exploded. Non-state-controlled media outlets were established and elections were held for the first time in decades. These are accomplishments worthy of pride, but sadly, the addition of more troops and resources to the NATO-led mission since 2006 has made the situation worse.
The tens of billions of dollars donated to the government of Afghanistan have undermined its leadership. The fashionable agendas of foreigners on short-term tours and their micromanagement have pushed aside the priorities of Afghan ministers. Many of the reconstruction projects have fueled waste and corruption. What’s more, the increases in foreign troops didn’t improve security: rather the reverse. Helmand is less safe in 2011 with 32,000 foreign troops in the province than it was in 2005, when there were only 300.
When I walked alone across central Afghanistan in the winter of 2001 and 2002, I found Afghan villagers to be hospitable and generous, but also far more conservative, insular and Islamist than foreigners acknowledged. When I returned to the country in 2006, to establish a nonprofit organization, it was clear that their resistance was inflamed by the increasingly heavy presence of Western troops, which allowed the Taliban to gain support by presenting themselves as fighters for Islam and Afghanistan against a foreign occupation.
In June, Obama announced a drawdown of U.S. forces, to be completed in 2014 with the handover of responsibility to Afghan forces. But a political settlement in the next three years is highly improbable because neither the Taliban, nor the Afghan government, nor Afghanistan’s neighbors are showing much commitment to compromise, in part because they still believe they can win.
Many people have pointed out the absurdity of the West’s approach. From 2008 to 2010, I ran the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School. The center’s research fellows collectively had more than a century of experience on the ground in Afghanistan. Research by fellows such as Andrew Wilder, David Mansfield and Michael Semple proved that our aid projects were increasing instability; that we were undermining any chance of political settlement with the Taliban; and that the Taliban-controlled areas were often more secure than the government areas. Their findings explained why our counterinsurgency strategy was empty and the “surge” was counterproductive, but they were often ignored by the military and political establishment, which has remained defiantly optimistic.
Over the last decade of war, many politicians have trusted charismatic, optimistic generals rather than their own instincts and reason. Concerns about the huge costs of the mission ($120 billion per year for the U.S. alone) and exaggerated fears about what would follow if it failed co-opted almost everyone: Afghan businessmen and foreign contractors, writers and academics. All continued to hope that some magic plan would extract us from humiliation.
At the heart of our irrational persistence are the demons of guilt and fear. Leaders are hypnotized by fears about global security; feel guilty about the loss of lives; ashamed at their inability to honor our promises to Afghans; and terrified of admitting defeat.
Failure in Afghanistan has become “not an option.” This is the fatal legacy of 9/11, because with that slogan, failure has become invisible, inconceivable and inevitable.
Rory Stewart is a member of the British Parliament, and the author of “The Places In Between,” about his solo walk across north-central Afghanistan in 2002.
Taliban claim new missiles downing aircraft
By Habiborrahman Ibrahimi Asia Times
KABUL - The Taliban say new missile consignments are allowing them to down increasing numbers of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aircraft. However, military officials and defense experts cast down on the claim, saying some helicopters have made forced landings after suffering technical problems, and any direct hits probably came from existing weapons.
An estimated 20 helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft belonging to both NATO and Afghan forces have either crashed or been forced to make emergency landings in the past six months.
In the deadliest incident of its kind since international forces entered Afghanistan 10 years ago, a Chinook helicopter carrying 30 US soldiers and eight Afghan colleagues crashed in Wardak province on August 6. NATO officials said the aircraft was probably hit by a rocket-propelled grenade, or RPG.
It was only one of several incidents involving helicopters within a matter of days. Helicopters reportedly came down in the southern Paktia province on August 8, in Khost on August 6 and in Kandahar on August 5. On July 25, a Chinook was brought down in the eastern Kunar region. NATO reports indicated that the aircraft were able to land and no one was killed in these incidents.
Taliban spokesman Zabihollah Mojahed told the Institute for War and Peace Reporting that the insurgents were hitting more aircraft because they had got hold of new surface-to-air missiles.
Without specifying the make or model, he indicated that they were portable, shoulder-launched weapons, and were being gradually rolled out to insurgent forces around Afghanistan. So far, they had been delivered to units in about half the country’s provinces.
"This is a very successful weapon, and the mujahideen in all provinces will soon be receiving it," he said.
Mojahed would not say what the country of origin of the new weapons was; he merely laughed and said the United States was making new enemies every day. "We can obtain anything we want, with the help of God," he said.
The Taliban spokesman said the international forces in Afghanistan "rely on their air power, but this will be defeated soon".
A spokesman for NATO's International Security Assistance Force, Brigadier-General Carsten Jacobsen, said three of the force's helicopters had been shot down by the Taliban, while other crashes and emergency landings were caused by technical problems.
In the case of the helicopter crash that killed 38 people in Wardak, Jacobsen said, "It is not clear whether the Taliban have obtained a new weapon, or used old weapons." He said an investigation was still ongoing, but all the indications were that a new weapon was not used in this case.
As well as NATO, the Afghan armed forces have their own fleet of helicopters. Defense Ministry spokesman General Zaher Azimi acknowledged that some had come down, but blamed this on technical breakdowns.
"Such things happen during military operations," he said, "but they don't mean the opposition has acquired new weapons or become stronger."
General Abdul Wahab Wardak, commander-in-chief of the Afghan Air Force, said the insurgents' claim to have sophisticated new weapons was just talk.
"The Taliban use this kind of propaganda to boost the morale of their fighters," he said.
After 30 years of conflict, weapons like Soviet-made machine guns were in plentiful supply, he said, and it was most likely these that were bringing down aircraft as part of bolder, more aggressive tactics employed by the Taliban in anticipation of the withdrawal of foreign troops, scheduled for 2014.
"Afghanistan is a mountainous country and NATO pilots aren't familiar with the topography," the general said. "They also make the mistake of flying at low altitude, so they can be targeted even with ordinary anti-aircraft weapons."
These general was referring to weapons like the antiquated but powerful Soviet-manufactured DShk heavy machine gun, RPG launchers and other arms capable - with a good aim - of hitting a low-flying helicopter, and still widely available.
From 1986, the US government supplied hundreds of Stinger missiles to Afghan mujahideen to allow them to strike at Soviet military helicopters, specifically the low-flying gunships that could pin them down.
After Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the Americans bought back as many of the missile systems as they could. Experts say that even if the shoulder-launched missiles the Taliban claim to have do exist, it is unlikely they are Stingers from the 1980s.
Not everyone dismisses the Taliban's claims of hitting more aircraft.
Nurolhaq Olumi, a politician from Kandahar and one-time general in the Afghan military, believes NATO is losing more helicopters to hostile fire than it is letting on.
"NATO generals are not telling the truth when they say their helicopters are carrying out emergency landings because of technical problems," he said. "The opposition forces really are hitting their aircraft as they fly at low altitudes."
Olumi said that if the Taliban had not yet got hold of new anti-aircraft systems, it was more than likely they would do so, and this would prolong the conflict. He said they would source such weapons in Iran or Pakistan - both countries that he believes "want NATO to fail in Afghanistan".
Habiborrahman Ibrahimi is a freelance reporter in Kabul.
On the Afghan frontline, U.S. soldiers see longer war ahead
By Nikola Solic Fri Sep 9, 2011 6:49am EDT
KUNAR, Afghanistan (Reuters) - U.S. soldiers deployed on the rugged mountains of eastern Afghanistan say the war isn't going away for another ten years, even after Washington pulls troops from a country locked in a deadly Islamist insurgency.
With failing public support for the war, President Barack Obama has announced a plan to gradually draw down the 100,000 troops in Afghanistan and hand over all security responsibilities to Afghan forces by the end of 2014.
But ten years after the September 11, 2011 attacks, which brought U.S. forces to Afghanistan, the country still faces a Taliban insurgency that the world's formidable military has been unable to quell.
For Captain Dan Mizak of the 27th Infantry Regiment from Cumberland, Maryland, deployed in Kunar on the violent border with Pakistan, the war in Afghanistan is far from over.
"I think one way or another the war is probably going to go on for another ten years," Mizak said.
"These people have been at war in this country for years and I think eventually, you know, we're going to leave but I think there's still going to be fighting going on. So, that's the way I feel about that."
Ten years ago, Mizak was an 18-year-old private in the U.S. army and now he's a captain doing the same thing he was trained to do back then, he said. Many others are on their third or fourth tour of duty.
"I don't think it's a traditional war where you can measure it on battles, but certainly I think we're doing something right when we got Bin Laden, and we're chipping away at the al Qaeda network, so I think we're making steps in the right direction to win the war on terrorism."
Months after al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was killed in Pakistan in a raid by U.S. Navy SEALS, violence is still at its worst levels in Afghanistan, with a resurgent Taliban insurgency taking the heaviest toll on both foreign forces and civilians.
ACTIVE FRONT
While the Taliban has been pushed out of some areas of its southern heartland, the insurgency has intensified along Afghanistan's eastern border with Pakistan.
Remote Kunar with its steep mountain valleys, where bin Laden once had his base, has become the more active front of the war against the Taliban.
The area is used by insurgent fighters as an infiltration and smuggling route from Pakistan, which is just over the mountains to the west. The United States had largely pulled out of Kunar a year ago, focusing the war effort on the southern base of the Taliban, but it has since added troops.
"After 9/11, I had an idea that it was going to be a long, hard campaign. These smaller wars, these savage little wars of peace tend to go on for a long time. They're not as quick and clean as America generally likes them to be," said Captain Tim Blair of the 22nd Infantry from Long Island, New York.
The nature of the enemy was such that the war could go on for a long time with varying intensity. If the United States is to be kept safe, then its soldiers had to go out and take the fight to the enemy.
"I've always kind of thought of the Afghanistan operation as kind of one of those bug lights or lamps that you put on your front porch during the summer months to help prevent the bugs from getting into the house," said First Lieutenant Edward Bachar from Freehold, New Jersey.
"You know, and that's the way I think of our efforts here. We take care of the bad guys in their backyard so the people in the United States don't have to worry about it."
U.S. officials said on Thursday there was a "credible but unconfirmed" threat ahead of the 10th anniversary of the September 11 attacks. It involved Washington D.C. and New York, which were targeted in al Qaeda attacks a decade ago.
A counter-terrorism official said intelligence pointed to possible car bomb attacks and added the threat information came from Pakistan's tribal areas which border Afghanistan.
Kevin Henderson, a staff sergeant from Palestine, Texas, said Americans had gone back to thinking they were invulnerable, but that was a mistake.
"And people in the United States and the world alike need to keep their eyes open and realize that this could happen over and over and over again. And it could be a lot worse."
But Joel Valette, a staff sergeant from California, who was in his fourth tour of duty in Afghanistan, said it was time to wind down, now that most of the objectives had been meet.
"I just. I don't agree with us staying here for another ten years. Because to me, it's pretty much useless since what we came here for we already accomplished."
(Writing by Sanjeev Miglani; Editing by Yoko Nishikawa; sanjeev.miglani.reuters.com)
NATO Commander, Pakistan army chief discuss security
ISLAMABAD, Sept. 9 (Xinhua) -- Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan met Pakistan's Army Chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and discussed " ways to improve regional security", said a U.S. spokesman Friday.
Gen. John R. Allen, during his visit in Pakistan on Thursday and Friday, also met with U.S. Embassy staff and received updates on the U.S. security assistance mission to Pakistan, the U.S. embassy spokesman said in a statement.
Gen. Allen's trip also included a visit to the 11th Corps Headquarters in Peshawar for an operational update and discussions about various topics of mutual interest and security near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, the spokesman said.
This is Gen. Allen's first visit to Pakistan as the NATO ISAF Commander.
Official sources said that Pakistan took up with the NATO commander the issue of attacks on its border check posts by Pakistani Taliban from Afghan territory.
The Pakistani army said that Pakistani Taliban who fled to Afghanistan as the result of major military operations were operating from Afghanistan's Kunar and Nuristan provinces.
The army said that nearly 300 Pakistan militants attacked seven Pakistani check posts in the border district of Chitral in the last week of August and killed about 27 Pakistani security men. Pakistan had summoned Afghan envoy to the Foreign Ministry for a formal protest.
Pakistani Taliban carried out several deadliest attacks from Afghan soil in recent weeks, killing border troops and civilians. They also kidnapped a group of Pakistani boys from the Bajaur tribal region who had gone to the mountainous region for picnic during the Muslim festival of Eid this month. Leader of Pakistani Taliban Maulvi Dadullah showed some of the kidnapped boys to a group of Afghan journalists in Kunar on Tuesday.
The army said that Pakistani Taliban have established bases in Afghanistan remote border regions where NATO and Afghan National Army has scant presence.
Sources said Islamabad was upset at the inability to hit bases of Pakistani Taliban on the side of the border, who are challenging Pakistani border check posts and civilians.
Counterfeit Dollars Flooding Afghanistan
September 8, 2011 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
KABUL -- Money-exchange dealers in Kabul say they are concerned by the large amounts of counterfeit foreign money that they say is entering Afghanistan from neighboring countries, RFE/RL's Radio Free Afghanistan reports.
Aminullah Owijdan, head of the Kabul-based Money Exchange Dealers Association, told RFE/RL that there has been a huge influx of fake U.S. dollars on Kabul's streets in recent weeks.
"We suspect that countries like Iran and Pakistan are attempting to discredit [and disrupt] Afghanistan's money markets," he said. "Therefore, we are urging the government and security forces to do more in the border areas to prevent [the fake money's] entry into the country."
Dealers have asked locals to report to the police if they find counterfeit banknotes, which are reportedly softer in texture than the originals.
Saif al-Din, professor of economics at Kabul University, told RFE/RL that the entrance of fake currencies into Afghanistan has damaged the economy and disrupted everyday business transactions.
"If the government and security forces are serious about finally tackling this problem, it has to put certain control mechanisms in place to detect forged money and keep it from entering Afghanistan in the first place," he said.
The Kabul Bank has thus far not commented publicly on the issue.
Pakistan: Taliban Plot To Free Bin Laden's Wives
ASHRAF KHAN 09/ 9/11 The Huffington Post
KARACHI — Pakistan is warning that the Taliban are plotting to secure the freedom of Osama bin Laden's wives and children by kidnapping a high-ranking government official and then offering to exchange him or her for the slain terror chief's family.
U.S. Navy seals killed bin Laden in a May helicopter-borne raid on his house in northwestern Pakistan.
They took the corpse with them, but left at least two of his wives and several children in the house. They were detained by Pakistani authorities.
Pakistan's interior ministry warned of the kidnap purported plot in a letter that was sent to top security officials on Aug 23 – just three days before gunmen seized Shahbaz Taseer, the son of a wealthy provincial governor who was killed by an Islamist militant earlier this year.
Interior Minister Rehman Malik said there was no evidence that the group that had seized Taseer from the streets of the Punjab provincial capital, Lahore, was hoping to exchange him for bin Laden's family members.
An Associated Press reported obtained a copy of the letter, stamped "secret" on Friday.
It said the information that led to the warning was reliable. It doesn't say which Pakistani official the Taliban plan to kidnap, but said the most likely location was one of the country's four provincial capitals.
Pakistan has reportedly released Taliban prisoners before in exchange for kidnapped government officials and army officers.
Taseer's kidnapping was the second high-profile abduction in Lahore in August. On Aug. 15, gunmen seized a 70-year-old American aid expert from his house. The man, Warren Weinstein, is still missing, and police have declined to speculate on who may be holding him.
Meanwhile, Pakistani police said they were preventing foreign journalists and other visitors from getting close to the house of bin Laden ahead of the 10th anniversary of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.
The Danish Ambassador to Pakistan and his wife, and two French journalists, were among several people detained this week in Abbottabad – the Pakistani garrison town that was bin Laden's last hideout.
They were held briefly before being allowed to return to the capital, Islamabad, police in the northern town said.
Ambassador Uffe Wolffhechel said he asked security officers at a checkpoint on the road to the house whether he and his wife could get in viewing range of it and "they said 'we are sorry, no,' and we shook hands and said 'have a nice day'."
He said they were then held for around two hours while officers checked their papers.
The U.S. operation that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in early May triggered embarrassing questions over how the CIA was able to track him down without the knowledge of Pakistan's powerful army and spy agencies. A backlash ensued, with authorities placing foreigners in Pakistan under greater scrutiny.
However, there have been no formal instructions to media organizations prohibiting their travel to Abbottabad.
Abbottabad police officer Karim Khan said the authorities were preventing journalists and foreigners from visiting the compound because it is regarded as evidence in investigations into how bin Laden lived there and how the CIA found him.
An editorial in the Dawn newspaper on Friday criticized the ban on foreigners visiting.
"Let's face it: the Bin Laden compound, as the site where the world's most wanted terrorist was found, killed and his body taken away in a raid of high drama, will continue to attract visitors," it said.
"The arbitrary restrictions imposed on visiting or filming in Abbottabad are thus untenable, and must be lifted to show the world that there is nothing there that Pakistan wants to hide."
In the days after the raid, hundreds of journalists traveled to the army town and were permitted – initially at least – to get as far as the door of the large, high-walled compound where bin Laden and his wives and children had been living for several years.
www.afghanistannewscenter.com