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Marwat, Fazal-ur-Rahim. The Evolution and Growth of Communism in Afghanistan (1917-1979). Karachi, Pakistan: Royal Book Company, 1997. 496 pp.
Afghanistan, one of the least known and most underdeveloped countries in the world, was propelled into the limelight when the Red Army of the former USSR invaded it in December 1979. Afghanistan was the first non-communist country to witness Soviet intervention. It was perceived as a Soviet move to obtain the warm water of the Arabian Sea, harboring the oil producing countries of the Middle East. The Persian Gulf controls the major supply of the world's oil needs. At first, resistance started by the Afghans in 1978, against the Saur Revolution or coup d'etat, did not attract world attention and was only supported by the neighboring countries of Pakistan, Iran and China. However, with the passage of time, the Western world came to the support of Afghan people with money and arms and Afghanistan became the `bleeding wound' for the Soviets. Undoubtedly, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan contributed to the disintegration of the USSR in 1989.
Afghanistan, being the flash point of 1980s, attracted a lot of writers, even fiction writers who wrote about the resistance and some of its legendary figures. For example, Ken Fallout, author of "Lay Down With the Lion," wrote about Ahmad Shah Masud, better known as the 'Lion of Panjsher.' Additionally, newspapers and magazines around the world, especially in the Muslim World, highlighted both fiction and facts about the Afghan Mujahidin. The book under review, The Evolution and Growth of Communism in Afghanistan, written by Dr. Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat, was originally a doctoral dissertation submitted to Area Study Centre (Central Asia), University of Peshawar. The author elucidates the thesis that the Anglo-Afghan wars in the nineteenth century pushed Afghanistan to the North to such an extent that it not only became closer to the Bolsheviks in the middle of the 20th century but caused the Soviets to move in to defend the Kabul regime in December 1979.
The book comprises eight chapters plus an introduction, two appendices, conclusion, bibliography and an index. The introduction of the book provides background information about the people and society of Afghanistan, and discusses the relationship of religion to the local code of conduct called Pukhtunwali. Both these patterns played, and continue to play, a dominant role in the history of Afghans.
In chapter one the writer discusses Anglo-Afghan relations and importance of three Afghan wars, which occurred in 1878-79, 1939-42, and 1919. These wars especially the first two had everlasting effects on the Afghans, drastically changing their behaviour and attitude. The Afghans, who at first were tolerant towards Christians' (p. 18) after the wars, distrusted the British who were considered not only infidels but also enemies who threatened Afghan independence. It is asserted that if these wars had not occurred, the Afghans would have adopted European ways rapidly. The British occupied Afghanistan for short intervals and sometimes controlled its external affairs, and Afghanistan suffered "most of the disadvantages of colonialism without any of its advantages." (p. 32) However, the social, economic and political impacts of these wars along with the geo-strategic position of Afghanistan shaped its destiny and political dynamics with a new outlook in the beginning of the 20th century. (p. 33)
In the second chapter, Dr. Marwat discusses the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 and the responses of the Afghans. While the Afghan monarch reacted cautiously, the 'Young Afghans' greeted the revolution as emancipation of an oppressed nation. They considered the revolution not in ideological perspective but as a system of government and as a factor promoting the struggle against imperialism elsewhere in the world. Socialist Russia became successful in building the confidence of the Afghans by withdrawing from the Urta Tugay Island after the decision of the joint commission, which awarded it to Afghanistan. (p. 80) Relations continued to improve as a result of a Friendship Treaty in 1921 and a Treaty on Non-aggression in 1926.
The author also discusses the role played by the Indian revolutionaries based in Kabul. These Indians fled to Afghanistan during World War I in order to intensify the freedom struggle for the Indian Sub-Continent. They formed a `Provisional Government' headed by Mahendar Partap, and contributed to the establishment of relations between the Afghan government and Bolshevik Russia. According to Marwat, on the one hand, Bolshevik relations with the Afghans were characterized by an overt policy of friendship and, on the other hand, a covert policy of intrigues and conspiracies.
Chapters three and four discuss the genesis of revolutionary trends in Afghanistan. The intimacy between the Indians and Afghans resulted in the new thinking among the Afghans who loosely organized themselves as Mashroota (constitutionalists). The man who provided intellectual ground work for the modern thinking was Mahmud Tarzi, foreign minister, during Amanullah's reign. Tarzi, through his bi-weekly newspaper Siraj ul Akhbar, imparted modernist ideas which were not contradictory to the religion. This chief ideologue suggested a path of progress consistent with the peculiar characteristics of Afghan society. The fall of Amanullah was a great set back to the constitutionalists and the "Young Afghans:' The political struggle between the "Young Afghans," pro Amanullah, pro-Charakhi (one of the three significant families at that time) and Mushaibians (Yehya Khe1 headed by Nadir Shah and then by his son Zahir Shah) turned into a badal (blood feud) between the ruler family and the oppressed family. (p. 184) The Munawirin (enlightened) group became successful in penetrating into the echelon of government through Sardar Daud when he became the Prime Minister in 1953.
In chapter five the writer discusses the formation of a new political organization-Wikh Zalmian (Awakened Youth) in 1947. The nature of the organization, its strategy, its works, and its prominent figures including writers and poets and the role they played in the Afghan society have been thoroughly visited. The cordial relations and sympathetic feelings of Afghans towards the Bolsheviks entered a new phase of ideological bondage. The events of past and present, a social phenomenon in the society, human relations' etc., are all discussed in terms of class struggle. Noor Mohammed Taraki, a member of the Wikh Zalmian, is conceivably the first writer to focus on the theme of class struggle in his writings in Afghanistan. Taraki characterizes the post-Wikh Zalmian period as the period of liberalism, political awakening, intellectual development and to some extent alliance between the public and palace. (p. 254)
In the sixth chapter, `The Pakhtunistan Demand-A Game?' Professor Marwat discusses in detail the Pakhtunistan problem, an age long `border dispute' between Afghanistan and British India and then with Pakistan since 1947, which caused many ups and downs in relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. For the first time, readers will find a well-documented discussion on an issue previously unexamined by academics. According to the author, the Afghan politicians used the issue when seeking a solid popular power base in the backward, divided and inward looking society of Afghanistan, because issue provided a logically needed unifying principle around which they could build a consensus. (p. 287) The writer very judiciously connects the internal political dynamics of the Afghan rulers with the Pakhtunistan issue. He described them as `the prisoners of Pakhtunistan issue.' (p. 298) The Soviet Union also used the issue to build serious cleavages in Afghan society i.e. tribal society vs. centralized government, ethno-national rivalry between Pakhtuns and non-Pakhtuns, urban and rural split, economic class (poor and rich) conflict and competition between modernity and traditionalists. India, on the other hand, supported the Pakhtunistan issue of Kabul to pursue her own interests through regional strife as a result of the dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan. (p. 298)
In chapters seven and eight, the writer examines events which led to the Sour revolution of 1978 (or coup d'etat), and finally the intervention of Soviet Red Army in December 1979. The Socialist elements organized themselves under the PDPA (Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan) in 1960s and contested the elections for the parliament held under the 1964 constitution. However, they won only four and two seats in the elections of 1965 and 1969 elections, respectively. Struck with the realization that they could not win a substantial number of seats in the constitutional and democratic manner, they resolved to undertake obstructionist methods in and outside the parliament. (p. 337) Sardar Daud (once Prime Minister), was disgruntled because he had no chance to enter the government owing to constitutional ban on the entry of members of the royal family. Therefore, with help from the PDPA he overthrew Zahir Shah and established a republican government in Afghanistan in 1973. Sardar Daud gave way to the Soviet penetration in Afghanistan by establishing a strong centralized army with Soviet help. (pp. 286-87) The alliance of the Socialists with Sardar Daud could not continue for a long period. In April 1978, the Socialists headed by Noor Mohammed Taraki came into power after killing Daud along with his family. The internal conflicts of the PDPA, the dissatisfaction of the Russians over the Kabul regime, and, above all, the political crosscurrents happening around Afghanistan compelled Moscow to send its forces into Afghanistan. It was the culminating point of the Russo-Afghan wedlock in the cold war era, which started during the 'Great Game' and was helped by the South Asian actors in the 20th century. The Marxists believed in the dialectal process of change based on class struggle and the final success of the forces of working class. But, the question arises as to why, the Socialists did not adopt this method instead of ultra-Socialist-Leninist methods of collaboration, manipulation and conspiracies. This flawed policy is evident in the words of Hafizullah Amin:
If we had waited to follow the same class pattern of workingclass revolution through a national democratic bourgeoisie, then we would have followed such a long and thorny road that it would have required not only years but centuries. (p. 373)
The book is a valuable addition to the works done on the subject. It is also encouraging that an academician has taken time to write it, because in Pakistan usually bureaucrats and military personnel produce books worthy to be studied. In a developing country like Pakistan it is very difficult for a teacher to write a book and then publish it. Professor Marwat supports his views with documents (both published and unpublished) of the governments of British India, Pakistan and Afghanistan which is not an easy task particularly when the original sources are in different languages including Persian and Russian. There are certain places where one experiences repetition, for example pp. 113 and 13637, 135 and 140, 224 and 257 etc. In Pakistan, the proof-reading profession is not well established, therefore mistakes in such circumstance are understandable. If coverage of the activities of the fundamentalists, active in Afghanistan since 1960s coinciding with the inception of the Socialists groups, could have been provided, it would have enabled the reader to fully comprehend the other non-Socialist political actors of the episode.
The author is successful in achieving the objective of tracing the origin and growth of communism in Afghanistan and the Soviet policies toward Afghanistan. He analyses the policies and the reforms introduced by the Socialist government after April 1978, and concludes that the government hastened in introducing reforms as they hastened in bringing revolution without any prior groundwork for a change. Consequently the people's revolt against the Kabul regime began in southern Afghanistan and then spread into all the rural areas. The Soviets, in the beginning, tried to curtail the flow of information about their antiIslamic and anti-Afghan policies, but the influx of refugees into Pakistan and Iran unearthed the unpopular measures of the Kabul regime to the rest of the world.
In Third World countries, especially the vastly underdeveloped nations, personalities play very important role in shaping things to come. After studying the book, it becomes clear that one Abdul Majid Zabuli, once the minister of economy, founder of the Bank-I-Milli and the richest person in Afghanistan, is behind every event, movement and activism in Afghanistan. He very skillfully contrived with his money and political wisdom and entrapped almost all-political leaders and activists particularly in the two decades of the pre- `Saur Revolution' period.
Evolution and Growth of Communism in Afghanistan (1917-1979), The - page 4 | Journal of Third World Studies
Afghanistan, one of the least known and most underdeveloped countries in the world, was propelled into the limelight when the Red Army of the former USSR invaded it in December 1979. Afghanistan was the first non-communist country to witness Soviet intervention. It was perceived as a Soviet move to obtain the warm water of the Arabian Sea, harboring the oil producing countries of the Middle East. The Persian Gulf controls the major supply of the world's oil needs. At first, resistance started by the Afghans in 1978, against the Saur Revolution or coup d'etat, did not attract world attention and was only supported by the neighboring countries of Pakistan, Iran and China. However, with the passage of time, the Western world came to the support of Afghan people with money and arms and Afghanistan became the `bleeding wound' for the Soviets. Undoubtedly, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan contributed to the disintegration of the USSR in 1989.
Afghanistan, being the flash point of 1980s, attracted a lot of writers, even fiction writers who wrote about the resistance and some of its legendary figures. For example, Ken Fallout, author of "Lay Down With the Lion," wrote about Ahmad Shah Masud, better known as the 'Lion of Panjsher.' Additionally, newspapers and magazines around the world, especially in the Muslim World, highlighted both fiction and facts about the Afghan Mujahidin. The book under review, The Evolution and Growth of Communism in Afghanistan, written by Dr. Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat, was originally a doctoral dissertation submitted to Area Study Centre (Central Asia), University of Peshawar. The author elucidates the thesis that the Anglo-Afghan wars in the nineteenth century pushed Afghanistan to the North to such an extent that it not only became closer to the Bolsheviks in the middle of the 20th century but caused the Soviets to move in to defend the Kabul regime in December 1979.
The book comprises eight chapters plus an introduction, two appendices, conclusion, bibliography and an index. The introduction of the book provides background information about the people and society of Afghanistan, and discusses the relationship of religion to the local code of conduct called Pukhtunwali. Both these patterns played, and continue to play, a dominant role in the history of Afghans.
In chapter one the writer discusses Anglo-Afghan relations and importance of three Afghan wars, which occurred in 1878-79, 1939-42, and 1919. These wars especially the first two had everlasting effects on the Afghans, drastically changing their behaviour and attitude. The Afghans, who at first were tolerant towards Christians' (p. 18) after the wars, distrusted the British who were considered not only infidels but also enemies who threatened Afghan independence. It is asserted that if these wars had not occurred, the Afghans would have adopted European ways rapidly. The British occupied Afghanistan for short intervals and sometimes controlled its external affairs, and Afghanistan suffered "most of the disadvantages of colonialism without any of its advantages." (p. 32) However, the social, economic and political impacts of these wars along with the geo-strategic position of Afghanistan shaped its destiny and political dynamics with a new outlook in the beginning of the 20th century. (p. 33)
In the second chapter, Dr. Marwat discusses the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 and the responses of the Afghans. While the Afghan monarch reacted cautiously, the 'Young Afghans' greeted the revolution as emancipation of an oppressed nation. They considered the revolution not in ideological perspective but as a system of government and as a factor promoting the struggle against imperialism elsewhere in the world. Socialist Russia became successful in building the confidence of the Afghans by withdrawing from the Urta Tugay Island after the decision of the joint commission, which awarded it to Afghanistan. (p. 80) Relations continued to improve as a result of a Friendship Treaty in 1921 and a Treaty on Non-aggression in 1926.
The author also discusses the role played by the Indian revolutionaries based in Kabul. These Indians fled to Afghanistan during World War I in order to intensify the freedom struggle for the Indian Sub-Continent. They formed a `Provisional Government' headed by Mahendar Partap, and contributed to the establishment of relations between the Afghan government and Bolshevik Russia. According to Marwat, on the one hand, Bolshevik relations with the Afghans were characterized by an overt policy of friendship and, on the other hand, a covert policy of intrigues and conspiracies.
Chapters three and four discuss the genesis of revolutionary trends in Afghanistan. The intimacy between the Indians and Afghans resulted in the new thinking among the Afghans who loosely organized themselves as Mashroota (constitutionalists). The man who provided intellectual ground work for the modern thinking was Mahmud Tarzi, foreign minister, during Amanullah's reign. Tarzi, through his bi-weekly newspaper Siraj ul Akhbar, imparted modernist ideas which were not contradictory to the religion. This chief ideologue suggested a path of progress consistent with the peculiar characteristics of Afghan society. The fall of Amanullah was a great set back to the constitutionalists and the "Young Afghans:' The political struggle between the "Young Afghans," pro Amanullah, pro-Charakhi (one of the three significant families at that time) and Mushaibians (Yehya Khe1 headed by Nadir Shah and then by his son Zahir Shah) turned into a badal (blood feud) between the ruler family and the oppressed family. (p. 184) The Munawirin (enlightened) group became successful in penetrating into the echelon of government through Sardar Daud when he became the Prime Minister in 1953.
In chapter five the writer discusses the formation of a new political organization-Wikh Zalmian (Awakened Youth) in 1947. The nature of the organization, its strategy, its works, and its prominent figures including writers and poets and the role they played in the Afghan society have been thoroughly visited. The cordial relations and sympathetic feelings of Afghans towards the Bolsheviks entered a new phase of ideological bondage. The events of past and present, a social phenomenon in the society, human relations' etc., are all discussed in terms of class struggle. Noor Mohammed Taraki, a member of the Wikh Zalmian, is conceivably the first writer to focus on the theme of class struggle in his writings in Afghanistan. Taraki characterizes the post-Wikh Zalmian period as the period of liberalism, political awakening, intellectual development and to some extent alliance between the public and palace. (p. 254)
In the sixth chapter, `The Pakhtunistan Demand-A Game?' Professor Marwat discusses in detail the Pakhtunistan problem, an age long `border dispute' between Afghanistan and British India and then with Pakistan since 1947, which caused many ups and downs in relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. For the first time, readers will find a well-documented discussion on an issue previously unexamined by academics. According to the author, the Afghan politicians used the issue when seeking a solid popular power base in the backward, divided and inward looking society of Afghanistan, because issue provided a logically needed unifying principle around which they could build a consensus. (p. 287) The writer very judiciously connects the internal political dynamics of the Afghan rulers with the Pakhtunistan issue. He described them as `the prisoners of Pakhtunistan issue.' (p. 298) The Soviet Union also used the issue to build serious cleavages in Afghan society i.e. tribal society vs. centralized government, ethno-national rivalry between Pakhtuns and non-Pakhtuns, urban and rural split, economic class (poor and rich) conflict and competition between modernity and traditionalists. India, on the other hand, supported the Pakhtunistan issue of Kabul to pursue her own interests through regional strife as a result of the dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan. (p. 298)
In chapters seven and eight, the writer examines events which led to the Sour revolution of 1978 (or coup d'etat), and finally the intervention of Soviet Red Army in December 1979. The Socialist elements organized themselves under the PDPA (Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan) in 1960s and contested the elections for the parliament held under the 1964 constitution. However, they won only four and two seats in the elections of 1965 and 1969 elections, respectively. Struck with the realization that they could not win a substantial number of seats in the constitutional and democratic manner, they resolved to undertake obstructionist methods in and outside the parliament. (p. 337) Sardar Daud (once Prime Minister), was disgruntled because he had no chance to enter the government owing to constitutional ban on the entry of members of the royal family. Therefore, with help from the PDPA he overthrew Zahir Shah and established a republican government in Afghanistan in 1973. Sardar Daud gave way to the Soviet penetration in Afghanistan by establishing a strong centralized army with Soviet help. (pp. 286-87) The alliance of the Socialists with Sardar Daud could not continue for a long period. In April 1978, the Socialists headed by Noor Mohammed Taraki came into power after killing Daud along with his family. The internal conflicts of the PDPA, the dissatisfaction of the Russians over the Kabul regime, and, above all, the political crosscurrents happening around Afghanistan compelled Moscow to send its forces into Afghanistan. It was the culminating point of the Russo-Afghan wedlock in the cold war era, which started during the 'Great Game' and was helped by the South Asian actors in the 20th century. The Marxists believed in the dialectal process of change based on class struggle and the final success of the forces of working class. But, the question arises as to why, the Socialists did not adopt this method instead of ultra-Socialist-Leninist methods of collaboration, manipulation and conspiracies. This flawed policy is evident in the words of Hafizullah Amin:
If we had waited to follow the same class pattern of workingclass revolution through a national democratic bourgeoisie, then we would have followed such a long and thorny road that it would have required not only years but centuries. (p. 373)
The book is a valuable addition to the works done on the subject. It is also encouraging that an academician has taken time to write it, because in Pakistan usually bureaucrats and military personnel produce books worthy to be studied. In a developing country like Pakistan it is very difficult for a teacher to write a book and then publish it. Professor Marwat supports his views with documents (both published and unpublished) of the governments of British India, Pakistan and Afghanistan which is not an easy task particularly when the original sources are in different languages including Persian and Russian. There are certain places where one experiences repetition, for example pp. 113 and 13637, 135 and 140, 224 and 257 etc. In Pakistan, the proof-reading profession is not well established, therefore mistakes in such circumstance are understandable. If coverage of the activities of the fundamentalists, active in Afghanistan since 1960s coinciding with the inception of the Socialists groups, could have been provided, it would have enabled the reader to fully comprehend the other non-Socialist political actors of the episode.
The author is successful in achieving the objective of tracing the origin and growth of communism in Afghanistan and the Soviet policies toward Afghanistan. He analyses the policies and the reforms introduced by the Socialist government after April 1978, and concludes that the government hastened in introducing reforms as they hastened in bringing revolution without any prior groundwork for a change. Consequently the people's revolt against the Kabul regime began in southern Afghanistan and then spread into all the rural areas. The Soviets, in the beginning, tried to curtail the flow of information about their antiIslamic and anti-Afghan policies, but the influx of refugees into Pakistan and Iran unearthed the unpopular measures of the Kabul regime to the rest of the world.
In Third World countries, especially the vastly underdeveloped nations, personalities play very important role in shaping things to come. After studying the book, it becomes clear that one Abdul Majid Zabuli, once the minister of economy, founder of the Bank-I-Milli and the richest person in Afghanistan, is behind every event, movement and activism in Afghanistan. He very skillfully contrived with his money and political wisdom and entrapped almost all-political leaders and activists particularly in the two decades of the pre- `Saur Revolution' period.
Evolution and Growth of Communism in Afghanistan (1917-1979), The - page 4 | Journal of Third World Studies