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Afghanistan is in a transitional phase. With security concerns growing, President Ashraf Ghani is seemingly trying to bring some much-needed order in his country. However, analysts believe some of his policies raise more questions than providing answers. AMRULLAH SALEH, former chief of Afghanistan's intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security (NDS) talks to KABIR TANEJA on countering the growing threat posed by the Taliban, the recent deal between NDS and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which has caused chaos in the Afghan polity and India's role as a partner in the Afghanistan story.
Q: How would you decode President Ghani's current policies in dealing with terrorism in Afghanistan, specifically when it comes to talks with the Taliban?
A: Ghani works closely with the British and they all decided to try something new. So he approached the Pakistan army, hoping to convince them to trust him and give up the Taliban. He ignored the reality that Pakistan has been investing in extremism for decades and the personal mood of the Afghan leaders won't change their entrenched policies until and unless they gain what they are fighting for, that is domination of Afghanistan in one way or another.
So Ghani never stopped fighting the Taliban, but he made a mistake to resort to a narrative of compromise, which emboldened both the Taliban and Islamabad alike.
Q: Analysts believe that Ghani is looking to control violence in Afghanistan under any circumstances, which means he is willing to make "sweeping concessions" for peace. Your views?
A: Actually, Pakistanis want two sets of concessions from Ghani, one for the state of Pakistan and another for the Taliban. As it stands now, they are making progress in pushing Afghanistan to show further softness and concession to Pakistan, without allowing the Taliban to enter into any political process. So Ghani would like to see a framework created in which talks with the Taliban would be focused, overt and agenda driven. That won't happen until Pakistan gets what it wants for itself first.
Q: Recently there were reports suggesting an MoU between Afghanistan's NDS and Pakistan's ISI on cooperation and training of intelligence personnel. Another report later suggested that the chief of NDS, Rahmatullah Nabil, warned Ghani against such an arrangement. How do you read this development?
A: Rahmatullah Nabil cannot warn Ghani, he serves Ghani. The MoU has the following problems. Politically and morally, after its signing, any side — either us or the Pakistanis — violating it will be seen as guilty and as the culprit. So Afghanistan entered into a deception trap, not an MoU. Technically it obliges Afghanistan to do things without anticipation of reciprocation from Pakistan. So in this MoU, Ghani has lost to Pakistan. He is also very isolated and facing embarrassment within the Afghan society. We suffer on a daily basis and Afghans see the MoU with disgust, and Ghani as a "seller of values" and not a protector.
Q: Pakistan often blames India for trying to undermine Islamabad in Afghanistan via covert wars. Ghani himself has also previously reportedly made his displeasure known of a kind of turf war between India and Pakistan in the country. Are Ghani's worries justified?
A: Well, India is a brand in Afghanistan. It is a brand associated with education, energy, medicine, entertainment, good work and so on. What has given India space in Afghanistan is the way India deals with Afghans and the government. India doesn't identify priorities, it is the Afghans and the government who identify the priorities and India provides technical and financial support. This unconditional help has created massive space for India in the country. It has opened the hearts and minds of Afghans for India. India in Afghanistan in 1992 was seen as a sinful country siding with the Soviets, but that is now long gone. India today is seen as a strategic friend, helper and a patient partner. It is using its soft power here and it works. Pakistan is using its hard power to undo India, and it hurts.
India is not sponsoring anything to undermine anyone, this is a view shared by all Afghans, including most of the Mujahedeen groups, who once upon a time were allies of Islamabad. There is an Afghan proverb that says "you can take an Afghan to hell by the way of friendship and partnership. You can't take him to heaven by force". India knows this.
Q: Ghani made his maiden visit to India recently. How do you see India's role under Prime Minister Narendra Modi developing, as during Ghani's visit Modi said that India would do "whatever's necessary" for Afghan security?
A: I don't see Indian policy vis-a-vis Afghanistan driven by Prime Ministers, maybe I am wrong. The strategic community and circle in India is bipartisan, only small things change. That is another good thing in India; it knows about Afghanistan and is not influenced by any interest groups here or in Delhi. So, Prime Minister Modi is more hands-on, but the big change, in material terms, has not come yet.
Q: How would you decode President Ghani's current policies in dealing with terrorism in Afghanistan, specifically when it comes to talks with the Taliban?
A: Ghani works closely with the British and they all decided to try something new. So he approached the Pakistan army, hoping to convince them to trust him and give up the Taliban. He ignored the reality that Pakistan has been investing in extremism for decades and the personal mood of the Afghan leaders won't change their entrenched policies until and unless they gain what they are fighting for, that is domination of Afghanistan in one way or another.
So Ghani never stopped fighting the Taliban, but he made a mistake to resort to a narrative of compromise, which emboldened both the Taliban and Islamabad alike.
Q: Analysts believe that Ghani is looking to control violence in Afghanistan under any circumstances, which means he is willing to make "sweeping concessions" for peace. Your views?
A: Actually, Pakistanis want two sets of concessions from Ghani, one for the state of Pakistan and another for the Taliban. As it stands now, they are making progress in pushing Afghanistan to show further softness and concession to Pakistan, without allowing the Taliban to enter into any political process. So Ghani would like to see a framework created in which talks with the Taliban would be focused, overt and agenda driven. That won't happen until Pakistan gets what it wants for itself first.
Q: Recently there were reports suggesting an MoU between Afghanistan's NDS and Pakistan's ISI on cooperation and training of intelligence personnel. Another report later suggested that the chief of NDS, Rahmatullah Nabil, warned Ghani against such an arrangement. How do you read this development?
A: Rahmatullah Nabil cannot warn Ghani, he serves Ghani. The MoU has the following problems. Politically and morally, after its signing, any side — either us or the Pakistanis — violating it will be seen as guilty and as the culprit. So Afghanistan entered into a deception trap, not an MoU. Technically it obliges Afghanistan to do things without anticipation of reciprocation from Pakistan. So in this MoU, Ghani has lost to Pakistan. He is also very isolated and facing embarrassment within the Afghan society. We suffer on a daily basis and Afghans see the MoU with disgust, and Ghani as a "seller of values" and not a protector.
Q: Pakistan often blames India for trying to undermine Islamabad in Afghanistan via covert wars. Ghani himself has also previously reportedly made his displeasure known of a kind of turf war between India and Pakistan in the country. Are Ghani's worries justified?
A: Well, India is a brand in Afghanistan. It is a brand associated with education, energy, medicine, entertainment, good work and so on. What has given India space in Afghanistan is the way India deals with Afghans and the government. India doesn't identify priorities, it is the Afghans and the government who identify the priorities and India provides technical and financial support. This unconditional help has created massive space for India in the country. It has opened the hearts and minds of Afghans for India. India in Afghanistan in 1992 was seen as a sinful country siding with the Soviets, but that is now long gone. India today is seen as a strategic friend, helper and a patient partner. It is using its soft power here and it works. Pakistan is using its hard power to undo India, and it hurts.
India is not sponsoring anything to undermine anyone, this is a view shared by all Afghans, including most of the Mujahedeen groups, who once upon a time were allies of Islamabad. There is an Afghan proverb that says "you can take an Afghan to hell by the way of friendship and partnership. You can't take him to heaven by force". India knows this.
Q: Ghani made his maiden visit to India recently. How do you see India's role under Prime Minister Narendra Modi developing, as during Ghani's visit Modi said that India would do "whatever's necessary" for Afghan security?
A: I don't see Indian policy vis-a-vis Afghanistan driven by Prime Ministers, maybe I am wrong. The strategic community and circle in India is bipartisan, only small things change. That is another good thing in India; it knows about Afghanistan and is not influenced by any interest groups here or in Delhi. So, Prime Minister Modi is more hands-on, but the big change, in material terms, has not come yet.
