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Local Taliban leader killed in Afghan Nangarhar province: ISAF
KABUL, Jan. 19 (Xinhua) -- A local Taliban leader was killed Saturday in an operation in eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar, the NATO-led coalition forces confirmed in a press release.
"During a security operation in Sherzad district, Nangarhar province, today, an Afghan and coalition force killed a local Taliban leader, Qari Sayed Wali, and arrested a second Taliban leader," the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) said in the press release.
"Qari Sayed Wali distributed and emplaced IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) throughout Sherzad district and conducted the April 2012 attack on the Sherzad District Center," it added.
The arrested leader conducted IED attacks against Afghan government officials as well as Afghan and coalition forces. He also permitted bomb makers to use his home to construct IEDs and store ammunition and explosives in the province 120 km east of capital Kabul, the release noted.
The security force also detained two suspected insurgents and seized multiple weapons and ammunition as a result of the operation, it added.
In addition, the joint forces in a separate operation arrested a Haqqani leader in Terayzai district, Khost province 150 km southeast of Kabul earlier Saturday, the coalition release said.
The Taliban-linked Haqqani network mostly operating in eastern Afghan provinces and Kabul is responsible for many high- profile attacks against the security forces.
The Taliban insurgent group, which has been waging an insurgency since its regime was toppled by a U.S-led invasion in late 2001, has yet to make comments.
Afghanistan frees Supreme staff arrested over tax issues
By Sadaf Shinwari - January 19 2013, 9:38 am Khaama Press
A number of the national and International employees of Supreme Global arrested by the Afghan government were released.
Afghan officials said the issue was related to tax payment by the Supreme Global to Afghan government. The company was late to pay tax to government at the beginning however later they reduced to pay taxes to the government anymore.
Deputy Afghan Attorney General Rahmatullah Nazari quoted by Radio Free Europe (RFE) said they were forced to arrest a number of the staff of Supreme Global.
Mr. Nazari said, “The issue continued for several years between Afghan finance ministry and Supreme Global and was finally referred to Afghan Attorney General. We followed the issue and Supreme Global at the beginning requested to extend the tax payment period, which was extended for several times but finally we had to arrest their employees.”
He said, “Three employees of Supreme Global including a Canadian Citizen, French Citizen and Afghan were arrested but were freed after they paid taxes.”
A eyewitness quoted by the Wall Street Journal said Afghan security forces arrested the employees of Supreme Global after they refused Afghan Attorney General to pay taxes to the government.
Deputy Attorney General said all foreign companies providing logistics services in Afghanistan must pay their taxes to the government.
He said, “The goods belonging to NATO and ISAF troops are tax exempted based on the agreement between the Afghan government and United Nations however if these companies provide logistics services then they should pay taxes to the government. Supreme Global is providing food and non-food items to US troops in Afghanistan and they must pay tax.”
Mr. Nazari further added supreme has other contracts with several other companies and should pay taxes for those contracts to the Afghan government.
The Supreme Global reportedly paid around $18 million tax to the Afghan government and its employees were freed.
Afghan minister seeks stronger ties with UAE ahead of troops leaving
The National By Awad Mustafa Jan 19, 2013
ABU DHABI - The UAE's continuing support for the Afghan peace process has been called for by Afghanistan's deputy foreign minister for political affairs.
During a visit to the capital yesterday, Jawed Ludin said his country was grateful for the UAE's role in Afghanistan's security, but his country would need more support from its Arabian Gulf allies after foreign troops leave.
"The UAE's support has been very important for Afghanistan's security in the past 10 years, but now we are moving towards the end of the international security forces' presence by 2014," he said.
"What we need to make sure of is that we curb the threat of terrorism and extremism, and the way [to do that] is to grow closer and forge stronger ties with our allies in the region politically."
Mr Ludin was in the capital yesterday for the trilateral committee meeting between Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States.
It was attended by Pakistan's foreign secretary, Jalil Abbas Jilani, and the deputy US special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, David Pearce.
The diplomats discussed security and political developments in Afghanistan and the peace process.
Mr Jilani said recent developments, such as the release of Taliban prisoners from Pakistani jails, proved his country's determination to bring stability to Afghanistan.
"Pakistan will do everything possible to bring peace ... to Afghanistan," he said. "In today's meeting we reviewed the progress we had made and we have gone over the developments to forge ahead with the peace process."
Mr Ludin said Qatar had agreed to set up an office in Doha for the Taliban to negotiate with the Afghan High Peace Council.
Earlier this week, the Qatari prime minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem Al Thani, said plans were under way to open the political office for the Taliban militia in Doha.
"Preparations are under way and it will happen as soon as possible," Sheikh Hamad said in Doha. "The opening of the office aims to facilitate dialogue between the Taliban and other political parties in Afghanistan."
He added it was "very important that a dialogue start before the withdrawal of US troops in 2014".
The US's Mr Pearce said this year would bring many changes.
"The year 2013 is going to be a very important year - a year of transition for Afghanistan," he said.
"Last week, presidents [Hamid] Karzai and [Barak] Obama had very detailed discussions on the matter and they both agreed that the security gains had to be matched by political progress, and they recommitted both nations to reconciliation."
Mr Pearce said the leaders agreed to open the Taliban office in Doha to facilitate negotiations with the support of Qatar.
This would be the second engagement of the US with the Taliban movement.
Washington began tentative moves towards peace with the group a year ago. But the Islamists broke off the talks a few months later, apparently over the failure of the US to free Taliban prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba.
Now the US is negotiating its exit from its longest war, pledging continued support for the Afghan government against an undefeated insurgency.
Details of US involvement after Nato combat troops withdraw next year remain vague and are subject to a security agreement still under negotiation.
"President Obama has not made a decision with this matter as yet, but we still have ongoing discussions regarding the security involvement with Afghan officials," Mr Pearce said.
It had been expected that a residual force of up to 20,000 troops would remain in the country to help counter the Taliban, who were deposed in 2001 for harbouring the Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.
amustafa@thenational.ae
Don't shrink Afghan forces, two key Senate Democrats warn Obama
Reuters Jan 18, 2013
WASHINGTON - Two Senate Democrats urged the White House on Friday to reconsider plans to shrink Afghan national security forces by a third after 2015, saying a robust Afghan fighting force will be needed to fight al Qaeda and its allies.
The appeal comes as President Barack Obama weighs how large of an American force to leave behind in Afghanistan after NATO declares the costly, unpopular war over at the end of 2014 and most foreign forces return home.
Officials say the White House is considering keeping between 3,000 and 9,000 troops in the country, a lower range than initially recommended by the top commander in Afghanistan.
Carl Levin of Michigan, head of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and committee member Jack Reed of Rhode Island said Obama, a fellow Democrat, should use the U.S. troop level announcement - expected in the coming months - as an opportunity to revisit plans to slash the Afghan forces from 352,000 to 230,000 after 2015.
"We support the establishment of a small number for the post-2014 (American) force," they wrote to Tom Donilon, Obama's national security adviser.
"At the same time, we are convinced that it will be necessary for the success of the mission, i.e., to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for al Qaeda and its affiliated organizations, to reconsider plans to reduce the size of the (Afghan forces)."
Ryan Crocker, a former U.S. envoy to Afghanistan, has estimated that the United States would end up paying about $2.5 billion a year for Afghan security forces totaling 230,000.
He called the expense "pretty cheap insurance."
Levin and Reed said the additional expense for keeping a larger Afghan force would be affordable, given the projected drop in funding for wartime operations.
"We recommend that when the president announces his decision on the post-2014 force, that he also announce he is reviewing the question of the size of the ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces) after 2015," they wrote. (Reporting by Phil Stewart; Editing by Xavier Briand)
Taliban prisoners freedom boost insurgency: Lawmakers
By Sajad - January 19 2013, 8:08 pm Khaama Press
Afghan lawmakers on Saturday warned that the freedom of the Taliban militants from Pakistan jails will spark further insurgency and war in the country.
Naqibullah Faiq, an Afghan lawmaker said the freedom of the Taliban militants will not assist Afghan peace at all and warned that the freedom of the senior and prominent Taliban leaders will boost insurgency.
The freedom of the Taliban militants from Pakistani jails was one of the main demands of the Afghan high peace council during their visit to Pakistan.
Pakistani government has freed around 20 Taliban detainees from the jails and deputy Pakistan foreign minister Jalil Jilani on Friday announced that Islamabad will free all Taliban prisoners.
A number of the senior Taliban leaders including Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar is believed to be among those who are going to be freed from Pakistan jails in the near future and according to Afghan high peace council their freedom will help Afghan peace process.
However Afghan lawmakers are not satisfied with the freedom of the Taliban group members, according to Shukria Barekzai, an Afghan lawmaker the freed Taliban militants are not returning to Afghanistan after they are released.
She said the freed Taliban leaders are staying in Pakistan and Islamabad will be able to arrest them again whenever they want.
Brekzai said, “We have experienced this in the past and the freed Taliban group members have rejoined the terrorist groups and their freedom will not help Afghan peace process at all.”
In the meantime a number of Afghan lawmakers also welcomed US officials decision to suspend transfer of prisoners to Afghan security forces.
According to the lawmakers several prisoners will escape in a similar incident as Kandahar prison if Bagram prison is completely handed over to Afghans.
Afghans chart their own future
Eleven years on, there is confidence in the stability of civil society and governance
Gulf News By Francis Matthew, Editor at Large January 18, 2013
Kabul: After decades of civil war, it is surprising that normal civil society is becoming a durable part of Afghan life. As Nato forces hand back responsibility for security to the Afghan armed forces, it seems hard to believe that the previous harsh choice of either Nato or Taliban has moved on to include a much more hopeful third option, which is the Afghans themselves.
A lot of concern has been voiced about the fragility of Afghan institutions as they face the twin challenges of the Nato withdrawal by the end of 2014, the same year as presidential elections in 2014 for which President Hamid Karzai will not be able to stand having served two terms.
Poor strategic thinking from the central government in Kabul is definitely a problem for Afghanistan, as is a genuine worry about the deep corruption that has taken root in Karzai’s government. But this has also compounded a lingering disbelief by some Afghans in their own abilities, although this was dismissed by an American colonel who has worked closely alongside the Afghan army in the eastern province of Paktiya.
He told Gulf News: “They are ready to do the job, and in fact are already doing it. They may not yet have a deep sense of confidence in their own capabilities, but that will come.”
Eleven years after Nato’s invasion drove out the Taliban government in 2001, and nine years since Hamid Karzai’s first government was elected into power, civil society has become a lot more established and there is a strong sense that it will now continue. For example, at a dinner in Kabul with a group of editors of Afghan newspapers and news services, the main concern was a planned press law and its impact on free speech. They were definitely not talking of impending doom and the collapse of their normal life.
Lively media scene
Today’s lively media scene in Afghanistan includes tens of newspapers in several languages including Dari and Pashtu, and the editors were committed Afghan individuals whose plans did not include a Taliban takeover in 2014. Their working assumption is that civil life has come to stay: one was planning a new edition in north east Afghanistan, and another was making a substantial investment in a new printing press.
This confident view was echoed at a meeting with several members of parliament, including Syed Ishaq Gailani, a forceful senior MP; Farkhunda Zahra Naderi, a young woman MP from Kabul; and Shinkai Zahine Karokhail, another women MP and an experienced campaigner for women’s rights. These and others disagreed forcefully on many parliamentary issues, but they all agreed that the parliament is there is to stay.
And they strongly supported holding the presidential elections in 2014, dismissing claims that changing the president just as the Nato mandate runs out would be dangerous for a fragile state like Afghanistan.
They argued that it would be much more damaging for Afghanistan’s future to interfere with the structures of democracy at this time. Any attempt to fiddle with the electoral process would raise all sorts of charges of pandering to Karzai’s special interests, and allowing corruption to get a deeper hold on the country.
Positive view
Senior officials in the ministries in Kabul offer a very positive view of how the country is developing, but their optimism needs to be interpreted carefully since they are paid to be cheerful. It is hard to check how effective their decisions might be outside the capital, in the reality of Afghanistan’s very independent regional governments.
However, Kabul will acquire more influence once 50 per cent of the huge foreign aid budget passes though its offices, rather than going direct from donor nations to their projects as at present, with little national coordination to these well-meant but local projects.
The international community does not plan to dump Afghanistan after its troops pull out of active service in 2014, and at the Tokyo donors’ summit in July 2012, Afghanistan was promised $16 billion for post-2014 aid, as well as $1.4 billion to support the Afghan forces.
Opposition politicians like Dr Abdullah Abdullah comment that similar sums have been landing in Afghanistan for 10 years, but far too much of that money has been spent on security and looking after the Nato forces, and not nearly enough on well planned economic regeneration which will build prosperity and jobs.
Money from the Tokyo Summit promises should go into generating new economic activity. “97 per cent of Afghanistan’s GDP is foreign development aid,” Deputy Finance Minister Abdul Razaq Vahidi told Gulf News. “So far a lot of the money spent in Afghanistan by the international community has been going on transport, housing for the forces, their security, etc, and this must change so that money is spent on infrastructure, and building new economic sectors.”
Farid Mamundzay, Deputy Minister for Policy in the Local Governance Directorate, has the daunting job of imposing open and transparent standards of recruitment and operating on 27,000 civil servants who work in the 37 provincial and 336 district governments all over Afghanistan, as well as the 153 municipalities.
He told visiting media, including Gulf News, that he was pleased that his imposition of common standards was made easier when the president reduced the number of presidential appointments made on political grounds from a previous 458 positions to 37, who are the 34 provincial governors and three other officials.
But it was hard to share Mamundzay’s confidence that the merit-based exams his directorate is rolling out all over Afghanistan would have much impact. It is all too easy to imagine powerful local leaders over-ruling such directives from Kabul, and simply continuing to appoint and run local government as they wished.
Chinese at the gates
After the departure of Nato in 2014 the continued engagement of the international community is important and this is why the Tokyo commitments are so important. Afghanistan remains an important focus of international economic and security interest, and if the Nato countries give up on Afghanistan, China is anxious to grab more influence.
Any lack of international interest will be ruthlessly exploited by the Chinese as was shown by the way that a Chinese company won a contract to run a large copper mine at Aynak in Logar Province 30 kms from Kabul. The Afghan minister wanted the Chinese to come in and start paying the Kabul government the substantial revenues the contract demanded for running the mine. The contract required the Chinese to find 10,000 skilled workers, but reserved them the right to bring in Chinese workers if they could not find the right Afghans.
The led one observer to point out that it would be very easy for the Chinese to deliberately fail Afghan applicants for the jobs on technical grounds, since very few Afghans have had the chance to become trained mine workers during four decades of civil war.
The Chinese could then bring in thousands of Chinese workers, which promoted him to ask: “And how many of them would be real miners? And how many would be security staff posing as miners? We run the risk of having regiments of Chinese security forces, based at Aynak, with little to stop them doing whatever they want.”
Security concerns
The Afghan forces want to destroy the Talban camps in Pakistan, and they want Nato to supply them enough heavy artillery to defend themselves against attacks from across the border where the Taliban and other insurgent groups are able to operate freely, unhindered by Pakistani armed forces.
They are confident that they have defeated the Taliban inside Afghanistan, and they do not see much home grown activity any more. Things have moved on a lot from when Nato troops arrived in 2001 and drove out the Taliban. At that time they found themselves the only coherent force in a country that had been devastated, so the various Nato forces started many local aid programmes, which were later formalized into a network of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), which offered basic reconstruction.
At the same time, the war against the Taliban rolled on, with initial success followed by a Taliban recovery in 2006 to 2009, leading to the long war of attrition that continues to this day. But as Nato pursued its way in these various campaigns, an important development was happening as the Afghans slowly built up their own forces.
Today there are 120,000 coalition forces in Afghanistan, but this compares to 340,000 Afghan National Security Forces, ANSF. More and more of the actual fighting is done by the Afghan forces, who now manage a majority of all missions against the insurgents. For example, in 2012 the Nato coalition forces lost 350 dead, compared to more than 1,500 by ANSF.
This process will continue to its logical conclusion when Nato will end all active fighting by the end of 2014, but will stay in Afghanistan for at least another 10 years under its new mandate of “Train. Advise. Assist.” as spelt out by Nato Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen when he spoke to the press in Kabul.
But all senior Afghans spoke of two important requirements for the Afghan armed forces to succeed when they fight the Taliban on their own. General Zaher Azmi, in the Ministry of Defence, is among many who said “Nato did not destroy the training centres of the enemy and these bases remain in Pakistan. They need to be attacked and destroyed. Second, Afghanistan does not have the heavy weapons or warplanes needed to defeat the enemy.”
Making peace work
Minister Mohammad Stanekzai is in charge of negotiations with the Taliban. He listed five actions vital to make peace talks succeed:
1. Strengthen Afghan security institutions, including international backing.
2. Have the right environment ready for those Taliban who want to leave violence.
3. Plan for the huge economic gap in 2014 when the $120 billion spent on Nato troops will vanish.
4. Improve cooperation with Pakistan and Iran to defeat violence.
5. Invest in education and training for the young generation.
KNAPP: Beyond 2014 in Afghanistan
Any strategy must build civilian trust
Washington Times By Patrick Knapp Friday, January 18, 2013
Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies issued a report in December on the U.S. war in Afghanistan, sparing no military kiss-up or diplomatic busybody. With U.S. troop levels past their peak and with post-2014 status of forces agreement talks flirting with the “zero-option,” we’re still being told that everything in Afghanistan is just fine. Unfortunately, Mr. Cordesman concludes, “no amount of inappropriately optimistic reporting of metrics and narrative can actually win a counterinsurgency campaign.”
Mr. Cordesman blames an “analytically illiterate media” for giving a pass to the Pentagon’s “statistical rubbish” and “worse than useless” reports on progress against the insurgency. Yet Mr. Cordesman’s quaint talk of “counterinsurgency” reveals his own blind spot to changing times: What the Pentagon once called “battle space” is now “area of operations”; what were “combat operations” are now “stability operations”; and what was long ago a “counterinsurgency” is now a political-diplomatic attempt to tiptoe out of Afghanistan while avoiding perceptions of American culpability for the Taliban takeover of the south and east that will follow.
Far from being duped, the media and civilians once bullied by “runaway generals” are now getting just what they wanted. A strategy hashed out by Rolling Stone’s Michael Hastings and National Security Adviser Tom Donilon could hardly top the current strategy of quietly divorcing counterinsurgency while keeping Afghanistan, with all of its political toxicity, at an Iraq-style arm’s length.
Yet, as suggested by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s authoritarian drift and al Qaeda in Iraq’s resurgence one year after the U.S. troop withdrawal, the arm’s length approach to negotiating the endgame may be good politics, but it does little for counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency is premised on the idea that coordinated political-military operations must earn the population’s trust. Regardless of any moral responsibility America may have for post-2014 human rights abuses and civil war in Afghanistan, there is no reason why anyone should expect an uninhibited insurgency to suddenly reform its tastes for terrorism.
Some rebut that Afghans are forcing our hand. “As we know from our Iraq experience,” says White House adviser Doug Lute, “if there are no authorities granted by the sovereign state, then there’s not room for a follow-on U.S. military mission.”
Yet the real lesson from the failure to extend Iraq’s status of forces agreement, as New York Times reporter Michael Gordon details in his recent book, “The Endgame,” was the United States’ “trouble taking yes for an answer.” President Bush had successfully prodded Mr. Maliki to crack down on Shiite death squads by forging a close relationship, based on the notion that “you don’t put your friends in an uncomfortable position.” Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has operated differently, and her strategy prevailed over both Adm. Mike Mullen’s troop level recommendations and Vice President Joseph R. Biden’s 2010 prediction: “I’ll bet you my vice presidency Maliki will extend the [status of forces agreement].”
What Afghanistan’s status of forces agreement talks are really about is perception. In Iraq, “the critical issue was not the U.S. troop presence,” argues political adviser Emma Sky, “but the U.S. commitment to Iraq — and the building of a relationship that went beyond military support.” Whereas the focus in Afghan talks thus far has been on American perceptions (“We are leaving in 2014. Period,” Mr. Biden has said), there is also the pesky matter of Afghan perceptions.
As one of my former Afghan staffers — a woman who has braved repeated death threats for working with Americans — put it in an email to me recently, “My concern is getting bigger for 2014 when the U.S. troops withdraw from Afghanistan.”
While the troop-level debate is narrow, the battle for Afghan perceptions is wide open — and the United States seems determined to lose, despite talks of a “soft power” reset. Alas, you go to war with the diplomats you have, and American diplomats are digging in for a “transformation decade” of “silk road” dreams and Taliban co-governance. “In your arrogance, you think you write the script,” says war correspondent Lara Logan. “But you don’t.”
Indeed, as one former U.S. official told American war correspondent Dexter Filkins last summer, “Every plan for the future I’ve seen assumes a deal with the Taliban.” Do we know who we are dealing with? If the U.S. AfPak Hands program is any indication, with its bizarre emphasis on training counterinsurgents to speak Farsi over the Taliban’s Pashto, it would seem not.
“I’d gone to Farsi language training for 41/2 months and I got sent to a Pashto-speaking area,” said one disillusioned AfPak Hand in a testament to America’s botched soft power.
Even within the confines of a stringent status of forces agreement, the United States can exert influence. India, which still harbors counterinsurgency illusions, as evidenced by its recent decision to train hundreds of Afghan army officers at its Counterinsurgency and Jungle Warfare School, is waiting for the day we end our fixation on pleasing our enemies in Pakistan. We could work with Afghans to legalize poppy for medicine. We could redouble efforts to kill Mullah Omar — a symbolic blow that would be more devastating to the Taliban than the loss of Osama bin Laden, who had long worn out his welcome among Pashtuns. Moreover, we could adopt the Bush tactic of building our allies’ trust and confidence via personal relationships and moral clarity.
“Countries don’t ‘end,’” writes Aatish Taseer in his Pakistan novel “Noon.” “They rot away slowly.” For now, the rot continues.
Patrick Knapp, a U.S. Army reserve officer, served as a civilian in Kandahar in 2011.
The case for an enduring mission in Afghanistan
Foreign Policy By Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, Jeffrey Dressler Friday, January 18, 2013
Denying al Qaeda's re-emergence in Afghanistan requires ensuring that Afghanistan can be sufficiently stable and capable of defending itself, as President Barack Obama explained during the surge announcement at West Point on Dec. 1, 2009. Al Qaeda is not present in large numbers (perhaps less than 1,000) in Afghanistan now, but Secretary Leon Panetta stated in November 2012 that "intelligence continues to indicate that they are looking for some kind of capability to be able to go into Afghanistan as well." The U.S. and NATO cannot allow war weariness and economic conditions to obscure the realities and requirements they face. The recently announced accelerated shift to a "support role" in Afghanistan could become a guise to withdraw if "support" means just a few thousand counterterrorism forces and trainers.
In the eyes of many officials, a sound counterterrorism strategy rests on the assumption that the U.S. and NATO can kill their way toward a better future, against the Taliban and the Haqqanis or against al Qaeda and its affiliates. A decade of war proves the falsehood of this assumption. Experts outside the military are better qualified to determine how best to assist Afghanistan in the areas of governance, economic development, and reconciliation, and how best to move forward in Pakistan. But my experience in accelerating the growth of the Iraqi security forces -- in size, capacity, and confidence -- during the Iraqi "surge" of 2007 to 2008 qualifies me to speak about what is necessary to help the Afghan army succeed in taking lead responsibility.
The Afghans and NATO began a program of accelerated Afghan National Army (ANA) growth in 2009, recognizing that sufficient capacity is still years away. The ANA's combat power is only partially developed. The tip of the ANA's spear, its fighting units, is more developed than its shaft, its enabler capacity. Its human intelligence ability can sense near-term threats, but its capacity to detect and anticipate threats is low. On the ground, it can maneuver well, but the ANA lacks the air and ground mobility to shift forces around the country in order to mass against the enemy. Lack of mobility and its still-developing staff capacity reduce the ANA's ability to apply timely and coordinated force. The ANA can place accurate enough direct fire against the enemy once engaged but has only limited land-based indirect fire ability. Nor does it have adequate air-delivered fires, important in the mountains and remote areas of Afghanistan. Pending medical, supply, maintenance, and transport capacity means that the ANA has
limited ability to maintain momentum against the enemy once engaged. Leadership quality varies. All these shortcomings affect the ANA's confidence and combat power; none will be complete by the end of this year or next.
None of this should be a surprise. In 2009, the Afghans and NATO wisely placed primary emphasis on accelerating fighting units, with secondary emphasis on enabler capacity. While their own systems were being developed and fielded, ANA fighting units could receive the support they needed from their NATO partners. As Afghan systems emerged, NATO support could be "thinned out" and ultimately cut altogether. To do otherwise would have been to grow the ANA at the pace of its slowest element, an approach that did not match the Afghan "surge" strategy adopted in 2009. In an underdeveloped country that has suffered from over 30 years of war and has very low literacy rates, growing enabler systems -- supply, medical, transport, analytic, staff, communications, air- and land-based indirect support -- takes longer. For this reason, the ANA will need some U.S. and NATO enabler support beyond 2014.
So how should the U.S. and NATO assist the ANA in taking lead security responsibility? First, leave a combat brigade, at least through 2014, to partner with Afghan forces in the east -- a strategically important area where heavy fighting against the Haqqanis will continue. Second, in the south and southwest, embed assistance teams with every ANA battalion and higher to provide access to NATO enabling support, solidify gains already made, and deny the Taliban's return to their historical stronghold. Third, in the west and north, embed assistance teams with ANA brigades and higher -- again to provide access to NATO enabling support and solidify gains already made. Fourth, provide development teams for the ANA's major commands (recruiting, logistics, medical, areas support, and detention), the ANA's general headquarters, and the Ministry of Defense -- to continue development of the ANA's "shaft." Finally, the U.S. and NATO should leave behind "dual-purposed" enabler forces -- intelligence, airlift and medical evacuation, air and ground indirect fires, supply, maintenance, ground transport, and logistics. These forces would support both the residual NATO training teams and provide the ANA support it does not have, until its systems reach sufficient capacity. Combined, these actions will improve both ANA combat power and confidence, increasing the probability that it will be successful in assuming lead security responsibility.
The exact size of this assistance and support effort can only be determined by a proper civil-military dialogue among the NATO nations and the Afghans. But, if the United States and NATO want to increase the probability that the ANA will be successful, the number will be around 30,000 troops, and this number will be required at least for the rest of this year and next. The size and cost of this force will diminish over time and will be significantly less than then near $10 billion per month the war cost at its height. U.S. and NATO strategic objectives are not yet accomplished in Afghanistan and cannot be "outsourced" to the Afghans. Pushing the Taliban out of the south is not permanent. The counteroffensive in the east is incomplete. The Taliban and the Haqqanis have not been defeated, and al Qaeda intends to return to Afghanistan.
Killing Osama bin Laden was a hugely important success, but it was only a disruption. Al Qaeda is not "dismantled or defeated," and it remains dedicated to bleed America and the West, to depose governments it claims are apostate, to eliminate the state of Israel, and to gain control of Central Asia, North Africa, and the Greater Middle East. Al Qaeda and its affiliates remain active in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. They control an area about the size of Texas in North Africa that includes parts of Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Algeria, Libya, Burkina Faso, and Chad. Despite ample sanctuary elsewhere, they want to return to Afghanistan -- for historical and symbolic reasons in addition to the complexity of the terrain, which is a nightmare for counterterrorism forces. They still recruit within the U.S. and Europe and have not given up on attacking both directly. They have not waivered with respect to their strategic objectives; neither should the U.S. or NATO.
If the United States and NATO don't finish the job now, they will leave it to another generation. Many of those fighting in Afghanistan now were 5 and 6 years old at the start of the war; we do not want the same future for the current generation of 5- and 6-year-olds. Leaving an adequate assistance and support force in Afghanistan through 2013 and beyond is in the U.S. and NATO's security interest. Certainly, the U.S. and NATO cannot afford to conduct operations as they have for the past decade. But equally certain, the U.S. and NATO cannot allow war weariness and economic conditions to obscure the realities and requirements they face. If the U.S. and NATO provide less-than-adequate support to the ANA this year and beyond, they should at least not fool themselves of the likely waste and result.
Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik (retired) is a senior fellow at the Institute for the Study of War, where Jeffrey Dressler is a senior analyst and team lead.
Islamabad Airs Doubts About Afghan Future
Ayaz Gul VOA News January 18, 2013
ISLAMABAD — As U.S.-led international combat troops prepare to withdraw from Afghanistan, officials in neighboring Pakistan are airing reservations about the drawdown, reporting increased militant violence and skepticism about the effectiveness of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF).
Citing a fresh flow of Afghan refugees and investment in border cities such as Peshawar, Pakistani officials say the trend indicates Afghan skepticism about the future of their own war-ravaged nation after most international forces withdraw by the end of 2014.
Speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on Wednesday, Pakistan Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar called for a “responsible transition” and warned U.S. and NATO forces against departing Afghanistan “in a rush.”
“One major objective of a foreign military presence in Afghanistan was to reduce the ideological space that exists for [an] extremist mindset," she said, questioning whether the U.S.-led intervention has achieved its stated goals. "I think if you look in the last 10 years, the space of the extremists – the ideological space for them – has only increased.”
Citing violence on both sides of the border, the foreign minister emphasized the staggering number of Pakistan’s suicide-bomb casualties since U.S. intervention in the wake of September 11, 2001.
“Before 2001 there was only one suicide bomb which [inaudible] inside Pakistan territory,” said Khar, explaining that she had “lost count” of the total number that have occurred since then. “But only in the last two or three years there has been more than 300 suicide bomb attacks which have caused, altogether, in the last 10 years, about 30,000 civilians have died in Pakistan because of suicide bomb attacks, et cetera. Six thousand of our soldiers, paramilitary forces, et cetera.”
“The other side of the border within Afghanistan is becoming less well-managed than it was two years back," she added, expressing concern about cross-border military raids on Pakistani targets, describing the situation as “not very confidence-inspiring.”
"The green-on-blue attacks: You know, they might scare you as Americans but they haunt us as Pakistanis, because what that means is that institutions that we are trying to build – the ANSF, et cetera – are not maybe as professional a military or an army that you ideally would want to think.”
But Afghan officials and some observers dismiss fears of a return to the chaos of the 1990s era that followed withdrawal of Soviet forces. Mozammil Shinwari, Afghanistan's Deputy Minister for Trade, says the country has made significant progress in areas like the economy, politics, security and human rights.
“We are quite hopeful because the resources, especially the human resources, that we were lacking 10 years back, now ... have enough potential inside Afghanistan," he said, adding that an Afghan security forces "system has been developed" alongside economic development. "We are quite keen and we are quite hopeful, and we are sure that Afghanistan will develop. So I don’t think any problem will happen in the future and after 2014. We will have a prosperous Afghanistan.”
For Kabul-based independent political commentator Said Mohammad Azam, the question of whether violence will persist in post-2014 Afghanistan is less important than considering socio-economic conditions in which it would unfold.
“I think it is widely believed that [fighting] will continue, but it will not lead to an immediate collapse of the Afghan regime, the way it happened after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union," he said. "The reason is because, for the next ten years, starting from 2015, the international community has already provided funding [to] keep the national army and police intact, and also [there will be] enough budget for developmental projects.”
U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan James Cunningham told reporters Thursday it is important for the Afghan government to start peace talks with the Taliban started as soon as possible.
“We are quite clear that, at the end, stability and peace in the region will require a peace agreement that the states in the region will have an important role in supporting," he said. "We will continue our efforts not just with Pakistan but other countries in the region and other countries that are interested to move in that direction and to support a genuine peace process that will finally bring peace and stability to Afghanistan.”
While it is hoped that Islamabad’s late-2012 decision to release more than two-dozen members of the Afghan Taliban will help bring the insurgents to the negotiating table, signs of an impending peace process have yet to be seen.
Kabul welcomed the move, and Washington has also been appreciative of bilateral cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan to promote peace and reconciliation efforts.
Peter Cobus contributed to this report from Washington.
www.afghanistannewscenter.com
KABUL, Jan. 19 (Xinhua) -- A local Taliban leader was killed Saturday in an operation in eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar, the NATO-led coalition forces confirmed in a press release.
"During a security operation in Sherzad district, Nangarhar province, today, an Afghan and coalition force killed a local Taliban leader, Qari Sayed Wali, and arrested a second Taliban leader," the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) said in the press release.
"Qari Sayed Wali distributed and emplaced IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) throughout Sherzad district and conducted the April 2012 attack on the Sherzad District Center," it added.
The arrested leader conducted IED attacks against Afghan government officials as well as Afghan and coalition forces. He also permitted bomb makers to use his home to construct IEDs and store ammunition and explosives in the province 120 km east of capital Kabul, the release noted.
The security force also detained two suspected insurgents and seized multiple weapons and ammunition as a result of the operation, it added.
In addition, the joint forces in a separate operation arrested a Haqqani leader in Terayzai district, Khost province 150 km southeast of Kabul earlier Saturday, the coalition release said.
The Taliban-linked Haqqani network mostly operating in eastern Afghan provinces and Kabul is responsible for many high- profile attacks against the security forces.
The Taliban insurgent group, which has been waging an insurgency since its regime was toppled by a U.S-led invasion in late 2001, has yet to make comments.
Afghanistan frees Supreme staff arrested over tax issues
By Sadaf Shinwari - January 19 2013, 9:38 am Khaama Press
A number of the national and International employees of Supreme Global arrested by the Afghan government were released.
Afghan officials said the issue was related to tax payment by the Supreme Global to Afghan government. The company was late to pay tax to government at the beginning however later they reduced to pay taxes to the government anymore.
Deputy Afghan Attorney General Rahmatullah Nazari quoted by Radio Free Europe (RFE) said they were forced to arrest a number of the staff of Supreme Global.
Mr. Nazari said, “The issue continued for several years between Afghan finance ministry and Supreme Global and was finally referred to Afghan Attorney General. We followed the issue and Supreme Global at the beginning requested to extend the tax payment period, which was extended for several times but finally we had to arrest their employees.”
He said, “Three employees of Supreme Global including a Canadian Citizen, French Citizen and Afghan were arrested but were freed after they paid taxes.”
A eyewitness quoted by the Wall Street Journal said Afghan security forces arrested the employees of Supreme Global after they refused Afghan Attorney General to pay taxes to the government.
Deputy Attorney General said all foreign companies providing logistics services in Afghanistan must pay their taxes to the government.
He said, “The goods belonging to NATO and ISAF troops are tax exempted based on the agreement between the Afghan government and United Nations however if these companies provide logistics services then they should pay taxes to the government. Supreme Global is providing food and non-food items to US troops in Afghanistan and they must pay tax.”
Mr. Nazari further added supreme has other contracts with several other companies and should pay taxes for those contracts to the Afghan government.
The Supreme Global reportedly paid around $18 million tax to the Afghan government and its employees were freed.
Afghan minister seeks stronger ties with UAE ahead of troops leaving
The National By Awad Mustafa Jan 19, 2013
ABU DHABI - The UAE's continuing support for the Afghan peace process has been called for by Afghanistan's deputy foreign minister for political affairs.
During a visit to the capital yesterday, Jawed Ludin said his country was grateful for the UAE's role in Afghanistan's security, but his country would need more support from its Arabian Gulf allies after foreign troops leave.
"The UAE's support has been very important for Afghanistan's security in the past 10 years, but now we are moving towards the end of the international security forces' presence by 2014," he said.
"What we need to make sure of is that we curb the threat of terrorism and extremism, and the way [to do that] is to grow closer and forge stronger ties with our allies in the region politically."
Mr Ludin was in the capital yesterday for the trilateral committee meeting between Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States.
It was attended by Pakistan's foreign secretary, Jalil Abbas Jilani, and the deputy US special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, David Pearce.
The diplomats discussed security and political developments in Afghanistan and the peace process.
Mr Jilani said recent developments, such as the release of Taliban prisoners from Pakistani jails, proved his country's determination to bring stability to Afghanistan.
"Pakistan will do everything possible to bring peace ... to Afghanistan," he said. "In today's meeting we reviewed the progress we had made and we have gone over the developments to forge ahead with the peace process."
Mr Ludin said Qatar had agreed to set up an office in Doha for the Taliban to negotiate with the Afghan High Peace Council.
Earlier this week, the Qatari prime minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem Al Thani, said plans were under way to open the political office for the Taliban militia in Doha.
"Preparations are under way and it will happen as soon as possible," Sheikh Hamad said in Doha. "The opening of the office aims to facilitate dialogue between the Taliban and other political parties in Afghanistan."
He added it was "very important that a dialogue start before the withdrawal of US troops in 2014".
The US's Mr Pearce said this year would bring many changes.
"The year 2013 is going to be a very important year - a year of transition for Afghanistan," he said.
"Last week, presidents [Hamid] Karzai and [Barak] Obama had very detailed discussions on the matter and they both agreed that the security gains had to be matched by political progress, and they recommitted both nations to reconciliation."
Mr Pearce said the leaders agreed to open the Taliban office in Doha to facilitate negotiations with the support of Qatar.
This would be the second engagement of the US with the Taliban movement.
Washington began tentative moves towards peace with the group a year ago. But the Islamists broke off the talks a few months later, apparently over the failure of the US to free Taliban prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba.
Now the US is negotiating its exit from its longest war, pledging continued support for the Afghan government against an undefeated insurgency.
Details of US involvement after Nato combat troops withdraw next year remain vague and are subject to a security agreement still under negotiation.
"President Obama has not made a decision with this matter as yet, but we still have ongoing discussions regarding the security involvement with Afghan officials," Mr Pearce said.
It had been expected that a residual force of up to 20,000 troops would remain in the country to help counter the Taliban, who were deposed in 2001 for harbouring the Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.
amustafa@thenational.ae
Don't shrink Afghan forces, two key Senate Democrats warn Obama
Reuters Jan 18, 2013
WASHINGTON - Two Senate Democrats urged the White House on Friday to reconsider plans to shrink Afghan national security forces by a third after 2015, saying a robust Afghan fighting force will be needed to fight al Qaeda and its allies.
The appeal comes as President Barack Obama weighs how large of an American force to leave behind in Afghanistan after NATO declares the costly, unpopular war over at the end of 2014 and most foreign forces return home.
Officials say the White House is considering keeping between 3,000 and 9,000 troops in the country, a lower range than initially recommended by the top commander in Afghanistan.
Carl Levin of Michigan, head of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and committee member Jack Reed of Rhode Island said Obama, a fellow Democrat, should use the U.S. troop level announcement - expected in the coming months - as an opportunity to revisit plans to slash the Afghan forces from 352,000 to 230,000 after 2015.
"We support the establishment of a small number for the post-2014 (American) force," they wrote to Tom Donilon, Obama's national security adviser.
"At the same time, we are convinced that it will be necessary for the success of the mission, i.e., to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for al Qaeda and its affiliated organizations, to reconsider plans to reduce the size of the (Afghan forces)."
Ryan Crocker, a former U.S. envoy to Afghanistan, has estimated that the United States would end up paying about $2.5 billion a year for Afghan security forces totaling 230,000.
He called the expense "pretty cheap insurance."
Levin and Reed said the additional expense for keeping a larger Afghan force would be affordable, given the projected drop in funding for wartime operations.
"We recommend that when the president announces his decision on the post-2014 force, that he also announce he is reviewing the question of the size of the ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces) after 2015," they wrote. (Reporting by Phil Stewart; Editing by Xavier Briand)
Taliban prisoners freedom boost insurgency: Lawmakers
By Sajad - January 19 2013, 8:08 pm Khaama Press
Afghan lawmakers on Saturday warned that the freedom of the Taliban militants from Pakistan jails will spark further insurgency and war in the country.
Naqibullah Faiq, an Afghan lawmaker said the freedom of the Taliban militants will not assist Afghan peace at all and warned that the freedom of the senior and prominent Taliban leaders will boost insurgency.
The freedom of the Taliban militants from Pakistani jails was one of the main demands of the Afghan high peace council during their visit to Pakistan.
Pakistani government has freed around 20 Taliban detainees from the jails and deputy Pakistan foreign minister Jalil Jilani on Friday announced that Islamabad will free all Taliban prisoners.
A number of the senior Taliban leaders including Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar is believed to be among those who are going to be freed from Pakistan jails in the near future and according to Afghan high peace council their freedom will help Afghan peace process.
However Afghan lawmakers are not satisfied with the freedom of the Taliban group members, according to Shukria Barekzai, an Afghan lawmaker the freed Taliban militants are not returning to Afghanistan after they are released.
She said the freed Taliban leaders are staying in Pakistan and Islamabad will be able to arrest them again whenever they want.
Brekzai said, “We have experienced this in the past and the freed Taliban group members have rejoined the terrorist groups and their freedom will not help Afghan peace process at all.”
In the meantime a number of Afghan lawmakers also welcomed US officials decision to suspend transfer of prisoners to Afghan security forces.
According to the lawmakers several prisoners will escape in a similar incident as Kandahar prison if Bagram prison is completely handed over to Afghans.
Afghans chart their own future
Eleven years on, there is confidence in the stability of civil society and governance
Gulf News By Francis Matthew, Editor at Large January 18, 2013
Kabul: After decades of civil war, it is surprising that normal civil society is becoming a durable part of Afghan life. As Nato forces hand back responsibility for security to the Afghan armed forces, it seems hard to believe that the previous harsh choice of either Nato or Taliban has moved on to include a much more hopeful third option, which is the Afghans themselves.
A lot of concern has been voiced about the fragility of Afghan institutions as they face the twin challenges of the Nato withdrawal by the end of 2014, the same year as presidential elections in 2014 for which President Hamid Karzai will not be able to stand having served two terms.
Poor strategic thinking from the central government in Kabul is definitely a problem for Afghanistan, as is a genuine worry about the deep corruption that has taken root in Karzai’s government. But this has also compounded a lingering disbelief by some Afghans in their own abilities, although this was dismissed by an American colonel who has worked closely alongside the Afghan army in the eastern province of Paktiya.
He told Gulf News: “They are ready to do the job, and in fact are already doing it. They may not yet have a deep sense of confidence in their own capabilities, but that will come.”
Eleven years after Nato’s invasion drove out the Taliban government in 2001, and nine years since Hamid Karzai’s first government was elected into power, civil society has become a lot more established and there is a strong sense that it will now continue. For example, at a dinner in Kabul with a group of editors of Afghan newspapers and news services, the main concern was a planned press law and its impact on free speech. They were definitely not talking of impending doom and the collapse of their normal life.
Lively media scene
Today’s lively media scene in Afghanistan includes tens of newspapers in several languages including Dari and Pashtu, and the editors were committed Afghan individuals whose plans did not include a Taliban takeover in 2014. Their working assumption is that civil life has come to stay: one was planning a new edition in north east Afghanistan, and another was making a substantial investment in a new printing press.
This confident view was echoed at a meeting with several members of parliament, including Syed Ishaq Gailani, a forceful senior MP; Farkhunda Zahra Naderi, a young woman MP from Kabul; and Shinkai Zahine Karokhail, another women MP and an experienced campaigner for women’s rights. These and others disagreed forcefully on many parliamentary issues, but they all agreed that the parliament is there is to stay.
And they strongly supported holding the presidential elections in 2014, dismissing claims that changing the president just as the Nato mandate runs out would be dangerous for a fragile state like Afghanistan.
They argued that it would be much more damaging for Afghanistan’s future to interfere with the structures of democracy at this time. Any attempt to fiddle with the electoral process would raise all sorts of charges of pandering to Karzai’s special interests, and allowing corruption to get a deeper hold on the country.
Positive view
Senior officials in the ministries in Kabul offer a very positive view of how the country is developing, but their optimism needs to be interpreted carefully since they are paid to be cheerful. It is hard to check how effective their decisions might be outside the capital, in the reality of Afghanistan’s very independent regional governments.
However, Kabul will acquire more influence once 50 per cent of the huge foreign aid budget passes though its offices, rather than going direct from donor nations to their projects as at present, with little national coordination to these well-meant but local projects.
The international community does not plan to dump Afghanistan after its troops pull out of active service in 2014, and at the Tokyo donors’ summit in July 2012, Afghanistan was promised $16 billion for post-2014 aid, as well as $1.4 billion to support the Afghan forces.
Opposition politicians like Dr Abdullah Abdullah comment that similar sums have been landing in Afghanistan for 10 years, but far too much of that money has been spent on security and looking after the Nato forces, and not nearly enough on well planned economic regeneration which will build prosperity and jobs.
Money from the Tokyo Summit promises should go into generating new economic activity. “97 per cent of Afghanistan’s GDP is foreign development aid,” Deputy Finance Minister Abdul Razaq Vahidi told Gulf News. “So far a lot of the money spent in Afghanistan by the international community has been going on transport, housing for the forces, their security, etc, and this must change so that money is spent on infrastructure, and building new economic sectors.”
Farid Mamundzay, Deputy Minister for Policy in the Local Governance Directorate, has the daunting job of imposing open and transparent standards of recruitment and operating on 27,000 civil servants who work in the 37 provincial and 336 district governments all over Afghanistan, as well as the 153 municipalities.
He told visiting media, including Gulf News, that he was pleased that his imposition of common standards was made easier when the president reduced the number of presidential appointments made on political grounds from a previous 458 positions to 37, who are the 34 provincial governors and three other officials.
But it was hard to share Mamundzay’s confidence that the merit-based exams his directorate is rolling out all over Afghanistan would have much impact. It is all too easy to imagine powerful local leaders over-ruling such directives from Kabul, and simply continuing to appoint and run local government as they wished.
Chinese at the gates
After the departure of Nato in 2014 the continued engagement of the international community is important and this is why the Tokyo commitments are so important. Afghanistan remains an important focus of international economic and security interest, and if the Nato countries give up on Afghanistan, China is anxious to grab more influence.
Any lack of international interest will be ruthlessly exploited by the Chinese as was shown by the way that a Chinese company won a contract to run a large copper mine at Aynak in Logar Province 30 kms from Kabul. The Afghan minister wanted the Chinese to come in and start paying the Kabul government the substantial revenues the contract demanded for running the mine. The contract required the Chinese to find 10,000 skilled workers, but reserved them the right to bring in Chinese workers if they could not find the right Afghans.
The led one observer to point out that it would be very easy for the Chinese to deliberately fail Afghan applicants for the jobs on technical grounds, since very few Afghans have had the chance to become trained mine workers during four decades of civil war.
The Chinese could then bring in thousands of Chinese workers, which promoted him to ask: “And how many of them would be real miners? And how many would be security staff posing as miners? We run the risk of having regiments of Chinese security forces, based at Aynak, with little to stop them doing whatever they want.”
Security concerns
The Afghan forces want to destroy the Talban camps in Pakistan, and they want Nato to supply them enough heavy artillery to defend themselves against attacks from across the border where the Taliban and other insurgent groups are able to operate freely, unhindered by Pakistani armed forces.
They are confident that they have defeated the Taliban inside Afghanistan, and they do not see much home grown activity any more. Things have moved on a lot from when Nato troops arrived in 2001 and drove out the Taliban. At that time they found themselves the only coherent force in a country that had been devastated, so the various Nato forces started many local aid programmes, which were later formalized into a network of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), which offered basic reconstruction.
At the same time, the war against the Taliban rolled on, with initial success followed by a Taliban recovery in 2006 to 2009, leading to the long war of attrition that continues to this day. But as Nato pursued its way in these various campaigns, an important development was happening as the Afghans slowly built up their own forces.
Today there are 120,000 coalition forces in Afghanistan, but this compares to 340,000 Afghan National Security Forces, ANSF. More and more of the actual fighting is done by the Afghan forces, who now manage a majority of all missions against the insurgents. For example, in 2012 the Nato coalition forces lost 350 dead, compared to more than 1,500 by ANSF.
This process will continue to its logical conclusion when Nato will end all active fighting by the end of 2014, but will stay in Afghanistan for at least another 10 years under its new mandate of “Train. Advise. Assist.” as spelt out by Nato Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen when he spoke to the press in Kabul.
But all senior Afghans spoke of two important requirements for the Afghan armed forces to succeed when they fight the Taliban on their own. General Zaher Azmi, in the Ministry of Defence, is among many who said “Nato did not destroy the training centres of the enemy and these bases remain in Pakistan. They need to be attacked and destroyed. Second, Afghanistan does not have the heavy weapons or warplanes needed to defeat the enemy.”
Making peace work
Minister Mohammad Stanekzai is in charge of negotiations with the Taliban. He listed five actions vital to make peace talks succeed:
1. Strengthen Afghan security institutions, including international backing.
2. Have the right environment ready for those Taliban who want to leave violence.
3. Plan for the huge economic gap in 2014 when the $120 billion spent on Nato troops will vanish.
4. Improve cooperation with Pakistan and Iran to defeat violence.
5. Invest in education and training for the young generation.
KNAPP: Beyond 2014 in Afghanistan
Any strategy must build civilian trust
Washington Times By Patrick Knapp Friday, January 18, 2013
Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies issued a report in December on the U.S. war in Afghanistan, sparing no military kiss-up or diplomatic busybody. With U.S. troop levels past their peak and with post-2014 status of forces agreement talks flirting with the “zero-option,” we’re still being told that everything in Afghanistan is just fine. Unfortunately, Mr. Cordesman concludes, “no amount of inappropriately optimistic reporting of metrics and narrative can actually win a counterinsurgency campaign.”
Mr. Cordesman blames an “analytically illiterate media” for giving a pass to the Pentagon’s “statistical rubbish” and “worse than useless” reports on progress against the insurgency. Yet Mr. Cordesman’s quaint talk of “counterinsurgency” reveals his own blind spot to changing times: What the Pentagon once called “battle space” is now “area of operations”; what were “combat operations” are now “stability operations”; and what was long ago a “counterinsurgency” is now a political-diplomatic attempt to tiptoe out of Afghanistan while avoiding perceptions of American culpability for the Taliban takeover of the south and east that will follow.
Far from being duped, the media and civilians once bullied by “runaway generals” are now getting just what they wanted. A strategy hashed out by Rolling Stone’s Michael Hastings and National Security Adviser Tom Donilon could hardly top the current strategy of quietly divorcing counterinsurgency while keeping Afghanistan, with all of its political toxicity, at an Iraq-style arm’s length.
Yet, as suggested by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s authoritarian drift and al Qaeda in Iraq’s resurgence one year after the U.S. troop withdrawal, the arm’s length approach to negotiating the endgame may be good politics, but it does little for counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency is premised on the idea that coordinated political-military operations must earn the population’s trust. Regardless of any moral responsibility America may have for post-2014 human rights abuses and civil war in Afghanistan, there is no reason why anyone should expect an uninhibited insurgency to suddenly reform its tastes for terrorism.
Some rebut that Afghans are forcing our hand. “As we know from our Iraq experience,” says White House adviser Doug Lute, “if there are no authorities granted by the sovereign state, then there’s not room for a follow-on U.S. military mission.”
Yet the real lesson from the failure to extend Iraq’s status of forces agreement, as New York Times reporter Michael Gordon details in his recent book, “The Endgame,” was the United States’ “trouble taking yes for an answer.” President Bush had successfully prodded Mr. Maliki to crack down on Shiite death squads by forging a close relationship, based on the notion that “you don’t put your friends in an uncomfortable position.” Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has operated differently, and her strategy prevailed over both Adm. Mike Mullen’s troop level recommendations and Vice President Joseph R. Biden’s 2010 prediction: “I’ll bet you my vice presidency Maliki will extend the [status of forces agreement].”
What Afghanistan’s status of forces agreement talks are really about is perception. In Iraq, “the critical issue was not the U.S. troop presence,” argues political adviser Emma Sky, “but the U.S. commitment to Iraq — and the building of a relationship that went beyond military support.” Whereas the focus in Afghan talks thus far has been on American perceptions (“We are leaving in 2014. Period,” Mr. Biden has said), there is also the pesky matter of Afghan perceptions.
As one of my former Afghan staffers — a woman who has braved repeated death threats for working with Americans — put it in an email to me recently, “My concern is getting bigger for 2014 when the U.S. troops withdraw from Afghanistan.”
While the troop-level debate is narrow, the battle for Afghan perceptions is wide open — and the United States seems determined to lose, despite talks of a “soft power” reset. Alas, you go to war with the diplomats you have, and American diplomats are digging in for a “transformation decade” of “silk road” dreams and Taliban co-governance. “In your arrogance, you think you write the script,” says war correspondent Lara Logan. “But you don’t.”
Indeed, as one former U.S. official told American war correspondent Dexter Filkins last summer, “Every plan for the future I’ve seen assumes a deal with the Taliban.” Do we know who we are dealing with? If the U.S. AfPak Hands program is any indication, with its bizarre emphasis on training counterinsurgents to speak Farsi over the Taliban’s Pashto, it would seem not.
“I’d gone to Farsi language training for 41/2 months and I got sent to a Pashto-speaking area,” said one disillusioned AfPak Hand in a testament to America’s botched soft power.
Even within the confines of a stringent status of forces agreement, the United States can exert influence. India, which still harbors counterinsurgency illusions, as evidenced by its recent decision to train hundreds of Afghan army officers at its Counterinsurgency and Jungle Warfare School, is waiting for the day we end our fixation on pleasing our enemies in Pakistan. We could work with Afghans to legalize poppy for medicine. We could redouble efforts to kill Mullah Omar — a symbolic blow that would be more devastating to the Taliban than the loss of Osama bin Laden, who had long worn out his welcome among Pashtuns. Moreover, we could adopt the Bush tactic of building our allies’ trust and confidence via personal relationships and moral clarity.
“Countries don’t ‘end,’” writes Aatish Taseer in his Pakistan novel “Noon.” “They rot away slowly.” For now, the rot continues.
Patrick Knapp, a U.S. Army reserve officer, served as a civilian in Kandahar in 2011.
The case for an enduring mission in Afghanistan
Foreign Policy By Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, Jeffrey Dressler Friday, January 18, 2013
Denying al Qaeda's re-emergence in Afghanistan requires ensuring that Afghanistan can be sufficiently stable and capable of defending itself, as President Barack Obama explained during the surge announcement at West Point on Dec. 1, 2009. Al Qaeda is not present in large numbers (perhaps less than 1,000) in Afghanistan now, but Secretary Leon Panetta stated in November 2012 that "intelligence continues to indicate that they are looking for some kind of capability to be able to go into Afghanistan as well." The U.S. and NATO cannot allow war weariness and economic conditions to obscure the realities and requirements they face. The recently announced accelerated shift to a "support role" in Afghanistan could become a guise to withdraw if "support" means just a few thousand counterterrorism forces and trainers.
In the eyes of many officials, a sound counterterrorism strategy rests on the assumption that the U.S. and NATO can kill their way toward a better future, against the Taliban and the Haqqanis or against al Qaeda and its affiliates. A decade of war proves the falsehood of this assumption. Experts outside the military are better qualified to determine how best to assist Afghanistan in the areas of governance, economic development, and reconciliation, and how best to move forward in Pakistan. But my experience in accelerating the growth of the Iraqi security forces -- in size, capacity, and confidence -- during the Iraqi "surge" of 2007 to 2008 qualifies me to speak about what is necessary to help the Afghan army succeed in taking lead responsibility.
The Afghans and NATO began a program of accelerated Afghan National Army (ANA) growth in 2009, recognizing that sufficient capacity is still years away. The ANA's combat power is only partially developed. The tip of the ANA's spear, its fighting units, is more developed than its shaft, its enabler capacity. Its human intelligence ability can sense near-term threats, but its capacity to detect and anticipate threats is low. On the ground, it can maneuver well, but the ANA lacks the air and ground mobility to shift forces around the country in order to mass against the enemy. Lack of mobility and its still-developing staff capacity reduce the ANA's ability to apply timely and coordinated force. The ANA can place accurate enough direct fire against the enemy once engaged but has only limited land-based indirect fire ability. Nor does it have adequate air-delivered fires, important in the mountains and remote areas of Afghanistan. Pending medical, supply, maintenance, and transport capacity means that the ANA has
limited ability to maintain momentum against the enemy once engaged. Leadership quality varies. All these shortcomings affect the ANA's confidence and combat power; none will be complete by the end of this year or next.
None of this should be a surprise. In 2009, the Afghans and NATO wisely placed primary emphasis on accelerating fighting units, with secondary emphasis on enabler capacity. While their own systems were being developed and fielded, ANA fighting units could receive the support they needed from their NATO partners. As Afghan systems emerged, NATO support could be "thinned out" and ultimately cut altogether. To do otherwise would have been to grow the ANA at the pace of its slowest element, an approach that did not match the Afghan "surge" strategy adopted in 2009. In an underdeveloped country that has suffered from over 30 years of war and has very low literacy rates, growing enabler systems -- supply, medical, transport, analytic, staff, communications, air- and land-based indirect support -- takes longer. For this reason, the ANA will need some U.S. and NATO enabler support beyond 2014.
So how should the U.S. and NATO assist the ANA in taking lead security responsibility? First, leave a combat brigade, at least through 2014, to partner with Afghan forces in the east -- a strategically important area where heavy fighting against the Haqqanis will continue. Second, in the south and southwest, embed assistance teams with every ANA battalion and higher to provide access to NATO enabling support, solidify gains already made, and deny the Taliban's return to their historical stronghold. Third, in the west and north, embed assistance teams with ANA brigades and higher -- again to provide access to NATO enabling support and solidify gains already made. Fourth, provide development teams for the ANA's major commands (recruiting, logistics, medical, areas support, and detention), the ANA's general headquarters, and the Ministry of Defense -- to continue development of the ANA's "shaft." Finally, the U.S. and NATO should leave behind "dual-purposed" enabler forces -- intelligence, airlift and medical evacuation, air and ground indirect fires, supply, maintenance, ground transport, and logistics. These forces would support both the residual NATO training teams and provide the ANA support it does not have, until its systems reach sufficient capacity. Combined, these actions will improve both ANA combat power and confidence, increasing the probability that it will be successful in assuming lead security responsibility.
The exact size of this assistance and support effort can only be determined by a proper civil-military dialogue among the NATO nations and the Afghans. But, if the United States and NATO want to increase the probability that the ANA will be successful, the number will be around 30,000 troops, and this number will be required at least for the rest of this year and next. The size and cost of this force will diminish over time and will be significantly less than then near $10 billion per month the war cost at its height. U.S. and NATO strategic objectives are not yet accomplished in Afghanistan and cannot be "outsourced" to the Afghans. Pushing the Taliban out of the south is not permanent. The counteroffensive in the east is incomplete. The Taliban and the Haqqanis have not been defeated, and al Qaeda intends to return to Afghanistan.
Killing Osama bin Laden was a hugely important success, but it was only a disruption. Al Qaeda is not "dismantled or defeated," and it remains dedicated to bleed America and the West, to depose governments it claims are apostate, to eliminate the state of Israel, and to gain control of Central Asia, North Africa, and the Greater Middle East. Al Qaeda and its affiliates remain active in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. They control an area about the size of Texas in North Africa that includes parts of Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Algeria, Libya, Burkina Faso, and Chad. Despite ample sanctuary elsewhere, they want to return to Afghanistan -- for historical and symbolic reasons in addition to the complexity of the terrain, which is a nightmare for counterterrorism forces. They still recruit within the U.S. and Europe and have not given up on attacking both directly. They have not waivered with respect to their strategic objectives; neither should the U.S. or NATO.
If the United States and NATO don't finish the job now, they will leave it to another generation. Many of those fighting in Afghanistan now were 5 and 6 years old at the start of the war; we do not want the same future for the current generation of 5- and 6-year-olds. Leaving an adequate assistance and support force in Afghanistan through 2013 and beyond is in the U.S. and NATO's security interest. Certainly, the U.S. and NATO cannot afford to conduct operations as they have for the past decade. But equally certain, the U.S. and NATO cannot allow war weariness and economic conditions to obscure the realities and requirements they face. If the U.S. and NATO provide less-than-adequate support to the ANA this year and beyond, they should at least not fool themselves of the likely waste and result.
Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik (retired) is a senior fellow at the Institute for the Study of War, where Jeffrey Dressler is a senior analyst and team lead.
Islamabad Airs Doubts About Afghan Future
Ayaz Gul VOA News January 18, 2013
ISLAMABAD — As U.S.-led international combat troops prepare to withdraw from Afghanistan, officials in neighboring Pakistan are airing reservations about the drawdown, reporting increased militant violence and skepticism about the effectiveness of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF).
Citing a fresh flow of Afghan refugees and investment in border cities such as Peshawar, Pakistani officials say the trend indicates Afghan skepticism about the future of their own war-ravaged nation after most international forces withdraw by the end of 2014.
Speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on Wednesday, Pakistan Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar called for a “responsible transition” and warned U.S. and NATO forces against departing Afghanistan “in a rush.”
“One major objective of a foreign military presence in Afghanistan was to reduce the ideological space that exists for [an] extremist mindset," she said, questioning whether the U.S.-led intervention has achieved its stated goals. "I think if you look in the last 10 years, the space of the extremists – the ideological space for them – has only increased.”
Citing violence on both sides of the border, the foreign minister emphasized the staggering number of Pakistan’s suicide-bomb casualties since U.S. intervention in the wake of September 11, 2001.
“Before 2001 there was only one suicide bomb which [inaudible] inside Pakistan territory,” said Khar, explaining that she had “lost count” of the total number that have occurred since then. “But only in the last two or three years there has been more than 300 suicide bomb attacks which have caused, altogether, in the last 10 years, about 30,000 civilians have died in Pakistan because of suicide bomb attacks, et cetera. Six thousand of our soldiers, paramilitary forces, et cetera.”
“The other side of the border within Afghanistan is becoming less well-managed than it was two years back," she added, expressing concern about cross-border military raids on Pakistani targets, describing the situation as “not very confidence-inspiring.”
"The green-on-blue attacks: You know, they might scare you as Americans but they haunt us as Pakistanis, because what that means is that institutions that we are trying to build – the ANSF, et cetera – are not maybe as professional a military or an army that you ideally would want to think.”
But Afghan officials and some observers dismiss fears of a return to the chaos of the 1990s era that followed withdrawal of Soviet forces. Mozammil Shinwari, Afghanistan's Deputy Minister for Trade, says the country has made significant progress in areas like the economy, politics, security and human rights.
“We are quite hopeful because the resources, especially the human resources, that we were lacking 10 years back, now ... have enough potential inside Afghanistan," he said, adding that an Afghan security forces "system has been developed" alongside economic development. "We are quite keen and we are quite hopeful, and we are sure that Afghanistan will develop. So I don’t think any problem will happen in the future and after 2014. We will have a prosperous Afghanistan.”
For Kabul-based independent political commentator Said Mohammad Azam, the question of whether violence will persist in post-2014 Afghanistan is less important than considering socio-economic conditions in which it would unfold.
“I think it is widely believed that [fighting] will continue, but it will not lead to an immediate collapse of the Afghan regime, the way it happened after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union," he said. "The reason is because, for the next ten years, starting from 2015, the international community has already provided funding [to] keep the national army and police intact, and also [there will be] enough budget for developmental projects.”
U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan James Cunningham told reporters Thursday it is important for the Afghan government to start peace talks with the Taliban started as soon as possible.
“We are quite clear that, at the end, stability and peace in the region will require a peace agreement that the states in the region will have an important role in supporting," he said. "We will continue our efforts not just with Pakistan but other countries in the region and other countries that are interested to move in that direction and to support a genuine peace process that will finally bring peace and stability to Afghanistan.”
While it is hoped that Islamabad’s late-2012 decision to release more than two-dozen members of the Afghan Taliban will help bring the insurgents to the negotiating table, signs of an impending peace process have yet to be seen.
Kabul welcomed the move, and Washington has also been appreciative of bilateral cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan to promote peace and reconciliation efforts.
Peter Cobus contributed to this report from Washington.
www.afghanistannewscenter.com